nep-pol New Economics Papers
on Positive Political Economics
Issue of 2025–02–24
fifteen papers chosen by
Eugene Beaulieu, University of Calgary


  1. Alternatives to plurality rule for single-winner elections: When do they make a difference? By Romain Lachat; Jean-François Laslier
  2. Does Trade Exposure Explain Antiglobalization Votes? By Antoine Bouët; Anthony Edo; Charlotte Emlinger
  3. Political Spillovers of Worker Representation: With or Without Workplace Democracy? By Uwe Jirjahn
  4. Causes and Extent of Increasing Partisan Segregation in the U.S. – Evidence from Migration Patterns of 212 Million Voters By Jacob R. Brown; Enrico Cantoni; Ryan Enos; Vincent Pons; Emilie Sartre
  5. Ancient Epics in the Television Age: Mass Media, Identity, and the Rise of Hindu Nationalism in India By Resuf Ahmed; Paul Brimble; Akhila Kovvuri; Alessandro Saia; Dean Yang
  6. Politics of Food: An Experiment on Trust in Expert Regulation and Economic Costs of Political Polarization By Burnitt, Christopher; Gars, Jared; Stalinski, Mateusz
  7. Are the Upwardly-Mobile More Left-Wing? By Andrew E Clark; Maria Cotofan
  8. Government Support in Times of Crisis: Transfers and the Road to Socialism By González, Felipe; Prem, Mounu
  9. The Far-Right Donation Gap By Julia Cagé; Moritz Hengel; Yuchen Huang
  10. Repeated Majority Voting By Antonin Macé; Rafael Treibich
  11. Lobbying for Globalisation By Michael Blanga-Gubbay; Paola Conconi; Mathieu Parenti
  12. Autonomy and Accountability: Strategic Behavior of German State Leaders During the COVID-19 Pandemic By Salvatore Barbaro; Reyn van Ewijk; Julia M. Rode
  13. The Immigrant Next Door By Leonardo Bursztyn; Thomas Chaney; Tarek A Hassan; Aakaash Rao
  14. The Resurgence of Trumponomics: Implications for the Future of ESG Investments in a Changing Political Landscape By Innocentus Alhamis
  15. Deliberation Among Informed Citizens - The Value of Exploring Alternative Thinking Frames - By Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky; Irénée Frérot

  1. By: Romain Lachat (CEVIPOF - Centre de recherches politiques de Sciences Po (Sciences Po, CNRS) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Institut d'Études Politiques [IEP] - Paris); Jean-François Laslier (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)
    Abstract: Declining levels of turnout and growing distrust in political elites are often seen as symptoms of a crisis of representative democracy. Various proposals of reform have been made to reinvigorate representation and political participation. This paper focuses on one aspect of that debate: finding an alternative to FPTP, which is the electoral rule most frequently used in single-member districts, but which is criticized, among others, for allowing only a limited expression of voters' preferences. Many alternative rules are in use or have been suggested, such as Two-Round majority, Instant Runoff, Approval Voting, Majority Judgement, or Range Voting. The literature on these decision rules has concentrated on their formal properties. Yet, we know surprisingly little about how frequently these rules would lead to different outcomes in normal electoral settings. This paper improves our understanding of these rules by examining their mechanical effects. We start from data on voters' party utilities from "real-world" settings, based on CSES data. This allows simulating and comparing the outcomes of different electoral rules under a variety of distributions of voters' party preferences. We then analyze how frequently they lead to different outcomes and identify the contextual characteristics that explain these differences. For the latter question, we focus on a number of party system or electorate's characteristics, which have been highlighted in debates on challenges to representation (such as ideological polarization, party system fragmentation, or affective polarization).
    Keywords: Electoral systems, Condorcet winner, Condorcet efficiency, Polarization, Party system fragmentation
    Date: 2024–01
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-04630321
  2. By: Antoine Bouët; Anthony Edo; Charlotte Emlinger
    Abstract: We investigate the local effects of trade exposure and immigration on voting behavior in France from 1988 to 2022. We use the content of each candidate's manifesto to construct an anti-globalization voting index for each French presidential election. This index shows a significant increase in the anti-globalization positions of candidates, and a growing anti-globalization vote beyond the far right. We show that increasing local exposure to import competition and immigration increases anti-globalization votes, while increasing export exposure reduces them. We also find that imports have different effects depending on the products imported. While exposure to imports of final goods increases anti-globalization voting, exposure to imports of intermediate goods reduces it.
