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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Titeca, Kristof |
| Abstract: | Uganda’s 2026 elections mark a shift from democratic competition to a succession-driven contest within a late-Museveni regime. |
| Keywords: | Uganda, elections |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iob:apbrfs:2025007 |
| By: | Frédéric Docquier; Stefano Iandolo; Hillel Rapoport; Riccardo Turati; Gonzague Vannoorenberghe |
| Abstract: | We propose new ways to measure populism, using the Manifesto Project Database (1960-2019) as main source of data. We characterize the evolution of populism over 60 years and show empirically that it is significantly impacted by the skill-content of globalization. Specifically, imports of goods which are intensive in low-skill labor generate more right-wing populism, and low-skill immigration shifts the distribution of votes to the right, with more votes for right-wing populist parties and less for left-wing populist parties. In contrast, imports of high-skill labor intensive goods, as well as high-skill immigration flows, tend to reduce the volume of populism. |
| Keywords: | Globalization, Populism, Immigration, Trade |
| JEL: | D72 F22 F52 J61 P00 |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:2550 |
| By: | Navin Kartik; Elliot Lipnowski; Harry Pei |
| Abstract: | Does electoral replacement ensure that officeholders eventually act in voters’ interests? We study a reputational model of accountability. Voters observe incumbents’ performance and decide whether to replace them. Politicians may be “good” types who always exert effort or opportunists who may shirk. We find that good long-run outcomes are always attainable, though the mechanism and its robustness depend on economic conditions. In environments conducive to incentive provision, some equilibria feature sustained effort, yet others exhibit some long-run shirking. In the complementary case, opportunists are never fully disciplined, but selection dominates: every equilibrium eventually settles on a good politician, yielding permanent effort. |
| JEL: | C73 D72 D78 D82 D83 |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35154 |
| By: | Dana Sisak (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Otto Swank (Erasmus University Rotterdam) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the determinants of states' policy capacity, defined as the ability of states to craft effective policies. Our model shows that the interaction between politicians' implementation decisions and bureaucrats' motivation to design effective policies can lead to the coexistence of high-trust and low-trust equilibria. Without electoral concerns, politicians favor high-trust equilibria and hire capable bureaucrats. In a polarized society, electoral concerns may prompt more policy-skeptical politicians to appoint less capable bureaucrats to diminish policy capacity and ensure low-trust equilibria. This strategy shifts future implementation decisions in favor of interventionist politicians. Moreover, it reduces voters' demand for interventionist decision-making. |
| Keywords: | infinite horizon optimal control, monotone trajectories |
| JEL: | D72 D73 D78 |
| Date: | 2025–10–24 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20250062 |
| By: | Neisser, Carina (University of Cologne); Wehrhöfer, Nils (Bundesbank) |
| Abstract: | We study how public disclosure of politicians’ outside income affects their behavior. We exploit a disclosure reform targeting German federal MPs and tax-return data in a difference-in-differences setup using unaffected state MPs as controls. MPs increase their outside income by 24%, driven by likely right-leaning MPs. A representative survey experiment uncovers that right-leaning voters interpret outside income as a signal of competence and hard work, while left-leaning voters associate it with weaker representation. Consistent with this, we show that newspapers cover right-leaning MPs’ outside activities more favorably. Our findings suggest that politicians strategically use public disclosure as a signaling tool. |
| Keywords: | tax data, outside income, politicians, income disclosure |
| JEL: | D72 D83 J45 |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18576 |
| By: | Yannick van Etten (Tinbergen Institute); Jan Magnus (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam); Tetsuya Matsubayashi (The University of Osaka) |
| Abstract: | We study the possible increase of partisan polarization in the Netherlands over the period 1998--2023, in particular its relationship with the degree of urbanization, the so-called urban-rural divide. Using national election results at the municipal level and municipal characteristics, we show that urban-rural polarization has indeed increased. A novel aspect of our paper is the introduction of shocks as possible explanatory variables. The effect of a shock on polarization depends on the type of shock. An exterior shock tends to increase cohesion and lower polarization, but an interior shock leads to less cohesion and more polarization. |
| Keywords: | urban-rural divide, elections, shocks, geographic polarization, regional resentment |
| JEL: | C52 D72 D74 D83 Z13 |
| Date: | 2025–09–26 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20250056 |
| By: | Pauline Grosjean; Saumitra Jha; Michael Vlassopoulos; Yves Zenou |
| Abstract: | We show how exposure to partisan peers, under conditions requiring high stakes cooperation, can trigger the breakthrough of novel political beliefs. We exploit the large-scale, exogenous assignment of soldiers from each of 34, 947 French municipalities into line infantry regiments during World War I. We show that soldiers from poor, rural municipalities---where the novel redistributive message of the left had previously failed to penetrate---voted for the left by nearly 45% more after the war when exposed to left-wing partisans within their regiment. We provide evidence that these differences reflect persuasive information provision by both peers and officers in the trenches that proved particularly effective among those most likely to benefit from the redistributive policies of the left. In contrast, soldiers from neighbouring municipalities that served with right-wing partisans are inoculated against the left, becoming moderate centrists instead. |
| Keywords: | Political Persuasion, Transmission, War, Voting Behavior, Conflict, Peer Effects, France, World War I |
