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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Hans Gersbach; Arthur Schichl; Oriol Tejada |
| Abstract: | Which level of voting costs is optimal in a democracy? This paper argues that intermediate voting costs - what we term a "Midcost democracy" - should be avoided, as they fail to ensure that electoral outcomes reflect the preferences of the majority. We study a standard binary majority decision in which a majority of the electorate prefers alternative A over alternative B. The population consists of partisan voters, who always participate, and non-partisan voters, who vote only when they believe their participation could be pivotal, given that voting entails a cost. We show that the probability of the majority-preferred alternative A winning is non-monotonic in the level of voting costs. Specifically, when voting costs are either high or negligible, alternative A wins in all equilibria. However, at intermediate cost levels, this alignment breaks down. These findings suggest that democratic systems should avoid institutional arrangements that lead to moderate voting costs, as they may undermine the majority principle. |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2507.07300 |
| By: | Christine T. Bangum; Jon H. Fiva; Giovanna M. Invernizzi; Carlo Prato; Janne Tukiainen |
| Abstract: | We study how political parties share power internally by analyzing the allocation of list positions to different factions. We develop a theory of intraparty bargaining in which list positions shape the mobilization efforts of party activists in different factions. Our results allow us to link observable patterns in list allocations to the importance of consensus in intraparty negotiations. We empirically evaluate these predictions using data from Norwegian municipal elections. We exploit a wave of municipal mergers to identify candidates' geography-based factional affiliations. In line with our theory's functionalist logic and consensus-based bargaining, smaller factions are over-compensated in safe list positions. While we also find a slight over-representation in the contested ranks, the relationship between size and resources is much closer to proportionality, as predicted by our theory. Our theoretical and empirical results show that parties can promote consensus among its factions while maintaining mobilization incentives, indicating that equality and efficiency within a political organization can be simultaneously achieved. |
| Keywords: | party factions, intra-party power sharing, candidate selection, geographic representation, municipal mergers. |
| JEL: | C21 C78 D72 H77 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12087 |
| By: | Ahlback, Johan; Yeandle, Alexander |
| Abstract: | International donors have invested heavily in strengthening electoral administration in low-income democracies, aiming to reduce irregularities and build trust. However, we know little about whether these interventions actually improve public perceptions. Using a conjoint choice experiment in Malawi, randomising organisational features of polling stations and their potential for political bias, we examine the determinants of public trust in a low-income setting. Voters are more trusting of stations with well-trained polling staff, independent monitors, security personnel, and transparency measures, effects driven by sanctioning the absence of these basic requirements. Respondents also prioritise procedurally fair measures over those that exclusively benefit their own party or ethnic group, challenging assumptions about the dominance of partisanship and ethnicity in African elections. We contribute to the literature on election administration and public opinion in low-income settings, while highlighting ways in which resource-constrained election bodies can build and maintain public support. |
| Date: | 2025–08–20 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:xhuz5_v1 |
| By: | Shi, Ruihan |
| Abstract: | The presidential election, as the most significant election in the United States, has numerous socio-economic impacts. The real estate market, one of the most closely watched sectors in recent years, has generally shown an upward trend in prices. This paper examines the county-level voting results in two presidential elections which are 2016 and 2020 and the corresponding changes in county housing prices, finding that when a county's presidential election voting results are inconsistent with the final election outcome, the county's housing market is affected, leading to a downward trend in prices. Additionally, counties with a preference for the Republican Party are more sensitive to fluctuations in the real estate market when they experience electoral defeat. Other factors as races and income status also exhibit heterogeneity in response to policy shocks. This study's analysis of the relationship between presidential elections and the real estate market provides guidance for strategic decision-making in the real estate industry and contributes to a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of the impact of presidential elections on socio-economic life. |
| Date: | 2025–08–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:d9tvz_v1 |
| By: | Wintemute, Garen J.; Crawford, Andrew; Tomsich, Elizabeth A.; Wright, Mona A.; Shev, Aaron B.; Tancredi, Daniel J.; Robinson, Sonia L |
