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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Carcaba, Ana; Gonzalez, Eduardo; Arrondo, Ruben |
| Abstract: | Determining what makes a person happy is an extremely complicated task. The objective of this article is to identify the effects of the composition and orientation of governance bodies in municipalities on individual subjective well-being. We connect the data from a large Spanish welfare survey to municipal data covering the aforementioned dimensions of political configuration. Unlike previous country-level studies, we find no significant effects of political orientation when applied to municipal data. In contrast, political alternation emerges as a relevant driver of subjective well-being, especially when corrupt local governments are replaced. Furthermore, the fragmentation in the Spanish political landscape after the 2015 elections improved the level of political competition, which, in turn, exerted a positive effect on subjective well-being. |
| Keywords: | Good governance; subjective well-being; political competition; local government; Spain |
| JEL: | H75 I31 I38 M41 |
| Date: | 2023–12–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:123248 |
| By: | Teguh Dartanto; Yoshua Caesar Justinus; Rus'an Nasrudin (Institute for Economic and Social Research, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Indonesia (LPEM FEB UI)) |
| Abstract: | COVID-19, as an infectious disease, increases health risks and may potentially reduce political participation in general elections. Nevertheless, existing empirical research has yielded inconclusive results. This study aims to estimate the impact of COVID-19 on political participation in the 2020 Regional Elections in Indonesia. Applying the Difference-in-Differences (DiD) method, Propensity Score Matching (PSM)-DiD, and First-Difference regression on panel data spanning 2015 and 2020, our investigation revealed significant insights. Firstly, we observed a strong negative correlation between COVID-19 and voter turnout, particularly in regions with increased COVID-19 cases witnessing reduced turnout. However, we did not find robust evidence to support a causal link between COVID-19 and decreased voter turnout. Secondly, the surge in turnout during the 2020 regional elections seems attributable to a time-related trend. Thirdly, voter turnout positively correlates with regions featuring two or more competing candidates. Our study confirms that health risks do not necessarily deter political participation in Indonesia. The relatively lower awareness of health risks among the Indonesian population could influence the country’s approach to managing COVID-19 and the future potential disease outbreak. |
| Keywords: | COVID-19 — health risk — local election — turnout — Indonesia |
| JEL: | D72 I18 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lpe:wpaper:202477 |
| By: | Yifeng Ding; Wesley H. Holliday; Eric Pacuit |
| Abstract: | In the context of voting with ranked ballots, an important class of voting rules is the class of margin-based rules (also called pairwise rules). A voting rule is margin-based if whenever two elections generate the same head-to-head margins of victory or loss between candidates, then the voting rule yields the same outcome in both elections. Although this is a mathematically natural invariance property to consider, whether it should be regarded as a normative axiom on voting rules is less clear. In this paper, we address this question for voting rules with any kind of output, whether a set of candidates, a ranking, a probability distribution, etc. We prove that a voting rule is margin-based if and only if it satisfies some axioms with clearer normative content. A key axiom is what we call Preferential Equality, stating that if two voters both rank a candidate $x$ immediately above a candidate $y$, then either voter switching to rank $y$ immediately above $x$ will have the same effect on the election outcome as if the other voter made the switch, so each voter's preference for $y$ over $x$ is treated equally. |
| Date: | 2025–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2501.08595 |
| By: | Jaume Magre-Pont (Universitat de Barcelona & IEB); Pierre Magontier (Universitat Pompeu Fabra & IEB); Albert Solé-Ollé (Universitat de Barcelona & IEB) |
| Abstract: | To what extent does the incumbent party’s identity shape public policies? We investigate this question by examining national and regional policies in Spain. First, we analyze the evolution of voter preferences and the platforms of the two mainstream parties (PSOE and PP) and of the newer challenger parties that emerged post-financial crisis (Ciudadanos, Podemos, and Vox). We focus on three key national-level issue dimensions: Economic, Social, and Centralization. As expected, the right-wing PP adopts a more conservative stance on all dimensions compared to the left-wing PSOE. However, the policy gap between these two parties remains relatively stable until the mid-2000s, with party platforms tracking the evolution of citizen preferences. After this period, platforms start to diverge, especially in the case of new parties, which display radical stances on these dimensions. We also provide descriptive evidence suggesting that these platform differences have translated into enacted policies. Second, to offer causal evidence on the effect of party identity on policy decisions, we examine partisan disparities in regional fiscal policies. Our findings reveal significant differences in tax policy following the granting of tax autonomy to the regions, somewhat moderated by tax competition and fiscal limits. |
| Keywords: | Political parties; Electoral competition; Fiscal policy |
| JEL: | D72 H70 R52 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2024-08 |
| By: | Felix Brandt; Chris Dong; Dominik Peters |
