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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Francesco Berlingieri (European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC); Global Labor Organization (GLO)); Béatrice d’Hombres (European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC)); Matija Kovacic (European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC); Ca’ Foscari University of Venice; Global Labor Organization (GLO)) |
| Abstract: | This paper explores the relationship between loneliness, trust, and populist voting across both extremes of the ideological spectrum. The contribution of this research is mainly two-fold. First, it considers different dimensions of loneliness and accounts for its predetermined component stemming from social isolation in childhood and adverse childhood experiences. Second, it disentangles the effects of loneliness and trust by incorporating actual trust behaviour from a large-scale trust game experiment conducted in 27 European member states, involving more than 25, 000 individuals. The richness of the data allows to account for and disentangle the impact of competitive explanatory factors such as emotions, objective social isolation, social media use and economic preferences. The main findings suggest the following: (i) social loneliness significantly impacts populist voting, particularly on the extreme right, whereas the emotional dimension of loneliness is associated with more left-leaning, but non-populist, voting preferences; (ii) higher levels of actual trust are associated with lower support for right-wing populist parties; (iii) loneliness and trust operate through distinct channels: loneliness exerts a greater impact on women and older individuals, while trust plays a more significant role among men and middle-aged individuals, and (iv) the effect of social loneliness on support of populist parties is significantly attenuated in contexts with a history of recurrent economic crises, suggesting a potential experience-based learning mechanism. |
| Keywords: | Loneliness, interpersonal trust, political polarisation, populism |
| JEL: | D72 D91 P00 C91 Z13 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ven:wpaper:2025:11 |
| By: | Patrick A. Testa; Jhacova A. Williams |
| Abstract: | Election results act as powerful signals, shaping social behavior in ways that can be dramatic and even violent. This paper shows how racial violence in the post-Reconstruction U.S. South was tied to the local performance of the anti-Black Democratic Party in presidential elections. Using a regression discontinuity design based on close presidential vote shares, we find that Southern counties where Democrats lost the popular vote between 1880 and 1900 were nearly twice as likely to experience Black lynchings in the following four years. This backlash was enkindled by local elites, who amplified narratives of Black criminality through newspapers after such defeats. These findings point to the strategic use of racial violence by Democratic elites, prefiguring the formal vote suppression of Jim Crow. |
| JEL: | D72 D83 I31 J15 N31 O10 |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34004 |
| By: | Barinas-Forero, Andrés Felipe; Scartascini, Carlos |
| Abstract: | While the literature extensively explores the structural enablers of corruption and its adverse effects on economic performance, less is known about how the state of the economy influences corruption and political accountability. To address this gap, we develop a theoretical model in which politicians may divert resources from public goods and citizens can respond by punishing corruption. In our model, periods of positive economic conditions increase corruption while weakening accountability. We validate these predictions through a laboratory experiment, finding that corruption rates significantly rise when economic conditions are good. However, citizens' willingness to punish corrupt politicians remains stable across the business cycle. Punishment decisions are driven by observed public good allocations; low allocations prompt significantly higher punishment rates than high allocations, even resulting in the punishment of honest politicians during bad economic times. Additionally, we assess the role of corruption expectations in shaping responses: citizens with prior beliefs that politicians are corrupt are less likely to punish than those who believe politicians are honest when public good provision is low. Accountability becomes more challenging when citizens struggle to clearly identify corruption, and citizens are more forgiving of corruption during good economic times and if they already mistrust politicians. These findings underscore the importance of robust transparency and accountability mechanisms in upholding governance standards, particularly in the face of economic fluctuations and public mistrust. |
| Keywords: | Rent Seeking;Economic Booms;corruption;Punishment;Laboratory Experiment;Downturns |
| JEL: | D72 D73 H41 C91 |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:idb:brikps:14179 |
| By: | Simon Zollo (UNIROMA - Università degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza" = Sapienza University [Rome]); Matteo Cinelli (UNIROMA - Università degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza" = Sapienza University [Rome]); Gabriele Etta (UNIROMA - Università degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza" = Sapienza University [Rome]); Roy Cerqueti (GRANEM - Groupe de Recherche Angevin en Economie et Management - UA - Université d'Angers - Institut Agro Rennes Angers - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement, UNIROMA - Università degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza" = Sapienza University [Rome]); Walter Quattrociocchi (UNIROMA - Università degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza" = Sapienza University [Rome]) |
