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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Ntounias, Theodoros; Dellmuth, Lisa; Jonsson, Evelina; Schneider, Christina |
| Abstract: | Climate shocks are becoming more frequent and costly, yet their consequences for electoral competition remain contested. Existing work has focused primarily on whether climate shocks redirect support toward green parties by raising the salience of climate policy. We argue that climate shocks shape political party competition primarily by shaping voters' retrospective evaluations of government performance. Political trust determines how voters interpret that signal. Where trust in institutions is low, hardship confirms preexisting perceptions of elite neglect: incumbents lose votes and populist challengers, particularly on the radical right, gain support by framing disaster as evidence of institutional betrayal. Where trust is high, voters extend goodwill to incumbents navigating difficult circumstances, leaving support largely unaffected. We test these claims using subnational monthly data on party vote shares, political trust, and exogenous heatwave and drought events across 230 regions in 24 European countries between 1996 and 2020. Incumbent losses in low-trust regions reach ten percentage points after heatwaves and sixteen after extreme dry spells; populist gains reach five and twelve points respectively. We find only weak and inconsistent evidence of shifts toward green parties, suggesting that the dominant political dynamic following climate shocks is driven by institutional grievance rather than climate issue salience. |
| Keywords: | Social and Behavioral Sciences, climate shocks, green parties, political conflict, populist party support, democracy |
| Date: | 2026–11–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:globco:qt68m3z2dt |
| By: | Lara-Rodríguez, Juan Sebastián |
| Abstract: | Political parties and corruption research relies predominantly on political spectrum, overlooking the organisational attributes that shape whether parties constrain or facilitate corrupt behaviour. This paper proposes a typological framework that clasïsifies parties by their organisational origins — traditional, personalistic, ethnic, rebelïorigin, and neo-Pentecostal — and examines how these are related to corruption across mayoral, gubernatorial, and presidential administrative levels. Drawing on prosecutorial records from Colombia’s Attorney General covering 2011–2020, I construct a composïite corruption indicator for 1, 122 municipalities across three local and two presidential elections. The empirical strategy combines municipality and two-way fixed effects, spaïtial econometric models, and a regression discontinuity design exploiting close elections. The results show that rebel-origin parties and citizen-signature movements consistently reduce corruption, whilst traditional and personalistic types remain statistically indistinïguishable; ethnic parties appear insignificant in the main classification, but the sensitivity analysis reveals that once parapolitically captured parties are reassigned, genuine indigenïous parties significantly reduce rent-seeking. This relationship varies across governmental tiers: party structure binds at the municipal level, church-based accountability operates at the gubernatorial level, and armed-group networks override party type at the presidential level. Voter turnout is positively associated with municipal corruption, consistent with clientelistic mobilisation. These findings demonstrate that how parties are built matters for understanding corruption in multi-party democracies. |
| Date: | 2026–10–14 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:6xsk9_v1 |
| By: | Igor Benati (CNR-IRCRES, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche – Istituto di Ricerca sulla Crescita Economica Sostenibile, via Real Collegio 30, Moncalieri (TO) – Italia); Greta Falavigna (CNR-IRCRES, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche – Istituto di Ricerca sulla Crescita Economica Sostenibile, via Real Collegio 30, Moncalieri (TO) – Italia); Lisa Sella (CNR-IRCRES, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche – Istituto di Ricerca sulla Crescita Economica Sostenibile, via Real Collegio 30, Moncalieri (TO) – Italia) |
| Abstract: | A long tradition of electoral studies focuses on the effects of the social context on political participation (Marsh, 2002; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1993). At the same time, an equally fertile line of research applies to the determination of the main causes of the gap of women in political representation. This article is located at the crossroads of these two fields of research. Its purpose is to illustrate how context variables can determine female candidate quota. In order to investigate the relationship between the quota of female candidatures and a plurality of social and economic variables related to context, a specification of the Correlated Random Effect (CRE) model has been applied to a panel. Indeed, this model allows to consider together time variant and time invariant variables. Data refer to municipal elections in Italy from 2009 to 2016. This period is particularly interesting since in 2012 an electoral reform became law that provides some gender rebalancing mechanisms in municipal elections. |
| Keywords: | Gender gap, political participation, contextual factors, panel data, correlated random effect |
| JEL: | D72 C23 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:csc:ircrwp:201908 |
| By: | Abel François; Nicolas Lagios; Pierre-Guillaume Méon |
