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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Tito Boeri; Nina Nikiforova; Guido Tabellini |
| Abstract: | We study the communication strategies on Twitter/X of 367 political leaders in 21 countries, focusing on electoral competition between populists and non-populists. We measure polarization by the ease with which the leader can be classified as populist or not, conditional on his tweet. We find that political rhetoric becomes more polarized before and around election dates. This happens because, in pre-electoral quarters, opposite leaders are more likely to: i) talk about different topics, and ii) frame differently the same issues. Our results are consistent with competing politicians targeting different voters, rather than appealing to the same swing voters. |
| Keywords: | Electoral competition, Populism, Partisanship, Polarization |
| JEL: | P H |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:26080 |
| By: | Francesco Fasani; Simone Ferro; Elisabetta Pasini; Alessio Romarri |
| Abstract: | This paper provides the first causal evaluation of the political impact of asylum seekers in the UK. Although they are dispersed across areas on a no-choice basis, political bargaining between central and local governments introduces potential endogeneity in their allocation. We address this concern with a novel IV strategy that exploits predetermined public-housing characteristics. Focusing on 2004-2019, we estimate a sizeable increase in the Conservative-Labour vote share gap in local elections: a one within-area standard deviation increase in dispersed asylum seekers widens the gap by 3.1 percentage points in favour of the Conservatives. We observe a similar shift to the right in national elections and longitudinal survey data on voting intentions, along with an increase in the Leave vote in the Brexit referendum. Electoral gains are observed for UKIP as well, although this finding is less robust. No effect is detected for non-dispersed asylum seekers, who forgo subsidised housing and make independent residential choices. Turning to mechanisms, voters move to the right without becoming more hostile towards foreigners. Leveraging the universe of MPs' speeches, we show that representatives from more exposed areas emphasise asylum and migration more, with no systematic change in tone or content. This heightened salience appears to shape voters' choices, with Conservative MPs particularly effective at channelling discontent. |
| Keywords: | Refugees, Elections, Brexit, MP's speeches. |
| JEL: | F22 D72 J15 |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:25147 |
| By: | Anthony Edo; Thomas Renault; Jérôme Valette |
| Abstract: | How does the electoral success of a far-right political force shape the strategies and policy platforms of mainstream candidates? We answer this question by exploiting the political shock of the creation of the Front National, an anti-immigration party, in 1972 and its sudden electoral breakthrough in the 1980s. Through a comprehensive textual analysis of candidate manifestos in French parliamentary elections from 1968 to 1997, we find that right-wing candidates respond to local far-right success, measured as voting shares, by amplifying the salience of immigration in their manifestos. They also adopt more negative positions on immigration and increasingly associate it with issues such as crime and the welfare state. In contrast, the ideological positions of left-wing candidates do not shift in response to far-right electoral gains. We finally show that the strategic adjustments of right-wing candidates help mitigate electoral losses to far-right competitors. |
| Keywords: | Political Economy, Anti-immigrant Parties, Electoral competition, Party Platform, Immigration |
| JEL: | F22 P16 D72 |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:25155 |
| By: | Naruki Notsu (Osaka School of International Public Policy, The University of Osaka); Asahi Semma (Mitsubishi UFJ Research and Consulting Co., Ltd.); Shuko Harada (Osaka School of International Public Policy, The University of Osaka) |
| Abstract: | This study examines how the complete absence of electoral competition shapes politicians’ behavior. To explore this, we focus on mayoral elections in Japanese municipalities, a setting where uncontested elections are a common and politically important phenomenon. Using the variation in uncontested elections across municipalities at each election year, we examine subsequent changes in mayors’ salaries. We find that mayors who win office without a contest subsequently increase their salaries. The pattern also extends to pivotal stakeholders. These findings suggest that when public conflicts, such as the existence of other candidates, do not exist, politicians are more likely to seek personal gain, highlighting the fundamental role of elections in disciplining officeholders. |
| Keywords: | Uncontested elections, Politicians’ behavior, Political rent, No competition |
| Date: | 2025–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osp:wpaper:25e004rev. |
| By: | Frémeaux, Nicolas (University of Rouen); Maarek, Paul (Université Paris Panthéon-Assas) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates gender-based differences in cooperativeness among French parliamentarians by analyzing legislative behaviors, such as cosponsorship and voting patterns. Using a comprehensive dataset covering all bills and amendments authored in France's Lower House between 2012 and 2022, we show that female parliamentarians attract fewer cosponsors, particularly from members of their own parties, despite being more likely to support their colleagues' initiatives and exhibit higher voting participation. This asymmetry highlights a paradox: while female legislators display greater cooperative and altruistic behaviors, they receive less reciprocal backing, limiting their legislative influence. The observed patterns are driven by behavioral gender differences rather than differences in observable characteristics, thematic alignment, or the quality of the politicians. |
