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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Alabrese, Eleonora; Capozza, Francesco; Garg, Prashant |
| Abstract: | As social media becomes prominent within academia, we examine its reputational costs for academics. Analyzing Twitter posts from 98, 000 scientists (2016-22), we uncover substantial political expression. Online experiments with 4, 000 U.S. respondents and 135 journalists, rating synthetic academic profiles with different political affiliations, reveal that politically neutral scientists are seen as the most credible. Strikingly, political expressions result in monotonic penalties: Stronger posts more greatly reduce the perceived credibility of scientists and their research and audience engagement, particularly among oppositely aligned respondents. Two surveys with scientists highlight their awareness of penalties, their perceived benefits, and a consensus on limiting political expression outside their expertise. |
| Keywords: | Twitter, Scientists' Credibility, Polarization, Online Experiment |
| JEL: | C93 D72 D83 I23 Z10 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbiii:336443 |
| By: | Antoine Prévotat (Université Jean Monnet Saint-Etienne, Université Lyon 2, Emlyon Business School, GATE, 42100, Saint-Etienne, France); Zoi Terzopoulou (CNRS, Université Jean Monnet Saint-Etienne, Université Lyon 2, Emlyon Business School, GATE, 42100, Saint-Etienne, France); Adam Zylbersztejn (Université Lyon 2, Université Jean Monnet Saint-Etienne, Emlyon Business School, GATE, CNRS, 69007, Lyon, France; research fellow at Vistula University Warsaw (AFiBV), Warsaw, Poland) |
| Abstract: | In a controlled laboratory experiment, we examine voting behavior under rule uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty about the voting rule itself. We compare behavior under three voting-rule conditions: simple plurality (1R), plurality with runoff (2R), and their probabilistic mixture (1R/2R) that is a lottery generating either 1R with known probability p, or 2R with probability 1-p. Following the previous literature, we conjecture that 1R/2R raises computational complexity and thus mitigates strategic manipulation. We test different models – either heuristic-based or rational – of (i) the formation of beliefs about other voters’ behavior, and of (ii) the resulting voting decisions. We find that beliefs tend to be formed in a myopic manner in all experimental conditions. With repetition, however, the accuracy of the belief formation process improves and we observe convergence between beliefs and votes. Regarding voting decisions, the model with highest (resp., lowest) predictive power is strategic (resp., sincere) voting, with some variation across conditions. Overall, our initial conjecture is not supported by the experimental data. Rule uncertainty steers the voters neither towards sincerity nor towards any other voting heuristic. If anything, it contributes to promoting strategic behavior. |
| Keywords: | Rule uncertainty; strategic voting; sincere voting; heuristics; plurality; plurality with runoff; economic experiment |
| JEL: | C23 C72 C91 C92 D72 D91 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:2603 |
| By: | Navin Kartik (Department of Economics, Yale University); Elliot Lipnowski (Department of Economics, Yale University); Harry Pei (Department of Economics, Northwestern University) |
| Abstract: | Does electoral replacement ensure that officeholders eventually act in voters' interests? We study a reputational model of accountability. Voters observe incumbents' performance and decide whether to replace them. Politicians may be "good" types who always exert effort or opportunists who may shirk. We find that good long-run outcomes are always attainable, though the mechanism and its robustness depend on economic conditions. In environments conducive to incentive provision, some equilibria feature sustained effort, yet others exhibit some long-run shirking. In the complementary case, opportunists are never fully disciplined, but selection dominates: every equilibrium eventually settles on a good politician, yielding permanent effort. |
| Date: | 2025–12–15 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2483 |
| By: | Matteo Picchio (Department of Economics and Social Sciences, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche); Raffaella Santolini (Department of Economics and Social Sciences, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche) |
| Abstract: | We study the role of mayoral gender in attracting public funding in Italian municipalities. We exploit a novel administrative dataset containing detailed information on all projects aimed at the digitalisation of local public administrations and funded under Italy's National Recovery and Resilience Plan between 2022 and 2024. Exogenous variation in the timing of municipal elections and switches from male to female mayors provides quasiexperimental identification within a staggered difference-in-differences framework. We find that female mayors attract significantly larger amounts of national public funding for the digitalisation of municipal administrative services. This effect is particularly strong when female leadership is combined with high levels of human, or supported by a high quality local bureaucrats, and a policy environment characterised by substantial funding opportunities. By contrast, the share of women in municipal councils and executives does not play a significant role. We also find that our main results are driven by small and territorially fragile municipalities. |
| Keywords: | Public funding, female political leadership, local governments, difference-in-differences, event-study, causal inference |
| JEL: | D72 H72 H76 J16 R58 |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:anc:wpaper:504 |
| By: | Jimmy Graham; Horacio Larreguy; Pablo Querubín |
| Abstract: | This chapter surveys the economics and political science literature on clientelism. We define clientelism as the exchange of votes or electoral participation for targeted material benefits and argue that it undermines electoral accountability, fostering rent-seeking and the underprovision of public goods. We document the prevalence of clientelism across countries and over time and examine how economic underdevelopment both facilitates clientelistic practices and may be perpetuated by them. We then analyze the agency problems that characterize clientelistic exchanges, focusing on broker–voter and politician–broker relationships, and review evidence on the roles of monitoring, selection, and social networks in sustaining these relationships. Finally, we discuss how clientelistic machines are financed, assess interventions aimed at weakening clientelism and promoting programmatic competition, and outline directions for future research. |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2026–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34761 |
