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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Atallah, Gamal |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces a new type of R&D subsidy, which is conditional on the success of the R&D project. In a three-stage model, the government chooses a subsidy(ies) in the first stage; in the second stage, a monopolist chooses R&D effort which determines the size or the probability of success of the R&D project; in the last stage, the firm chooses its output. It is found that conditional subsidies can yield the same level of innovation and welfare as unconditional subsidies. However, when the probability of success is sufficiently low (be it endogenous or exogenous), conditional subsidies yield suboptimal levels of innovation and welfare. When the firm chooses the probability of success, conditional subsidies can have the advantage of a lower expected cost of the subsidy to the government. I consider the simultaneous use of conditional and unconditional subsidies, and show that different combinations of the two can lead to the same levels of innovation and welfare as unconditional subsidies alone. Finally, reverse conditional subsidies, which the firm gets only if the project fails, are considered. It is found that they yield the same level of innovation as unconditional subsidies, except when the probability of success is sufficiently high. Comparing conditional subsidies with reverse conditional subsidies, conditional subsidies yield higher (lower) welfare when the probability of success is high (low). |
| Keywords: | R&D subsidies; Innovation; R&D policy; Innovation policy |
| JEL: | O38 O31 |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:2895&r=ppm |
| By: | Woolcock, Michael; Diprose, Rachael; Barron, Patrick |
| Abstract: | Drawing on an integrated mixed methods research design, the authors explore the dynamics of the development-conflict nexus in rural Indonesia, and the specific role of development projects in shaping the nature, extent, and trajectories of " everyday " conflicts. They find that projects that give inadequate attention to dispute resolution mechanisms in many cases stimulate local conflict, either through the injection of development resources themselves or less directly by exacerbating preexisting tensions in target communities. But projects that have explicit and accessible procedures for managing disputes arising from the development process are much less likely to lead to violent outcomes. The authors argue that such projects are more successful in addressing project-related conflicts because they establish direct procedures (such as forums, facilitators, and complaints mechanisms) for dealing with tensions as they arise. These direct mechanisms are less successful in addressing broader social tensions elicited by, or external to, the development process, though program mechanisms can ameliorate conflict indirectly through changing norms and networks of interaction. |
| Keywords: | Post Conflict Reintegration,Development Economics & Aid Effectiveness,Education and Society,Rural Poverty Reduction,Population Policies |
| Date: | 2007–04–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4212&r=ppm |
| By: | Schmidt, Tobias |
| Abstract: | In this paper we analyse the decision of firms in the Canadian manufacturing sector to co-operate on innovation projects. Our focus is on the motives behind this decision and the firm characteristics, both general and with respect to innovation activities, which influence the motives for innovation co-operation. Using data from the Canadian Survey of Innovation 2005 we find that the factors influencing the decision to co-operate in order to access external knowledge are very similar to those influencing cost-sharing motives. We also show that public funding leads firms to cooperate in order to access external knowledge and R&D. |
| Keywords: | Innovation Co-operation, Motives for Co-operation, Canadian Survey of Innovation |
| JEL: | L22 O31 O32 |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:5506&r=ppm |
| By: | Titiunik, Rocio; Martinez, Sebastian; Gertler, Paul J.; Galiano, Sebastian; Cattaneo, Matias D. |
| Abstract: | Despite the importance of housing for people ' s well-being, there has been little work done to assess the causal impact of housing and housing improvement programs on health and welfare. In this paper the authors help fill this gap by investigating the impact of a large-scale effort by the Mexican government to replace dirt floors with cement floors on child health and adult happiness. They find that replacing dirt floors with cement floors significantly reduces parasitic infestations in young children, reduces diarrhea, reduces anemia, and improves cognitive development. Finally, they also find that this program leave adults substantially better off, as measured by satisfaction with their housing and quality of life and by their significantly lower rates of depression and perceived stress. |
| Keywords: | Health Monitoring & Evaluation,Disease Control & Prevention,Housing & Human Habitats,Construction Industry,Economic Theory & Research |
| Date: | 2007–04–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4214&r=ppm |
| By: | Ed Nosal; Michael Smart |
| Abstract: | We study the consequences of the introduction of widespread limited liability for corporations. In the traditional view, limited liability reduces transactions costs and enhances investment incentives for individuals and firms. But this view does not explain several important stylized facts of the British experience, including the slow rate of adoption of limited liability by firms in the years following legal reforms. We construct an alternative model that accounts for this and other features of the nineteenth century British experience. In the model, project risk is private information, and a firm’s decision to adopt limited liability may be interpreted in equilibrium as a signal the firm is more likely to default. Hence less risky firms may choose unlimited liability or forego investments entirely. We show the choice of liability rule can lead to "development traps," in which profitable investments are not undertaken, through its effect on equilibrium beliefs of uninformed investors in the economy. |
| Keywords: | Capital market |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedcwp:0703&r=ppm |