nep-ppm New Economics Papers
on Project and Portfolio Management
Issue of 2006‒12‒09
four papers chosen by
Arvi Kuura
Parnu College - Tartu University

  1. The Aggregate Labour Market Effects of the Swedish Knowledge Lift Program By Albrecht, James; van den Berg, Gerard J; Vroman, Susan
  2. L'influence du Tarif des Infrastructures de Transport sur la Rentabilité Sociale d'un programme : Quelques enseignements à partir d'une simulation simple By Damien Pons; Frederik Johanson
  3. Relative Rewards within Team-Based Compensation By Bernd Irlenbusch; Gabriele K. Ruchala
  4. Evaluating Active Labor Market Programs in Romania By Nuria Rodriguez-Planas; Jacob Benus

  1. By: Albrecht, James; van den Berg, Gerard J; Vroman, Susan
    Abstract: The Swedish adult education program known as the Knowledge Lift (1997--2002) was unprecedented in its size and scope, aiming to raise the skill level of large numbers of low-skill workers. This paper evaluates the potential effects of this program on aggregate labour market outcomes. This is done by calibrating an equilibrium search model with heterogeneous worker skills using pre-program data and then forecasting the program impacts. We compare the forecasts to observed aggregate labour market outcomes after termination of the program.
    Keywords: calibration; job search; program evaluation; returns to education; Swedish labour market; unemployment; wages
    JEL: C31 D83 J21 J24 J31 J64
    Date: 2006–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5927&r=ppm
  2. By: Damien Pons (LET - Laboratoire d'économie des transports - [CNRS : UMR5593] - [Université Lumière - Lyon II] - [Ecole Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'Etat]); Frederik Johanson (LET - Laboratoire d'économie des transports - [CNRS : UMR5593] - [Université Lumière - Lyon II] - [Ecole Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'Etat])
    Abstract: De nos jours, la puissance publique et les opérateurs privés font partie intégrante de l'organisation du secteur des transports. Au vue des fortes contraintes budgétaires pesant sur les états et des déréglementations en cours au sein de la CEE, le rôle des organismes privés tend à se renforcer.<br />Alors, lorsqu'il s'agit de fixer le tarif, deux logiques s'opposent, la puissance publique cherchant à maximiser l'utilité socio-économique d'un projet d'infrastructure lorsque le secteur privé à pour objectif d'assurer la rentabilité financière des investissements.<br />La tendance est alors à considérer les politiques tarifaires des opérateurs et celle des collectivités comme des mesures aux résultats antagonistes pour la collectivité. Qu'en est-il véritablement?<br />Grâce à une simple modélisation, ce travail montre que le tarif maximisant la rentabilité financière permet de dégager plus d'utilité socio-économique lorsque l'on considère un programme de projets à réaliser sous contrainte budgétaire. Ce constat se renforce lorsque la contrainte budgétaire se ressert.<br />Ce résultat est essentiel en terme d'organisation du secteur des transports et de politique tarifaire; d'autant plus qu'il va à l'encontre des clivages habituels.
    Keywords: Tarification optimale ; maximisation du bien-être collectif ; programmation ; maximisation de la rentabilité financière ; PPP ; contrainte budgétaire
    Date: 2006–11–29
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00117036_v1&r=ppm
  3. By: Bernd Irlenbusch (London School of Economics and IZA Bonn); Gabriele K. Ruchala (University College London)
    Abstract: How to design compensation schemes to motivate team members appears to be one of the most challenging problems in the economic analysis of labour provision. We shed light on this issue by experimentally investigating team-based compensations with and without bonuses awarded to the highest contributors in teams. A purely team-based compensation scheme induces agents to voluntarily cooperate while introducing an additional relative reward increases effort and efficiency only when the bonus is substantial. In this case, however, the data suggests that tournament competition crowds out voluntary cooperation within a team.
    Keywords: teamwork, bonus pools, relative rewards, motivation crowding out, voluntary cooperation, personnel economics, experiments
    JEL: C72 C91 H41 J33 L23 M52
    Date: 2006–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2423&r=ppm
  4. By: Nuria Rodriguez-Planas (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and IZA Bonn); Jacob Benus (Impaq International)
    Abstract: We evaluate the presence of effects from joining one of four active labour market programs in Romania in the late 1990s compared to the no-program state. Using rich survey data and propensity score matching, we find that three programs (training and retraining, small business assistance, and employment and relocation services) had success in improving participants' economic outcomes and were cost-beneficial from society’s perspective. In contrast, public employment was found detrimental for the employment prospects of its participants. We also find that there is considerable heterogeneity, which suggests that targeting may improve the effectiveness of these programs.
    Keywords: active labour market programs, propensity score matching, transition economies, net social benefits
    JEL: J68
    Date: 2006–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2464&r=ppm

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