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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Camille Urvoy |
| Abstract: | What makes politicians respond to civil society organizations’ demands? I use new data on government transfers to French associations and exploit close elections to show that politicians grant more funds to ideologically close organizations when the local incumbent is a political ally and was elected by a small margin. The results are consistent with politicians and organizations exchanging financial support for electoral support. Organizations secure funding because of the votes they can deliver, not because of their campaign contributions; however the fact that transfers appear to be conditioned on support may undermine their ability to help hold politicians accountable. |
| Keywords: | civil society organizations, elections, distributive politics, clientelism |
| JEL: | D72 L31 |
| Date: | 2024–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2024_601 |
| By: | Mia, Rubel; Hasan, Mehedi; Joynal, Abedin Md |
| Abstract: | This study intends to understand the local level politics in terms of changing political beliefs among the participants in the larger context of politics in Bogura, a northern district of Bangladesh. In particular, the research tries to investigate the voting behaviour during the national election of 2008 in Bogura. Though there are some studies about the national-level politics but still there is a dearth of researchers in understanding the local political dynamics. The study of a local-level election helps us engaging with different stakeholders and local agencies. To explore this research, with a list of questionnaires, researcher conducted interviews with grassroots level respondents’ including local politicians, civil society members, academicians and mass people to examine the attitudes, opinions, voting behaviour and the political environment of the locality in reference to the parliamentary election of 2008 in Bogura district, Bangladesh. The study has found that behaviour of voters was influenced by several factors such as religion, caste, community, language, money, policy or ideology, purpose of the polls, extent of the franchise, political wave etc which led the Bangladesh Awami League (AL) to capture two seats from Bogura district. Since then the contemporary Bangladeshi politics has taking place through conflicts and corruption. |
| Date: | 2024–09–15 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:vq647 |
| By: | Subhayu Bandyopadhyay; Devashish Mitra |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes and compares equilibrium immigration levels of some popular political economy models in the context of unequal capital holdings. We show that immigration rises (falls) with inequality in a limited (inclusive) democracy where only a small (large) fraction of the population has voting rights. Furthermore, we highlight the similarities between a campaign-contributions model and a partial-democracy model in terms of their predictions about immigration policy. In particular, we show that extension of voting rights in a partial democracy has qualitatively similar implications on immigration policy as reducing the relative weight on campaign contributions. |
| Keywords: | legal immigration policy; inequality in capital ownership; partial democracy; voter support for immigration; campaign contributions; lobbying |
| JEL: | F22 F66 J61 |
| Date: | 2024–10–15 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedlwp:98968 |
| By: | Anton Kolotilin (School of Economics, UNSW); Alexander Wolitzky (Department of Economics, MIT) |
| Abstract: | We study the problem of a partisan gerrymanderer who assigns voters to equipopulous districts to maximize his party’s expected seat share. The designer faces both aggregate, district-level uncertainty (how many votes his party will receive) and idiosyncratic, voter-level uncertainty (which voters will vote for his party). Segregate-pair districting, where weaker districts contain one type of voter, while stronger districts contain two, is optimal for the gerrymanderer. The optimal form of segregate-pair districting depends on the designer’s popularity and the relative amounts of aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty. When idiosyncratic uncertainty dominates, a designer with majority support pairs all voters, while a designer with minority support segregates opposing voters and pairs more favorable voters; these plans resemble uniform districting and “packing-and-cracking, ” respectively. When aggregate uncertainty dominates, the designer segregates moderate voters and pairs extreme voters; this “matching slices” plan has received some attention in the literature. Estimating the model using precinct-level returns from recent US House elections shows that, in practice, idiosyncratic uncertainty dominates. We discuss implications for redistricting reform, political polarization, and detecting gerrymandering. Methodologically, we exploit a formal connection between gerrymandering—partitioning voters into districts—and information design—partitioning states of the world into signals. |
| Keywords: | Gerrymandering, pack-and-crack, segregate-pair, information design |