| Keywords: | gender, cooperativeness, politicians, parliament |
| JEL: | J16 D72 D73 |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18559 |
| By: | Joop Adema |
| Abstract: | Far-right parties frequently mobilize anti-refugee sentiment during periods of high asylum migration. Prior work shows that exposure to transit routes and regional inflows tends to raise far-right support, whereas direct local contact with asylum seekers can dampen it. Yet much of the sharp rise in far-right voting around major refugee waves remains unexplained by actual inflows. I study a Dutch policy reform, the Dispersal Act, which obligated municipalities to host asylum seekers and thereby generated a sudden, plausibly exogenous increase in expected future local inflows. Comparing changes in far-right vote shares between not-yet and already hosting municipalities before the actual arrival of asylum seekers allows me to isolate the electoral effect of heightened expectations of future hosting. I find that affected municipalities experienced a substantial increase in far-right support following the Act's passage. The effect operates on both the extensive margin (whether municipalities expect to host) and the intensive margin (how many they expect to host): a one-percentage-point increase in allocated asylum-seeker share raises far-right vote shares by about 1.2 percentage points. |
| Keywords: | Asylum Seekers, Far-right voting, Group threat, Migration |
| JEL: | D72 F22 H75 |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:25150 |
| By: | Lavy Victor; Netanel Ben-Porath; Ran Abramitzky; Michal Palgi |
| Abstract: | While many socialist countries suffered from harsh economic crises, studying their impacts on economic and political attitudes is challenging because of the scarcity of reliable data in nondemocratic contexts. We study a democratic socialist setting where we have ample information on such attitudes: the Israeli kibbutzim. Exploiting an economic crisis that hit some kibbutzim more than others, we find that the crisis led to reduced support for leftist political parties. This effect persisted for over 20 years after the crisis had ended. We document that the electoral movement was rooted in a rightward shift in economic attitudes, suggesting that economic crises may undermine socialist regimes by silently changing attitudes toward them. In our unique setting, we can also study recovery mechanisms from the crisis. First, we find that while a sharp debt relief arrangement restored trust in the leadership, it did not reverse the impact of the crisis on economic attitudes. Second, as part of their efforts to recover from the crisis, kibbutzim liberalized their labor markets. Analyzing the staggered shift away from equal sharing to market-based wages, we find that this labor market liberalization led kibbutz members to move further rightward in their political voting and economic attitudes. |
| Keywords: | Economic Crisis, Disillusionment from Socialism, economic and political attitudes |
| JEL: | J01 |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:25129 |
| By: | Barbara Boelmann; Carola Stapper |
| Abstract: | Over the past century, women have gained formal political rights, yet remain under-represented in leadership-partly due to lower demand for representation among women themselves. In this paper, we shift the perspective from why men extended political rights to women toward what shaped women's own demand for representation. Specifically, we study how male absence during World War I affected German women's demand for the franchise, exploiting exogenous variation in drafting intensity across regions for identification. To make demand for political representation directly measurable, we construct a newly digitised panel dataset of the universe of German suffragette clubs-a revealed-preference measure of demand, given the considerable costs of maintaining a club, especially under wartime restrictions on political activism. Our results show that women were more likely to keep suffragette clubs open in counties with greater male absence. This effect is driven by regions where women publicly led war relief efforts, pointing to agency and specifically women's experience in visible leadership roles as the central mechanism. We further show that this demand for representation persisted after the franchise was extended, with women more likely to run for parliament and to vote in counties with greater wartime male absence and a suffragette club. |
| Keywords: | women's political representation, suffrage movement, agency |
| JEL: | J16 N44 D72 |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:26077 |
| By: | Enrico Rubolino |
| Abstract: | Declining civic engagement increasingly strains welfare state institutions. This paper asks whether civic values can be shaped through early educational investments. I study Tax and School, a large-scale program implemented in Italian primary and secondary schools to promote fiscal and civic responsibility. Exploiting staggered cross-municipality adoption, I find that exposure increases students' intrinsic motivation for rule compliance and reduces antisocial behaviors, particularly in socio-economically disadvantaged contexts. These student-level responses gradually aggregate into community-level outcomes: exposed municipalities later exhibit higher voter turnout and stronger support for redistributive policies. Survey evidence points to belief updating about the value of public goods and the role of government in mitigating inequality as a central mechanism. Counterfactual simulations imply that scaling the program could attenuate the secular decline in voter turnout. |
