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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Romain Lachat (CEVIPOF - Centre de recherches politiques de Sciences Po (Sciences Po, CNRS) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Institut d'Études Politiques [IEP] - Paris); Jean-François Laslier (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
| Abstract: | Declining levels of turnout and growing distrust in political elites are often seen as symptoms of a crisis of representative democracy. Various proposals of reform have been made to reinvigorate representation and political participation. This paper focuses on one aspect of that debate: finding an alternative to FPTP, which is the electoral rule most frequently used in single-member districts, but which is criticized, among others, for allowing only a limited expression of voters' preferences. Many alternative rules are in use or have been suggested, such as Two-Round majority, Instant Runoff, Approval Voting, Majority Judgement, or Range Voting. The literature on these decision rules has concentrated on their formal properties. Yet, we know surprisingly little about how frequently these rules would lead to different outcomes in normal electoral settings. This paper improves our understanding of these rules by examining their mechanical effects. We start from data on voters' party utilities from "real-world" settings, based on CSES data. This allows simulating and comparing the outcomes of different electoral rules under a variety of distributions of voters' party preferences. We then analyze how frequently they lead to different outcomes and identify the contextual characteristics that explain these differences. For the latter question, we focus on a number of party system or electorate's characteristics, which have been highlighted in debates on challenges to representation (such as ideological polarization, party system fragmentation, or affective polarization). |
| Keywords: | Electoral systems, Condorcet winner, Condorcet efficiency, Polarization, Party system fragmentation |
| Date: | 2024–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-04630321 |
| By: | Martorano, Bruno (Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, RS: GSBE MGSoG); Metzger, Laura; Justino, Patricia |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the effect of austerity on forms of political participation—including voting, appealing for reform, and peaceful protesting—and the role of preferences for redistribution in shaping the relationship between individual exposure to austerity and political participation. The paper focuses on the case of the United Kingdom (UK) where, between 2011 and 2019, wide-ranging austerity policies were introduced to deal with high public debt in the aftermath of the 2007–08 financial crisis. Cuts to government spending on public investment, services, and social protection, especially during the initial fiscal consolidation phase of 2011–15, led to significant welfare losses for the population. We provide evidence from observational microeconomic data and a large-scale online experiment in the UK showing that individual exposure to welfare losses from austerity increases political participation and strengthens preferences for government redistribution. The experimental data suggests that changes in individual preferences for redistribution significantly shape the effect of austerity on political participation. |
| JEL: | D31 D72 H53 H60 I38 |
| Date: | 2023–05–15 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:unumer:2023016 |
| By: | Roost, Stefanie (RS: GSBE MGSoG, Maastricht Graduate School of Governance); Gassmann, Franziska (RS: GSBE UM-BIC, RS: GSBE MORSE, Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, RS: GSBE MGSoG) |
| Abstract: | Questions surrounding the allocation and design of social transfers have long intrigued scholars and policymakers in the field of political economy. While transfers targeting those most in need aim to maximize the value of their benefits and improve their livelihood, the political economy of targeting posits that such restrictive eligibility criteria might dampen general social support. This study delves into the social and political sustainability of social protection systems and explores whether and to what extent a broadening of social protection programs impacts society’s redistributive and tax preferences. Using longitudinal individual-level data from Poland’s Panel Survey, we examine the effects of the 2016 transition from income-tested to quasi-universal child benefits on redistributive, tax, and political preferences. Contrary to expectations from political economy models, the findings reveal nuanced responses among beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Beneficiaries do not become more supportive of redistribution, and their political and tax preferences remain similar to those of overall non-beneficiaries. A specific group of non-beneficiaries, the ones with children but excluded due to income requirements, react to the policy change by retaliating against the incumbent party and preferring a tax schedule that shifts the burden to other income groups. Overall, the study advances our understanding of the political economy of targeting social transfers and provides insights for policymakers navigating the trade-offs between targeting efficiency and societal endorsement in welfare policy design. |
| JEL: | P29 H23 D72 |
| Date: | 2024–10–25 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:unumer:2024028 |
| By: | Zohal Hessami; Timo Häcker; Maximilian Thomas |
| Abstract: | We analyze whether mayors’ prior occupation in the local public administration matters for their performance. In theory, mayors’ professional background may shape their competence in bureaucratic tasks. We use the example of grant receipts for visible investment projects for which mayors must submit an extensive application to the state government. Our dataset includes 1, 933 mayor elections (1993-2020) in the German state of Hesse to which we apply a sharp RD design for close mixed-background races. Mayors’ background on average has no effect on grant receipts. Yet, public administrator mayors do attract more grants than outsider mayors when they are ideologically aligned with the council, raising the motivation to apply for grants in the first place. We conclude that the competence of public administrator mayors only matters when they are motivated to use it, i.e. this is an example where incentives are necessary for the effects of political selection to materialize. |
