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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Kavetsos, Georgios; Krekel, Christian; Melios, George |
| Abstract: | Two prominent mechanisms have been advanced to explain the effects of election outcomes on economic attitudes/perceptions: partisan competence attribution, based on voters' genuine belief of an elected party's competence; and partisan motivated reasoning, where voters change their economic attitudes so as to remain consistent with their past behavior/view. To date, these two mechanisms have not been considered jointly. We draw on a unique, closely spaced, panel dataset around the 2013 German general elections to consider retrospective (past evaluations) and prospective (future expectations) attitudes about both one's personal economic situation and that of the national economy. We find no evidence for competence attribution; voters of the future coalition parties do not expect higher household incomes nor their job situation to improve. We find changes in retrospective attitudes about the national economy, explained by partisan motivated reasoning given a political alliance that was negated and depreciated throughout the pre‐election period. We discuss the implications these results have. |
| Keywords: | elections; voting; attitudes; motivated reasoning |
| JEL: | J1 |
| Date: | 2025–04–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:127528 |
| By: | DiGiuseppe, Matthew; Garriga, Ana Carolina; Kern, Andreas |
| Abstract: | How does partisanship affect inflation expectations? While most research focuses on how inflation impacts political approval and voter behavior, we analyze the political roots of inflation expectations. We argue that elections serve as key moments when citizens update their economic outlook based on anticipated policy changes, and that partisanship influences these re-evaluations. Using a two-wave panel survey conducted before and after the 2024 U.S. Presidential Election, we show that partisan alignment strongly shapes inflation expectations. Democrats reported heightened inflation expectations, anticipating inflationary policies under a Trump administration, while Republicans expected inflation to fall. These shifts reflect partisan interpretations of economic policy rather than objective forecasts. We also analyze the characteristics of those who are more likely to update inflation expectations and in what direction. Importantly, we verify that individuals with strong partisan attitudes exhibit less anchored inflation expectations. Our findings have implications beyond the case under analysis. From a policy perspective, our results underscore the challenges central banks face in anchoring inflation expectations in an era of political polarization, where economic perceptions differ sharply across partisanship lines. |
| Keywords: | Inflation expectations, Survey data, Partisanship, United States, Polarization |
| JEL: | D83 E03 E31 E58 Y80 |
| Date: | 2025–04–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:124391 |
| By: | Andre Diegmann (Halle Institute for Economic Research); Laura Pohlan (Institute for Employment Research (IAB)); Andrea Weber (Central European University) |
| Abstract: | We study how connections to German federal parliamentarians affect firm dynamics by constructing a novel dataset linking politicians and election candidates to the universe of firms. To identify the causal effect of access to political power, we exploit (i) new appointments to the company leadership team and (ii) discontinuities around the marginal seat of party election lists. Our results reveal that connections lead to reductions in firm exits, gradual increases in employment growth without improvements in productivity. Adding information on credit ratings, subsidies and procurement contracts allows us to distinguish between mechanisms driving the effects over the politician’s career. |
| Keywords: | Politicians, Firm Performance, Identification, Political Connections |
| JEL: | O43 L25 D72 |
| Date: | 2025–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:2506 |
| By: | Günther G. Schulze; Nikita Zakharov |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we unveil targeted repression against journalists as an elaborate strategy used by modern autocrats to mitigate the risk of mass protests during autocratic elections—a common threat to their rule. Repression is deployed to discipline the media before elections to secure favorable media coverage of the incumbent, thereby discourage public dissent. In contrast, the reigns are loosened during off-election periods to allow the media’s credibility to be rebuilt. This dynamic creates distinct electoral cycles of media repression in autocracies. Our empirical study establishes these cycles using a unique granular dataset on the harassment of journalists in Putin's Russia and the predetermined, staggered timing of local elections. We then demonstrate the disciplinary effects on reporting about incumbents using a novel media coverage index. Finally, employing survey data, we show that media repression is extremely effective when it comes to dwarfing the threat of anti-government protests. |
| Keywords: | autocracy, elections, media repression, political cycles, protest |
| JEL: | D72 H10 P43 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11701 |
| By: | Salvatore Carrozzo |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the effect of a temporary forced internal migration on the voting behavior in the receiving municipalities. During World War I, around 500, 00 thousand displaced nationals were resettled from the Italian government within the country and stayed in the receiving place for less than two years. Leveraging on the quasi-random relocation policy and the short stay of displaced individuals, I evaluate whether hosting a large share of forced migrants affects voting behavior in the subsequent elections. Findings indicate that an increase in the share of hosted displaced individuals corresponds to a decrease in the vote share for the Italian Popular Party (PPI), the Catholic party. This aligns with historical evidence highlighting the significant role of Catholic associations in assisting displaced people at arrival. The negative impact on the Catholic party persisted for two consecutive elections, 1919 and 1921, before dissipating in 1924. Anti-competitive behavior for public services is likely to explain the voting behavior. |
| Keywords: | displaced people, political outcomes, public spending, resettlement policies |
| JEL: | D72 H53 I38 N34 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11737 |