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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Lester, Cian (University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates whether austerity-induced welfare cuts contributed to a shift in political ideology in the United Kingdom during the 2010s. Combining welfare reform data with general election outcomes and survey-based ideological positioning, the study constructs a Right-Wing Index to capture temporal and spatial variation in rightwing political sentiment. Using a Multi-Way Fixed Effects Difference-in-Difference approach, the analysis estimates the impact of austerity on right-wing ideology. The paper contributes to political economy literature by incorporating updated 2020/21 austerity estimates and a broader ideological framework beyond party vote shares alone. Overall, the findings suggest that austerity shaped British political ideology in complex, time-dependent ways. In the short term, it reduced support for the right through electoral backlash, but may have caused longer-term shifts toward right-wing populism as economic hardship deepened. |
| Keywords: | Voting Behaviour ; Austerity ; Elections ; Fiscal Policy ; Welfare Expenditure JEL classifications: D72 ; H30 ; H53 ; I38 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:wrkesp:88 |
| By: | Marco Due\~nas; Hector Galindo-Silva; Antoine Mandel |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the impact of temperature shocks on European Parliament elections. We combine high-resolution climate data with results from parliamentary elections between 1989 and 2019, aggregated at the NUTS-2 regional level. Exploiting exogenous variation in unusually warm and hot days during the months preceding elections, we identify the effect of short-run temperature shocks on voting behaviour. We find that temperature shocks reduce ideological polarisation and increase vote concentration, as voters consolidate around larger, more moderate parties. This aggregated pattern is explained by a gain in support of liberal and, to a lesser extent, social democratic parties, while right-wing parties lose vote share. Consistent with a salience mechanism, complementary analysis of party manifestos shows greater emphasis on climate-related issues in warmer pre-electoral contexts. Overall, our findings indicate that climate shocks can shift party systems toward the centre and weaken political extremes. |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2510.01551 |
| By: | Davide Cipullo; Federico Franzoni; Jonas Klarin |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the causal effect of the term length of political executives on economic policy outcomes. To establish causality, we exploit the staggered adoption of four-year terms for governors across US states, using data for the period 1937-2008. We find that increasing governors' tenure in office from two years to four years reduced state expenditures and revenues by approximately 0.3-0.5 percentage points of GDP. The effect on state finances is primarily driven by a reduction of current spending and grants from the federal government, and it is concentrated in states where the incumbent governor expects fierce competition in the next election. Lastly, we discuss the implications of longer terms for macroeconomic stabilization, political budget cycles, and intergovernmental resource allocation. |
| Keywords: | term length, US States finance, political selection, electoral incentives, political accountability |
| JEL: | D72 H11 H72 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12186 |
| By: | Jerg Gutmann; Martin Rode |
| Abstract: | Populist governance is fundamentally at odds with constitutionalism. As a political project, populism rejects constraints on “the will of the people, ” including those essential to liberal-democratic constitutions. Yet, the extent to which elected populists actually undermine constitutional order remains contested. This article presents the first empirical analysis of whether constitutional compliance declines following the electoral success of populist parties in parliament and government. Using novel indicators of party populism and constitutional compliance, we find that the entry of populists into government leads to an erosion of constitutional norms, while their mere parliamentary presence has no systematic effect. This negative impact is primarily driven by a weakening of political and civil rights. Our results further show that populist parties — as distinct from individual leaders — are the primary drivers of noncompliance, and that the ideological orientation of these parties predicts the extent of their threat to constitutional order. |
| Keywords: | populism, constitutional compliance, constitutionalism, political ideology, rule of law |
| JEL: | D72 D78 K38 K42 P16 P26 P37 P48 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12191 |
| By: | Marina Diakonova (BANCO DE ESPAÑA); Corinna Ghirelli (BANCO DE ESPAÑA); Javier J. Pérez (BANCO DE ESPAÑA) |
| Abstract: | Political polarization—broadly defined as the growing ideological distance between political parties or their supporters—has become an increasingly prominent feature of both U.S. and European political discourse. While it is often associated with legislative dysfunction, existing measures tend to conflate polarization with its consequences. This paper proposes a narrative-based, cross-country approach to separately measure ideological polarization and legislative gridlock. Using dictionary-based analysis of national press coverage in France, Germany, Spain, and Italy, we construct two high-frequency indices: a Political Polarization Index, capturing the extent of ideological division, and a Legislative Gridlock Index, capturing evidence of policy stalling. Our results show that polarization has increased significantly in Europe since the Global Financial Crisis, though its institutional consequences vary by country: while France and Germany show a close link between polarization and gridlock, Spain and Italy present more nuanced patterns, likely reflecting differences in political institutions and reform trajectories. |
| Keywords: | political polarization, policy gridlock, fiscal policy uncertainty, textual analysis, Europe |