    Keywords: Voting;Trade;Immigration;Political Economy
    JEL: D72 F6
    Date: 2024–10
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cii:cepidt:2024-12
  3. By: Uwe Jirjahn
    Abstract: A series of studies show that unions and works councils have an influence on workers’ political activities and attitudes. However, at issue are the transmission channels through which worker representation impacts workers’ political activities and attitudes. This article discusses from a theoretical and empirical viewpoint whether the influence of worker representation reflects increased workplace democracy. The article also discusses possible policy implications.
    Keywords: Trade Unions, Works Councils, Political Engagement, Party Preferences, Democratic Leadership, Autocratic Leadership
    JEL: D70 J51 J53 K31 O35
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trr:wpaper:202502
  4. By: Jacob R. Brown; Enrico Cantoni; Ryan Enos; Vincent Pons; Emilie Sartre
    Abstract: Using data on the residential location and migration for every voter in U.S. states recording partisan registration between 2008–2020, we find that residential segregation between Democrats and Republicans has increased year over year at all geographic levels, from neighborhoods to Congressional Districts. Individual demographic information reveals that segregation increases for voters of most demographic backgrounds, but that Democratic and Republican trending places have starkly different demographic profiles, thus contributing to the growing confluence of demographics, partisanship, and geography in the United States. We further decompose the change in segregation into different sources. Increases in segregation have not been driven primarily by migration but rather by generational change, as young voters enter the electorate, causing some places to become more homogeneously Democratic, and by existing voters leaving the Democratic party and causing other places to become more Republican.
    JEL: D72 P00
    Date: 2025–01
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33422
  5. By: Resuf Ahmed; Paul Brimble; Akhila Kovvuri; Alessandro Saia; Dean Yang
    Abstract: This study examines the long-term social and political impacts of mass media exposure to religious content in India. We study the impact of "Ramayan, " the massively popular adaptation of the Hindu epic televised in 1987-88. To identify causal effects, we conduct difference-in-difference analyses and exploit variation in TV signal strength driven by location of TV transmitters and topographical features inhibiting electromagnetic TV signal propagation. We find that areas with higher exposure to Ramayan (higher TV signal strength when the show aired) experienced significant cultural and political changes. First, we document a strengthening of religious identity among Hindus: parents in these areas became more likely to give their newborn sons traditionally Hindu names, and households showed increased adherence to orthodox Hindu dietary practices. In the short term, this cultural shift led to an increase in Hindu-Muslim communal violence through 1992. Over the longer term, through 2000, the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) became more likely to win state assembly elections. Analyses of changes in local TV signal strength in India over decades indicate that these effects are not due to general access to TV but are due to exposure to the Ramayan TV show in 1987-1988. Our findings reveal that media portrayal of religious narratives can have lasting effects on cultural identity, intergroup violence, and electoral outcomes.
    JEL: D72 L82 Z12
    Date: 2025–01
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33417
  6. By: Burnitt, Christopher (University of Warwick); Gars, Jared (University of Florida and JILAEE); Stalinski, Mateusz (University of Warwick and CAGE)
    Abstract: Addressing rising political polarization has become a focal point for policy makers. Yet, there is little evidence of its economic impacts, especially in contexts where partisan- ship cannot be easily hidden. To fill this gap, we study a novel channel: the perception of out-group partisan oversight of independent civil service reduces trust in regulation, affecting key markets (e.g., food and medicine). First, we motivate it by demonstrating the salience of the association between the president and expert regulators in US media reporting. Second, in a pre-registered experiment with 5, 566 individuals, we test the channel by exploiting an alignment in the way that the EPA under Trump and Biden defended the safety of spraying citrus crops with antibiotics. This enabled us to randomize the partisanship of the administration, holding the scientific arguments constant. Despite the EPA’s independence, out-group administration reduces support for the spraying by 26%, lowers trust in the EPA’s evaluation, and increases donations to an NGO opposing the spraying by 15%. We find no overall effect on the willing- ness to pay for citrus products, measured in an obfuscated follow-up survey. However, we document significant differences in effects for elastic vs. inelastic consumers. Taken together, polarization has the potential to affect economic decisions. However, a reduction in trust might not translate into lower demand, especially for inelastic consumers.
    Keywords: political polarization, civil service, trust in regulation, trust in science, food policy, partisan identity, consumer demand JEL Classification: D12, D83, P16, Q11, Q13, Q18, Z18
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:wacage:744
  7. By: Andrew E Clark (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Maria Cotofan (King‘s College London)
    Abstract: It is well-known that the wealthier are more likely to have Right-leaning political preferences. We here in addition consider the role of the individual's starting position, and in particular their upward social mobility relative to their parents. In 18 waves of UK panel data, both own and parental social status are independently positively associated with Rightleaning voting and political preferences: given their own social status, the upwardly-mobile are therefore more Left-wing.We investigate a number of potential mediators: these results do not reflect the relationship between well-being and own and parents' social status, but are partly linked to the individual's beliefs about how fair society is. We replicate these findings using US data and show that, in both countries, the choice of specification when controlling for the respondent's own status is crucial and may help explain some of the mixed findings in the literature.
