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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Hans Gersbach |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces a simple democratic procedure. In a first stage, all members of a polity decide whether to apply for proposal-making or later vote on proposals made in the second stage. This procedure is called Propose or Vote (PoV). With appropriate default points and majority voting over two randomly selected proposals, the PoV procedure can implement the Condorcet winner with only one round of voting if a Condorcet winner exists. We explore ways to establish uniqueness, alternative voting procedures over the selected alternatives, and the application to elections. In the latter case, agents can decide whether to stand for election to an office or to vote on the set of candidates. |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2506.05998 |
| By: | Vasiliki Fouka; Marco Tabellini |
| Abstract: | This chapter reviews the literature on the relationship between culture and political preferences. We distinguish conceptually between the direct cultural transmission of political ideology and the transmission of more primitive preferences and beliefs that influence preferences over policies, parties, and forms of government. While there is substantial evidence that political preferences persist across generations and within communities, the literature often does not specify which primitive values and beliefs drive this persistence. A growing body of work points to a multifaceted mapping from underlying preferences and beliefs over the material world and social relations to political ideology. In this chapter, we summarize these studies, organize their findings in a coherent framework, and suggest possible directions for future research. |
| JEL: | D72 N30 P0 Z1 |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33786 |
| By: | Saka, O.; Ji, Y.; Minaudier, C. |
| Abstract: | We show that politicians facing a binding term limit are more likely to engage in financial de-liberalisation than those facing re-election, but only in the wake of a financial crisis. In particular, they implement policies that tend to favour incumbent financial institutions over the general population, such as increasing barriers to entry in the banking sector. We rationalise this behaviour with a theory of political accountability in which crises generate two opposite effects: they increase the salience of financial policies to voters but also create a window of opportunity for politicians captured by the financial industry to push potentially harmful reforms. In line with the implications of our model, we show that revolving doors between the government and the financial sector play a key role in encouraging bank-friendly policies after crises. |
| Keywords: | Financial crises; political accountability; democracies; term-limits; special-interest groups. |
| Date: | 2024–11–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cty:dpaper:24/01 |
| By: | Jon H. Fiva; Jo Thori Lind; Bjørn-Atle Reme; Henning Øien |
| Abstract: | Political office involves stress, long hours, and media scrutiny, which may harm politicians' health. However, winning prestigious positions can increase social status, income, and connections, potentially offsetting these harms. We investigate the health effects of political promotions using comprehensive Norwegian administrative data on public health care utilization. Using an event study framework, we assess health outcomes by comparing newly elected mayors to controls matched by gender, age group, and education within the same municipality. While securing full-time office results in a substantial income boost, we find no evidence of adverse health effects. On the contrary, winning office leads to a sustained modest reduction in both general doctor visits and mental health consultations. This evidence runs counter to common concerns about the toll of political careers, pointing to potential health benefits associated with political advancement. |
| Keywords: | political selection, returns from office, health consequences, event study, administrative data |
| JEL: | D72 I12 J81 M51 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11881 |
| By: | Assaf Razin |
| Abstract: | This paper explores the two-way relationship between international migration and political regime change, emphasizing the potential for a feedback loop: political shifts influence migration patterns, and migration can, in turn, affect political developments. Using a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) approach and a dataset combining migration flows, regime quality indicators (CHRI), and measures of economic integration such as EU membership, the study identifies three key findings. First, substantial immigration into politically fragile democracies can further weaken their institutions. Second, democratic decline tends to increase emigration, undermining a country's ability to a democratic institutional recovery. Third, international economic integration, particularly in our study, through EU accession—shapes how emigration responds to political change. |
| JEL: | F02 H7 |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33793 |
| By: | Jerg Gutmann; Pascal Langer; Matthias Neuenkirch |
| Abstract: | It is well-established that political leaders matter for domestic outcomes, but statistical evidence for their relevance in international politics is still scarce. Here, we ask whether the personal relationship between political leaders can change the propensity for nonviolent conflict between nation-states in the form of sanctions. Panel probit models with data for the period 1970 to 2004 are estimated to evaluate whether more similar leaders are less likely to sanction each other. Our results indicate that higher leader similarity significantly reduces the likelihood of sanction imposition. The effect is most pronounced for sanctions imposed through unilateral political decisions. The probability of such sanction imposition ranges from 4.9% at the highest observed leader similarity in the sample to 13.0% at the lowest. Leader similarity seems to matter especially for sanctions aimed at democratic change or human rights improvements, for non-trade sanctions, and when at least one autocracy is involved. Finally, leader similarity has become more important after the Cold War. |
| Keywords: | geoeconomics, international sanctions, leader similarity, political leaders |
| JEL: | D70 F51 K33 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11921 |
| By: | Inés Berniell (CEDLAS-IIE-FCE-UNLP); Mariana Marchionni (CEDLAS-IIE-FCE-UNLP & CONICET); Julián Pedrazzi (CEDLAS-IIE-FCE-UNLP & CONICET); Mariana Viollaz (CEDLAS-IIE-FCE-UNLP) |
| Abstract: | This paper explores how female political leaders impact environmental outcomes and climate change policy actions using data from mixed-gender mayoral races in Brazil. Using a Regression Discontinuity design we find that, compared to male mayors, female mayors significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This effect is driven by a reduction in emissions intensity (CO2e/GDP) in the Land Use sector, without changes in municipal economic activity. Part of the reduction in emissions in the Land Use sector is attributable to a decline in deforestation. We examine potential mechanisms that could explain the positive environmental impact of narrowly electing a female mayor over a male counterpart and find that in Amazon municipalities, female elected mayors allocate more space to the environment in their government proposals and are more likely to invest in environmental initiatives. Differences in the enforcement of environmental regulations do not explain the results. |
| JEL: | J16 D72 Q54 Q56 Q58 |
| Date: | 2028–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dls:wpaper:0351 |
| By: | Antony Mbithi (World Bank, Washington DC, USA); Yoko Kijima (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo, Japan) |
| Abstract: | Political accountability is an anchor to a well-functioning democracy. Governments and bureaucrats accountable to their electorate abide by the rule of law. With information provision for better governance involving complex conditions, we investigate at what stage corruption-information from public oversight institutions is successful in effecting political accountability. Using publicly released audit information on the newly established county governments in Kenya, outcomes of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) that initiate the implementation of audit queries, and a nationally representative survey, we find that individuals interviewed immediately after the release of corruption news perceive their county executives (governor’s) to be corrupt and condemn local legislators’ performance of oversight role. Also, local legislators with a high number of audit irregularities are less likely to run and win in the next elections. Our findings show that in an emerging democracy and developing country context, a symbiotic relationship between audit institutions and the PAC, as expected in a Westminster system, is needed, for one without the other cannot achieve its mandate. |
| Keywords: | Rent Extraction; Corruption; Accountability; Politics; Information. |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ngi:dpaper:25-05 |