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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Marius Kröper; Valentin Lindlacher |
| Abstract: | We investigate how reducing information costs through forced experimentation with postal voting, while holding administrative rules fixed, affects subsequent voting behavior. Leveraging a natural experiment during Bavaria’s 2020 Mayoral Elections and drawing on municipality-level administrative data spanning seven federal and state elections (2013-2025), we employ an event study design. We find a transitory increase in total turnout of 0.4 percentage points in the first election after the treatment, one and a half years later, and a persistent substitution from in-person to postal voting even five years after the treatment. Municipalities with a higher turnout in the past show larger effects. Investigating the distribution of information costs shows an age gradient, with the highest information costs in the oldest municipalities. The conservative governing party gains from higher postal turnout and other right-wing parties’ in-person voters. |
| Keywords: | postal voting, voter turnout, lLocal elections, information costs, COVID-19 |
| JEL: | D72 H70 D83 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12075 |
| By: | Steven T. Berry; Christian Cox; Philip Haile |
| Abstract: | We study voting in general elections for the U.S. House of Representatives. Our data set includes demographics and turnout of all registered voters for the years 2016–2020, as well as vote shares at the precinct and contest level. We estimate a Downsian voting model incorporating rich observed and unobserved heterogeneity at the voter and contest level. We find that voters with high perceived voting costs tend to favor Democrats, as do marginal voters in most districts. Variation in state voting policies accounts for a modest share of overall estimated voting costs but is sufficient to determine the majority party in some years. We also find that many states’ district maps favor one party in converting votes to seats. On net, these biases favor Republicans. For example, we estimate that winning 50% of votes in every state would give Republicans a nine percentage point seat advantage in the House. |
| JEL: | H10 L0 P0 |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34149 |
| By: | Kansikas, Carolina (University of Warwick); Bagues, Manuel (University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | We study whether term limits can accelerate women’s access to top political positions by analyzing two reforms in Italian local elections that extended mayoral term limits from two to three five-year terms. In a period marked by rapid growth in women’s political participation, the first reform affected municipalities with fewer than 3, 000 inhabitants in 2014, and the second those below 5, 000 in 2022. Using a difference-in-discontinuities design, we find that longer term limits restrict opportunities for early-career politicians, with substantial effects for female representation: the share of female mayors would be 8 percentage points higher without the term limit extensions. The impact is larger in municipalities with more women in lower political positions and where gender quotas for council members are present, suggesting that entry-level quotas can be more effective when paired with policies promoting turnover in top positions. |
| Keywords: | Term limits, female political representation, Italian local elections JEL Classification: J16, J18, J48, D72 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:wacage:768 |
| By: | Matilde Bombardini; Frederico Finan; Nicolas Longuet-Marx; Suresh Naidu; Francesco Trebbi |
| Abstract: | We study the effects of climate change and mitigation-related employment changes on U.S. politics. We combine 2000-2020 precinct-level voting information and congressional candidate positions on environmental policy with high-resolution temperature, precipitation, and census block-group level measures of “green” and “brown” employment shares. Holding politician positions fixed within a district, we find that Democratic vote shares increase with exogenous changes in local climate and green transition employment. We embed these estimates into a model of political competition, including both direct and demand-driven effects of shocks on candidate supply of climate policy positions. Incorporating these estimates into 2022-2050 projections of climate change and green employment transition, we find that voting for the Democratic Party increases, while both parties move slightly to the right on climate policy. Under worst-case climate projections and current mitigation trajectories, our estimates indicate that the probability the House passes a carbon-pricing bill is 9 percentage points higher in 2050 than in 2020. |
| JEL: | D72 D78 P0 Q5 |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34120 |
| By: | Beckmann, Joscha; Schweickert, Rainer; Jahn, Marvin |
| Abstract: | ABSTRACT This study contributes to the literature on political business cycles by assessing the effect of elections on growth expectations based on expert survey data instead of using actual performance data. We analyze the different roles opportunistic and partisan politics play in varieties of capitalistic systems as a source of heterogeneity. Our results show that expectations differ remarkably between Liberal and Coordinated Market Economies (LME vs. CME) even independent of election outcomes. |
| Keywords: | expectations, political business cycles, varieties of capitalism |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkie:323860 |
| By: | Wesley H. Holliday |