    Keywords: Fairness, Social Mobility, Voting, Redistribution, Satisfaction
    Date: 2024–03
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-04500774
  8. By: González, Felipe (Queen Mary University of London); Prem, Mounu (Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance)
    Abstract: Despite the adverse effects of economic crises, incumbents often retain significant electoral support. We attribute this resilience to the intensified political returns of transfers during crises. Our context is the largest infant nutrition program in the world, implemented by Salvador Allende and his left-wing coalition in Chile (1970-1973) as part of a large increase in spending that contributed to hyperinflation, scarcity of basic goods, and plummeting real wages. Using administrative data and surveys, we find that the delivery of three cups of milk per day to all preschoolers in the country lowered infant mortality and helped the left-wing government to remain electorally popular. We support the causal interpretation of results by exploiting a family planning program from the late 1960s, information campaigns targeting women, and voting in gender-segregated booths. Furthermore, novel measures of the local severity of the economic crisis reveal that transfers yielded greater political returns in areas hardest hit by economic hardship. Why did the crisis fail to translate into support for the opposition coalition? Survey evidence suggests that transfers swayed voters who perceived the crisis as unrelated to government policies. Overall, our findings demonstrate how direct transfers and heterogeneous perceptions of economic crises can sustain the electoral popularity of governments.
    Keywords: government support, transfers, crisis, hyperinflation, socialism
    JEL: H51 N35 N46 P35
    Date: 2025–01
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17661
  9. By: Julia Cagé (Institut d'Études Politiques [IEP] - Paris, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research); Moritz Hengel (Institut d'Études Politiques [IEP] - Paris); Yuchen Huang (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)
    Abstract: We document a widespread decline in the share of donors to charities in Western countries over the past decade, and show that this can be in part explained by a lower propensity to donate among far-right voters. Focusing on France, we first conduct a large-scale survey (N = 12, 600) and show that far-right voters are significantly less likely to report a charitable donation than the rest of the population, conditional on a rich set of controls. Second, using administrative tax data for the universe of French municipalities (N 33, 000) combined with electoral results, we find that the negative relationship between vote shares for the far right and charitable donations holds in a broad range of specifications, at both the extensive and the intensive margin, and controlling for municipality fixed effects. Third, we exploit unique geo-localized donation data from several charities and document similar patterns. All evidence points towards a drop in the propensity to donate driven by a shift in social norms that threatens general acceptance of the charitable sector.
    Keywords: Charitable giving, Political donations, Far-right, Social norms, Underlying preferences, Communal moral values, Universalist moral values
    Date: 2023–08
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-04423452
  10. By: Antonin Macé (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Rafael Treibich (SDU - University of Southern Denmark)
    Abstract: We propose a general model of repeated voting in committees and study equilibrium behavior under alternative majority rules. We find that repetition may significantly increase the efficiency of majority voting through a mechanism of intertemporal logrolling, agents sometimes voting against their immediate preference to benefit the group's long-term interest. In turn, this affects the comparison of majority rules, which may differ significantly relative to the static setting. The model provides a rationale for the use of super-majority rules, while accounting for the prevalence of consensus in committee voting.
    Keywords: Logrolling, Repeated games, Majority voting, Preference intensities, Consensus
    Date: 2024–06
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-04610689
  11. By: Michael Blanga-Gubbay (WTO, UZH - Universität Zürich [Zürich] = University of Zurich); Paola Conconi (University of Oxford, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research, CESifo - CESifo, CEP - Center for Economic Performance); Mathieu Parenti (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CESifo - CESifo, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research)
    Abstract: Using detailed information from lobbying reports filed under the Lobbying Disclosure Act, we construct a unique dataset that allows us to identify which firms lobby on Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) negotiated by the United States, their position (in favour or against) and their lobbying effort on the ratification of each trade agreement. Using this dataset, we show that lobbying on FTAs is dominated by large multinational firms, which are in favour of these agreements. On the intensive margin, we exploit exogenous variation across FTAs to show that individual firms put more effort supporting agreements that generate larger potential gains -larger improvements in their access to foreign consumers and suppliers and smaller increases in domestic competitionand that are more likely to be opposed by politicians. To rationalise these findings, we develop a new model of endogenous lobbying on trade agreements. In this model, heterogeneous firms select into trade and choose whether and how much to spend lobbying on the ratification of an FTA, and politicians may be biased in favour of or against the agreement.