| JEL: | C78 D72 D82 |
| Date: | 2024–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:swe:wpaper:2024-06 |
| By: | Woodley, Lucas; Greene, Joshua D. |
| Abstract: | Since the 2020 presidential race and allegations of voter fraud, distrust in U.S. elections has continued to rise, particularly among Republicans, with only one-third believing that the 2024 election will be honest and open. Such widespread distrust poses substantial risks for the future of American democracy. Yet, it remains unclear how electoral confidence can be restored. In two pre-registered experiments (N = 1, 292), we test three potential pathways: (1) exposure to Republican politicians reaffirming the legitimacy of the 2020 election (i.e., elite in-party cues), (2) receiving information about non-elite Republicans' beliefs regarding the 2020 election (i.e., non-elite in-party cues), and (3) combined exposure to elite and non-elite in-party cues. We find that combined exposure to elite and non-elite in-party cues, as well as sole exposure to elite in-party cues, increases future election trust and perceived legitimacy of the 2020 election among Republicans. However, there exists significant heterogeneity between self-identified strong and moderate Republicans. Among strong Republicans, sole exposure to elite cues increased future election trust and perceived legitimacy of the 2020 election. Yet, combined elite and non-elite cues yield non-significant effects on future election trust and weak, inconsistent effects on perceived legitimacy of the 2020 election. Conversely, among moderate Republicans, only combined elite and non-elite cues consistently increase future election trust and perceived legitimacy of the 2020 election. These results demonstrate the importance of tailoring efforts to restore election support for different populations. |
| Date: | 2024–10–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:yvaf5 |
| By: | Diogo G. C. Britto; Gianmarco Daniele; Marco Le Moglie; Paolo Pinotti; Breno Sampaio |
| Abstract: | We study the prevalence and effects of individuals with past criminal charges among candidates and elected politicians in Brazil. Individuals with past criminal charges are twice as likely to both run for office and be elected compared to other individuals. This pattern persists across political parties and government levels, even when controlling for a broad set of observable characteristics. Randomized anti-corruption audits reduce the share of mayors with criminal records, but only when conducted in election years. Using a regression discontinuity design focusing on close elections, we demonstrate that the election of mayors with criminal backgrounds leads to higher rates of underweight births and infant mortality. Additionally, there is an increase in political patronage, particularly in the health sector, which is consistent with the negative impacts on local public health outcomes. |
| Keywords: | politicians, crime, audits, policies, patronage |
| JEL: | K42 J45 P16 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp24230 |
| By: | Caro, Florian; Labovich, Asher; Okechi, Chidubem; Reinstein, David; Rodrigues, Maria Clara |
| Abstract: | Colantone et al. (2024a) use survey data to examine how a major ban on combustion engine cars in Milan, Italy affected voting behavior of treated car owners. The authors find that the ban raised the probability of voting for the populist right wing Lega party by 15.4-18.3 percentage points, a 70-80% increase relative to the average car owner. The estimate is statistically significant at the 5% level. These effects are driven by dissatisfaction with money losses rather than more antagonistic attitudes towards environmental protection. In this report, we inspect the data and replication package of the paper with two sets of exercises. First, we successfully computationally reproduce all the main results of the paper. Second, we test the robustness of the authors' main results by exploring different definitions of control variables, variations in the regression specifications, and alternative econometric models and research designs. Our results generally confirm the authors' conclusions, but are smaller in magnitude and suggest that the ATTs in the original paper might have been overstated. |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:i4rdps:168 |
| By: | Aytimur, Emre; Boukouras, Aris; Suen, Richard M. H. |
| Abstract: | We examine how the optimal degree of policy divergence between two policy platforms in an election is affected by two types of aggregate uncertainty: policy-related and candidate-specific. We show that when the candidate-specific uncertainty is sufficiently large, policy convergence becomes optimal. We also show that when these two types of uncertainty co-exist, only purely office-motivated parties result in policy convergence, in other words, any level of policy motivation of parties results in some policy divergence, making policy motivation undesirable when candidate-specific uncertainty is sufficiently large. |
| Keywords: | Voting; Policy Divergence; Polarisation |
| JEL: | D72 D80 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:122279 |