| Abstract: | Proponents of Condorcet voting face the question of what to do in the rare case when no Condorcet winner exists. Recent work provides compelling arguments for the rule that should be applied in three-candidate elections, but already with four candidates, many rules appear reasonable. In this paper, we consider a recent proposal of a simple Condorcet voting method for Final Four political elections. Our question is what normative principles could support this simple form of Condorcet voting. When there is no Condorcet winner, one natural principle is to pick the candidate who is closest to being a Condorcet winner. Yet there are multiple plausible ways to define closeness, leading to different results. Here we take the following approach: identify a relatively uncontroversial sufficient condition for one candidate to be closer than another to being a Condorcet winner; then use other principles to help settle who wins in cases when that condition alone does not. We prove that our principles uniquely characterize the simple Condorcet voting method for Final Four elections. This analysis also points to a new way of extending the method to elections with five or more candidates that is simpler than an extension previously considered. The new proposal is to elect the candidate with the most head-to-head wins, and if multiple candidates tie for the most wins, then elect the one who has the smallest head-to-head loss. We provide additional principles sufficient to characterize this simple method for Final Five elections. |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2508.17095 |
| By: | Fernanda Sobrino (School of Government and Public Transformation, Tecnológico de Monterrey); Alejandro Díaz Domínguez (School of Government and Public Transformation, Tecnológico de Monterrey) |
| Abstract: | This study analyzes TikTok's influence on political campaigns across Mexico's state capitals during the 2024 municipal elections (and Mexico City's state-level race). Using the full video histories and campaign-period posts for candidates with TikTok accounts, we compile engagement metrics (likes, shares, comments, saves, plays), hashtag strategies, and user features. Sentiment on 1.8M+ comments is classified with a Spanish RoBERTa-based model (RoBERTuito). Results show strong heterogeneity: candidates with preexisting influencer profiles concentrate engagement; parties with robust digital operations post more and attract more interactions; and hashtag use ranges from personal branding to partisan or opponent-referencing strategies. During official campaigns, comments per video often rise in low-engagement states while falling for influencer-driven races; neutral sentiment tends to increase over time, with negative exceeding positive in most cases. We discuss implications for digital campaign strategy and youth engagement in Mexico. |
| Keywords: | TikTok, political campaigns, Mexico, sentiment analysis, social media, state capitals |
| JEL: | D72 D83 L82 O54 |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gnt:wpaper:9 |
| By: | Herrmann, Oliver (University of Groningen) |
| Abstract: | Do citizens of democratic nations have a civic duty to cast a vote in elections? Thequestion of whether such a duty to vote exists is a topic of much debate. I revisita common generalization argument for the existence of a civic duty and, combininginsights from the economics and political science literature, contend that no such dutyfollows. However, I show that the generalization argument can instead be used toestablish the existence of a partisan duty to vote. That is, an argument can be madethat those who identify with a political party, or a group whose interests align witha subset of parties, share a moral obligation to act in the electoral interest of theirin-group. I discuss empirical evidence in support of the notion that there is a strongpartisan element to voters’ duty perceptions. |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gro:rugfeb:2024001-eef |
| By: | Paulo Bastos; Cristián Sánchez |
| Abstract: | We examine whether and how the educational background of political leaders matters for policy choices and outcomes. Using data on municipalities in Brazil from 2000–2008, we estimate the effects of electing a more educated leader in a regression-discontinuity design whereby policy inputs and outcomes in municipalities where a highly educated candidate barely won the election are compared with those of municipalities where a highly educated candidate barely lost. Our results indicate that highly educated mayors make different choices regarding the allocation of public funds and inputs in critical sectors when compared to non-highly educated mayors, yet they do not produce better indicators on a variety of measurable outcomes. Furthermore, our estimates suggest a negative impact of educated mayors on local economic growth and children’s health. We additionally document the existence of heterogeneity in the effects of highly educated leaders along political ideology and age of the candidate. Lastly, highly educated leaders are not more likely to be reelected, suggesting that they are not perceived as better politicians. |
| Date: | 2025–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chb:bcchwp:1039 |
| By: | Achim Hagen; Gilbert Kollenbach |
| Abstract: | We study the interaction of climate policies and investments into fossil and renewable energy generation capacity under political uncertainty caused by democratic elections. We develop an overlapping generations model, where elected governments determine carbon taxation and green investment subsidies, and individuals make investments into fossil and renewable capacity. We find that some fossil investments become stranded assets if the party offering the higher carbon tax is unexpectedly elected. Green investment subsidies can be used by governments to bind the hands of their successor. By using the subsidy, the party in power can influence the capital stocks and, therefore, the climate policy of the following period to reduce or even avoid potentially stranded assets. With endogenous reelection probability, the impact on the capital stocks can also be used strategically to manipulate the reelection probabilities in favor of the party in power. |
| Keywords: | stranded assets, elections, fossil fuel, renewable energy, carbon tax, investment subsidy |
| JEL: | D72 H23 Q54 Q58 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12063 |