| Abstract: | Social media platforms play a significant role in political discourse, often serving as tools for political actors to disseminate partisan narratives, frequently encapsulated in concise slogans presented as hashtags. In this paper, we present a novel systematic framework leveraging network science tools and clustering algorithms to discern the political orientations of posts through their associated hashtags, that can be used in the context of opinion dynamics. Our results show that by applying this framework within the context of the 2022 Italian Elections, we successfully quantify the online activity of political coalitions and their supporters pre and post-election. By analyzing labeled posts derived from this framework we find a surge in user activity leading up to the election, followed by a pronounced decline afterward. Moreover, we note a remarkable shift in engagement toward the winning coalition post-election. Interestingly, at the coalition level, our findings reveal an inverse correlation between posting activity and the level of engagement received on social media platforms. Finally, a rank-size analysis of publication patterns among supporters during the pre-election period highlighted comparable trends in content generation across coalitions. |
| Keywords: | Network science, Label propagation, Political elections , Opinion mining |
| Date: | 2025–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05109451 |
| By: | Stefano Carattini; Ulrich Matter; Matthias Roesti |
| Abstract: | The ability of private interests to influence the political process is an important topic in economics and political science. While some of these efforts appear as campaign finance and lobbying expenditures in the official record, private interests may also engage in "covert" influence through media capture. In this paper, we systematically examine whether and to what extent corporations in the United States with an interest in slowing climate action might have used corporate advertisement in media outlets as a strategic tool to align such outlets' coverage with their views. Based on several complementary empirical strategies, we find that advertisement spending by such actors (i) increases during election periods and (ii) is associated with both lower and more skeptical-leaning coverage of climate change and climate policy. |
| Keywords: | lobbying, advertising, media capture, climate policy |
| JEL: | D72 D83 L82 Q54 Q58 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12000 |
| By: | Paul-Emile Bernard (University of Paris-Dauphine, PSL) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the role of political connections in shaping firm-level resource allocation in China. Using administrative data, I distinguish between national and local ties and estimate their effects on subsidies, capital costs, and tax liabilities. Politically connected managers secure systematically larger transfers and face more favorable financial conditions. National connections increase access to direct subsidies, while local ties reduce capital costs and effective tax rates. A difference-in-differences design reveals that nationally connected firms receive 38% higher annual subsidies over four years. Locally connected firms lower their capital costs by 2.5%. Political access substitutes for marketbased allocation. |
| Keywords: | Political Connection, Subsidy, Tax Avoidance, Misallocation |
| JEL: | D24 D72 L38 L52 H2 O25 |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dia:wpaper:dt202505 |
| By: | Raul Magni-Berton (ESPOL-LAB - ESPOL-LAB - ESPOL - European School of Political and Social Sciences / École Européenne de Sciences Politiques et Sociales - ICL - Institut Catholique de Lille - UCL - Université catholique de Lille); Simon Varaine (GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes, IEPG - Sciences Po Grenoble-UGA - Institut d'études politiques de Grenoble - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes, CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier) |
| Abstract: | Previous research shows that elected governments primarily follow the preferences of high-income citizens, but the reasons for this remain controversial. In the present paper, we introduce a new synthetic measure of electoral plutocracy, i.e. the relative electoral weight of the rich compared to the poor for a given government in a parliamentary regime. The index takes into account three sources of electoral distortion that may favor the rich: i) the conversion of persons into votes (turnout), ii) the conversion of votes into seats (representation), iii) the conversion of seats into government portfolios (coalition). Using survey data on parliamentary democracies since the late 1990s, we show that, on average, a person above the median income is electorally worth 1.16 times a person below the median income (and a person from the 10th decile is electorally worth 1.48 times a person from the 1st decile). This is mainly explained by higher turnout and higher participation in governing coalitions of parties supported electorally by the rich. Finally, we illustrate the interest of our index by re-testing the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis on the link between income inequality and redistribution. We show that the positive effect of inequality on redistribution is moderated by the level of electoral plutocracy. |
| Keywords: | Inequality, Redistribution, Voter turnout, Representation, Coalition |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05167160 |
| By: | Frédéric Docquier (LISER, Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research, Luxembourg); Stefano Iandolo (DISES, Università degli Studi di Salerno, Italy.); Hillel Rapoport (Paris School of Economics, France, CEPII, LISER and CEPR); Riccardo Turati (Department of Applied Economics, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain.); Gonzague Vannoorenberghe (IRES-LIDAM, Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium) |
