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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Tanguiane, Andranick S. |
| Abstract: | This is the last out of four papers on the 2025 German federal elections continuing our analysis of the 2009, 2013, 2017 and 2021 Bundestag elections. First, we apply the model from [Tangian 2022b] to construct the 2025 German political spectrum understood as a contiguous party ordering, i.e., such that the neighboring parties have close policy profiles. For this purpose, we consider the parties that took part in the 2025 federal elections, define their policy profiles as 38-dimensional vectors of their Yes/No answers to 38 policy questions from the German voting advice application Wahl-O-Mat ('Support for Ukraine'?-Yes/No, 'General speed limit on motorways?'-Yes/No, etc.), and contiguously order them by means of Principal Component Analysis. The circular party ordering obtained is cut, resulting in a horseshoe-shaped left-right ideological axis with the far-left and far-right ends approaching each other. Among other things, the one-dimensionality of the political spectrum looks as a precondition for the voters' single-peaked preferences that guarantee the election consistency. Second, using similar data from the 2009, 2013, 2017 and 2021 German federal elections, we construct political spectra for these years as well and trace the changes. Since the set of contesting parties varies from one election to another, and the Wahl-O-Mat questions vary as well, we only dispose five party orderings with a relatively small core of 13 parties that participated in all five elections. To locate the five spectra on a common scale, we consider 60 parties that have ever participated in elections and order them basing on five spectra on subsets of 24, 29, 31, 37 and 28 parties, respectively. This is done in terms of collective choice: find a group preference on 60 alternatives given five individual preferences on five incomplete alternative subsets; so we adapt the Condorcet and Borda approaches. Then the five political spectra are stretched onto this unified party ordering by constrained least squares, adjusting the distances between the parties in each spectrum. All of these enable to adequately visualize party reshuffles in the political space. In particular, we see that, among the major German parties, the SPD fluctuates by far the most between left and right. This political inconsistency can deter voters, especially floating voters without a firm self-identification with a particular party, and may explain the SPD's failure in the 2025 elections, when the party received the historical minimum of 16.4% of the votes, having lost 9.3 percent points compared with the 2021 elections. |
| Keywords: | Political spectrum, contiguous party ordering, left-right ideological axis, single-peaked preferences, principal component analysis, group choice with incomplete individual preferences |
| JEL: | D71 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:kitwps:320440 |
| By: | Tanguiane, Andranick S. |
| Abstract: | This is the third out four papers on the 2025 German Bundestag elections continuing our analysis of the 2009, 2013, 2017 and 2021 elections. In particular, this paper contributes to the discussion of the imperfection of the German 2023/24 Electoral reform in [Tangian 2025a]. We show that policy representation by the Bundestag could be improved using the alternative Third Vote election method. Under the Third Vote, electors cast no votes for parties by name. The electoral ballot consists of questions on topical policy issues ('General speed limit on motorways?'-Yes/No, 'Germany should increase its defense spending?'-Yes/No, etc.), and the parties answer to these questions before the elections - as required by the Wahl-O-Mat, the German voting advice applications. However, the Third Vote is not concerned with individual advices or individual voting intermediation. The electoral ballots are processed to construct the electorate's policy profile with balances of public opinion on all the issues. Then the matching of the parties' profiles with the electorate's profile is measured using the parties' indices of popularity (average percentage of electors represented on all the issues) and universality (percentage of questions when a majority is represented). These indices of representativeness are used instead of the conventional index 'number of votes received' to define the party quotas in the Bundestag. This method is hypothetically applied to reallocate the 2025 Bundestag seats to the eligible parties, resulting in a considerable gain in the Bundestag representativeness. Finally, we discuss mixed election procedures combining the Third Vote with the conventional voting by party name and analyze possible implications. |
| Keywords: | Representative democracy, elections, theory of voting, proportional representation |
| JEL: | D71 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:kitwps:320439 |
| By: | Kitamura, Shuhei; Takahashi, Ryo; Yamada, Katsunori |