| By: | Carlsson, Fredrik (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University); Kataria, Mitesh (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University); Lampi, Elina (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University) |
| Abstract: | We investigate how politicization and the financial cost of climate policies influence public trust in scientific information about climate change. We find that citizens' trust in science-based information on climate is influenced by its political context. When climate policy is associated with a political affiliation, trust in the scientific information decreases, independent of the political party supporting the policy. However, there is no effect on policy support on political endorsement. Varying the financial cost of the policy to induce cognitive dissonance had no significant effect on trust in the scientific information; instead, as expected, higher cost substantially reduced policy support. |
| Keywords: | Experiment; climate change; scientific information; political parties; motivated beliefs |
| JEL: | D91 Q54 Q58 |
| Date: | 2025–08–26 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0856 |
| By: | Andrea Bernini; Navid Sabet |
| Abstract: | We study how immigrant legalization affects political representation and public service delivery, focusing on the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which granted legal status to nearly three million undocumented Hispanic migrants. Using geographic variation in IRCA exposure and newly digitized data on 12, 000 Hispanic officials, we find legalization increased Hispanic representation in local government and facilitated upward mobility from school boards into municipal and county offices. These changes altered institutional behavior, shifting education spending toward capital investment and diversifying the racial composition of the teaching workforce. Immigration policy thus reshapes who governs and how public goods are allocated. |
| Keywords: | legalization, political representation, political mobility, local public finance |
| JEL: | J15 H75 D72 I28 J61 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12081 |
| By: | Ackland, James; Basiri, Ana |
| Abstract: | Democratic government relies on a great deal of voluntary participation from the population. This participation is not guaranteed, and when citizens are absent from the data collecting processes of the state, a missing data problem occurs. The co-occurrence of the Scottish local elections and the Scottish Census in 2022 provides an unusual opportunity to test hypotheses about common and context-specific drivers of civic non-participation. Using a geospatial approach, we show that ward-level census nonresponse is highly correlated with electoral abstention despite abstention being about five times more common than initial census nonresponse. Statistical modelling demonstrates strong common roles for deprivation and English-language speaking in driving the participation rates of a ward. Meanwhile relatively specific effects are shown for cohabitation in driving census response, and the proportion of young people in driving voting behaviour. We conclude that the similarity between these nonresponse processes represents an opportunity for improving practice in increasing response rates. For example, census “hard to count” indices can incorporate data from elections as “interim” predictions for low-response areas, and framing voting as a household duty, rather than an individual one, may improve turnout. |
| Date: | 2025–09–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:x9rj4_v6 |
| By: | Andres Rodriguez-Pose; Lewis Dijkstra; Chiara Dorat |
| Abstract: | Over the past two decades, support for Eurosceptic parties has climbed from fringe to nearly one-third of voters. Promising renewed prosperity through less European integration, these partiesimplyEuroscepticismisa‘freelunch.’Drawingonanoriginalpanelof1, 166European NUTS-3 regions (2004-2023) and using fixed-, random-eNects, and diNerence-in-diNerences designs, we test how rising Euroscepticism connects with regional economic and demographic outcomes. We track GDP per capita, productivity, employment, and population growth. We find that a region 10 points more Eurosceptic than another could have ended up with GDP per capita roughly 5% lower than the less Eurosceptic region, as the negative economic influence of Euroscepticism compounds across cycles and intensified after the financial and austerity crises. The same applies for productivity and employment. Demographic impacts are smaller but point in the same direction. Even without governing, Eurosceptic support appears to deter investment and raise uncertainty, deepening the very stagnation that fuels discontent. There is no free lunch: political backlash against European integration carries a measurable costs for the regions that embrace it. |
| Keywords: | Euroscepticism; Economic development; Population growth; European integration; Political discontent; Regions; EU |
| JEL: | F15 D72 R11 |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:egu:wpaper:2527 |
| By: | Boris Ginzburg |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces a definition of ideological polarization of an electorate around a particular central point. By being flexible about the location or width of the center, this measure enables the researcher to analyze polarization around any point of interest. The paper then applies this approach to US voter survey data between 2004 and 2020, showing how polarization between right-of-center voters and the rest of the electorate was increasing gradually, while polarization between left-wingers and the rest was originally constant and then rose steeply. It also shows how, following elections, polarization around left-wing positions decreased while polarization around right-wing positions increased. Furthermore, the paper shows how this measure can be used to find cleavage points around which polarization changed the most. I then show how ideological polarization as defined here is related to other phenomena, such as affective polarization and increased salience of divisive issues. |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2507.07770 |