| Abstract: | Can shared transnational experiences foster people’s attachment to a community beyond the nation-state? The answer is a priori ambiguous: international events bring nations together around a common frame, but they also set them against one another. To address this, we study the Eurovision Song Contest, an annual competition broadcast to a large cross-national audience and organized around shared European values. Comparing respondents surveyed just before and after their country’s participation in the show, we find that the contest raises European identification, which complements national identity rather than substituting for it. The effect persists and is independent of the event’s results. Regarding mechanisms, we show that Eurovision changes the values individuals attribute to Europe without changing their own values, and identification increases when the two align. Importantly, the event has electoral consequences: in countries that narrowly qualify for the final, votes in European Parliament elections shift toward more pro-European parties. |
| Keywords: | national identity, supranational identity, regional integration, voting, shared experiences, European integration, Eurovision Song Contest |
| JEL: | D72 D83 D91 Z13 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_13123 |
| By: | Sesay, Vamuyan A.; Zahra, Tahreen; Beland, Louis-Philippe |
| Abstract: | The study by Granzier et al. (2023) shows that a candidate's ranking in polls and previous elections can strongly influence how political parties and voters coordinate their actions. Specifically, candidates who rank first in the initial round of elections are more likely to stay in the race and win the second round than those who rank second. This pattern also holds true when comparing candidates ranked second versus third and third versus fourth. To verify these findings, we replicated all the regression tables and figures using regression discontinuity design as in the original study. We also conducted additional tests by analyzing different subsets of the data, removing extreme cases based on "election year" and "district identifier." Our results mostly confirm the original findings, with only slight changes in the strength and significance of the effects. For example, the effect of being ranked first instead of second on the likelihood of continuing to the second round remains consistent across all tests. However, the effect of being ranked third instead of fourth on winning the second round varies more, especially when extreme cases are removed, which aligns with the original study's observation that very few candidates ranked third or fourth in the first round go on to win in the second round. |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:i4rdps:337 |
| By: | Lenik, Paulina |
| Abstract: | This note makes the Reiljan Affective Polarization Index (API) available for CSES Module 6 elections and documents the pipeline that produces it. To our knowledge, as of October 2026, no published work reports API values from Module 6. We replicate published API scores to within 0.000002 (about six significant figures) for 12 elections (2007–2017) in ten countries that are covered by Reiljan et al.’s replication data, compute the index for eight Module 6 elections (five with usable occupation codes) held in 2022–24, and link party-level populism codes from PopuList 4.0 through Party Facts and ParlGov identifiers. As a demonstration, we test whether voters in occupations more exposed to generative AI are more or less affectively polarised, using five studies. Exposure is negatively associated with individual-level API (−0.135 per SD, p = .003), but the estimate falls to −0.082 (p = .27) with ISCO major-group fixed effects. The association with voting for populist parties behaves similarly (−3.1 pp, p = .004; −1.4 pp, p = .31 with ISCO major-group fixed effects). The exposure × populist interaction is not distinguishable from zero (p = .13). Only the far-right vote estimate stays below p = .05 with fixed effects, and it does not in the extended sample. We treat these results as a transparent null from an exploratory design, not as evidence of a causal mechanism. Code and aggregate scores are deposited on Zenodo. |
| Date: | 2026–10–18 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:4jf2m_v1 |
| By: | Vladimir Shchukin |
| Abstract: | In this paper, I propose a theory that explains why the landowning elite promoted industrialization in the second half of the 19th century. I argue that this elite used public investment (e.g. railroad construction) strategically to undermine capitalists’ support for revolution and thereby stabilize the existing political regime. Specifically, increased public investment enhanced the productivity of the industrial sector, thereby increasing capital income and augmenting capitalists’ wealth. Greater wealth among capitalists translated into heightened potential losses from redistributive policies if political power shifted to the working class, which imposes higher taxes. If there is a positive probability that the working class will take power, the potential higher degree of public investment they will impose will always mean that capitalists will prefer to maintain the political regime of landowners. |
| Keywords: | industrialization, political commitment, democratization |
| JEL: | D72 D74 O14 |
| Date: | 2026–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cer:papers:wp820 |
