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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Valentina Bosetti; Italo Colantone; Catherine E. De Vries; Giorgio Musto |
| Abstract: | This narrative review delves into the politics of climate policy, with specific focus on the so-called "green backlash". That is, rising resistance by voters, parties, and governments to the climate transition. We start by reviewing the literature on the political consequences of climate policies. The evidence points to a green backlash among citizens negatively affected by the decarbonization transition. Populist right forces emerge as main beneficiaries of the backlash. They tend to be more skeptical regarding anthropogenic climate change and less supportive of climate policies. Their electoral success has negative implications for countries' climate policy making and performance. Finally, we draw insights from the literature to reflect on what can be done to improve the political sustainability of climate policies. |
| Keywords: | Climate policies; green backlash; right-wing populism |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bcu:greewp:greenwp26 |
| By: | Alex Armand; Frederica Mendonca; Wayne Aaron Sandholtz; Pedro C. Vicente |
| Abstract: | Urbanization is a force for structural change. However, it has been slow in Sub-Saharan Africa, possibly due to conflicting political interests of national incumbents. We study the political impacts of a randomized program integrating rural migrants in a Mozambican city with the participation of local leaders. We find that the program increases the mobilization of local leaders, who conduct more electoral campaigning. We observe migrants to be more politically active and more supportive of the city incumbent (national opposition). Migrants’ contacts at the origin align with the national opposition and migrate to the city. We conclude that urbanization is political.. |
| Keywords: | Political economy, Urbanization, Rural migrants, Migrant integration, Political behavior, Mozambique, Africa |
| JEL: | D72 O18 J61 O12 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unl:unlfep:wp670 |
| By: | Michael Eldar; Sinem Hidir |
| Abstract: | Political actors routinely target custom audiences on social media in order to influence elections. We model this process, focusing on the way in which it induces voters to learn about their own preferences. This differs from the past literature, which has focused on party platforms and the effects of bias. We find that the optimal strategy based on some empirically estimated parameters is to target groups favoring one’s opponents, providing a rational explanation for negative campaigning. More generally, log-concave cost of voting distributions can give rise to a non-convex set being targeted—weak supporters of the politician and strong sup porters of their opponent. We make use of this setup to provide a novel analysis of the effects of micro-targeting on turnout, and find a sense in which lower costs of voting encourage negative campaigning. |
| Date: | 2025–04–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:wpaper:1077 |
| By: | Wayne Aaron Sandholtz; Pedro C. Vicente |
| Abstract: | Tax revenue is vital for development, but governments must balance raising revenues with maintaining political support. Partnering with a city government in Mozambique, we experimentally vary the provision of information highlighting the role of municipal tax revenues in 1) local public good provision and 2) local political autonomy. We measure how this information affects property owners’ tax morale and political support for the government. Public goods information raises tax morale, especially in areas of low baseline public good provision, but has no effect on voting. The political message increases electoral support generally, but raises tax morale only among co-partisans. These results suggest that communication about the uses of public revenue offers a politically feasible way to increase tax morale. |
| Keywords: | Tax morale, Public goods, Information, Political economy, Experiments, Mozambique |
| JEL: | O12 H00 P00 C93 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unl:unlfep:wp671 |
| By: | Mendoza, Karl Patrick Regala (Polytechnic University of the Philippines) |
| Abstract: | This article advances trust research by theorizing political scandals as moments of rupture where culturally embedded trust cultures, media logics, and populist strategies collide to reshape democratic legitimacy. Moving beyond proceduralist accounts, it conceptualizes trust as a relational, emotional, and historically situated practice—produced and fractured through moral expectations and cultural scripts. Drawing on the Dengvaxia vaccine controversy in the Philippines, the article traces how protective trust cultures centered on children and familial care were activated and amplified by sensational media coverage, transforming a complex public health issue into a national moral scandal. Populist actors strategically seized the moment, reframing the controversy as elite betrayal and recasting themselves as moral protectors of the people. This reconfiguration of trust not only delegitimized institutions but eroded vaccine confidence and deepened political polarization. The case illustrates how, in contexts shaped by relational trust cultures, scandals become existential tests of democratic legitimacy—exposing the limits of technocratic responses and the power of emotional and cultural framings. By foregrounding trust cultures as an analytical lens, the article calls for greater attention to the cultural and emotional dimensions of trust in media-driven democracies, particularly across the Global South where democratic legitimacy remains deeply contested. |