| By: | Cyril Benoît (CEE - Centre d'études européennes et de politique comparée (Sciences Po, CNRS) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Tim Vlandas (DSPI - Department of Social Policy and Intervention - University of Oxford) |
| Abstract: | What explains changes in the economic structures, institutions and policies of Advanced Capitalist Democracies (ACDs)? In this article, we suggest that the various answers to this question in the field of Comparative Political Economy (CPE) are essentially linked to two main approaches. The first approach emphasizes the role of electorates and political parties, their transformations, and their competition in shaping the evolution of ACDs. The second approach highlights the primacy of producer groups as the most powerful actors influencing the trajectory of ACDs. This review article introduces the debate between these two approaches and underscores its enduring relevance. It then discusses four recent important contributions that provide renewed perspectives on what remains a structuring cleavage in CPE, with implications for neighbouring fields in political science research. Through a systematic comparison of their analytical structure accross various dimensions, we show that their conception of the economy critically shapes their understanding of politics. |
| Keywords: | politics of growth, institutional change, electoral competition, producer groups, comparative political economy |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05218352 |
| By: | Edward, Caesar |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a real options–based framework for modeling the dynamics of political regimes, integrating decision theory with a six-state Markov Decision Process (MDP). Political regimes are treated as strategic decision-makers holding flexible political options—such as repression, reform, policy shift, or exit—whose value evolves with volatility, entropy, and time. The core asset is the regime’s political capital, modeled as a dynamic stock S(t) subject to both gradual diffusion and sudden Poisson jumps representing exogenous shocks (e.g., coups, assassinations, natural death). Option exercise is constrained by an Action Cost Threshold X(t), the political strike price, which evolves over time and determines the cost–benefit feasibility of action. The framework introduces novel visualization and diagnostic tools: Opportunity Landscapes to map option exercise probabilities over volatility and time; Valence of Power heatmaps to measure relative option value; Decision Thresholds under Uncertainty curves linking entropy and action probabilities to reveal points of strategic equivalence; and Volatility Landscapes that integrate volatility, entropy, and probability to assess stability risk. We model the Decay Time Value of Political Capital Stocks and Political Options, quantify the Time Evolution of both S(t) and X(t), and use Cost–Benefit Landscapes to jointly evaluate capital and cost trajectories. The framework also captures coercion dynamics, distinguishing between rational coercion in dysfunctional equilibria and irrational coercion in stable democracies. Applied to Rwanda, South Sudan, and Uganda, the model produces empirical simulations of resilience, fragility, and optimal decision timing. In addition to capturing volatility and cost thresholds, the analysis introduces Regime Survivability Probabilities—quantifying the joint likelihood of sustaining or losing power under affordability and hazard constraints—and the Regime Survivability Frontier, which traces the tipping points where survival and failure probabilities converge. Results show how shifting volatility, erosion of political capital, and rising exit hazards shape strategic urgency and force leaders toward difficult trade-offs. The approach offers a predictive and diagnostic tool for political survival analysis, grounded in the theory of real options but adapted to the contingencies of political power. |
| Date: | 2025–08–21 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:fyhtp_v2 |
| By: | Yaron Azrieli; Ritesh Jain; Semin Kim |
| Abstract: | We study the design of voting mechanisms in a binary social choice environment where agents' cardinal valuations are independent but not necessarily identically distributed. The mechanism must be anonymous -- the outcome is invariant to permutations of the reported values. We show that if there are two agents then expected welfare is always maximized by an ordinal majority rule, but with three or more agents there are environments in which cardinal mechanisms that take into account preference intensities outperform any ordinal mechanism. |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2508.08055 |
| By: | Tianyu Fan |
| Abstract: | This paper establishes geopolitical relations as a first-order determinant of economic growth. We construct a novel event-based measure of bilateral geopolitical alignment by employing large language models with web search capabilities to analyze over 440, 000 political events across 196 countries from 1960--2019. This comprehensive measure enables us to identify the precise timing and magnitude of geopolitical shifts within countries over time. Using local projections with country fixed effects, we find that a one-standard-deviation improvement in geopolitical relations increases GDP per capita by 9.6 log points over 25 years. These persistent effects operate through multiple reinforcing channels -- enhanced political stability, increased investment, expanded trade, and productivity gains. Across our sample, geopolitical factors generate GDP variations ranging from -35% to +30%, with developing nations facing particularly severe penalties from international isolation. Our findings reveal how geopolitical alignment shapes economic prosperity in an increasingly fragmented global economy. |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2507.04833 |