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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Lasse Aaskoven (University of Southern Denmark); Christian Vedel (University of Southern Denmark) |
| Abstract: | A growing literature concerns the role of symbolic politics, including how political parties benefit electorally from politicizing the past, a strategy which should be more effective in localities with physical memories of the past. We test this argument by studying the effect of the local concentration of pre-Christian monuments on electoral support for the Danish Nazi Party -- a far-right party who relied heavily on the symbols of Denmark's pre-Christian past in its propaganda -- in Danish parliamentary elections 1935-1943. In contrast to the proposed theoretical argument, we find no evidence that Danish localities with a greater concentration of pre-Christian monuments saw greater electoral support for the Danish Nazi Party. These findings hint at the limits of symbolic politics for electoral support for the far-right and suggest that investigating the scope conditions for the political effects of physical memories of the past may be a fruitful avenue for future research. |
| Keywords: | Symbolic politics, Collective memory, Far-right voting |
| JEL: | D72 N44 |
| Date: | 2026–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hes:wpaper:0295 |
| By: | António Afonso; José Alves; Frederico Silva Leal |
| Abstract: | Using quarterly data for the period Q1:2000–Q4:2024, the study examines whether elections in EU-27 member states shape the composition and timing of fiscal policy strategies, and how political, fiscal and institutional constraints condition these dynamics. Employing a two-way fixed-effects framework, we find evidence that elections consistently lead to increases in primary expenditure. These effects are visible across several components, namely compensation of employees, intermediate consumption, gross fixed capital formation, and other primary expenditure. Using alternative electoral windows reveals that some adjustments begin before the electoral year, particularly in the case of GFCF and other primary expenditure, suggesting medium-term planning of politically salient spending. Importantly, these patterns emerge only around regular elections, with no evidence of political budget cycles in early elections. In addition, high-debt countries tend to adopt more restrictive electoral strategies, EU membership moderates pre-electoral spending, and coalition governments appear to impose additional fiscal discipline during election periods. Overall, the findings indicate that political budget cycles persist in the European Union, but their magnitude and composition depend critically on fiscal conditions, institutional frameworks, and governance structures. |
| Keywords: | Political Budget Cycles, Fiscal Policy, Elections, European Union. |
| JEL: | D72 E62 H60 |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ise:remwps:wp04052026 |
| By: | Lanterna, Federica; Marin, Giovanni; Sacchi, Agnese |
| Abstract: | Environmental challenges increasingly shape political discourses across Europe, yet their influence on actual environmental governance remains unclear. This paper examines the political economy mechanisms linking environmental change, party platforms, and the decentralisation of environmental protection expenditure in 27 EU member states from 2002 to 2022. We distinguish between political signalling – the commitments parties make in electoral manifestos – and policy implementation, measured through actual decentralised environmental spending. Our results reveal a sharp asymmetry: while extreme events substantially increase the salience of environmental protection in party platforms, they do not translate into changes in the territorial allocation of environmental expenditure. Instead, decentralisation responds primarily to long-term structural conditions, such as the relative weight of locally versus globally relevant emissions. Political orientations of governing coalitions, whether on environmental issues or decentralisation, show no systematic association with spending outcomes. Taken together, these findings highlight a persistent gap between electoral incentives and policy implementation in multilevel environmental governance, consistent with public-choice theories emphasising institutional inertia and limited political responsiveness beyond the stage of platform competition. |
| Keywords: | Climate Change, Environmental Economics and Policy, Political Economy |
| Date: | 2026–02–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:feemwp:391387 |
| By: | Giampiero M. Gallo; Demetrio Lacava; Edoardo Otranto |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the dynamic relationship between electoral polls and indicators of economic and financial uncertainty during the last two U.S. presidential elections (2020 and 2024). Using daily polling data on Donald Trump and measures such as the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti Business Conditions Index, the 5-year Breakeven Inflation Rate, the Trade Policy Uncertainty index, and the VIX, we estimate conditional correlation models to capture time-varying interactions. The analysis reveals that in 2020, correlations between polls and uncertainty measures were highly dynamic and event-driven, reflecting the influence of exogenous shocks (COVID-19, oil price collapse) and political milestones (primaries, debates). In contrast, during the 2024 campaign, correlations remained close to zero, stable, and largely unresponsive to shocks, suggesting that entrenched polarization and non-economic events (e.g., assassination attempt, candidate changes) muted the economic channel. The study highlights how the interplay between voter sentiment, financial markets, and uncertainty varies across electoral contexts, offering a methodological contribution through the application of Dynamic Conditional Correlation models to political data and policy-relevant insights on the conditions under which economic fundamentals influence electoral dynamics. |
| Date: | 2026–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2601.21534 |
| By: | Vasiliki Fouka; Theo Serlin |
| Abstract: | When do people identify with their class? Evidence from social psychology shows that individuals are more likely to identify with a group if they are similar to its members. We study early 20th century Britain and show that regional cultural heterogeneity combined with internal migration influenced class identity. We develop and validate a measure of class identity using naming decisions. Exploiting within-household variation, we show that migration patterns that increased the local share of culturally-distant workers reduced working class identification. Where migration increased the cultural distance of the working class, workers were less likely to join unions, voters were less likely to support the nascent Labour Party, and parliamentary candidates were less likely to target working class voters. By 1911, slower in-migration and rising local population growth reduced working class distance in urban areas, which also became strongholds of support for Labour. Migration alters social identity and creates political cleavages. |
| JEL: | D72 J61 N33 Z10 |
| Date: | 2026–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34721 |
| By: | Jan Zápal; Clara Ponsatí |