| JEL: | D72 D74 H3 P16 |
| Date: | 2025–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bde:wpaper:2533 |
| By: | Jens Wäckerle (University of Cologne); Bruno Castanho Silva (Freie Universität Berlin); Danielle Pullan (Georgia College & State University); Firuze Taner (University of Vienna) |
| Abstract: | Cross-national parliamentary data have increasingly enabled scholars to study the behavior of individual Members of Parliament (MPs), allowing insights into issues such as (re)selection, intra-party dissent, and representation. Yet data on MPs’ activity have largely been limited to speeches, roll-call votes, and bill sponsorship. We introduce the Committee Membership Dataset (CMD), a major expansion of available legislative data. The CMD records all committee assignments for MPs in 14 countries (14, 963 MPs in 260 parties) from 1989 to 2024, including positions held (e.g., member, chairperson), assignment dates, and committee policy areas. Harmonized MP and party identifiers allow linkage with other widely used datasets. We illustrate the CMD’s value by showing that women are systematically underrepresented in prestigious committees and chairperson roles across all 14 countries. These disparities persist across nearly all party families. The CMD provides a new resource for analyzing legislative behavior, institutional power, and political representation across democracies. |
| Keywords: | Committee positions, parliaments, political careers, dataset, political science |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:376 |
| By: | Anina Harter |
| Abstract: | This paper studies how legislative institutions shape distributive policy outcomes. Specifically, I analyze the effect of budget committee membership in the German Bundestag using a novel dataset of 4, 629 geocoded federal grants (1999–2023). Employing a within-legislator difference-in-differences design, I estimate that gaining a seat on the budget committee doubles the average per capita grant amount received by a legislator’s electoral district. This committee benefit corresponds to approximately 2.6 million EUR over a typical budget committee career. Distributive benefits are driven by internal committee hierarchy rather than mandate type or affiliation with governing parties. |
| Keywords: | distributive politics; localized benefits; legislative institutions; parliamentary committees; geocoded data |
| JEL: | D71 D72 H50 H81 |
| Date: | 2025–09–29 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdp:dpaper:0075 |
| By: | Walter Bossert; Salvador Barberà |
| Abstract: | In his 1958 classic, The Theory of Committees and Elections, Duncan Black proposed the following lexicographic rule: for any set of feasible alternatives, and any pro- file of voters' goodness relations, choose the strong Condorcet winner if it exists, and select the set of Borda winners otherwise. We provide what we think is the first axiomatic characterization of this rule. We do so through the intermediary study of the generalized social welfare functions that underlie the rule's choices, and the use of axioms that emphasize what is common and what is different in the spirit of the amply debated proposals made by these two 18th-century authors. |
| Keywords: | Black’s voting rule, Borda count, Social choice correspondences, strong Condorcet winners |
| JEL: | D71 D72 D63 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:1515 |
| By: | Ritzen, Jo (Mt Economic Research Inst on Innov/Techn, RS: GSBE MGSoG, RS: UNU-MERIT Theme 3) |
| Abstract: | The advent of generative artificial intelligence (AI) has sparked a critical debate: will it fortify democratic institutions or accelerate their decline? This paper evaluates AI’s dual role as both a potential guardian and disruptor of democracy in the Western hemisphere. At the centre of analysis stands the traditional economic model of human decision making, with information asymmetry. Personalized advertising, based on clicks, recorded purchase- and social media behaviour are powerful sales-boosters. Without being held to ethical boundaries, generative AI will increase rather than reduce the asymmetries in markets. Translating the economic model to voting behaviour the same asymmetry appears. Drawing on case studies, empirical research, and policy analyses, the paper explores how AI’s capabilities—from spreading disinformation to enhancing civic engagement—shape democratic resilience. The discussion emphasizes the urgent need for balanced governance to harness AI’s benefits while mitigating its risks. By synthesizing insights from recent elections, regulatory frameworks, and socio-political trends, this paper argues that proactive, multi-sectoral collaboration is essential to ensure AI serves as a bulwark rather than a threat to democratic values. |
| JEL: | O33 O38 D72 D83 L51 |
| Date: | 2025–10–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:unumer:2025021 |
| By: | Muratovska, Milka; Kubbe, Ina; Merkle, Ortrun (RS: GSBE MORSE, RS: GSBE MGSoG, Maastricht Graduate School of Governance) |
| Abstract: | This article examines how corruption operates as a gendered informal institution that restricts women’s substantive political empowerment in post-socialist democracies. Focusing on North Macedonia, we argue that clientelism and male-dominated party networks function as gatekeeping mechanisms that limit women’s access to decision-making despite the presence of gender quotas. Drawing on a sequential mixed-methods study—including an online survey and in-depth interviews with women politicians—we show how informal party practices, electoral manipulation, and the co-optation of quotas create symbolic rather than substantive inclusion. By reframing corruption as a structural and gendered mechanism of exclusion, this study explains why formal democratization and numerical representation fail to dismantle entrenched patriarchal networks. These findings underscore the need for anti-corruption and democratization reforms that confront informal institutions, offering insights for other transitional and hybrid regimes where gendered exclusion persists beneath democratic façades. |
| JEL: | D73 J16 P20 |
| Date: | 2025–09–30 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:unumer:2025020 |