nep-ppm New Economics Papers
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management
Issue of 2007‒03‒24
four papers chosen by
Arvi Kuura
Parnu College - Tartu University

  1. Ranking Transport Projects by their Socioeconomic Value or Financial Interest rate of return? By Alain Bonnafous; Pablo Jensen
  2. The impact of endangered species law on the real estate development process explored with cost-benefit analysis: The case of the corncrake in Hamburg/Germany By Jan Marcus Matauschek
  3. Network Effects in R&D Partnership Evidence from the European Collaborations in Micro and Nanotechnologies By Corinne Autant-Bernard; Pascal Billand; Christophe Bravard; Nadine Massard
  4. PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: By Guillaume Biot-Paquerot; Jean-Luc Rossignol

  1. By: Alain Bonnafous (LET - Laboratoire d'économie des transports - [CNRS : UMR5593] - [Université Lumière - Lyon II] - [Ecole Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'Etat]); Pablo Jensen (LET - Laboratoire d'économie des transports - [CNRS : UMR5593] - [Université Lumière - Lyon II] - [Ecole Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'Etat], LPMCN - Laboratoire de Physique de la Matière Condensée et Nanostructures - [CNRS : UMR5586] - [Université Claude Bernard - Lyon I], Phys-ENS - Laboratoire de Physique de l'ENS Lyon - [CNRS : UMR5672] - [Ecole Normale Supérieure de Lyon])
    Abstract: This paper discusses the choice by the public authority of the most efficient programme of infrastructure investments. More specifically, it studies the optimal ranking of the projects implementations when these projects are partially self-financed by their own revenues such as tolled highways. In this case, the optimal investment programme must be defines under a constraint of annual subsidies. This paper demonstrates that the optimal ranking is not necessarily the ranking of decreasing socio-economic IRR. This counter-intuitive result can be demonstrated by a general approach. Analytical calculations are not useful in the discrete problems because each programme is an ordered subset of projects. Therefore, there is no continuous variation linking the various programmes and the usual tools of optimisation are useless, such as differential calculus. Thus, we adopt here a discrete optimisation analysis based on standard techniques in the physics area, such as Monte Carlo sampling.
    Keywords: Transport Infrastructure ; Infrastructure Investments ; Transportation Financing ; Appraisal ; Economic Calculation ; Transport project evaluation ; Public-private partnership ; Socio economic net present value
    Date: 2007–03–14
  2. By: Jan Marcus Matauschek
    Abstract: In recent decades protection of the environment has become an issue of wide public interest. Both on a national and an EU level a multitude of statutes and directives in this area have been enacted. In many cases, these provisions intervene into business activity. This paper explores the way in which environmental protection law can affect real estate projects. The paper uses the example of a development project in Hamburg/Germany, where a population of corncrakes (a small bird) halted a large scale housing project as the bird is protected under the EU Birds Directive (79/409/EEC). The author conducts a cost benefit analysis (CBA), comparing the stopped project and a newly proposed, amended project, which takes the requirements of the directive into account. The author reviews as to whether a study of this nature is justified under aspects of philosophy of science and as to whether the employed method of cost-benefit analysis is appropriate for this purpose By using the residual value method of land valuation the author determines the implicit value which society places on a corncrake. This value is defined as the difference between the residual land value of the stopped project and the residual land value of the alternative project. The value of the bird is thus expressed as the foregone profits which could have been realised with the first, much larger project. The result is that society's valuation of a corncrake amounts to approximately Euro7.2m. A sensitivity analysis and discussion of limitations conclude the paper.
  3. By: Corinne Autant-Bernard (CREUSET - Centre de Recherche Economique de l'Université de Saint-Etienne - [CNRS : FRE2938] - [Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne]); Pascal Billand (CREUSET - Centre de Recherche Economique de l'Université de Saint-Etienne - [CNRS : FRE2938] - [Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne]); Christophe Bravard (CREUSET - Centre de Recherche Economique de l'Université de Saint-Etienne - [CNRS : FRE2938] - [Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne]); Nadine Massard (CREUSET - Centre de Recherche Economique de l'Université de Saint-Etienne - [CNRS : FRE2938] - [Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne])
    Abstract: Based on the research projects submitted to the 6th Framework Program of the European Union, this paper studies cooperative networks in micro and nanotechnologies. Our objective is twofold. First, using the statistical tools of the social network analysis, we characterise the structure of the R&D collaborations established between firms. Second, we investigate the determinants of this structure, by analysing the individual choices of cooperation. A binary choice model is used to put forward the existence of network effects alongside other microeconomic determinants of cooperation. Our findings suggest that network effects are present, so that probability of collaboration is influenced by each individual's position within the network. It seems that social distance matters more than geographical distance. We also provide some evidence that similar firms (in terms of research potential) are more likely to collaborate together
    Keywords: Network formation; R&D collaboration; Knowledge externalities; nanotechnologies
    Date: 2007–03–19
  4. By: Guillaume Biot-Paquerot (CEREGE - CEntre de REcherche en sciences de GEstion - [CNRS : EA1722] - [Groupe Sup de Co La Rochelle]); Jean-Luc Rossignol (CUREGE - Centre universitaire de recherche en gestion - [Université de Franche-Comté])
    Abstract: Education supply in universities of most European countries has for the last ten years become a strategic matter. At present, French universities consider education supply as an investment. But they do not utilize all incentive mechanisms in order to drive their strategies. At the beginning of the year 2006, the public sector reform will tend to impose performance measurements of research and educational activities, in order to improve organizational efficiency. The aim of this reform in the French context is to provide driving elements to increase internal efficiency, social and economic impact of higher education system and to reinforce international attractiveness of public education institutions. The substitution of resources management by result management involves an agent's performance responsibility measurement. Evaluation becomes a central factor and is articulated with incentives system. The weakening of the property right system drives project bearers to maximize their utility instead of their incomes. In such a context, the understanding of individual strategies permits to understand constraints of management within universities, and to take into account the impact of stakeholders who take part in the value generation process. The major risk is to constraint the utility function of projects bearers by increasing their burden and their motivation. The result could be the limitation of the number of projects, and as well, the decreasing of university investments.
    Keywords: performance, public sector, universities, efficiency, value generation
    Date: 2007–03–17

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