| Abstract: | A finite group of voters must elect the pope from a finite set of candidates. They repeatedly cast ballots (possibly for ever) until one candidate attains at least Q votes. A candidate is electable—if enough voters prefer him to a continuous disagreement—as well as stable—if no other candidate is preferred to him by a sufficient number of voters. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a candidate that is both electable and stable. When there are three candidates and voters are willing to compromise somewhat, the condition requires choice by two-thirds supermajority, which coincides with the procedure that the Catholic Church has used to appoint the pope for almost a millennium. |
| Keywords: | conclave, electable, Pope, repeated ballots, stable, supermajority |
| JEL: | D71 D72 Z12 |
| Date: | 2026–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:1553 |
| By: | Keefer, Philip; Ronconi, Lucas |
| Abstract: | Why are inefficient policies popular? One explanation is incomplete voter information. Evidence from survey experiments in Argentina points instead to inattention. The experiments explore voter evaluations of two anti-inflation policies, price controls and limits on monetary emission. Inattentive individuals should favor policies with simple, easily validated narratives, such as price controls; survey respondents considered price controls to be at least as effective in controlling inflation as limits to monetary emission. Two experimental treatments encouraged respondents to consider more complex policy narratives. Both increased respondent evaluations of the effectiveness of monetary policy relative to price controls. Inattention better accounts for these results: effects were independent of respondent knowledge and beliefs; larger for the evaluation of the more complex policy; and strongest for respondents who were more attentive to the survey. Treatment effects are also independent of the strength of partisan identity and ideological beliefs, indicating that these are low-cost cues for inattentive voters rather than signals of immutable beliefs regarding appropriate policies. The results underscore the role of attention in the spread of political narratives and their influence on voter behavior. |
| Keywords: | rational inattention;cognitive effort;attention allocation;Voter Behavior;Populism |
| JEL: | C90 D72 D80 D83 E71 P30 P50 |
| Date: | 2026–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:idb:brikps:14480 |
| By: | Efraim Benmelech; Joao Monteiro |
| Abstract: | We provide the first global, long-run evidence on how war reshapes democratic institutions. Using data on all conflicts since 1948, we show that the onset of conflict causes a large and persistent decline in democracy: institutions weaken immediately, continue to erode for nearly a decade, and do not recover. Yet this deterioration is highly selective. It appears only in first-time conflicts, intrastate wars, highly fractionalized societies, and conflicts that governments win. The decline operates through political channels – media censorship, judicial purges, curtailed civil liberties, irregular leadership turnover, and constitutional suspensions - rather than through any functional requirement of war-making. Autocratization does not increase the probability of victory, and institutional instability reduces it. Taken together, the findings show that war does not require autocracy; it enables executives to expand their authority and implement institutional changes that would be difficult to enact in peacetime. |
| JEL: | D74 H56 P48 |
| Date: | 2026–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34734 |
| By: | Krishna Sharma; Khemraj Bhatt |
| Abstract: | Text-based measurement in political research often treats classi6ication disagreement as random noise. We examine this assumption using con6idence-weighted human annotations of 5, 000 social media messages by U.S. politicians. We 6ind that political communication is generally highly legible, with mean con6idence exceeding 0.99 across message type, partisan bias, and audience classi6ications. However, systematic variation concentrates in the constituency category, which exhibits a 1.79 percentage point penalty in audience classi6ication con6idence. Given the high baseline of agreement, this penalty represents a sharp relative increase in interpretive uncertainty. Within messages, intent remains clear while audience targeting becomes ambiguous. These patterns persist with politician 6ixed effects, suggesting that measurement error in political text is structured by strategic incentives rather than idiosyncratic coder error. |
| Date: | 2026–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2601.20912 |
| By: | Simon Gaechter (University of Nottingham); Dominik Suri (University of Bonn); Sebastian Kube (University of Bonn); Johannes Schultz (University of Bonn) |
| Abstract: | Democratic societies depend on citizens following rules even when those rules are set by political opponents. Rising polarization may threaten this behavior. We test the impact of polarization on rule compliance in the United States across three pre-registered waves (May and November 2024; April 2025; n = 8, 340) using the “coins task”, which is a non-political, generic rule-following task, where breaking the rule increases payoffs. Participants were randomly assigned to follow rules set by the experimenter, a political co-partisan, a political opponent, or a non-partisan US citizen. Rule compliance ranged from 52.3% to 57.8%, and equivalence testing indicates no meaningful differences across waves or partisan rule-setter identities. However, greater affective distance from partisan rule setters is associated with lower compliance and weaker descriptive and normative beliefs about rule-following. These findings suggest that rule compliance is resilient to the rule-setter’s identity. While affective polarization may erode this behavior somewhat, substantial compliance remains: the human tendency to follow rules, even when incentivized to break them, survives the “stress test” of partisan rule-setting in highly polarized times. |
| Keywords: | Political polarization;affective polarization;rule-following;coinstask;norms;online experiments; political identity; equivalence testing; replication |
| Date: | 2026–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2026-01 |
| By: | Trevor Incerti; Jonathan Elkobi; Daniel Mattingly |
| Abstract: | How do authoritarian regimes strengthen global support for nondemocratic political systems? Roughly half of the users of the social media platform TikTok report getting news from social media influencers. Against this backdrop, authoritarian regimes have increasingly outsourced content creation to these influencers. To gain understanding of the extent of this phenomenon and the persuasive capabilities of these influencers, we collect comprehensive data on pro-China influencers on TikTok. We show that pro-China influencers have more engagement than state media. We then create a realistic clone of the TikTok app, and conduct a randomized experiment in which over 8, 500 Americans are recruited to use this app and view a random sample of actual TikTok content. We show that pro-China foreign influencers are strikingly effective at increasing favorability toward China, while traditional Chinese state media causes backlash. The findings highlight the importance of influencers in shaping global public opinion. |
| Date: | 2026–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2601.14118 |