| By: | Adam, Antonis; Tsarsitalidou, Sofia |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the impact of remittances from democratic countries on the political institutions of recipient nations. We argue that the democratic origin of remittances, rather than their aggregate level, is what matters for institutional outcomes. To test this proposition, we analyse a sample of 156 countries from 1970 to 2023, using a novel dataset that distinguishes between remittances from democratic and autocratic source countries. Our instrumental-variable strategy uses common-language exposure to democratic source countries, weighted by inverse bilateral distance and interacted with global trade openness. Results from our analysis and several robustness tests indicate that remittances from democratic countries significantly enhance democratic institutions. While the analysis is global in scope, the findings are particularly relevant to debates on political change in autocratic and weakly democratic regimes. |
| Keywords: | democratisation;emigration;IV regression;political institutions;remittances |
| JEL: | F3 G3 |
| Date: | 2026–09–24 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:141817 |
| By: | Benjamin Tremblay-Auger (Chapman University) |
| Abstract: | I develop a theory in which the distribution of cultural traits and institutions co-evolve through a political multiplier: as more individuals adopt a trait, they support policies aligned with it, incentivizing others to adopt the trait, and leading politicians to propose even more aligned policies. This feedback loop can generate multiple stable equilibria, and the stronger the multiplier, the more distinct they are. Information is aggregated through the political process and diffused via public signals rather than through decentralized social networks, allowing a temporary shock to trigger a rapid, long-lasting shift from one stable equilibrium to another. The model sheds light on Quebec’s sudden secularization, the “Quiet Revolution.†Combining 58 historical polls, I document that Quebec went from Canada’s most to least religious province in under two decades after 1960, and show that existing theories cannot account for this striking pattern. I argue that Quebec’s distinctive integration of church and state gave public institutions substantial influence over religiosity, producing a strong multiplier and multiple equilibria there—but not in the rest of Canada—thus leaving it susceptible to an equilibrium shift. Historical evidence indicates that a similar mechanism drove rapid secularization in some European countries. |
| Keywords: | political multiplier; cultural change; secularization; political economy of religion; Quiet Revolution |
| JEL: | C62 D02 D72 N30 Z10 Z12 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:26-14 |
| By: | Suter, Manuel; Iten, Tonja; Gubler, Lena; Mayer, Heike; Kallis, Giorgos |
| Abstract: | Surveying the opinions of 1, 557 citizens and 588 parliamentary politicians in Switzerland on eleven post-growth sustainability policies, we find that citizens overwhelmingly support the policies, while politicians support them substantially less. Compared to citizens, politicians’ evaluation is more polarized. Given the legislative power of politicians, such political elite-citizen divergence may help explain why transformative sustainability action remains limited despite public support. |
| Date: | 2026–10–20 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:2djcw_v1 |
| By: | Afolabi, Damilola; Zimmermann, Klaus F. |
| Abstract: | This chapter defines and reviews partisan demographics as an emerging field at the intersection of political demography, political economy, and population economics. Whereas political demography examines how population change affects politics, partisan demographics studies how political events, party control, political climates, and policy regimes influence demographic behavior in ways that vary with the partisan alignment of individuals, households, or local populations. The chapter asks under what conditions partisan events become demographic shocks and organizes the evidence around five mechanisms: economic expectations, policy anticipation, affective identity, social matching and sorting, and risk perception and health behavior. The strongest evidence currently concerns fertility and reproductive behavior, including conceptions and abortions, while studies of marriage, partnership formation, residential sorting, health behavior, wellbeing, and mortality extend the field with varying degrees of empirical support. Evidence on migration, integration, and naturalization remains more limited. Particular attention is given to empirical credibility, including the timing of political shocks and demographic responses, the distinction between behavior and attitudes, the measurement of partisan exposure, and the separation of partisan effects from pre-existing demographic differences. The chapter concludes by identifying the conditions under which partisan politics becomes a consequential determinant of demographic behavior and by outlining priorities for future research. |
| Keywords: | Partisan demographics, political demography, political economy, political shocks, fertility, health, demographic sorting |
| JEL: | D72 J11 J13 I12 J61 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:glodps:1865 |
| By: | Liu, Tzu-Ping (University of Taipei); Yang, Tzu-Hsien |