| Abstract: | Elections are a primary mechanism through which citizens can hold politicians accountable for misconduct. However, whether voters actually punish corruption at the ballot box remains an open question, as electoral decisions often involve strategic considerations, including beliefs about how others think and behave. To better understand how such strategic considerations operate in this context, we conducted a pre-registered information intervention during a major political corruption scandal in Japan. The treatment provided information about the prevailing social norm—specifically, the perceived social intolerance of the scandal. The treatment increased turnout and support for a challenger, particularly among swing voters who initially believed that others were intolerant of corruption. Among party loyalists with more lenient prior beliefs, the same information backfired, increasing support for the incumbent. The turnout effect among swing voters was sizable—approximately six percentage points—comparable in magnitude to benchmark mobilization interventions involving personalized contact or social pressure. To account for these patterns, we develop a simple model that incorporates mechanisms—notably *moral reinforcement* and *identity reinforcement*—that generate predictions consistent with the observed heterogeneity in responses. By highlighting how perceptions of prevailing norms shape voter behavior in the presence of strategic considerations, this study contributes to a broader understanding of how democratic institutions can remain resilient in the face of political misconduct. |
| Date: | 2025–06–22 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:296zd_v1 |
| By: | Tanguiane, Andranick S. |
| Abstract: | This is the first of four articles on the 2025 German federal elections, continuing our analysis of the 2009, 2013, 2017 and 2021 elections. We begin with the 2023/24 electoral reform, which aimed to curb the uncontrolled growth of the Bundestag caused by political developments not envisaged in the original election rules. The reform fixes the size of the Bundestag at 630 members and introduces limits to parties' mandates at the level of federal states (Länder). All this makes the proportional allocation of Bundestag seats to parties less accurate and skews the balance between the two concepts implemented in the German mixed-member proportional representation system - the descriptive one (parliament consists of local representatives in order to 'mirror' the society) and the agent one (parliament consists of credible political experts from political parties) - in favor of the agent concept at the expense of the descriptive one. We show that the accuracy of Bundestag seat allocation to parties can be improved by applying modern discrete optimization techniques instead of the currently used historical Sainte-Lague/Webster method. The balance between the two concepts of representation can be restored by replacing the official two-tier distribution of Bundestag seats between federal state party associations with that computed directly in one step. Finally, all apportionment problems can be completely solved by introducing adjustment vote weights. All these devices are illustrated using hypothetical redistributions of Bundestag seats. |
| Keywords: | Representative democracy, elections, theory of voting, proportional representation |
| JEL: | D71 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:kitwps:320437 |
| By: | Oliver Feltham (University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute); Arthur Schram (University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute); Randolph Sloof (University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute) |
| Abstract: | In an election, protest voters signal their discontent with the party they traditionally support in different ways. This paper examines a specific form of protest voting in which voters choose an anti-mainstream party over their true first preference, the mainstream party, as a way to signal discontent with mainstream policies or influence future policy decisions. Protest voters face a trade-off stemming from a coordination problem. Too few protest votes mean that the strength of the protest is insufficient to affect the mainstream’s policies; too many protest votes may result in an anti-mainstream victory, which is a sub-optimal outcome for the protest voter. One way to address this coordination problem is through opinion polls. In this context, polls serve a dual purpose: they provide information about the challenges protest voters face (information channel) and function as a coordination mechanism, allowing voters to adjust their behaviour based on poll results to resolve the coordination problem (coordination channel). We test, experimentally, the extent to which each of these channels increases the likelihood that the protest is successful and find that both channels are significant. |
| Keywords: | protest voting, opinion polls, experiments |
| JEL: | C92 D72 D83 |
| Date: | 2025–02–28 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20250013 |
| By: | Cícero, Vinicius Curti; Goes, Iasmin |
| Abstract: | This paper examines how exogenous economic shocks shape electoral accountability in local elections. We develop a theoretical framework in which a sudden increase in household income temporarily boosts support for incumbents, even when the shock is unrelated to their actions. As voters gradually update their expectations, however, the incumbent’s advantage fades. We test the model’s predictions using Brazil’s 2003 legalization of genetically engineered soybean seeds, a policy that triggered uneven productivity gains across municipalities due to variation in climate and soil. Leveraging this quasi-natural experiment over the 2000–2020 period, we show that incumbent mayors were more likely to be reelected in municipalities with larger gains in soy productivity --- but this advantage was short-lived. Our findings highlight how misattribution and voter learning jointly shape the political consequences of economic change in developing countries, where structural reliance on commodity exports increases vulnerability to external shocks. |