| Abstract: | Background: In 2025, during a protracted period of risk for political violence in the United States (US) and with a trend toward authoritarianism evident in the new federal administration, there is an urgent need for information on the public’s support for authoritarianism and government-initiated violence and the public’s willingness to engage in pro- or anti-government violence. Methods: Findings are from Wave 4 of a nationally representative annual longitudinal survey of members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel. They are expressed as weighted proportions with 95% confidence intervals (CIs), with extrapolations to counts for the US adult population. Results: The completion rate was 90.0%; there were 8248 respondents. About one third of respondents agreed at least somewhat that “having a strong leader for America is more important than having a democracy” and that “having political leaders I can trust to look out for my values and interests” was more important than “having election outcomes determined democratically.” About one in four agreed at least somewhat that “we should suspend Congress for a few years so a strong leader can clean up the mess made by politicians in Washington.” A third of respondents agreed at least somewhat that “the [federal] government should use the military to help enforce its policies in the United States.” About 14% of respondents agreed at least somewhat with the use of “private armed militia groups” for that purpose. Between 14% and 20% of respondents agreed at least somewhat that the federal government should arrest ordinary people and reporters or journalists who publicly oppose or criticize “its policies or the President.” About 2% of respondents were very or completely willing to personally “use force or violence” to support or to oppose “the government’s enforcement of its policies” and against individual opponents or supporters of “government policies or the President.” Conclusions: In 2025, substantial minorities of US adults endorse pro-authoritarian views. Smaller minorities endorse and are willing to participate in pro- or anti-government violence. These findings call for sustained, concerted action to preserve democracy in the United States by non-violent means. |
| Date: | 2025–08–13 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:pxfnk_v1 |
| By: | Keinprecht, Michael |
| Abstract: | The growing inequalities around the world are becoming increasingly alarming making redistribution more relevant than ever. One reason why people may oppose redistribution is third party loss aversion. In a pre-registered online experiment with a within-subjects design, I show that redistribution decisions by third parties are affected by loss aversion. Overall, spectators are 7%-points less likely to redistribute from a status quo to an alternative if the alternative entails a loss for one person, even if inequality aversion, maximin preferences and efficiency concerns favor the alternative. This effect is stronger the higher the loss is compared to the gain and the higher the individual loss aversion of the spectator. The key contribution of the paper is to disentangle third party loss aversion from pure status quo bias, rank reversal aversion and other distributional preferences in multiple loss scenarios and to link it to individual loss aversion. |
| Keywords: | Third party loss aversion; loss aversion; redistribution; spectators; fairness |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wiw:wus005:76570814 |
| By: | Strehl-Pessina, Matías (University of California, Santa Barbara); Bergolo, Marcelo (IECON, Universidad de la República); Leites, Martin (Universidad de la República, Uruguay) |
| Abstract: | Do top-income individuals support different levels of redistribution compared to the rest of society? If so, what drives these differences? We address these questions using a novel dataset that combines administrative tax records with unique survey data on the social and economic preferences of workers in Uruguay. We document a marked decline in support for redistribution among the Top 1% of the income distribution. Comparing this group with the Top 50-2%, we show that differences in support for redistribution are not solely explained by current income or demographics. A set of beliefs, perceptions, and views, including political ideology, meritocratic beliefs, and views on government, account for much of the observed differences. Instead, a set of behavioral traits and social preferences, such as altruism and risk aversion, measured through incentivized online games, contribute little to explaining the gap. Finally, the differences in support for redistribution persist even when comparing the Top 1% with otherhigh-incomegroups. Together, these findings suggest that the Top 1% is a distinct group with preferences for redistribution that differ from the rest of society, even from other high-income groups. |
| Keywords: | beliefs, social preferences, behavioral traits, preferences for redistribution, top-income individuals, perceptions, views |
| JEL: | D31 D63 D91 H20 H30 |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18057 |
| By: | Edith Elkind; Tzeh Yuan Neoh; Nicholas Teh |
| Abstract: | We study a temporal voting model where voters have dynamic preferences over a set of public chores -- projects that benefit society, but impose individual costs on those affected by their implementation. We investigate the computational complexity of optimizing utilitarian and egalitarian welfare. Our results show that while optimizing the former is computationally straightforward, minimizing the latter is computationally intractable, even in very restricted cases. Nevertheless, we identify several settings where this problem can be solved efficiently, either exactly or by an approximation algorithm. We also examine the effects of enforcing temporal fairness and its impact on social welfare, and analyze the competitive ratio of online algorithms. We then explore the strategic behavior of agents, providing insights into potential malfeasance in such decision-making environments. Finally, we discuss a range of fairness measures and their suitability for our setting. |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2508.08810 |