| Keywords: | civic capital; civic education; tax morale; political participation |
| JEL: | I21 H26 D72 Z13 |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:26096 |
| By: | Gaia Dossi; Marta Morando |
| Abstract: | We link U.S. patent and inventor records to individual voter register files and map politically polarized policy issues to related technologies. Compared to Republicans, Democrats are one-third more likely to patent technologies addressing climate-change mitigation or women's reproductive health, and one-third less likely to patent weapons and related technologies. These gaps are not explained by differences in inventive ability or by sorting across organizations or teams. Party-technology alignment has strengthened over the past two decades, a period of rising political polarization in U.S. society. Technology diffusion is also politically polarized: Democrats are more likely than Republicans to cite aligned technologies and less likely to cite misaligned ones. Together, these findings are consistent with political polarization and societal views being important drivers of the direction and diffusion of technological change and operating, at least in part, through inventors' technology choices, with implications for innovation policy. |
| Keywords: | Diffusion, Innovation, Partisanship, Polarization, Technology |
| JEL: | D72 I10 J24 O31 O33 O44 P00 |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:26064 |
| By: | Alena Gorbuntsova; Gaurav Khanna; Sultan Mehmood |
| Abstract: | Wars are often framed as responses to external threats or shifts in the regional balance of power. Yet they can also serve domestic political ends. This paper studies how Russia’s escalations against Ukraine reshaped support for the regime and redistributed the burdens of war across the population. Combining ethnic Russian shares with election and independent polling data, we exploit two sharp geopolitical shocks, the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the 2022 full-scale invasion, in a difference-in-differences event-study design. We find that provinces with larger ethnic Russian populations exhibit sharp increases in support for President Putin following both episodes. At the same time, battlefield casualties fall disproportionately on regions with lower ethnic Russian shares, and attitudes toward the US and EU deteriorate sharply. On the Ukrainian side, Russian attacks are concentrated in areas with higher ethnic Russian shares rather than in resource-rich provinces. Explanations based on material extraction, Soviet symbolism, or differential exposure to external threats do not account for these patterns. Instead, the evidence is more consistent with ethnic identity playing a central role in the domestic political economy of the war. Our conclusions remain similar in fraud-adjusted electoral outcomes, with alternative ethnicity measures, under bounded departures from parallel trends, and after accounting for several baseline regional differences. |
| JEL: | F50 O43 P50 |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35107 |
| By: | Arthur Campbell; C. Matthew Leister; Philip Ushchev; Yves Zenou |
| Abstract: | We develop a simple model of content filtering-the tendency of individuals to selectively forward information that aligns with their ideological preference-to study how network structure shapes the distribution of political content. In our framework, individuals and content are horizontally differentiated into three types (left, middle, right). We show that content filtering can amplify the middle or the extremes and may result in only centrist content (full moderation) or only extreme content (full polarization). The outcome depends on the interaction between two forces: a preference advantage from the relative prevalence of types in the population, and a pairwise comparison advantage that systematically favors centrist content. Network density plays a critical role. Sparse networks robustly yield moderation, even when extreme types dominate the population, while dense networks replicate the population's type distribution. Intermediate densities generate non-monotonic comparative statics, including sharp transitions between moderation and polarization. These findings complement existing empirical results that emphasize the types of connections individuals have on social media by highlighting how the number of connections, holding their composition fixed, may fundamentally shape the information environment in ways that foster/mitigate populism and polarization. |
| Keywords: | Social networks, network density, content filtering, polarization |
| JEL: | D83 D85 L82 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:2582 |
| By: | Giacomo Battiston; Federico Boffa; Eugenio Levi; Alberto Parmigiani; Steven Stillman |