    Keywords: Trade agreements, Endogenous lobbying, Heterogeneous firms
    Date: 2024–11
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-04777509
  12. By: Salvatore Barbaro (Johannes-Gutenberg University, Germany); Reyn van Ewijk (Johannes-Gutenberg University, Germany); Julia M. Rode (Deutsche Bundesbank, Germany)
    Abstract: The COVID-19 pandemic presented governments with unprecedented challenges, requiring decisions that balanced public health measures against substantial social and economic impacts. This study examines the strategic and opportunistic behaviors of regional officials in Germany during the pandemic. Using a comprehensive empirical analysis based on hundreds of statements from state incumbents, we shed light on the dynamics of state level political behavior. Our findings reveal that German regional leaders emphasized their autonomy when performance metrics were favorable but strategically shifted responsibility when outcomes were less favorable. This behavior underscores the dual potential of federal systems as both laboratories of democracy and breeding grounds for responsibility-avoiding (opportunistic) behavior.
    Date: 2025–02–13
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jgu:wpaper:2503
  13. By: Leonardo Bursztyn (University of Chicago, NBER - The National Bureau of Economic Research); Thomas Chaney (USC - University of Southern California, ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research); Tarek A Hassan (BU - Boston University [Boston], NBER - The National Bureau of Economic Research, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research); Aakaash Rao (Harvard University)
    Abstract: We study how the presence of individuals of a given foreign descent shapes natives' attitudes and behavior toward that group. Using individualized donations data from large charitable organizations, we show that the long-term presence of a given foreign ancestry in a US county leads to more generous behavior specifically toward that group's ancestral country. To shed light on mechanisms, we focus on attitudes and behavior toward Arab-Muslims, combining several existing large-scale surveys, cross-county data on implicit prejudice, and a newly-collected national survey. We show the presence of a larger Arab-Muslim population: (i) decreases both natives' explicit and implicit prejudice against Arab-Muslims, (ii) reduces natives' support for policies and political candidates hostile toward Arab-Muslims, (iii) leads to more personal contact between natives and Arab-Muslim individuals, and (iv) increases natives' knowledge of Arab-Muslims and Islam.
    Keywords: Contact, Attitudes, Immigration, Prejudice
    Date: 2024–02
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04900080
  14. By: Innocentus Alhamis
    Abstract: Public policy shapes the economic landscape, influencing everything from corporate behavior to individual investment decisions. For Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) investors, these policy shifts can create opportunities and challenges as they navigate an ever-changing regulatory environment. The contrast between the Trump and Biden administrations offers a striking example of how differing political agendas can affect ESG investments. Trump's first term was marked by deregulation and policies favoring fossil fuels, which created an uncertain environment for sustainable investments. When Biden assumed office, his focus on climate action and clean energy reinvigorated the ESG sector, offering a more stable and supportive landscape for green investments. However, with Trump's return to power in his second term, these policies are being reversed again, leading to further volatility. This paper explores how such dramatic shifts in public policy influence economic strategies and directly impact ESG investors' decisions, forcing them to constantly reassess their portfolios in response to changing political climates.
    Date: 2025–02
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2502.02627
  15. By: Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Irénée Frérot (LKB (Jussieu) - Laboratoire Kastler Brossel - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - SU - Sorbonne Université - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: In this paper we investigate the potential of deliberation to create consensus among fully informed citizens. Our approach relies on a two cognitive assumptions i. citizens need a thinking frame (perspective) to consider an issue; ii. citizens cannot consider all relevant perspectives simultaneously only sequentially. Together this implies that citizens' opinions are intrinsically contextual i.e., they have quantum-like characteristics.We capture contextuality in a simple quantum cognitive model. We find that in a binary voting problem, letting two citizens with alternative thinking frames and opposite voting intentions deliberate under the guidance of a benevolent facilitator allows reaching consensus. Opinion change occurs as the result of citizens' action in terms of "putting themselves in another citizen's shoes". The probability for reaching consensus depends on the correlation between perspectives and on their sophistication (dimensionality). Maximally uncorrelated sophisticated perspectives give the best chance for opinion change. With more than two citizens, multiple deliberation rounds with experts allow reaching consensus with significant probability.A first central lesson is that with contextual opinions, the diversity of perspectives is beneficial and necessary to overcome initial disagreement. We also learn that well-design procedures managed by a facilitator are needed to increase the probability for consensus. An additional finding is that the richness of a thinking frame helps convergence toward a joint position. The optimal facilitator's strategy entails focusing deliberation on a properly reduced problem.
    Date: 2024–10
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-04725697

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