| By: | Vanschoonbeek, Jakob |
| Abstract: | The recent rise and distinct geography of populism highlights the need for high resolution data on the economic and political landscapes and improved spatial political economy models that explain their interrelation. This paper shows that divergent development generates political externalities in lagging regions. To do so, it develops a dynamic spatial political economy model that integrates redistributive taxation and agglomerated economic growth in a standard economic geography framework. It finds that divergent development induces skill-biased labor mobility towards faster growing locations, simultaneously reducing their willingness to pay redistributive taxes and increasing their electoral influence on redistributive policy. To empirically validate and calibrate the model, the Spatial Political Economy in Europe Database (SPEED) is introduced, containing newly georeferenced electoral maps, political party classifications and gridded (per capita) GDP estimates for most European countries in the 17th release of the Constituency-Level Electoral Archive (CLEA). Instrumental variable regressions exploiting geographically-determined differences in economic growth potential confirm a strong constituency-level causal relation between underdevelopment and radical vote shares in the past two centuries. Counterfactual simulations suggests that policies that enhance labor mobility or income redistribution may both increase radical vote shares at least in the short run, as they risk fueling backlash in lagging and leading regions respectively. |
| Keywords: | Economic geography, political economy, political discontent, long-term effects of divergent development, quantitative model, populism, political extremism |
| JEL: | C51 C52 C63 C80 H21 J61 N93 N94 O40 R12 R32 Z18 |
| Date: | 2024–06–26 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:122310 |
| By: | Lakdawala, Leah (Wake Forest University, Economics Department); Chakraborty, Judhajit (Michigan State University, Colorado State University); Nakasone, Eduardo (Michigan State University) |
| Abstract: | We examine how extreme weather affects individuals’ perceptions of government and political institutions in Peru. We match granular data on cold weather shocks to individuals using variation in interview date and location and find that extreme cold worsens perceptions of democracy. Further, extreme cold reduces civic engagement in formal democratic institutions (participation in national elections) but increases participation in local neighborhood associations. We provide evidence that these effects work through several mechanisms: economic losses, increased incidence of illness, and higher crimes. Finally, we find that higher coverage of government-provided goods and services can attenuate the adverse effects of extreme cold. |
| Keywords: | extreme temperature; climate change; democracy; political trust; voting |
| JEL: | O13 P16 Q54 |
| Date: | 2024–10–21 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:wfuewp:0118 |
| By: | Ilyana Kuziemko (Princeton University and NBER); Nicolas Longuet-Marx (Columbia University); Suresh Naidu (Columbia University and NBER) |
| Abstract: | We argue that the Democratic Party’s evolution on economic policy helps explain partisan realignment by education. We show that less-educated Americans differentially demand “predistribution†policies (e.g., a federal jobs guarantee, higher minimum wages, protectionism, and stronger unions), while more-educated Americans differentially favor redistribution (taxes and transfers). This educational gradient in policy preferences has been largely unchanged since the 1940s. We then show the Democrats’ supply of predistribution has declined since the 1970s. We tie this decline to the rise of a self-described “New Democrat†party faction who court more educated voters and are explicitly skeptical of predistribution. Consistent with this faction’s growing influence, we document the significant growth of donations from highly educated donors, especially from out-of-district donors, who play an increasingly important role in Democratic (especially “New Democrat†) primary campaigns relative to Republican primaries. In response to these within-party changes in power, less-educated Americans began to leave the Democratic Party in the 1970s, after decades of serving as the party’s base. Roughly half of the total shift can be explained by their changing views of the parties’ economic policies. We also show that in the crucial transition period of the 1970s and 1980s, New Democrat-aligned candidates draw disproportionately from more-educated voters in both survey questions and actual Congressional elections. |
| JEL: | H20 J00 P00 |
| Date: | 2024–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:cepsud:321 |
