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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Günther G. Schulze; Nikita Zakharov (Department of International Economic Policy, University of Freiburg) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we unveil targeted repression against journalists as an elaborate strategy used by modern autocrats to mitigate the risk of mass protests during autocratic electionsâa common threat to their rule. Repression is deployed to discipline the media before elections to secure favorable media coverage of the incumbent, thereby discourage public dissent. In contrast, the reigns are loosened during off-election periods to allow the mediaâs credibility to be rebuilt. This dynamic creates distinct electoral cycles of media repression in autocracies. Our empirical study establishes these cycles using a unique granular dataset on the harassment of journalists in Putin's Russia and the predetermined, staggered timing of local elections. We then demonstrate the disciplinary effects on reporting about incumbents using a novel media coverage index. Finally, employing survey data, we show that media repression is extremely effective when it comes to dwarfing the threat of anti-government protests. |
| Keywords: | Autocracy, elections, media repression, political cycles, protest. |
| Date: | 2025–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fre:wpaper:52 |
| By: | Muhoza, Benjamin Kanze; Majune, Socrates Kraido |
| Abstract: | This study analyses the effect of political instability on firm performance in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), one of the most unstable countries in sub-Saharan Africa. We use pooled panel data for three waves of the World Bank Enterprise Survey of the DRC (2006, 2010, and 2013) to analyse the effect of political instability on five measures of performance: employee growth, sales growth, productivity, investment, and export status. Results from the endogenous switching model reveal that political instability adversely affects firm performance in the DRC. In the presence of political instability, employee POLICY BRIEF Political Instability and Firm Performance in the Democratic Republic of Congo Benjamin Kanze Muhoza and Socrates Kraido Majune October 2023 / No.786 2 Policy Brief No.786 growth, sales growth, productivity, and investment growth significantly decline. Conversely, firms that do not experience political instability grow in terms of employee growth, sales growth, productivity, investment, and exporting activities. Our results are robust when we proxy political instability with losses due to theft, robbery, and vandalism. For purposes of policy, we recommend that political stability should be enhanced through political goodwill and legislation that advocates for peace. Firms can also push for this agenda through their business associations and platforms such as public-private partnerships that link them to the government. |
| Date: | 2024–04–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aer:wpaper:a38292f3-622c-4e63-8076-14dc81a21bf4 |
| By: | Chang, Ho-Chun Herbert; Wang, Austin Horng-En; Fang, Yu Sunny |
| Abstract: | Taiwan simultaneously has one of the highest freedom of speech indexes yet encounters the largest amount of foreign interference, due to its contentious history with China. Due to the large influx, Taiwan takes a public “crowdsourcing” approach using fact-checking ChatBots and AI to combat misinformation. Combining this public database with large-language models, we investigate misinformation across three platforms (Line, PTT, and Facebook) during the 2024 Taiwanese Presidential Elections. We find most misinformation attacks US-Taiwan relations through visuals and within pan-Blue identity groups. Curiously, we find misinformation rhetoric that references conspiracy groups in the west. |
| Date: | 2023–12–20 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:uefgw_v1 |
| By: | Patty, John; Turner, Ian R (Yale University) |
| Abstract: | Legislators can benefit from delegation to executive agencies, but they have limited tools to hold these agencies accountable. One key tool is 'power of the purse': control of the agency's appropriations. We present a theory that incorporates heterogeneous legislator preferences over bureaucratic activity, legislative budgetary control, and endogenous bureaucratic policy discretion to understand legislative incentives when appropriating funds to bureaucratic agencies. Our theory provides several insights: first, legislators' induced preferences over budgets are only partially determined by their policy preferences. Second, in some cases a legislator opposed to the direction that the agency will take policy nevertheless supports increased funding for that agency, which we refer to as the legislator facing cross-pressure. Finally, "strange bedfellows" coalitions emerge in which legislators with competing policy preferences may nonetheless agree on their most-desired budget level for the agency. |
| Date: | 2024–01–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:pnx2u_v1 |