| Abstract: | Political transparency promotes accountability only if citizens are willing to accept the information provided. As artificial intelligence (AI) increasingly mediates the production and evaluation of public information, an important question is whether AI-generated political information remains subject to partisan filtering. We examine this question using an online survey experiment in Taiwan that varies two potential partisan cues surrounding an AI-generated legislative-performance evaluation: the partisan camp of the legislator receiving a favorable evaluation and the partisan alignment of the media outlet associated with the AI system. The results show that acceptance is strongly shaped by congruence with the favorably evaluated legislator. Respondents are more accepting when the legislator belongs to their own partisan camp and substantially less accepting when the legislator belongs to an opposing camp. By contrast, congruence with the media outlet associated with the AI system has no statistically significant effect. Further, prior generative-AI usage is positively associated with acceptance, but this association is significantly weaker when the favorably evaluated legislator is politically congruent with the respondent. These findings demonstrate that AI-mediated transparency does not eliminate partisan filtering and suggest that the partisan implications of AI-generated outputs may matter more than the political alignment of the institutions associated with their production. |
| Date: | 2026–10–28 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:b3nzt_v1 |
| By: | Oppel, Annalena |
| Abstract: | The relationship between political trust and support for redistributive policies reveals a paradox: while political trust typically increases policy support, it may simultaneously strengthen meritocratic beliefs that legitimise wealth accumulation and suppress redistributive preferences. Drawing on survey data from 2, 249 wealthier, predominantly secondary- and tertiary-educated South African adults collected in 2022, I test a mediation framework where political trust affects wealth tax preferences both directly and indirectly through meritocratic tendencies. The analysis reveals a ‘meritocratic brake effect’: while higher political trust increases support for wealth taxation, it also strengthens meritocratic beliefs about wealth accumulation, which in turn suppresses redistributive preferences. This creates a complex dynamic where the positive effect of trust on wealth tax support is partially offset by merit-based legitimisation of inequality. Given South Africa’s extreme inequality and historically low political trust levels (70 per cent of respondents expressing distrust), these findings reveal a potential vicious cycle where the institutional confidence needed to implement redistributive policies is undermined by the very ideologies that legitimise wealth concentration. The study contributes to understanding how trust-inequality-meritocracy dynamics shape attitudinal receptivity to wealth taxation in highly unequal societies, suggesting that successful wealth tax implementation may require simultaneous efforts to rebuild institutional trust and challenge meritocratic narratives about wealth accumulation. |
| Keywords: | political trust;wealth taxation;redistribution;South Africa;meritocracy |
| JEL: | J1 |
| Date: | 2026–11–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:141921 |
| By: | Mostapha Diss (Université Marie et Louis Pasteur, CRESE UR3190, F-25000 Besançon, France); Salma Larabi (Université Marie et Louis Pasteur, CRESE UR3190, F-25000 Besançon, France); Bertrand Tchantcho (École normale supérieure, Université de Yaoundé 1, Cameroon.) |
| Abstract: | When voters rank all alternatives from best to worst, an alternative is said to be socially acceptable if the number of voters who rank it among their most preferred half of the alternatives is at least as large as the number of voters who rank it among their least preferred half of the alternatives (Mahajne and Volij, 2018, Social Choice and Welfare 51:223-233). It has also been established that there exists a unique scoring rule that always selects a subset of socially acceptable alternatives. This notion of social acceptability has since been extensively studied in the social choice literature. We study a generalized version of this principle based on asymmetric thresholds: for integers p and q such that 1 ≤p, q ≤⌊m 2 ⌋, an alternative is socially p/q-acceptable whenever the number of voters who rank it among their top p positions is at least as large as the number of voters who rank it among their bottom q positions. We provide a complete characterization of the scoring rules that always select socially p/q-acceptable alternatives. We show that such a rule exists if and only if p ≥q, and that this rule is unique when p= q. For any pair (p, q), we further give a complete characterization of every admissible scoring rule, together with a monotonicity property describing how the admissible class varies with p and q. Finally, we apply our results to several classical scoring rules, including the Borda, plurality, antiplurality, and k-approval rules, identifying the conditions under which they satisfy the proposed acceptability property. |
| Keywords: | Voting, scoring rules, social acceptability, asymmetric thresholds |
| JEL: | D71 D72 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crb:wpaper:2026-15 |
| By: | Huth, Federico (Torcuato Di Tella University); Parnes, Sebastian |