| Date: | 2025–06–30 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:kvwph_v1 |
| By: | Eniro Asemota (University of Graz, Austria); Patrick Mellacher (University of Graz, Austria); Stefania Rossi (University of Graz, Austria) |
| Abstract: | Using municipal data from Austria (n=2115), Italy (n=7894), and Sweden (n=290), we examine how Covid-19 shaped right-wing vote shares in the 2024 European elections versus 2019. We model the 2024-2019 vote-share differences using spatial regressions controlling for socio-demographic characteristics in three contrasting cases. Austria's Freedom Party (FPO) and the Italy's Lega and Fratelli d'Italia (FdI) opposed a large number of pandemic measures as being excessive. In contrast, Sweden Democrats opposed their government's lax response, demanding stricter measures. In Austria and Italy, right-wing vote-share gains are negatively correlated with vaccination rates and positively with post-pandemic unemployment. Furthermore, high excess mortality predicts poorer Italian right-wing performance, with mixed effects in Austria. In contrast, Swedish right-wing support is negatively linked to unemployment, with no significant impact of vaccination rates or excess mortality. These results suggest that the electoral rewards for opposing government crisis policies depend on the national context and party strategy. |
| Keywords: | right-wing populism, corona skepticism, strategic party competition |
| JEL: | D72 H12 I18 |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:grz:wpaper:2025-10 |
| By: | Hubert Sebastian Tandianto (University of Surabaya); Felizia Arni Rudiawarni (University of Surabaya) |
| Abstract: | This study investigates the correlation between earnings management and presidential elections in Indonesia. Prior research has demonstrated that general elections have a detrimental effect on the practice of earnings management at State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). The objective of this study is to examine the impact of presidential elections on the practice of earnings management in Indonesia, specifically focusing on SOEs. A study was carried out utilizing a sample of 63 Indonesian companies that are listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX), out of which 21 are SOEs. The study spanned over a period of 5 years. It aimed to investigate the impact of presidential elections in the years leading up to the election, the election year itself, and the years after the election. Our empirical research shows that presidential elections harm the practice of real earnings management in both SOEs and non-SOEs. Additionally, we observe a significant increase in the prevalence of earnings management before the election period compared to the period following the election. The discovery indicates a substantial increase in pressure caused by political events, such as the presidential election. These findings provide a reference point for future studies and aid in anticipating earnings management practices during prospective political events, particularly presidential elections. |
| Keywords: | Earnings Management, Election, Stated Owned Enterprises, Political pressure |
| JEL: | E66 M40 M41 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sek:iefpro:14316088 |
| By: | Tanguiane, Andranick S. |
| Abstract: | This is the second out of four papers on the 2025 German federal elections continuing our analysis of the 2009, 2013, 2017 and 2021 Bundestag elections. We estimate the policy representation ability of the 29 parties that participated in the 2025 elections and of the 2025 Bundestag. For this purpose, the parties' Yes/No answers to 38 topical questions are compared with the results of recent public opinion polls. Then the party indices of popularity (the average percentage of the population represented) and universality (frequency in representing a majority) are constructed. Assuming that the Bundestag position on the 38 issues is determined by the Bundestag majority, the Bundestag indices of popularity and universality are estimated as well. The main conclusion is that the representativeness of the parties in the Bundestag and the Bundestag as a whole (before coalition-formation) has significantly decreased since 2021. In particular, the former election winner, the SPD, is now ranked 16 instead of 4 in 2021, having the mean index (popularity + universality)/ 2 = 56.3% instead of 65 % in 2021, and the mean index of the Bundestag is now equal to 48.5% instead of the former 61.1%. As for the currently ruling coalition of the CDU/CSU + SPD, its compatibility of 52.8% is greater than that of the former ruling coalition of the SPD + GRÜNE + FDP1, which was equal to 45% (which resulted in the coalition collapse). The mean representativeness index of the current ruling coalition is however significantly lower (51.5% compared with the former 61%). |
| Keywords: | Policy representation, representative democracy, direct democracy, elections, coalitions |
| JEL: | D71 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:kitwps:320438 |
