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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Bloem, Michael D. (College Board); Holbein, John B. (University of Virginia); Imlay, Samuel J. (College Board); Smith, Jonathan (Georgia State University) |
| Abstract: | Using millions of siblings in the U.S., we detail three findings that quantify whether siblings influence one another to vote in national elections. First, and descriptively, younger siblings are 10 percentage points (50 percent) more likely to vote in their first eligible election when their older sibling votes in a prior election. Second, roughly one-third of this is caused by the older sibling voting, as determined by age-of-voting-eligibility thresholds in a regression discontinuity design. Third, the causal impact of a sibling voting runs in the other direction as well---younger siblings increase the probability of their older siblings voting in their early 20's by 14 percent. These results demonstrate the influence and importance of family and peers in creating an engaged citizenry and underscore that across a wide array of policy domains, conventional impact evaluations do not fully account for all of policies' impacts. |
| Keywords: | voting, civic engagement, political socialization, family, siblings, spillovers, peer effects |
| JEL: | J18 D19 D7 D72 D04 |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17962 |
| By: | Christensen, Love (Aarhus University); Persson, Mikael (University of Gothenburg); Schwenk, Jana (University of Gothenburg) |
| Abstract: | Economic voting theory suggests that voters reward incumbents for strong economic performance and punish them for weak performance. However, this view often ignores the multidimensional nature of the economy. Hence, we lack systematic evidence about how voters simultaneously process multiple economic signals. This study provides a comprehensive examination of how voters respond to four key economic dimensions: growth, unemployment, inflation, and stock markets. We develop a theoretical framework distinguishing between different types of economic reasoning: macroeconomic, egotropic, sociotropic, and distributive reasoning. We first use descriptive data from OECD countries to understand the economy’s dimensionality and analyze survey data from national election studies to assess the impact on economic evaluations. Finally, we present findings from survey experiments conducted in Germany, Sweden, and the United States, tailored to analyze the impact of the four economic dimensions in an ideal information setting. Our results reveal interesting patterns in how voters process economic information. Voters can discern relationships between economic dimensions and their effects on personal and economic circumstances, and distributional outcomes. Subsequently, all four signals independently affect preferences for economic policy and voting intentions. Inflation emerges as a dominant factor, shaping personal and national economic evaluations. Our findings challenge traditional approaches to economic voting by exploring how voters integrate multiple economic signals. By emphasizing the multidimensionality of economic signals, we highlight implications for democratic accountability. |
| Keywords: | Economic voting; macroeconomic analyses; survey experiments; voter reasoning; political behavior |
| JEL: | D72 P16 |
| Date: | 2025–06–17 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:ifauwp:2025_010 |
| By: | Daron Acemoglu; Asuman Ozdaglar; James Siderius |
| Abstract: | We consider the political consequences of the use of artificial intelligence (AI) by online platforms engaged in social media content dissemination, entertainment, or electronic commerce. We identify two distinct but complementary mechanisms, the social media channel and the digital ads channel, which together and separately contribute to the polarization of voters and consequently the polarization of parties. First, AI-driven recommendations aimed at maximizing user engagement on platforms create echo chambers (or “filter bubbles”) that increase the likelihood that individuals are not confronted with counter-attitudinal content. Consequently, social media engagement makes voters more polarized, and then parties respond by becoming more polarized themselves. Second, we show that party competition can encourage platforms to rely more on targeted digital ads for monetization (as opposed to a subscription-based business model), and such ads in turn make the electorate more polarized, further contributing to the polarization of parties. These effects do not arise when one party is dominant, in which case the profit-maximizing business model of the platform is subscription-based. We discuss the impact regulations can have on the polarizing effects of AI-powered online platforms. |
| JEL: | L10 M37 P40 |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33892 |
| By: | Berniell, Inés (University of La Plata); Marchionni, Mariana (Universidad Nacional de la Plata); Pedrazzi, Julián (Universidad Nacional de la Plata); Viollaz, Mariana (CEDLAS-UNLP) |
| Abstract: | This paper explores how female political leaders impact environmental outcomes and climate change policy actions using data from mixed-gender mayoral races in Brazil. Using a Regression Discontinuity design, we find that, compared to male mayors, female mayors significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This effect is driven by a reduction in emissions intensity (CO2e/GDP) in the Land Use sector, without changes in municipal economic activity. Part of the reduction in emissions in the Land Use sector is attributable to a decline in deforestation. We examine potential mechanisms that could explain the positive environmental impact of narrowly electing a female mayor over a male counterpart and find that in Amazon municipalities, female elected mayors allocate more space to the environment in their government proposals and are more likely to invest in environmental initiatives. Differences in the enforcement of environmental regulations do not explain the results. |
| Keywords: | Brazil, Amazon, mayoral elections, climate change, gender, Latin America |
| JEL: | J16 D72 Q54 Q56 Q58 |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17920 |