| Abstract: | This article examines the spatial distribution of Lula’s vote gains between the two rounds of Brazil’s 2026 presidential election. Using electoral-section results and data from the 2022 Census, we estimate the composition of the electorate at 3, 478 polling places in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. In both cities, Lula made greater gains at polling places with a higher estimated share of favela residents, even after controlling for income, violence, and first-round results. The difference associated with moving from the 10th to the 90th percentile of this share was approximately one percentage point of the registered electorate. In São Paulo, proximity to favelas was also positively associated with Lula’s gains, while Flávio Bolsonaro’s gains were smaller in areas with higher levels of violence in both cities. The comparison with 2022 shows that the association between electorate composition and Lula’s gains intensified in both metropolitan centers. Extending the analysis to 23 large cities shows a smaller intensification on average, distinguishable from zero in only five of them. In 2026, the differential was larger in cities whose state governments elected in 2022 were allied with Bolsonaro. This pattern is consistent with a reaction to security policies, although the aggregate data cannot identify this mechanism or reconstruct individual vote transfers. |
| Date: | 2026–10–28 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:edk6v_v1 |
| By: | E, Kaushik |
| Abstract: | Political labels are often assumed to map neatly onto economic systems: the left is expected to favor socialism and the right capitalism. This paper asks why that pattern exists and why it breaks down in some countries. It first examines four explanations for the pattern: historical origins, class interest, core values, and coalition bundling. It then compares cases, including Sweden, China, the United States and India, where party labels and economic policy diverge. The paper argues that the link between political stance and economic policy is contingent rather than necessary, and that it varies with a party's voter base, a country's history, and its state capacity. The findings suggest that left-right labels are an unreliable guide to actual economic policy. |
| Date: | 2026–10–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:3qtrg_v1 |
| By: | Downes, Alexander; Lyall, Jason (Dartmouth College) |
| Abstract: | Democratic initiators are widely held to win interstate wars far more often than autocracies. Yet this ``democratic advantage'' rests on one war dataset, the Correlates of War (COW), and a few democracy measures. We reassess it using 11 operationalizations of democracy and Project Mars, a far larger dataset of wars. Across 490 estimates, we find no robust advantage for democratic initiators. With standard controls, Project Mars contrasts between democratic and non-democratic initiators range from -12 to +8 percentage points; none is significant. A 1, 408-specification multiverse shows the advantage fades as controls are added: only 5.8\% of Project Mars specifications are significant, and the Bayesian model average (11 points) is indistinguishable from zero. Project Mars rules out advantages of 15 points or more; COW, by contrast, has too few democratic initiators to settle the question. Research that treats democracies as the benchmark of wartime success may rest on a baseline that does not exist. |
| Date: | 2026–10–16 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:jvryq_v1 |
| By: | Lara-Rodríguez, Juan Sebastián |
| Abstract: | Colombia produces more coca than ever, yet scholarship remains anchored in security frameworks that overlook how institutional configurations shape this illegal crop. This article treats coca cultivation as a governance outcome, arguing that the interaction between formal institutions — political parties and electoral processes — and informal entities — criminal and rebel armed groups — determines where coca takes root. Drawïing on a municipality-level panel covering the national territory from 2011 to 2023, and employing fixed effects, spatial Durbin models, and a difference-in-differences leveraging the 2016 peace settlement, the analysis reveals that no party or coalition bears a signifïicant association with coca once municipal heterogeneity is absorbed. What persistently predicts cultivation is electoral fraud risk and armed group presence, specially the ELN guerrilla. The latest peace accord caused coca expansion rather than contraction. These findings suggest that phasing out coca demands strengthening democracy and extending the rule of law to plantation clusters. |
| Date: | 2026–10–14 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:przdf_v1 |
| By: | Franco Corti; Sajid Siraj |
| Abstract: | Locating political parties on environmental and climate policy is central to the study of party competition, yet the established instruments, expert surveys and the hand coding of manifestos, are costly, periodic, and slow to extend to new documents. We ask whether a panel of large language models can serve as a cheaper and reproducible alternative. Treating each manifesto as a set of sentences, three models from independent providers score every sentence on two dimensions, environmental protection and climate change, separating a party's position on an issue from the salience it gives it, and the judgments are averaged to the manifesto level. Agreement across the models is retained as a built-in reliability signal. We apply the panel to 41 manifestos from the 2024 European Parliament election, covering Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the European party families, and validate it against the 2024 Chapel Hill Expert Survey for the 25 parties with a like-for-like expert benchmark, using the other manifestos as diagnostic cases. The panel recovers the expert ordering of parties with strong rank agreement on both dimensions, while reading them as systematically greener than experts do, a gap we interpret as the distance between manifesto promise and governing record. Inter-model disagreement modestly flags where the instrument errs, and position and salience prove related for environmental protection but independent for climate change. The result is a transparent, low-cost, and multilingual instrument that complements rather than replaces expert and hand-coded approaches; the prompt, code, and manifesto-level results are released openly. |