| By: | Canova, Luciano; Paladino, Giovanna |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the emotional impact of exogenous political shocks on individual well-being by examining how Italian citizens’ optimism and happiness responded to the unexpected outcome of the 2024 U.S. presidential election. Leveraging a unique two-wave panel dataset collected before and after the election, we implement a difference-in-differences design to estimate the causal effect of electoral surprise. Respondents who had confidently predicted a Kamala Harris victory and were subsequently surprised by Donald Trump’s re-election exhibited a significant decline in self-reported happiness, controlling for individual characteristics. We interpret this as evidence of the emotional cost of unexpected geopolitical outcomes, even when such events occur abroad. Our findings underscore the conceptual distinction between optimism (a forward-looking cognitive disposition) and happiness (an affective state), showing that optimism may amplify both the emotional gains from positive outcomes and the emotional costs of negative surprises. The analysis contributes to the literature on subjective well-being by highlighting the role of global events in shaping personal affective responses and by emphasizing the need to account for exogenous shocks in models of life satisfaction. Finally, we discuss implications for future research on the causal relationship between optimism and happiness and suggest methodological strategies for disentangling endogeneity between the two constructs. |
| Keywords: | exogenous emotional shocks, optimism, subjective wellbeing |
| JEL: | C21 D91 I31 |
| Date: | 2025–06–25 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:125123 |
| By: | Nitsova, Silviya (University of Manchester) |
| Abstract: | State capture by extremely wealthy elites is a widespread phenomenon in developing democracies, yet the mechanisms through which it works and the impact it has on political and policy outcomes remain poorly understood. I develop a network-based approach to studying captured institutions. Focusing on the national legislature and using social network and regression analyses of unique quantitative data and original interview-based evidence on the case of Ukraine (2014-2022), I demonstrate that oligarchs seek to defend their wealth by promoting as members of parliament individuals who are linked to them via interpersonal ties. The connections between oligarchs and legislators take the form of a highly fragmented, weakly connected, and decentralized network with distinct clusters, in which oligarchs occupy central positions, and influence the adoption of policies related to oligarchs' economic interests. The study has important implications for the scholarship on money in politics, oligarchy, state capture, political connections, neopatrimonialism, legislative politics, political parties, and political representation. |
| Date: | 2025–06–23 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:k27ez_v1 |
| By: | Wintemute, Garen J.; Velasquez, Bradley; Robinson, Sonia; Tomsich, Elizabeth A.; Wright, Mona; Shev, Aaron |
| Abstract: | Background: The possibility of widespread political violence poses a serious concern for the United States. A nationally representative survey found in 2022 that “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) Republicans, as defined, were more supportive than others of political violence. This study updates and expands those findings; the principal comparison is between MAGA Republicans and non-MAGA non-Republicans. Methods: Findings are from Wave 3 of a nationally representative annual longitudinal survey of members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel, conducted May 23-June 14, 2024. All respondents to prior waves who remained in KnowledgePanel were invited to participate. Political party and MAGA affiliations were reported by respondents. Outcomes are expressed as weighted proportions and adjusted prevalence differences (aPDs; these are percentage point (pp) differences), with p-values adjusted for the false discovery rate and reported as q-values. Results: The completion rate was 88.4%; there were 8896 respondents. After weighting, half the sample was female (50.9%, 95% confidence interval (CI) 49.5%, 52.3%); the weighted mean (SD) age was 48.5 (24.9) years. MAGA Republicans were substantially more likely than non-MAGA non-Republicans to endorse violence to effect sociopolitical change generally and to consider violence usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 21 specific political objectives (MAGA Republicans, 55.9% (95% CI 52.3%, 59.4%); non-MAGA non-Republicans, 25.5% (95% CI 23.7%, 27.2%); aPD 30.1pp (95% CI 26.0pp, 34.2pp), q < 0.001). They were not more willing to commit political violence. Similarly, while MAGA Republicans more frequently predicted that they would be armed in a future setting where they considered political violence to be justified (very or extremely likely: MAGA Republicans, 19.8% (95% CI 17.0%, 22.6%); non-MAGA non-Republicans, 5.5% (95% CI 4.6%, 6.4%); aPD 16.4pp (95% CI 13.3pp, 19.5pp), q < 0.001), they were not more likely to shoot someone (very or extremely likely: MAGA Republicans, 2.1% (95% CI 0.8%, 3.4%); non-MAGA non-Republicans, 1.6% (95% CI 1.0%, 2.1%); aPD 1.5pp (95% CI -0.1pp, 3.0pp), q = 0.43). Prevalences for other Republicans generally fell between those for MAGA Republicans and non-MAGA non-Republicans. On some political violence measures, prevalences were highest among a small, demographically distinct group of non-Republican MAGA supporters. In secondary analyses, MAGA Republicans endorsed statements of beliefs associated with political violence—racism, hostile sexism, homonegativity, transphobia, xenophobia, and Islamophobia; support for the QAnon movement and Christian nationalism; conspiracism; trait aggression; and authoritarianism—more frequently than did non-MAGA non-Republicans. Conclusions: In 2024, MAGA Republicans were more likely than others to endorse political violence and beliefs associated with an increased risk of committing violence. They were not more willing to commit political violence themselves, but their endorsement may increase the risk that political violence will occur. |