| JEL: | D74 N44 L14 |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:2539 |
| By: | Marco Bertoni (University of Padova); Paolo Falco (University of Copenhagen); Luigi Guiso (Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) and CEPR); Tullio Jappelli (University of Naples Federico II, CSEF, and CEPR); Roberto Nisticò (University of Naples Federico II, CSEF and IZA) |
| Abstract: | We use a large-scale survey experiment in Italy to study how citizens update their beliefs about the effects of highly salient and politically contested policy reforms when exposed to scientific evidence. We find that while prior beliefs are often inconsistent with accurate scientific evidence, providing this evidence shifts beliefs towards accuracy. Crucially, belief updating is largely independent of the political alignment of media source conveying the information. This suggests that credible evidence can overcome partisan divides. |
| Keywords: | Policy misperceptions; Belief updating; Media bias |
| JEL: | D83 D72 D91 |
| Date: | 2026–04–17 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:776 |
| By: | Boelmann, Barbara (University of Cologne); Stapper, Carola (Johannes Kepler University Linz) |
| Abstract: | We shift the perspective from why men extended political rights to women toward what shaped women’s own demand. Exploiting World War I drafting variation, we study how male absence affected German women’s demand for the franchise. We construct a new panel of all suffragette clubs - a revealed-preference measure given high wartime costs. Women were more likely to keep clubs open where more men were absent, especially where women led war relief efforts, highlighting agency and leadership experience as the central mechanism. Demand persisted after enfranchisement, with more female candidates and higher female turnout in high-absence counties with a wartime club. |
| Keywords: | women's political representation, suffrage movement, agency |
| JEL: | J16 N44 D71 |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18587 |
| By: | Gutmann, Jerg; Metelska-Szaniawska, Katarzyna |
| Abstract: | Populism is frequently described as a threat to constitutionalism, although some researchers emphasize that populists, too, draft, enforce, and derive legitimacy from constitutions. This chapter explains the theoretical foundations of these concerns and provides an overview of empirical evidence regarding the relationship between populism and constitutionalism. |
| Keywords: | Populism, Constitutional change, Constitutional compliance, Constitutionalism, Judicial independence, Rule of law |
| JEL: | D72 D73 K11 K38 K42 P48 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ilewps:92 |
| By: | Masako Ikefuji (University of Osaka); Jan R. Magnus (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam); Zhehao Wang (University of Osaka) |
| Abstract: | We explore how news and social pressure affect public opinion on climate change in the USA, based on county-level data over the period 1990--2024. Social pressure turns out to be the key factor that shapes public opinion on climate change, much more so than media. Policies that increase the overall level of educational achievement will create more awareness of climate change, but only if these policies don't change the shape of the education distribution. If only right-wing news is available and republicans have complete control over all media, public opinion about climate in democratic counties will not decrease; in fact, it will increase, although only marginally. |
| Keywords: | News coverage, social pressure, demographic diversity, political polarization, dynamics of opinion, climate change, USA |
| JEL: | D72 D83 D91 Q54 C13 C15 |
| Date: | 2025–11–21 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20250065 |
| By: | Steeve Mongrain; Federico Revelli; Tanguy van Ypersele; Roberto Zotti |
| Abstract: | This paper models theoretically and tests empirically the hypothesis that the decision about the location of a public bad within a multi-tiered structure of government (a facility providing benefits throughout the federation but inflicting damage to the region hosting it) can be driven by strategic electoral considerations exploiting the heterogeneous migration responses to the location of the public bad by voters of different ideologies - a sort of mobility-based gerrymandering. As long as the average utility loss from living close to the public bad is larger for progressives than it is for conservatives, conservative and progressive central governments will pursue opposite strategies. The former locate the public bad in an electorally tight region to induce progressive voters to exit and gain the region for the conservative party, while the latter attempt to spread progressive voters out of safe and into electorally tight regions. An application to waste treatment plant locations across Italian municipalities returns evidence in support of the model's main hypotheses. |
| Keywords: | gerrymandering, sorting, multi-tier structure, local elections |
| JEL: | D72 R23 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12625 |
| By: | Daniel Borbely; Mathias Bühler; Joris Mueller; Jonathan Norris |
| Abstract: | Why do some economies recover from armed conflict much better than others? We provide evidence that political accountability determines whether post-conflict societies realize the peace dividend. We study Cambodia, where a nationwide landmine clearance campaign created large local potential surpluses by freeing arable land and reducing victimization by 48%. Whether these surpluses translate into realized development depends on accountability. Using a staggered difference-in-differences strategy, we show that clearance raises the probability of any nightlights by 7.3 percentage points in areas with strong pre-existing demand for checks and balances on political elites. Where such demand is weak, the effect is close to zero. Elite capture explains the divergence. In low-accountability areas, clearance increases land concessions, deforestation, land disputes, and labor displacement. Where accountability is strong, clearance instead raises household consumption by 22%. Post-conflict recovery requires not just the existence of a peace dividend but political constraints on its capture. |
| Keywords: | political accountability, peace dividend |
| JEL: | D7 O4 Q1 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12632 |