| Keywords: | public administration, professional background, administrative skills, political selection, mayors, investment grants |
| JEL: | D73 D78 H71 H77 H83 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11626 |
| By: | Jo Thori Lind |
| Abstract: | High electoral turnout is seen as a key determinant of a successful democracy. One reason for this is that turnout is believed to affect electoral outcomes. This has given rise to a flourishing literature studying the effect of increased turnout on various outcomes. It is well known that variation in turnout is not random, so a plethora of identification strategies are applied to assure causal estimates. In this paper I argue that this endeavor is futile. I first discuss theoretically how we should define increased turnout. Next, I show that with the various identification strategies, estimates are based on the behavioral response of a biased group of voters. |
| Keywords: | electoral turnout, effect of turnout, composition of electorate, econometric identification |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11650 |
| By: | Lasse F. Henriksen; Jacob Lunding; Christoph H. Ellersgaard; Anton G. Larsen |
| Abstract: | Who represents the corporate elite in democratic governance? Prior studies find a tightly integrated "inner circle" network representing the corporate elite politically across varieties of capitalism, yet they all rely on data from a highly select sample of leaders from only the largest corporations. We cast a wider net. Analyzing new data on all members of corporate boards in the Danish economy (200k directors in 120k boards), we locate 1500 directors that operate as brokers between local corporate networks. We measure their network coreness using k-core detection and find a highly connected core of 275 directors, half of which are affiliated with smaller firms or subsidiaries. Analyses show a strong positive association between director coreness and the likelihood of joining one of the 650 government committees epitomizing Denmark's social-corporatist model of governance (net of firm and director characteristics). The political network premium is largest for directors of smaller firms or subsidiaries, indicating that network coreness is a key driver of business political representation, especially for directors without claims to market power or weight in formal interest organizations. |
| Date: | 2025–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2501.17209 |
| By: | Koetter, Michael; Noth, Felix |
| Abstract: | Lowering carbon intensity in manufacturing is necessary to transform current production technologies. We test if local agents' preferences, revealed by vote shares for the Green party during local elections in Germany, relate to the carbon intensity of investments in production technologies. Our sample comprises all investment choices made by manufacturing establishments from 2005-2017. Our results suggest that ecological preferences correlate with significantly fewer carbon-intensive investment projects while investments stimulating growth and reducing carbon emissions increase by 14 percentage points. Both results are more distinct in federal states where the Green Party enjoys political power and local ecological preferences are high. |
| Keywords: | ecological preferences, elections, establishments' energy usage, investments |
| JEL: | D72 G31 G38 O13 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwhdps:310322 |
| By: | Kshitiz Shrestha (International Center for Public Policy, Georgia State University); Rose Camille Vincent (Utrecht School of Economics, Utrecht University); Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (International Center for Public Policy, Georgia State University) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the impact of fiscal decentralization on climate change and how this impact can be mediated by political institutions. Decentralization has remained an important shift in governance structure throughout the world in the past several decades. The literature, thus far, has not provided conclusive evidence regarding the impact of fiscal decentralization on combating climate change. Decentralized decision-making may seem as antagonistic to the large externalities that typically characterize climate change policies. However, the under-provision of public goods with externalities by subnational governments may be mediated by the presence of certain political institutions. In particular, national integrated political parties have the ability to provide the right incentives to shape the choices of subnational elected officials to consider those externalities. This paper exploits two databases to test the significance of those effects. First, using a large panel cross-country data set from 1971 to 2019, we find that the presence of strong party institutionalization significantly improves the functional role of fiscal decentralization in combating climate change. Second, we exploit a new OECD/European Commission database on subnational climate finance measuring the level of fiscal decentralization in climate-related expenditure and investment. The results support our primary findings and are robust to alternative specifications. |
| Date: | 2025–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper2502 |
| By: | Michelle Blom; Alexander Ek; Peter J. Stuckey; Vanessa Teague; Damjan Vukcevic |
| Abstract: | The single transferable vote (STV) is a system of preferential proportional voting employed in multi-seat elections. Each ballot cast by a voter is a (potentially partial) ranking over a set of candidates. The margin of victory, or simply margin, is the smallest number of ballots that, if manipulated (e.g., their rankings changed, or ballots being deleted or added), can alter the set of winners. Knowledge of the margin of an election gives greater insight into both how much time and money should be spent on auditing the election, and whether uncovered mistakes (such as ballot box losses) throw the election result into doubt -- requiring a costly repeat election -- or can be safely ignored. Lower bounds on the margin can also be used for this purpose, in cases where exact margins are difficult to compute. There is one existing approach to computing lower bounds on the margin of STV elections, while there are multiple approaches to finding upper bounds. In this paper, we present improvements to this existing lower bound computation method for STV margins. In many cases the improvements compute tighter (higher) lower bounds as well as making the computation of lower bounds more computationally efficient. For small elections, in conjunction with existing upper bounding approaches, the new algorithms are able to compute exact margins of victory. |