| Date: | 2025–06–21 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:fzc8x_v1 |
| By: | Ghizlen Ouasbaa (Pompeu Fabra & IEB); Albert Solé-Ollé (Universitat de Barcelona & IEB); Elisabet Viladecans-Marsal (Universitat de Barcelona & IEB & CEPR) |
| Abstract: | We examine the impact of city council members with real estate backgrounds on housing supply in California 1995-2019. Using candidate occupation data and a close-elections regression discontinuity design, we find that electing a developer increases approved housing units by 68% during their term. This effect fades after one term, suggesting developers influence zoning decisions more than long-term policy change. Analysis of votes extracted from council meetings shows they are especially effective in securing discretionary zoning approvals. Importantly, we find no evidence of electoral backlash, suggesting voters are generally supportive of housing expansion led by pro-development candidates. |
| Keywords: | Land-use Policies, Housing Market, Interest Groups |
| JEL: | P00 R31 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2025-05 |
| By: | Alessandro Belmonte (Department of Economics and Social Sciences - Marche Polytechnic University, Italy; CAGE - University of Warwick, United Kingdom); Davide Ticchi (Department of Economics and Social Sciences - Marche Polytechnic University, Italy); Michele Ubaldi (Department of Economics and Social Sciences, Marche Polytechnic University) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates whether and how affirmative action policies lead to backlash from the incumbent group. We exploit the unique historical context provided by the legacy of apartheid in democratic South Africa. Passing affirmative action legislation, intended to improve the conditions of the black community, increases support for far-right parties in national elections among low-educated white voters, who were most affected by the resulting labor market competition. This effect is larger in areas closer to the former homelands of the black community, where the threat of labor market competition was higher. We complement these findings using several survey datasets and find that this effect is associated with increased self-perceived economic insecurity. Our results indicate that, to design effective affirmative action policies, these should be accompanied by measures aimed at addressing the economic concerns of incumbent members. |
| Keywords: | Affirmative action, economic insecurity, labor markets, voting, South Africa. |
| JEL: | D72 J15 J78 K31 N37 |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:anc:wpaper:496 |
| By: | Siye Bae (Northwestern University); Sangyup Choi (Yonsei University); Sang-Hyun Kim (Yonsei University); Myunghwan Andrew Lee (New York University); Myungkyu Shim (Yonsei University) |
| Abstract: | We study how politically diverse households form and update macroeconomic expectations in response to public communication, using novel survey waves of Korean individuals conducted in 2022 during a historic inflation surge. The survey includes a randomized information treatment in which respondents are exposed to government forecasts about inflation stabilization, with treatments varying in messenger, framing, media source, and numerical content. We first document substantial political polarization in macroeconomic beliefs, including inflation expectations. We then find that only pro-government individuals revise their expectations downward in response to the information, while anti-government and centrist individuals remain largely unresponsive, regardless of message source, content, or presentation. These asymmetric responses are driven by differences in trust toward the policy authority, which are themselves linked to partisanship, highlighting the challenges of anchoring expectations in politically polarized environments. |
| Keywords: | Inflation expectations; Macroeconomic beliefs; Partisan bias; Central bank communication; Household survey |
| JEL: | C83 D84 E31 |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:yon:wpaper:2025rwp-255 |
| By: | Mostapha Diss (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE], AIRESS - Africa Institute for Research in Economics and Social Sciences); Clinton Gubong Gassi (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE], department of mathematics University of yaounde 1); Eric Kamwa (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
| Abstract: | We consider a model of multi-winner elections, where each voter expresses a linear preference over a finite set of alternatives. Based on voters' preferences, the primary goal is to select a subset of admissible alternatives, forming what is referred to as a committee. We explore (weakly) separable committee scoring rules, the voting mechanisms that assess each alternative individually using a scoring vector and select the top k alternatives, where k represents the committee's size. Furthermore, we operate under the assumption that alternatives are categorized based on specific attributes. Within each attribute category, there exists a targeted minimum number of alternatives that the selected committee should encompass, emphasizing the necessity for diversity. In this context, we assess the cost associated with imposing such a diversity constraint on the voting process. This assessment is conducted through two methodologies, referred to as the "price of diversity" and the "individual price of diversity". We set the upper bounds for both prices across all (weakly) separable committee scoring rules. Additionally, we show how the maximum price of diver- sity can be used to discriminate between different voting rules in this context. Ultimately, we illustrate that concentrating on the candidates' performance yields a more accurate estimation of the price of diversity compared to a focus on the enforced diversity constraint. |