| By: | H\'ector Hermida-Rivera; Toygar T. Kerman |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces a novel binary stability property for voting rules-called binary self-selectivity-by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itself in pairwise elections will choose not to do so. In Theorem 1, we show that a neutral voting rule is binary self-selective if and only if it is universally self-selective. We then use this equivalence to show, in Corollary 1, that under the unrestricted strict preference domain, a unanimous and neutral voting rule is binary self-selective if and only if it is dictatorial. In Theorem 2 and Corollary 2, we show that whenever there is a strong Condorcet winner; a unanimous, neutral and anonymous voting rule is binary self-selective (or universally self-selective) if and only if it is the Condorcet voting rule. |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2506.15265 |
| By: | Alban de Gmeline (University of Cambridge) |
| Abstract: | What was the impact of rail development on electoral behaviour in France? This paper quantifies the impact of the opening of stations on voting in the 1902 election. It distinguishes the specific effect linked to the opening of a news agent in stations. The analysis is based on a new dataset from the archives of Hachette who had a monopoly on these news agents in French railway stations. These selling points account for 2.64% of the 42.46% of votes obtained by the left-wing alliance in 1902. A political bias of Hachette may partly explain this effect. These results underscore the importance of transport infrastructure and information access in shaping political behaviors. |
| JEL: | N73 D72 |
| Date: | 2025–03–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cmh:wpaper:41 |
| By: | H\'ector Hermida-Rivera |
| Abstract: | In this paper, I characterize minimal stable voting rules and minimal self-stable constitutions (i.e., pairs of voting rules) for societies in which only power matters. To do so, I first let players' preference profiles over voting rules satisfy four natural axioms commonly used in the analysis of power: non-dominance, anonymity, null player and swing player. I then provide simple notions of minimal stability and minimal self-stability, and show that the families of minimal stable voting rules and minimal self-stable constitutions are fairly small. Finally, I conclude that political parties have evolved to ensure the minimal self-stability of otherwise not minimal self-stable constitutions. |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2506.15323 |
| By: | Jerg Gutmann (University of Hamburg); Pascal Langer (Trier University); Matthias Neuenkirch (Trier University) |
| Abstract: | It is well-established that political leaders matter for domestic outcomes, but statistical evidence for their relevance in international politics is still scarce. Here, we ask whether the personal relationship between political leaders can change the propensity for nonviolent conflict between nation-states in the form of sanctions. Panel probit models with data for the period 1970 to 2004 are estimated to evaluate whether more similar leaders are less likely to sanction each other. Our results indicate that higher leader similarity significantly reduces the likelihood of sanction imposition. The effect is most pronounced for sanctions imposed through unilateral political decisions. The probability of such sanction imposition ranges from 4.9% at the highest observed leader similarity in the sample to 13.0% at the lowest. Leader similarity seems to matter especially for sanctions aimed at democratic change or human rights improvements, for non-trade sanctions, and when at least one autocracy is involved. Finally, leader similarity has become more important after the Cold War. |
| Keywords: | Geoeconomics; International sanctions; Leader similarity; Political leaders |
| JEL: | D70 F51 K33 |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:drx:wpaper:202529 |
| By: | H\'ector Hermida-Rivera |
| Abstract: | In this paper, I introduce a novel stability axiom for stochastic voting rules, called self-equivalence, by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itself will choose not do so. I then show that under the unrestricted strict preference domain, a voting rule satisfying the democratic principles of anonymity, optimality, monotonicity, and neutrality is self-equivalent if and only if it assigns to every voter equal probability of being a dictator (i.e., uniform random dictatorship). Thus, any society that desires stability and adheres to the aforementioned democratic principles is bound to either employ the uniform random dictatorship or decide whether to change its voting rule using a voting rule other than itself. |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2506.15310 |
| By: | Charles Hankla (International Center for Public Policy, Georgia State University); Eunice Heredia-Ortiz (Ernst and Young); Raul Ponce-Rodr’guez (Universidad Autonoma de Ciudad Juarez) |
| Abstract: | Scholars have long understood the key role played by political institutions in mediating the impact of decentralization on critical governance outcomes. In this chapter, we review the scholarship on these relationships and present some conclusions and ways forward. We organize our analysis according to the specific decentralization outcomes considered by scholars, grouping them into the following categories: (1) nation-state integrity, (2) accountability, participation, and corruption, (3) social equity, (4) macro-fiscal performance, and (5) service delivery and public spending. On the independent variable side, we consider numerous types of institutions writ large, including: (1) institutions governing accountability and democracy, (2) institutions related to vertical relationships among tiers, (3) institutions determining horizontal relationships at subnational level, and (4) the structure and nationalization of parties and party systems. We conclude that, while recent scholarship has greatly expanded our understanding of how political institutions mediate fiscal federalism, there is still much to learn. |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper2510 |
| By: | Venkat Ram Reddy Ganuthula; Krishna Kumar Balaraman |
