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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Nicola Fontana (Department of Economics, Trinity College Dublin); Tommaso Nannicini (School of Transnational Governance, European University Institute); James M. Snyder, Jr. (Department of Government, Harvard University) |
| Abstract: | We study whether the partisan affiliation of U.S. state governors affects the outcome of partisan judicial elections. Exploiting close gubernatorial races from 1946 to 2023, we find that electing a Democratic (Republican) governor significantly increases the subsequent vote share of Democratic (Republican) judicial candidates. This executive spillover effect arises despite the formal institutional independence of the judiciary and holds in contexts with similar levels of polarization and partisanship. Our findings show that, under partisan judicial elections, even narrow shifts in executive power can erode the separation of powers, as some voters adjust their judicial choices in response to the partisan control of the executive. This effect is stronger when executive and legislative powers are unified and when the judicial election occurs soon after the governor's race. |
| Keywords: | Judicial Elections; Partisan Alignment; Regression Discontinuity |
| JEL: | D72 D73 K40 |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tcd:tcduee:tep0626 |
| By: | Ryo Arawatari (Faculty of Economics, Doshisha University); Tetsuo Ono (Graduate School of Economics, The University of Osaka) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the optimal supermajority threshold for approving fiscal rule suspensions within a two-period political turnover model. Faced with the potential loss of power, the incumbent party aims to secure preferred expenditures by increasing public debt. To counteract this, an expenditure rule requiring legislative approval for suspension is introduced. The analysis shows that the voting threshold in parliament should exceed a simple majority, making a simple majority rule suboptimal. A stricter supermajority is necessary when fiscal expenditure rules are more flexible, as it allows for more effective responses to economic fluctuations. Moreover, while higher initial debt levels call for stricter expenditure rules, the optimal supermajority threshold remains unaffected by the debt level. Finally, as political polarization among voters intensifies, the optimal threshold decreases, increasingly aligning with the incumbent party’s preferences. |
| Keywords: | Fiscal rules, Government debt, Political turnover |
| JEL: | D72 D78 H62 H63 |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osk:wpaper:2605 |
| By: | Shuhei Kitamura; Ryo Takahashi; Katsunori Yamada |
| Abstract: | Elections can deter corruption only if voters punish tainted incumbents. We study whether punishment depends on second-order beliefs—beliefs about how other voters will react. Before Japan’s October 2024 general election amid a funding scandal, we ran a pre-registered online survey experiment. To study this channel, we provided no new factual information about the scandal itself and instead reported a baseline statistic about perceived public intolerance of the underlying corruption: treated respondents learned that, in our baseline survey, the average respondent estimated that 67% of other respondents viewed the conduct as unacceptable. The message increased turnout by 6 percentage points and support for opposition challengers by 7 percentage points. Effects were sharply heterogeneous. Swing voters, especially those who initially overestimated how widely others would punish, became more likely to vote and back challengers. By contrast, ruling-party supporters, especially those who initially underestimated how widely others would punish, shifted toward the incumbent when they learned that intolerance of the corruption was higher than expected. More broadly, anti-corruption messages may affect voting not only by changing beliefs about wrongdoing, but also by changing beliefs about others’ reactions, helping explain why such campaigns often have mixed effects. |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1289rr |
| By: | Anelli, M.; Morelli, M.; Pappalettera, M. |
| Abstract: | The People’s Party is the only major populist movement in American history that was quickly reabsorbed by mainstream parties. We study the main trigger of its rise—technological disruption from railroad expansion—and discuss its dissolution in light of the conceptual framework we develop and test empirically. We construct a novel county-level measure of Technological Disruption Exposure (TDE) that captures the change in competitive pressure each county faced from all other counties, driven by railroad-induced reductions in transportation costs between 1870 and 1890. TDE positively predicts People's Party vote share in the 1894 congressional elections: a one standard deviation increase raises Populist support by nearly 3 percentage points. Heterogeneity analysis shows that the effect is concentrated in counties with high crop specialization—where competitive vulnerability translates into concentrated losses. A commitment-politics framework organizes these patterns: railroads reduced the prob-ability of being a market winner in high-TDE counties, where voters shifted from discretionary to commitment politicians. The 1890s episode is uniquely informative because, unlike today, there was fiscal and institutional room to rebuild trust: main-stream parties credibly adopted Populist demands, and the movement dissolved. Today those conditions do not hold—which may explain why modern populism has proven more persistent. |
| Date: | 2026–04–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:2628 |
| By: | Antoinette Baujard (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - EM - EMLyon Business School - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Roberto Brunetti (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - EM - EMLyon Business School - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Isabelle Lebon (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Simone Marsilio (UniSR - Universita Vita Salute San Raffaele = Vita-Salute San Raffaele University [Milan, Italie]) |