| By: | Thomas Calvo (LEDa-DIAL, IRD, CNRS, Universite Paris-Dauphine, Universite PSL, Paris); Emmanuelle Lavallée (LEDa-DIAL, IRD, CNRS, Universite Paris-Dauphine, Universite PSL, 75016 Paris); Mireille Razafindrakoto (LEDa-DIAL, IRD, CNRS, Universite Paris-Dauphine, Universite PSL, Paris); François Roubaud (LEDa-DIAL, IRD, CNRS, Universite Paris-Dauphine, Universite PSL, Paris) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies how armed conflict affects public attitudes to democracy. We analyze the role of both experience and fear of violence in support for basic democratic principles and preference for democratic rule in Mali, a country torn by a multi-dimensional conflict since 2012. We combine event location data with sub-nationally representative household survey data including first-hand add-on survey modules on governance, peace and security collected yearly from 2014 to 2019. On the one hand, we find that exposure to violence has a small negative to zero effect on attitudes to democracy. Our results are robust to recent eventstudy approaches as well as to selection into migration. Behind the null effect of violence lie heterogeneities based on the identity of the armed group involved. On the other hand, fear of conflict has strong negative impacts on the public’s commitment to democratic values and support for democracy. Greater support for military rule from fearful individuals is driven by those living in areas not affected by the conflict. In conflict-free areas, citizens are willing to forgo certain freedoms in pursuit of greater security. |
| Keywords: | Armed conflict; Fear; Political attitudes; Support for democracy; Military rule |
| JEL: | D71 D72 D91 F51 O12 |
| Date: | 2026–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dia:wpaper:dt202601 |
| By: | Mundschenk, Lovisa; Janssen, Lisa; Werner, Hannah (University of Zurich); Reiljan, Andres; Cicchi, Lorenzo |
| Abstract: | Climate change has become increasingly politicized, prompting concerns that it may generate new societal rifts. While elite-level rhetoric—particularly among radical right actors—has grown more adversarial, it remains unclear whether similar affective divisions have emerged among citizens. Using cross-national survey data, this paper examines affective polarization over climate change in France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, and Poland. Mirroring real-world debates that pit stricter climate protection against economic prosperity, we assess mutual affect between individuals on either side of this division, and estimate polarization across the full attitudinal spectrum. Across all countries, we find significant affective polarization with a clear asymmetric pattern: pro-climate citizens express clear in-group warmth and out-group coldness, whereas pro-growth citizens show little affective opposition and in some cases even evaluate climate-oriented individuals more positively than their own group. Moreover, affective polarization among pro-climate respondents is not associated with reduced political tolerance. These findings suggest that mass affective polarization over climate action is less entrenched than elite discourse implies. |
| Date: | 2026–01–23 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:pm3qd_v1 |
| By: | Alex Krumer; Felix Otto; Tim Pawlowski |
| Abstract: | Despite a large body of theoretical literature on voting mechanisms, there is no documented evidence from real-world panel evaluations about the effect of trimming the extreme votes on sincere voting. We provide the first such evidence by comparing subjective evaluations of experts from different countries in competitive settings with and without a trimming mechanism. In these evaluations, some of the evaluated subjects are experts' compatriots. Using data on 29, 383 subjective evaluations, we find that experts assign significantly higher scores to their compatriots in panels without trimming. However, in panels with trimming, this favoritism is generally insignificant. |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2602.05542 |
| By: | Navin Kartik (Yale University, Department of Economics); Francesco Squintani (University of Warwick, Department of Economics); Katrin Tinn (McGill University, Desautels Faculty of Management) |
| Abstract: | We study two-player constant-sum Bayesian games with type-independent payoffs. Under a "completeness" statistical condition, any "identifiable" equilibrium is an ex-post equilibrium. We apply this result to a Downsian election in which office-motivated candidates possess private information about policy consequences. The ex-post property implies a sharp bound on information aggregation: equilibrium voter welfare is at best equal to the efficient use of a single candidate's information. In canonical specifications, politicians may "anti-pander" (overreact to their information), whereas some degree of pandering would be socially beneficial. We discuss other applications of the ex-post result. |
| Date: | 2025–12–19 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2484 |
| By: | Albarello, Alessio; Boix, Carles |
| Abstract: | We examine the impact of 1990 and 2000 laws of citizenship in Germany, which liberalized the path to the acquisition of citizenship, on the national identity of immigrants. Leveraging the exogenous variation in waiting time for naturalization generated by those two reforms, we find that immigrants who benefited from less restrictive conditions to become citizens developed a stronger national identification with Germany, both after and during their waiting time for naturalization. The effect was particularly strong for women and for those immigrants that were older at the time of their arrival. A higher attachment to Germany seems to have been mainly driven by psychological and socioeconomic mechanisms: a more liberal regime reduced subjective concerns about discrimination, heightened immigrants’ social and political participation, and fostered their use of the German language. |
| Date: | 2026–01–20 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:2zy64_v1 |