| Date: | 2025–03–28 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:2ye3x_v1 |
| By: | Betz, Timm (Washington University in St. Louis); Pond, Amy |
| Abstract: | How do democratic institutions shape financial market regulation? Focusing on the government’s fiscal motives in financial market regulation, we present a new dataset documenting policies that governments use to place their own debt in an advantageous position on financial markets. These policies, which we call borrowing privileges, commonly require that banks and institutional investors hold their own government’s debt, and take a place in-between prudential and repressive regulation. Drawing on data for 58 non-OECD countries, we document that borrowing privileges are more likely to be implemented in countries with democratic institutions. Focusing on the mechanisms for this association, we show that several characteristics typically associated with democracies – increased revenue needs from trade liberalization, political competition and transparency, and the growth of financial markets – make these policies attractive to policy-makers. We contribute to the literature on the institutional sources of financial regulation and show how governments balance the growth of financial markets with revenue concerns. |
| Date: | 2025–03–26 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:z4kpa_v1 |
| By: | Schroeder, Wolfgang; Ziblatt, Daniel; Bochert, Florian |
| Abstract: | January 2025, for the first time in the postwar history of Germany's national parliament, a mainstream political party (the Christian Democratic Union) relied on the support of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) to pass a motion. This prompted intense public debate as many Germans worried that this cooperation was a harbinger of possibly still more cooperation to come. Against this backdrop, our study examines the state of the so-called "firewall" - the self-commitment of established parties to not cooperate with the AfD - in Germany at the district level. To do so, we analyzed more than 11, 000 meetings of councils at the district level across all federal states from mid-2019 to mid-2024. Our analysis shows that in this period no cooperation with the AfD took place in approximately 81.2% of cases where cooperation was possible. While regional differences across Germany can be observed, on average there was no significant difference in levels of cooperation between eastern and western German districts. Even in western German districts, the firewall has not strictly been upheld everywhere. However, larger differences do become apparent when comparing rural and urban districts. Eastern German rural districts, in particular, are at the forefront of cooperation with the AfD, whereas in western German districts, there is no significant urban-rural divide. From a party-political perspective, smaller parties are the most frequent collaborators with the AfD, followed by the FDP and CDU. While the firewall is beginning to crack, as of fall 2024, it had not yet completely collapsed at the district level. |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbtod:315200 |
| By: | Cottiero, Christina; Schneider, Christina J |
| Abstract: | International financial institutions (IFIs) are often perceived as engines of economic and political liberalization. Yet, despite their outsized influence in shaping the development trajectories of recipient nations, the lending strategies of IFIs dominated by authoritarian regimes remain underexplored. We argue that autocratic IFIs are not merely neutral economic actors; rather, they strategically allocate aid to reinforce authoritarian resilience. Our analysis reveals that these institutions disproportionately channel funds to authoritarian governments confronting acute domestic or international challenges to their rule, such as coup risk, political conflict, or democratic mobilization. We introduce a comprehensive, original dataset tracking the lending behavior of 20 autocratic IFIs across 143 recipient countries from 1967–2021. Our findings uncover a striking pattern: aid flows from autocratic IFIs increase precisely when authoritarian regimes are most vulnerable. By situating these insights within the broader aid allocation literature, we provide a fresh perspective on the political calculus of international development lending, with profound implications for understanding global power dynamics. |
| Keywords: | Social and Behavioral Sciences, foreign aid, development, authoritarianism, illiberal networks, democratization |
| Date: | 2025–04–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:globco:qt63z4m8qw |