| Abstract: | This article examines the complex relationship between money and political legitimacy in democracies (United States, Germany, India) and nondemocracies (China, Russia), using published empirical evidence to explore how financial resources influence governance. In democracies, US campaign finance, German party funding, and Indias electoral bonds amplify elite influence, openly eroding public trust by skewing policy toward wealthy interests. In nondemocracies, Chinas state enterprise patronage and Russias oligarch suppression strengthen legitimacy, yet hide vulnerabilities revealed by anticorruption campaigns and power struggles. The analysis argues that moneys corrosive impact is widespread but varies: democracies face evident legitimacy crises, while nondemocracies conceal underlying fragility. These findings highlight the need for reforms: increased transparency in democracies and wider power bases in nondemocracies, to mitigate moneys distorting effect on political authority. |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2505.09128 |
| By: | Jachimowicz, Jessica; Puppe, Clemens |
| Abstract: | Deliberative decision-making is often proposed as a mechanism to mitigate polarization in democratic processes. However, empirical evidence remains mixed, with some studies suggesting that deliberation among like-minded individuals can drive preference shifts toward extremes. We use a three-round group dictator game to systematically examine how group composition influences deliberative outcomes. Our design allows us to compare deliberation within like-minded and mixed-minded groups while also manipulating the voting rule (median vs. unanimity) to assess its impact on decision-making. Contrary to expectations of polarization, we find that deliberation moderates preferences across all conditions. This effect is strongest for selfish participants in mixed-minded groups, but also like-minded selfish groups behave significantly less extreme than individuals. On the other hand, the moderating effect of deliberation does not persist when subjects revert back to individual decision-making. Regardless of the voting rule, groups tend to converge on unanimous decisions, suggesting norm-driven behavior in deliberative and participatory settings. Our findings contribute to ongoing debates on the role of group composition and decision rules in shaping collective outcomes in social dilemmas. |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:kitwps:319615 |
| By: | Venkat Ram Reddy Ganuthula; Krishna Kumar Balaraman |
| Abstract: | This article examines the interplay of money, identity, and information as a pivotal triad reshaping electoral politics and legitimacy in modern democracies, with insights from the United States, India, Germany, China, and Russia. Financial resources, through campaign finance and state funds, enable strategies exploiting identity cleavages like race, caste, and nationalism, amplified by digital networks such as social media and targeted messaging. In democracies, this dynamic fosters polarization and erodes trust, while in non democracies, it bolsters regime narratives. Drawing on political economy, social identity theory, and media studies, the study reveals a feedback loop: money shapes identity appeals, information disseminates them, and power consolidates, challenging issue based governance assumptions. Comparative analysis highlights the triad universal yet context specific impact, underscoring the need for reforms to address its effects on democratic theory and practice, as it entrenches elite influence and tribal divisions across diverse political systems. |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2505.09124 |
| By: | Rafael Acuna; Aldie Alejandro; Robert Leung |
| Abstract: | Dynasties have long dominated Philippine politics. Despite the theoretical consensus that dynastic rule erodes democratic accountability, there is limited empirical evidence establishing dynasties' true impact on development. A key challenge has been developing robust metrics for characterizing dynasties that facilitate meaningful comparisons across geographies and election cycles. Using election data from 2004 to 2022, we leverage methods from graph theory to develop four indicators to investigate dynastic evolution: Political Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), measuring dynastic power concentration; Centrality Gini Coefficient (CGC), reflecting inequalities of influence between clan members; Connected Component Density (CCD), representing the degree of inter-clan connection; and Average Community Connectivity (ACC), quantifying intra-clan cohesion. Our analysis reveals three key findings. Firstly, dynasties have grown stronger and more interconnected, occupying an increasing share of elected positions. Dominant clans have also remained tightly knit, but with great power imbalances between members. Secondly, we examine variations in party-hopping between dynastic and non-dynastic candidates. Across every election cycle, party-hopping rates are significantly higher (p |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2505.21280 |
| By: | Levy, Gilat; Razin, Ronny |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the dynamic ramifications of cohort effects on politics. We propose a theoretical framework that encompasses a dynamic social-learning model of politics, where cohort effects are endogenously derived from preceding generations’ political decisions. This process underscores the role of political experiences in shaping the beliefs of younger cohorts, which subsequently influence policy decisions as these individuals mature. We demonstrate how these dynamic intergenerational linkages lead to cyclical patterns of polarised and cohesive cohorts. In the proposed model, cohorts emerging during periods of political consensus display less familiarity with optimal policies, resulting, due to random external shocks, in high variance of public opinions. Conversely, cohorts maturing amidst polarisation and political turnover demonstrate greater knowledge about optimal policies, leading to more cohesive public opinions. Notably, our model suggests that transitory shocks can exert persistent influence on politics due to these dynamic linkages. We also present some suggestive evidence, using ANES surveys, showing that different cohorts’ opinions exhibit distinct levels of variance. |
| Keywords: | cohort effects; polarisation |
| JEL: | J1 |
| Date: | 2025–07–31 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:128073 |