| Date: | 2025–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2501.14847 |
| By: | Tavishi Choudhary (Greenwich High, Greenwich, Connecticut, US) |
| Abstract: | Artificial Intelligence large language models have rapidly gained widespread adoption, sparking discussions on their societal and political impact, especially for political bias and its far-reaching consequences on society and citizens. This study explores the political bias in large language models by conducting a comparative analysis across four popular AI mod-els—ChatGPT-4, Perplexity, Google Gemini, and Claude. This research systematically evaluates their responses to politically charged prompts and questions from the Pew Research Center’s Political Typology Quiz, Political Compass Quiz, and ISideWith Quiz. The findings revealed that ChatGPT-4 and Claude exhibit a liberal bias, Perplexity is more conservative, while Google Gemini adopts more centrist stances based on their training data sets. The presence of such biases underscores the critical need for transparency in AI development and the incorporation of diverse training datasets, regular audits, and user education to mitigate any of these biases. The most significant question surrounding political bias in AI is its consequences, particularly its influence on public discourse, policy-making, and democratic processes. The results of this study advocate for ethical implications for the development of AI models and the need for transparency to build trust and integrity in AI models. Additionally, future research directions have been outlined to explore and address the complex AI bias issue. |
| Keywords: | Large language models (LLM), Generative AI (GenAI), AI Governance and Policy, Ethical AI Systems |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:smo:raiswp:0451 |
| By: | Alberto Porto; Jorge Puig; Bautista Vidal |
| Abstract: | We study the dynamic impact of intergovernmental transfers on subnational budgets. Unlike the abundant literature that focuses on local governments, in this paper we study intermediate governments. Using the ideal case of a multi-level government like Argentina, and methods for dynamic analysis, we disentangled the nature of subnational fiscal adjustments that follow a shock in federal transfers. In the short run, transfers lead to a more than proportional increase in spending, while own-source revenues rise slightly, resulting in a deficit. In the long-run, provinces recover fiscal equilibrium by adjusting spending and taxes to a level consistent with a balanced budget. The steady-state equilibrium involves a higher level of spending, as transfers increase endogenously as a result of cross-regional spillover effects. We also provide a potential mechanisms driving fiscal adjustments and explore relevant extensions that consider regional disparities and different types of taxes, spending, and transfers used to balance subnational budgets. Overall, the paper offers valuable insights for designing subnational fiscal policy. |
| JEL: | D72 H11 H20 H50 H77 |
| Date: | 2025–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:akh:wcefip:049 |
| By: | Sajayan, Gayatri |
| Abstract: | Until the passing of the 19th Amendment in 1919, voting rights for women in the US were not mandatory. Accordingly, many states refused women this privilege. However, the West appeared to be an exception, with all but one state in this region having granted female suffrage before federal enforcement. This paper seeks to understand the role of regional trends in female labour force participation in women’s enfranchisement, with a focus on the impact of occupational dispersion between 1880 - 1910. By exploring an avenue outside of religion and gender imbalances, an original contribution to existing literature on the success of Western women’s suffrage is provided. I utilise census data and governmental marital status statistics to conduct graphical analysis using cartography and complementary log-logistic regression analysis. The key finding of the paper is that women in Western states tended to be engaged in a narrow range of jobs – a consistent pattern found over the period of study. This helped them form a collective voice to fight for emancipation by facilitating mobilisation and more effective suffrage strategies. Hence, although the impact of women’s occupational dispersion is not found to be statistically significant, the relationship between the two variables is nevertheless historically meaningful. |
| JEL: | N31 J16 |
| Date: | 2025–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:wpaper:127205 |
| By: | Hussain, Ahmed; Ritzen, Jo (Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, RS: GSBE MGSoG, RS: UNU-MERIT Theme 3) |
| Abstract: | We explore empirically the relationship between trust in government and the quality of government (QoG) with a dynamic panel model for the period 2006-2021 in the 38 OECD countries, with reverse and lag specifications while incorporating a range of social, political, and economic factors as explanatory variables. The results show a clear positive mutually reinforcing dynamic between QoG and trust in government when the social, political and economic factors are included. Trust in government with a three-year lag is positively related to QoG. Foreign-born population with a three-year lag is negatively associated with QoG. The other way around: trust in government is affected by the QoG in the same year. Economic decline reduces trust in government. QoG and trust appear to be embedded in culture (measured with the Hofstede indices). Power distance is negatively related to both QoG and institutional trust. The association between individualism and QoG is positive, while long-term orientation and indulgence positively impact trust. |
| JEL: | D31 D73 D78 E61 H50 H83 I38 O10 Z13 Z18 Z19 |
| Date: | 2023–09–18 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:unumer:2023029 |