| Date: | 2026–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2611.02033 |
| By: | Dossi, Gaia Greta; Morando, Marta |
| Abstract: | We study whether, and how, societal views about which problems are most important or worth solving are reflected in the direction of technological progress. Compared to Republican inventors, Democrats are more likely to patent technologies addressing climate-change mitigation or women?s reproductive health and less likely to patent weapons. These gaps are not explained by differences in inventive ability, persist within organizations, have strengthened over the past two decades, and also appear in subsequent innovation. Together, societal views and their polarization appear to be important drivers of technological change, operating in part through inventors' technology choices, with implications for innovation policy. |
| Keywords: | innovation;polarization;technological change |
| JEL: | D72 I10 J24 O31 O33 P00 |
| Date: | 2025–08–13 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:141556 |
| By: | Mostapha Diss (Université Marie et Louis Pasteur, CRESE UR3190, F-25000 Besançon, France); Salma Larabi (Université Marie et Louis Pasteur, CRESE UR3190, F-25000 Besançon, France); Zéphirin Nganmeni (Université Paris 8, LED UR3391, F-93526 Saint Denis, France) |
| Abstract: | Popular consultations and citizens’ assemblies can restrict the set of politically admissible alternatives before parliamentary decision-making takes place. We study a two-stage spatial voting model in which a first-stage admissibility restriction determines the domain over which a parliamentary voting game operates. The sequential core consists of admissible alternatives that no winning parliamentary coalition can block through another admissible alternative. At the coalition level, the no-blocking problem is a constrained Euclidean Pareto-efficiency problem. Applying the projection characterization of Carrizosa et al. (Operations Research Letters, 14(5):291–295, 1993.) represents the sequential core as the intersection of the Euclidean projections of the convex hulls of winning coalitions’ ideal points onto the admissible domain. This yields invariance to standard blocking conventions, a barycentric support interpretation, and preservation of unrestricted core points under projection, while localizing additional stability to the boundary of a full-dimensional admissibility domain. Our main existence results exploit the effective dimension of the projected no-blocking loci. When these loci are convex and lie in a common affine space of dimension r, an (r + 1)-fold intersection property of winning coalitions guarantees a nonempty sequential core. For symmetric quota rules, a quota above r/(r + 1) of the assembly is sufficient, and this bound is exact for the corresponding coalition-intersection property. Under the leading core-based admissibility rule, the first-stage domain is a polytope. Around almost every exterior point, a whole neighbourhood is projected affinely onto one proper face, so any parliamentary profile in that neighbourhood inherits the lower-dimensional stability condition. In the plane, this reduces the sufficient quota from two-thirds to a strict majority, even when the unrestricted majority core is empty. |
| Keywords: | Popular admissibility; sequential spatial voting; parliamentary stability; sequential core; spatial core; Euclidean projection; multidimensional voting |
| JEL: | D71 D72 D78 C62 C71 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crb:wpaper:2026-16 |
| By: | Santos, Vinicius |
| Abstract: | Generative artificial intelligence allows political presence to be produced without the participation of those whose presence is displayed. Research has treated such media mainly as false records, or has studied AI presented as a political agent. This article examines a third phenomenon: AI that supplies the face, voice, or body through which human operators make a political appearance. It develops the concept of synthetic political avatars, analyzes them by referent, claimed basis of standing, accountability, and disclosure, and distinguishes four kinds of claims they make: to be a specific person, to be a typical member of a group, to speak for a group, and to present content as the work of a group. A layered comparison covers nineteen documented avatars in nine countries of the Global South between 2023 and 2026, set against contrast cases from other regions, institutional uses, and AI-driven candidacies. Across the core configurations, the cases reveal recurring gaps between synthetic presence and the strongest available basis of standing, while disclosure and authorization vary independently. Procedural governance of synthetic presence exists mainly in museums and foundations, not in electoral politics. The cases also support propositions about synthetic succession, the substitution of absent leaders, and the use of identity markers without participation. Generative AI lowers the cost of producing political presence without lowering the cost of authorizing or attributing it, and labeling, on its own, does not close that gap. |
| Date: | 2026–10–28 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:xw9cq_v1 |