| Keywords: | Group decisions and negotiations, Voting, Multiwinner elections, Scoring rules, Price of diversity |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04390700 |
| By: | Kevin Grieco; Abou Bakarr Kamara; Niccolo F. Meriggi; Julian Michel; Prichard Wilson |
| Abstract: | Building durable fiscal capacity requires that states obtain compliance with their taxes - a persistent challenge for states with low enforcement capacity. One promising option for governments in weak states is to raise voluntary compliance by enhancing governmental legitimacy. This study reports results from a participatory budgeting policy experiment in Sierra Leone designed to increase legitimacy and tax compliance by inviting public par- ticipation in local policy decision-making. In phone-based town halls, participants shared policy preferences with neighbors and local politicians and then voted for public services that were subsequently implemented. We find that the intervention durably increased participants’ perceptions of government legitimacy. However, contrary to influential models of tax compliance, we report a robust null effect on tax compliance behavior. Participants’ partisan affiliation strongly conditions the treatments’ effects on tax compliance and attitudes toward paying taxes: We find large, positive impacts among copartisans of the incumbent government but significant negative impacts among non-copartisans. Our results highlight that the legitimacy gains of participatory interventions may not increase voluntary tax compliance when participation politicizes compliance. |
| Keywords: | fiscal capacity; participatory budgeting; taxation; legitimacy; state building |
| JEL: | H20 D72 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:csa:wpaper:2025-05 |
| By: | Kvasin, Michael; Lamm, Claus; Martins, Mauricio (University of Vienna) |
| Abstract: | Germany's recent history has been characterized by economic and political crises, fascism, and two global wars. While obstacles existed until the final establishment of democracy, the underlying cultural preferences remain understudied. Here, we compiled a corpus of German fiction and analyzed the expression of cooperation and tolerance, replicating previous studies on democratization. We developed bag-of-words dictionaries measuring multiple facets of cooperation and tolerance to track their diachronic trends through 1890 and 1945 across the German Empire, Weimar Republic, and Third Reich. We tested whether cooperation and tolerance 1) increased over time, 2) preceded democratic shifts, and 3) followed socioeconomic performance (proxied by real wages and GDP per Capita). Generally, those hypotheses were not confirmed. First, while Openness increased over time, other proxies did not. Second, unlike shifts in England and France, cultural changes followed (not preceded) regime transitions, with Sympathy increasing during democracy and Prosociality and Positivity increasing during autocracy. Finally, while real wages and GDPpc may predict Sympathy and Prosociality, these results lacked robustness. We discuss how these findings might have been impacted by the exogenous character of Weimar’s democratization, the world wars, and data availability bias due to censorship and a lack of digitized literature from the Nazi-era. |
| Date: | 2025–06–23 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:un26x_v1 |
| By: | Mattioli, Francesco (Bocconi University); Minello, Alessandra (University of Padova); Nannicini, Tommaso (European University Institute) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates whether the characteristics of locally elected officials influenced excess mortality during the COVID-19 pandemic. Using data on Italy, one of the first countries to be severely affected, we examine whether mayoral education influenced municipal-level mortality outcomes. We estimate weekly excess mortality using official death statistics and a Bayesian hierarchical spatio-temporal model. To address endogeneity in political selection, we implement a close-election Regression Discontinuity Design. We find that college-educated mayors significantly reduced mortality during the first wave of the pandemic, by lowering both the likelihood of excess deaths and the excess mortality rate. These effects are not observed in the second wave, likely due to policy convergence and a stronger role played by national and regional institutions. Our design interprets education as a proxy for broader leadership traits, such as decision-making capacity under uncertainty. The findings underscore that political selection can have real demographic consequences, shaping population outcomes during crises. |
| Keywords: | regression discontinuity design, mortality, COVID-19, political selection |
| JEL: | D72 J10 H75 |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17992 |