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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Keizo Mizuno (School of Businiess Administration, Kwansei Gakuin University); Testuya Shinkai (School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University) |
| Abstract: | This paper provides a simple model that examines a firmfs incentive to invest in a network infrastructure through coalition formation in an open access environment with a deregulated retail market. A regulator faces a dilemma between inducing an incentive for efficient investment and reducing the distortion generated by imperfect competition. We show that, in such a case, the degree of cost-reducing effect of the investment is crucial from a welfare point of view. In particular, when network investment through coalition formation creates a large (small) cost-reducing effect, the regulator can (should not) delegate an investment decision to firms with an appropriate level of access charge. |
| Keywords: | Network infrastructure, Coalition, Access Charge, Delegation |
| JEL: | L13 L22 L43 L90 |
| Date: | 2006–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kgu:wpaper:28&r=ppm |
| By: | Stephen V. Burks; Jeffrey Carpenter; Lorenz Goette; Kristen Monaco; Aldo Rustichini; Kay Porter |
| Abstract: | The Truckers and Turnover Project is a statistical case study of a single firm and its employees which matches proprietary personnel and operational data to new data collected by the researchers to create a two-year panel study of a large subset of new hires. The project's most distinctive innovation is the data collection process which combines traditional survey instruments with behavioral economics experiments. The survey data include information on demographics, risk and loss aversion, time preference, planning, non-verbal IQ, and the MPQ personality profile. The data collected by behavioral economics experiments include risk and loss aversion, time preferences (discount rates), backward induction, patience, and the preference for cooperation in a social dilemma setting. Subjects will be followed over two years of their work lives. Among the major design goals are to discover the extent to which the survey and experimental measures are correlated, and whether and how much predictive power, with respect to key on-the-job outcome variables, is added by the behavioral measures. The panel study of new hires is being carried out against the backdrop of a second research component, the development of a more conventional in-depth statistical case study of the cooperating firm and its employees. This is a high-turnover service industry setting, and the focus is on the use of survival analysis to model the flow of new employees into and out of employment, and on the correct estimation of the tenure-productivity curve for new hires, accounting for the selection effects of the high turnover. |
| JEL: | C82 C93 J63 L92 |
| Date: | 2007–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12976&r=ppm |
| By: | Kristian R. Miltersen; Eduardo S. Schwartz |
| Abstract: | We develop a new approach to dealing with real options problems with uncertain maturity. This type of situation is typical for R&D investments and mine or oil exploration projects. These types of projects are characterized by significant on-going investment costs until completion. Since time to completion is uncertain, the total investment costs will also be uncertain. Despite the fact that these projects include complicated American abandonment/switching options until completion and European options at completion (because of fixed final investment costs) we obtain simple closed form solutions. We apply the framework to situations in which the owner of the project has monopoly rights to the outcome of the project, and to situations in which there are two owners who simultaneously invest, but where only one of them may obtain the rights to the outcome. We expand the real options framework to incorporate game theoretic considerations, including a generalization of mixed strategies to continuous-time models in the form of abandonment intensities. |
| JEL: | G13 G31 |
| Date: | 2007–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12990&r=ppm |
| By: | Dean Baker |
| Abstract: | The Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) was passed in 2003 to reform the Medicare system, but the result was an inefficient set of rules and regulations. This report projects the savings from a drug benefit program that was designed with efficiency in mind. |
| Date: | 2006–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:epo:papers:2006-1&r=ppm |
| By: | Shareen Joshi (University of Chicago); T. Paul Schultz (Yale University and IZA) |
| Abstract: | The paper analyzes 141 villages in Matlab, Bangladesh from 1974 to 1996, in which half the villages received from 1977 to 1996 a door-to-door outreach family planning and maternalchild health program. Village and individual data confirm a decline in fertility of about 15 percent in the program villages compared with the control villages by 1982, as others have noted, which persists until 1996. The consequences of the program on a series of long run family welfare outcomes are then estimated in addition to fertility: women’s health, earnings and household assets, use of preventive health inputs, and finally the inter-generational effects on the health and schooling of the woman’s children. Within two decades many of these indicators of the welfare of women and their children improve significantly in conjunction with the program-induced decline in fertility and child mortality. This suggests social returns to this reproductive health program in rural South Asia have many facets beyond fertility reduction, which do not appear to dissipate over two decades. |
| Keywords: | fertility, family planning, gender and development, program evaluation, Bangladesh |
| JEL: | O12 J13 I12 J16 |
| Date: | 2007–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2639&r=ppm |