| Abstract: | We propose new ways to measure populism, using the Manifesto Project Database (1960-2019) as main source of data. We characterize the evolution of populism over 60 years and show empirically that it is significantly impacted by the skill-content of globalization. Specifically, imports of goods which are intensive in low-skill labor generate more right-wing populism, and low-skill immigration shifts the distribution of votes to the right, with more votes for right-wing populist parties and less for left-wing populist parties. In contrast, imports of high-skill labor intensive goods, as well as high-skill immigration flows, tend to reduce the volume of populism. |
| Keywords: | Globalization, Populism, Immigration, Trade. |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uab:wprdea:wpdea2509 |
| By: | Harrs, Sören; Sterba, Maj-Britt |
| Abstract: | This paper establishes three novel findings on fairness and redistribution by combining theory-driven experimental games with large-scale surveys in the U.S. and five European countries. First, individuals revealing egalitarian, libertarian, or meritocratic fairness preferences in experimental games show large differences in support for tax and transfer policies. Second, beliefs in merit strongly predict policy support among meritocrats, but are less predictive among non-meritocrats. Third, fairness concerns matter across income groups and political camps. Our findings challenge the assumptions that meritocratic preferences are homogeneous, that fairness is a luxury good, and that fairness is mainly a moral foundation of left voters. |
| Keywords: | Fairness, Redistribution, Political Ideology, Moral Foundations |
| JEL: | D31 D63 H24 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cexwps:323221 |
| By: | Alonso, Ricardo; Padró i Miquel, Gerard |
| Abstract: | Two opposed interested parties (IPs) compete to influence citizens with heterogeneous priors which receive news items produced by a variety of sources. The IPs fight to capture the coverage conveyed in these items. We characterize the equilibrium level of capture of item as well as the equilibrium level of information transmission. Capture increases the prevalence of the ex ante most informative messages and can explain the empirical distribution of slant at the news‐item level. Opposite capturing efforts do not cancel each other and instead undermine social learning as rational citizens discount informative messages. Citizen skepticism makes efforts to capture the news strategic substitutes. Because of strategic substitution, competition for influence is compatible with horizontal differentiation between successful media. In equilibrium, rational citizens choose to consume messages from aligned sources despite knowledge of the bias in a manner consistent with recent empirical evidence. |
| Keywords: | collective action; communication technology;; media bias; lobbying; public opinion |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2025–07–31 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:127777 |
| By: | Enomy Germain (CU - Cornell University [Ithaca]) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the relationship between natural disasters and emigration from Haiti to the United States, focusing on the moderating role of political instability. Haiti is one of the most disaster-prone and politically fragile countries in the Western Hemisphere, experiencing an average of 3.1 disasters per year between 1990 and 2020. Drawing on thirty years of national-level time series data, this study employs a linear Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model with interaction terms to test whether political instability amplifies the migration response to disasters. The results reveal a strong and statistically significant link between disaster frequency and emigration flows. Moreover, this relationship is significantly intensified in years of heightened political instability, suggesting that weak institutional capacity compounds the push factors associated with natural shocks. While traditional migration models emphasize economic drivers, this study shows that political stability plays a crucial role in shaping emigration outcomes. These findings highlight the need for integrated policy responses that address both environmental risks and governance challenges in disaster prone settings. |
| Keywords: | Haiti migration natural disasters political instability, Haiti, migration, natural disasters, political instability |
| Date: | 2025–05–22 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-05083695 |
| By: | D\'ora Gr\'eta Petr\'oczy |
| Abstract: | In a weighted majority voting game, the players' weights are determined based on the decision-maker's intentions. The weights are challenging to change in numerous cases, as they represent some desired disparity. However, the voting weights and the actual voting power do not necessarily coincide. Changing a decision threshold would offer some remedy. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is one of the most important international organisations that uses a weighted voting system to make decisions. The voting weights in its Board of Governors depend on the quotas of the 191 member countries, which reflect their economic strengths to some extent. We analyse the connection between the decision threshold and the a priori voting power of the countries by calculating the Banzhaf indices for each threshold between 50% and 87\%. The difference between the quotas and voting powers is minimised if the decision threshold is 58% or 60%. |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2505.16654 |