| Abstract: | If individuals are to be empowered in their selection or use of a voting rule, it is necessary that they understand it. This paper analyzes people's understanding of two voting rules: evaluative voting and majority judgment. We first distinguish three components of understanding in this context: how to fill in the ballot; how votes are aggregated; and how to vote strategically. To measure each component, we draw on results from a lab experiment on incentivized voting where participants are exogenously assigned single-peaked preferences and answer comprehension questions on the rules employed. We find that most participants understand how to fill in the ballot with both voting rules. However, participants' understanding of vote aggregation under majority judgment is lower and, crucially, more heterogeneous. While some participants correctly understand its aggregation property, a sizable group fails to grasp it. We also observe no difference in voting behavior between evaluative voting and majority judgment: the data confirm the theoretical prediction that under evaluative voting there will be a high incidence of strategic voting through the use of extreme grades, but contradict the prediction that under majority judgment voters will vote less strategically. Finally, we find that with majority judgment, the better voters understand how votes are aggregated, the more they vote strategically, hence resulting in inequality in voter agency. |
| Keywords: | laboratory experiment, majority judgment, evaluative voting, understanding, voting rules |
| Date: | 2024–07–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04653702 |
| By: | Diego Marino-Fages (Durham University); Agustina Martínez-Pozo (University of Leicester) |
| Abstract: | How does the advent of political information influence social norms? This paper examines the impact of Jair Bolsonaro’s victory in the 2018 Brazilian presidential electionon the prevalence of hate speech. We apply Natural Language Processing techniques to detect hate speech in over 37.6 million tweets, and leverage the electoral surprise ofBolsonaro’s victory in a difference-in-differences design. Our findings reveal a substantial increase in online hate speech following the election, particularly in municipalities where Bolsonaro’s vote share was lower—where his local and national support diverged most. The increase is primarily driven by the extensive margin of hate speech and is concentrated in homophobic and sexist content—areas in which Bolsonaro’s rhetoric was highly controversial. Overall, these patterns suggest that the election outcome reshaped perceptions of the social acceptability of expressing hate. |
| Keywords: | Hate speech; Social Media; Social Norms |
| JEL: | D72 D83 J15 Z13 |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aoz:wpaper:391 |
| By: | Yameogo, Souleymane |
| Abstract: | Why does democracy lose credibility under chronic insecurity? Existing accounts of democratic backsliding emphasise authoritarian attitudes, institutional weakness, or elite manipulation. This article advances the Hierarchical Fear Theory (HFT), arguing that democratic legitimacy depends on the ordering of competing political fears. Political fear is conceptualised not as an irrational emotion but as a structured anticipation of harm that becomes hierarchically ranked in specific contexts. When insecurity intensifies, fears of physical survival, state collapse, and symbolic disappearance can displace fear of arbitrariness—the liberal concern with unchecked power. Using Burkina Faso as a critical case and drawing on theory-driven analysis and Afrobarometer trends, the article shows how chronic violence reordered the hierarchy of fears, shifting legitimacy from procedural constraint to protective effectiveness. Democratic institutions are consequently evaluated instrumentally rather than intrinsically, generating conditional support for concentrated authority. The findings offer a non-moralising, context-sensitive explanation of democratic erosion with implications for other conflict-affected and fragile democracies. |
| Date: | 2026–04–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:czx97_v1 |
| By: | Jacob Bastian; Melody Harvey |
| Abstract: | Consumer sentiment influences household behavior in important ways, yet we lack causal evidence on whether government policies themselves shape these perceptions. We help fill this gap by studying the expiration of the expanded 2021 Child Tax Credit (CTC), which abruptly reduced household income for millions of families. Using monthly microdata from the University of Michigan's Consumer Sentiment Survey and plausibly exogenous variation in benefit losses across households, we implement continuous difference-in-differences and instrumental variables strategies. We find that each $1, 000 in lost CTC benefits reduces sentiment by 1.7 points (or about 2.4%), with largest effects among lower-income families with multiple children. These effects persist two years after expiration and remain robust to controls for inflation, interest rates, and macroeconomic conditions. The results suggest that fiscal policy impacts perceived economic well-being beyond contemporaneous income effects, with potential implications for household economic activity, political attitudes, and voting behavior. |
| JEL: | E32 E71 H31 I38 |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35059 |
| By: | Reber, Ueli; Ingold, Karin |
| Abstract: | How evidence is used to frame policy issues plays a crucial role in shaping which knowledge is deemed relevant to policymaking. Drawing on argumentation theory and framing literature, we argue that evidence functions as a tool that speakers use strategically and systematically to support specific elements of frames (regarding causes, consequences, or solutions), thereby determining which bodies of knowledge are mobilised in political discourse. Using quantitative content analysis of media, trade, and parliamentary discourse in Switzerland from 2013 to 2022, we identified four frames relating to the issue of pesticide risk reduction: health, environment, economy, and practice. We found that across all frames, the most emphasised frame element is also the one most likely to be supported by evidence. Overall, consequence claims were more likely to be backed by evidence than claims about causes or policy solutions. These patterns reveal which bodies of knowledge are mobilised in political discourse in support of certain policy stances and where the presented frames lack supporting evidence. Recognising the role of framing in evidence use can thus support more transparent and reflexive policymaking by helping researchers and policymakers to identify unavailable or overlooked knowledge and addressing gaps in both research and policymaking. |
| Date: | 2026–04–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:qtuek_v1 |