| Abstract: | Technological disruptions often generates political conflict. Artificial intelligence (AI) is widely expected to transform labor markets and economic systems, yet it has not become a strongly polarizing political issue in advanced democracies. This paper investigates why, by fielding a preregistered survey experiment with 11, 418 respondents in the United States, Germany and Italy. We examine factual knowledge on AI and automation, beliefs over its economic effects, demand for policy intervention and signatures of online petitions on Change.org. We document limited knowledge, widespread pessimism on their labor-market impact, substantial demand for government intervention and considerable potential for political mobilization, pointing to an unmet demand for policy responses. We then test the mobilization power of competing political narratives on the economic effects of AI and automation. Overall, across countries and institutional contexts, politicizing AI shifts policy preferences in the expected directions but reduces engagement in political mobilization. In addition, it decreases support for the extreme petitions, thereby reducing polarization. These findings suggest that emerging technologies characterized by high uncertainty and large distributive effects may not follow the historical pattern of polarization associated with past economic shocks. Our results rationalize politicians' hesitation towards increasing the salience of AI and automation. |
| Keywords: | Artificial Intelligence; Automation; Political Polarization |
| JEL: | O33 P16 |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:26063 |
| By: | Christopher Ball (Quinnipiac University); Federica Weßel (Friedrich Schiller University Jena) |
| Abstract: | Populist political movements frequently campaign on promises to rebuild domestic manufacturing and reverse perceived losses from globalization. This paper evaluates whether populist governments succeed in improving manufacturing performance once global trends are taken into account. Using a panel of 86 countries from 1960 to 2019, we examine manufacturing output and employment—both in levels and relative to GDP—during periods of populist governance. To isolate country-specific effects from global structural change, outcomes are measured relative to peer groups defined by region, income level, economic size, population, and initial manufacturing structure. Two-way fixed effects estimates and dynamic event-study analyses based on the Sun and Abraham (2021) estimator reveal little evidence that populist regimes systematically increase manufacturing performance relative to comparable countries. Where statistically significant effects appear, they are short-lived and not part of sustained trends. The results suggest that populist policies do not meaningfully reverse long-run deindustrialization, though pre-treatment patterns in manufacturing employment may help explain the electoral appeal of re-industrialization rhetoric. |
| Keywords: | Populism; Manufacturing, Industrial Policy, Event Studies |
| JEL: | E65 L60 O14 P16 |
| Date: | 2026–04–22 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2026-005 |
| By: | Goh, David (University of Toronto) |
| Abstract: | We test whether Singapore's 2025 electoral redistricting produced a statistically anomalous allocation of competitively contested territory. Using a hypergeometric permutation test, we examine the 114 subzones that changed constituency between the 2020 and 2025 general elections. Among the 52 subzones originating from competitive 2020 constituencies (PAP vote share < 55%), zero ended up in competitive 2025 constituencies—against an expected value of 3.2 under random redistribution (Fisher’s exact p = 0.012). The anomaly follows a specific pattern: the new competitive seat (Jalan Kayu SMC) was seeded from stronghold populations, while dissolved competitive constituencies were absorbed into safe districts. A complementary MCMC ensemble analysis using GerryChain finds that while Singapore’s boundaries are extreme outliers in geometric compactness, this is consistent with administrative logic rather than partisan gerrymandering. We conclude that while the GRC block-vote remains the primary seat-to-vote bonus mechanism, redistricting serves as a secondary mechanism for managing competitive communities. |
| Date: | 2026–04–22 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:p7q2m_v1 |
| By: | Mikael Elinder; Oscar Erixson; Olle Hammar |
| Abstract: | The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 reshaped geopolitics and intensified debates on how wars influence domestic political support. Media reports and scholarly work based on aggregate time-series data suggest rally effects, reflected in an immediate surge in Putin's approval ratings. Leveraging the quasi-experimental timing of the invasion relative to survey fieldwork by Levada and Gallup World Poll, we show that the invasion not only increased support for Putin but also fostered greater optimism about the future, strengthened anti-Western attitudes, and reduced migration aspirations. These effects were broadly consistent across demographic groups, with the notable exception of residents in Moscow. The mobilization, however, had the opposite effects, albeit only temporarily. Our analyses also indicate that Russians abroad have become more critical of Putin, aligning with global views. Taken together, these findings provide new evidence on autocratic leaders' use of foreign conflicts as a tool for domestic support. |
| Keywords: | War, Public opinion, Sentiments, Rally 'round the flag, Russia |
| JEL: | D72 F51 H56 P20 |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:26044 |
| By: | Patrick Mellacher (University of Graz, Austria); Teresa Lackner (University of Graz, Austria) |
