nep-pol New Economics Papers
on Positive Political Economics
Issue of 2025–04–07
six papers chosen by
Eugene Beaulieu, University of Calgary


  1. Who Gets to Come In? How Political Engagement Shapes Views on Legal Immigration By Afzal, Muhammad Hassan Bin; Omosun, Foluke
  2. Choosing Democracy Over Party? How Civic Education Can Mitigate the Anti-Democratic Effects of Partisan Polarization By Melek Hilal Eroglu; Steven Finkel; Anja Neundorf; Aykut Ozturk; Ericka G. Rascon-Ramirez
  3. Liberalisation Reforms and Misallocation: The Role of Political Institutions By Ahmed Pirzada
  4. Impact of Political Polarization on Economic Conditions By William Ginn; Jamel Saadaoui
  5. Collusion when players take turns By Corchón, Luis C.; Correa-Lopera, Guadalupe; Moreno, Bernardo
  6. Status of Women in Economics: Mexico By Eva O. Arceo-Gómez

  1. By: Afzal, Muhammad Hassan Bin; Omosun, Foluke
    Abstract: This study examines how political engagement shapes public attitudes toward legal immigration in the United States. Using nationally weighted data from the 2024 ANES Pilot Study, we construct a novel Political Engagement Index (PAX) based on five civic actions—discussing politics, online sharing, attending rallies, wearing political symbols, and campaign volunteering. Applying weighted ordered logistic regression models, we find that higher engagement predicts greater support for easing legal immigration, even after adjusting for education, gender, age, partisanship, income, urban residence, and generalized social trust. To capture the substantive effect, we visualize predicted probabilities across levels of engagement. In full-sample models, the likelihood of supporting "a lot harder" immigration drops from 26% to 13% as engagement rises, while support for "a lot easier" increases from 10% to 21%. Subgroup analyses by partisanship show consistent directionality, with notable shifts among Republicans. Social trust and education are also consistently associated with more open attitudes, while older respondents tend to support less easy pathways to legal immigration policies. These findings suggest that a cumulative increase in political participation is associated with support for legal immigration in shaping public attitudes toward legal immigration pathways, with varying intensity across partisan identities and socio-demographic characteristics.
    Keywords: Political Engagement, Immigration Policy, Voting Behavior, Civic Participation, Issue Salience, Elite Cues
    JEL: D72 F50
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esconf:314938
  2. By: Melek Hilal Eroglu (University of Pittsburgh); Steven Finkel (University of Pittsburgh); Anja Neundorf (University of Glasgow); Aykut Ozturk (University of Glasgow); Ericka G. Rascon-Ramirez (Department of Economics, CIDE and Middlesex University London)
    Abstract: How can the negative effects of partisan polarization on democratic attitudes be mitigated? Can polarized individuals be persuaded to choose democracy over party, i.e., support a candidate from an opposing party who upholds democratic norms when their co-partisan candidate fails to do so? We tested the effect of an online civic education intervention conducted on over 41, 000 individuals in 33 countries that was designed to promote the choice for "democracy" by emphasizing the benefits of democratic versus autocratic regimes. The results are striking: exposure to civic education messages significantly dampens the negative effect of partisan polarization on anti-democratic co-partisan candidate choice. Civic education also has a small positive effect on polarization itself, with further exploration showing that this is the result of increased evaluations of parties that uphold democratic norms and practices, resulting in greater differences between democratic and antidemocratic parties.
    Keywords: Civic education, partisan polarization, democratization, online experiments
    Date: 2025–02
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:emc:wpaper:dte647
  3. By: Ahmed Pirzada
    Abstract: To what extent did the liberalisation policies of the 1990s and 2000s help address the misallocation of factors across sectors in developing countries? This paper shows that while misallocation decreased during this period - particularly in countries with higher levels of misallocation in 1990 - this improvement cannot be explained by the liberalisation reforms implemented by respective governments. However, a more nuanced picture emerges for trade liberalisation. In countries which were sufficiently democratic, an increase in trade liberalisation decreased misallocation. This evidence also helps reconcile conflicting views on the success of liberalisation reforms by highlighting the importance of right political institutions for their success.
    Date: 2024–12–16
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bri:uobdis:24/784
  4. By: William Ginn (Labcorp and Coburg University of Applied Sciences); Jamel Saadaoui (University Paris 8)
    Abstract: This study investigates the impact of political polarization on output growth, capital formation, and foreign direct investment (FDI) across 139 economies via a panel Local Projections (LP) model. We examine whether the effects of political polarization vary by income group (advanced [AEs], emerging markets [EMs]) and by political regimes (democracy, autocracy). Our findings reveal that political polarization negatively affects output growth and capital formation, with adverse effect on FDI in EMs and autocracies, highlighting “hidden” economic costs of polarization.
    Keywords: Political polarization, panel local projections, economic development
    JEL: E
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inf:wpaper:2025.3
  5. By: Corchón, Luis C.; Correa-Lopera, Guadalupe; Moreno, Bernardo
    Abstract: Traditional collusion models typically assume that players coordinatetheir actions actively during the competition process to influence the outcomes.In contrast, we consider a repeated interaction setting betweentwo players where collusion occurs through well-defined strategies: theplayers take turns, with one holding monopoly power while the other eitherrefrains from participating or behaves as if absent. We provide afull characterization of when taking turns constitutes a subgame perfectNash equilibrium in repeated games. By allowing players to discount timedifferently, we uncover a novel, non-monotonic condition on the discountfactor that sustains collusion. We apply our findings to three specificcontexts: contests, duopoly, and political competition.
    Keywords: Collusion; Political competition; Repeated games; Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium; Take-turns
    JEL: D43 C62 C73 D72
    Date: 2025–03–25
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:werepe:46355
  6. By: Eva O. Arceo-Gómez (Department of Economics, CIDE)
    Abstract: The status of women in Economics in Mexico is unmoved. Progress has stalled at all levels. Female representation among students has varied from around 38 to 42% on average between 2010 and 2022. I found tiny declines in female representation from undergraduate to doctoral level, so there is no strong evidence of a leaky pipeline. Among researchers, 34% of the Economics researchers in the National System of Researchers are women. Female representation falls sharply for researchers as we climb the system's ladder. At the top of the system are four male economists per woman. Women's representation in academic production has increased over time, but for women in Mexican institutions, it has stalled, even though they are now teaching relatively less than men. Overall, Mexican women in Economics are facing stagnation in their progress toward a more balanced representation in student bodies, faculties, and academic production.Length: 54 pages
    Keywords: Mexico, Economics, women, underrepresentation
    JEL: A11 J16 J44
    Date: 2025–03
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:emc:wpaper:dte649

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