| By: | Robert J. Gordon |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the effect of economic indicators on the Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index, Presidential approval ratings, and Presidential election outcomes since 1956. How closely do the indicators predict sentiment, how well does sentiment predict approval, and what role does approval have in explaining election outcomes measured by electoral votes? How much of the variance of approval ratings depends on non-economic factors like the “honeymoon effect”? Is there a role for economic indicators in explaining election outcomes once the contribution of approval ratings is taken into account? Regression equations provide answers to these questions and allow new interpretations of political history. Equation residuals and the contributions of specific variables are graphically displayed, providing insights into time intervals when sentiment was above or below the prediction of economic indicators, when approval differed from its usual relation with sentiment and the indicators, and when and why the electoral vote totals in each election since 1956 exceeded or fell short of the predictions of the econometric equations. |
| JEL: | P0 |
| Date: | 2024–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33068 |
| By: | Egerod, Benjamin C. K.; Aaskoven, Lasse |
| Abstract: | Why do some firms lobby consistently while others never lobby at all? We argue that most firms lack information about the market for lobbying services. This implies that even when there are large returns associated with a political presence, most firms will not lobby. We present comprehensive evidence from US publicly traded firms supporting this argument. First, using a natural experiment, we show that only firms that already have a political presence use lobbying to deal with political shocks. Second, firms start lobbying when they receive an influx of information about political strategy among other firms. Third, the information effect is present among firms that can rely on trade associations for lobbying needs. Our results suggest that lack of information keeps firms from lobbying that would benefit from it. This has large consequences for the input available to decision-makers. |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cbscwp:303526 |
| By: | Cornago Bonal, Luis; Raffaelli, Francesco (University of Oxford) |
| Abstract: | Do political identities influence workers’ willingness to cooperate at work? Do workers prefer copartisans over outpartisans as colleagues even at the expense of competence? This article introduces a novel theory of how political identities per- meate modern workplaces in knowledge economies, where collaboration and non- cognitive skills are crucial. An original survey experiment conducted in the United Kingdom reveals that workers prefer to avoid working closely with outpartisans and favour collaborating with copartisans. While highly competent workers are gener- ally preferred over less competent ones, their favorability declines significantly if they are outpartisans. A new measure of affective polarization at work, which ex- ploits open-ended survey items, suggests that some individuals perceive partisan and Brexit identities to signal relevant information about non-cognitive skills they highly value in colleagues. More broadly, this article contributes to our under- standing of the challenges to workplace cooperation in knowledge economies with significant levels of affective polarization. |
| Date: | 2024–10–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:j43tn |
| By: | Andreas Baur; Lisandra Flach; Sebastian Link; Andreas Peichl |
| Abstract: | How do German firms view the upcoming US election and a possible second Donald Trump presidency? As part of the ifo Business Survey in September 2024, more than 2, 000 German manufacturing firms were asked about the US election. 44 percent of German manufacturing firms anticipate negative impacts on their business situation if Donald Trump wins the election, compared to a potential Kamala Harris presidency. Key Messages The US market plays a crucial role for German industry, with a significant portion of German manufacturing firms maintaining export, import, or production relationships with the US economy 44 percent of German manufacturing firms anticipate negative impacts on their business situation if Donald Trump wins the election, compared to a potential Kamala Harris presidency Firms expecting negative consequences from a Trump presidency tend to rate Harris' chances of winning more favorably On the eve of the US elections, only 4 percent of German manufacturing companies are currently planning concrete adjustment measures for a potential second Trump presidency |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:econpb:_65 |
| By: | Yeandle, Alex; Green, Jane; Le Corre, Tiphaine |
| Abstract: | Does becoming poorer always cause people to shift their attitudes towards higher demand for redistribution? Through a systematic review of the literature on this question, we reveal five important themes in existing research: a person’s current income, their future expectations, their expectations about redistribution benefits, their income in early life and their attitudes towards beneficiaries. Identifying these themes helps explain why responses to economic hardship are variable and heterogeneous, and can very usefully guide future research. |
| Keywords: | redistribution; income shocks; public opinion |
| JEL: | J1 |
| Date: | 2024–09–26 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:125294 |