| Abstract: | We develop a simple computational model capturing the co-evolution of opinion formation, political decision making and economic outcomes to study how societies form opinions if their members have opposing economic interests. The model features two types of individuals, a small minority and a large majority with conflicting economic interests who form and update beliefs about which policy best serves their interest through three channels: social influence, exposure to costly advertisements, and stochastic access to unbiased outside information. Individuals receive a payoff based on a policy they decide democratically and can use their funds to influence other individuals by sending costly advertisements. Our model illustrates how a tiny, but well-informed minority can influence democratic processes in their favor - even in situations where it seems unlikely at first glance, due to a vicious cycle in which political and economic power gradually shift from one group to another. Our model offers two ways out of this misery: First, on the individual-level, bounded confidence - the tendency of humans to distrust opinions which are too different from their own - has a mitigating effect and leads to better societal outcomes. This is particularly interesting, as bounded confidence has famously been shown by Hegselmann and Krause (2002) to produce polarization which is generally considered harmful. However, bounded confidence can cause political chaos and its effectiveness can be reduced by strategic messaging. Second, on a societal level, better access to unbiased information sources can counter disinformation. Our model highlights the dangers that economic and information inequality can pose for democracies and contributes to debates on the causes of the decades-long increase in inequality in democratic countries and the persistent failure to adequately address climate change. |
| Keywords: | Opinion dynamics, Agent-based model, Social conflict, Bounded confidence, Disinformation, Strategic advertising |
| JEL: | C63 D83 D72 |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:grz:wpaper:2026-04 |
| By: | Eduardo Levy Yeyati; César M. Ciappa; Milagros Onofri |
| Abstract: | Recent work measures ideological positioning and drift in large language models (LLMs), but typically assumes that those measurements are invariant to the language of evaluation. This paper tests that assumption using the full Political Compass questionnaire in English and Spanish across three generations of OpenAI models, together with a benchmark comparison against recent Qwen and Mistral releases. Using matched item-level responses, we estimate within-model Spanish–English displacement and assess how language choice affects cross-model comparisons. We find that measured ideological coordinates remain in the same broad region across languages, but are not language-invariant. Spanish–English shifts differ in sign and magnitude across models and axes, and in several cases amount to a substantial share of the inter-model dispersion typically interpreted as ideological drift in English-only audits. The implication is methodological: ideological drift should not be treated as a language-invariant property of a model, but as a measurement outcome conditional on language choice and instrument design. Multilingual audits should therefore report language-specific placements and within-model cross-language displacement rather than extrapolating from English-only measurements. |
| Keywords: | large language models, ideological drift, multilingual evaluation, Political Compass, language dependence |
| JEL: | C83 C90 C18 D72 |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:udt:wpgobi:wp_gob_2026_07 |
| By: | Sulin Sardoschau; Annalí Casanueva-Artís |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the impact of right-wing populist mobilization on anti-minority violence across 10, 000 German municipalities between 2015 and 2019. Exploiting variation in weather conditions on scheduled protest days, we show that right-wing protests held on pleasant days increase their salience and visibility by attracting larger crowds, generating more attention in traditional and social media and subsequently raising the probability of hate crimes by 8.6 percentage points. These offenses are carried out predominantly by known, recidivist, lone-actor extremists in the aftermath of the protest. Spillovers are substantial: downstream newspaper coverage of protests and social media networks transmit violence to municipalities that did not host any protest. Our findings highlight a critical externality of grass-roots populist movements: they not only drive immediate local violence but also propagate it across wider networks. |
| Keywords: | Populism, hate crimes, protest, media |
| JEL: | D74 D72 K42 J15 L82 |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:26073 |
| By: | Muise, Daniel; Cornelius, Justin; Lee, Jihye; Lu, Yingdan (Northwestern University); Shapiro, Jacob N |
| Abstract: | Political scientists seek to understand the political environment and to identify causal relationships within it. This often requires accurate measurement of how individuals consume political information. Many data-collection approaches, particularly those relying on social media content, infer consumption behavior from publicly posted material. Yet public-facing, platform-specific content misrepresents the fragmented, multimedia nature of smartphone use, and thus of political information consumption. Continuous smartphone screen-recording (CSSR) offers a theoretically strong means of capturing individuals’ information experience, but has remained largely inaccessible to political scientists due to technical, operational, analytical, and ethical barriers. We introduce an open-source CSSR tool to mitigate these challenges. We motivate its relevance for political science and outline its solutions to practical constraints that have limited CSSR’s adoption. |
| Date: | 2026–04–22 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:6wgm5_v1 |