| Abstract: | A voting rule is a Condorcet extension if it returns a candidate that beats every other candidate in pairwise majority comparisons whenever one exists. Condorcet extensions have faced criticism due to their susceptibility to variable-electorate paradoxes, especially the reinforcement paradox (Young and Levenglick, 1978) and the no-show paradox (Moulin, 1988). In this paper, we investigate the susceptibility of Condorcet extensions to these paradoxes for the case of exactly three candidates. For the reinforcement paradox, we establish that it must occur for every Condorcet extension when there are at least eight voters and demonstrate that certain refinements of maximin, a voting rule originally proposed by Condorcet (1785), are immune to this paradox when there are at most seven voters. For the no-show paradox, we prove that the only homogeneous Condorcet extensions immune to it are refinements of maximin. We also provide axiomatic characterizations of maximin and two of its refinements, Nanson's rule and leximin, highlighting their suitability for three-candidate elections. |
| Date: | 2024–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2411.19857 |
| By: | Burnitt, Christopher (University of Warwick); Gars, Jared (University of Florida and JILAEE); Stalinski, Mateusz (University of Warwick & CAGE) |
| Abstract: | Addressing rising political polarization has become a focal point for policy makers. Yet, there is little evidence of its economic impacts, especially in contexts where partisanship cannot be easily hidden. To fill this gap, we study a novel channel: the perception of out-group partisan oversight of independent civil service reduces trust in regulation, affecting key markets (e.g., food and medicine). First, we motivate it by demonstrating the salience of the association between the president and expert regulators in US media reporting. Second, in a pre-registered experiment with 5, 566 individuals, we test the channel by exploiting an alignment in the way that the EPA under Trump and Biden defended the safety of spraying citrus crops with antibiotics. This enabled us to randomize the partisanship of the administration, holding the scientific arguments constant. Despite the EPA’s independence, out-group administration reduces support for the spraying by 26%, lowers trust in the EPA’s evaluation, and increases donations to an NGO opposing the spraying by 15%. We find no overall effect on the willingness to pay for citrus products, measured in an obfuscated follow-up survey. However, we document significant differences in effects for elastic vs. inelastic consumers. Taken together, polarization has the potential to affect economic decisions. However, a reduction in trust might not translate into lower demand, especially for inelastic consumers. JEL Codes: D12 ; D83 ; P16 ; Q11 ; Q13 ; Q18 ; Z18 |
| Keywords: | political polarization ; civil service ; trust in regulation ; trust in science ; food policy ; partisan identity ; consumer demand |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1542 |
| By: | Volckart, Oliver |
| Abstract: | Scholars agree that a core feature of the political style of the Holy Roman Empire was the focus on consensus, without which policy-making at the level of the Empire would have been impossible. This article demonstrates that the consensus on which decisions of the imperial estates was based tended to be superficial and was often in danger of breaking down. This vulnerability was a product of the diet’s open and sequential voting procedure, which allowed the bandwagon effect to distort outcomes. An analysis of the votes cast in the princes’ college at the diet of 1555 shows that low-status members of the college regularly imitated the decisions of high-status voters. Reforming the system would have required accepting that the members of the college were equals—an idea no one was prepared to countenance. Hence, superficial and transitory agreements remained a systematic feature of politics at the level of the Empire. |
| Keywords: | bandwagon effect; voting; early modern parliamentarism; Holy Roman Empire |
| JEL: | N43 H11 |
| Date: | 2023–03–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:112798 |
| By: | Christopher Clayton; Matteo Maggiori; Jesse Schreger |
| Abstract: | Great powers are increasingly using their economic and financial strength for geopolitical aims. This rise of "geoeconomics" has the potential to reshape the international trade and financial system. This paper examines the role of domestic political economy forces in determining a government's ability to project geoeconomic power abroad. We also discuss the role that persuading or coercing foreign governments plays in projecting geoeconomic power around the world. |
| JEL: | F3 |
| Date: | 2025–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33353 |
| By: | Pierre Magontier (Universitat Pompeu Fabra & IEB); Albert Solé-Ollé (Universitat de Barcelona & IEB); Elisabet Viladecans-Marsal (Universitat de Barcelona & IEB & CEPR) |
| Abstract: | Coastal development has advantages, such as job creation, and drawbacks, such as the loss of environmental amenities, for both residents and nonresidents. Local overnments may prioritize their constituents' interests, resulting in suboptimal coastal development. We investigate how political alignment among neighboring mayors facilitates intergovernmental cooperation in the development of coastal areas. We leverage causal effects by applying a close-elections Regression Discontinuity Design to the universe of buildings in Spain. Municipalities with partyaligned mayors develop 46% less land than politically isolated ones, and politically homogeneous coastal areas develop less than fragmented ones. The effect is more salient for land closest to shore or previously occupied by forests, in municipalities with a large share of protected land, and for relevant environmental markers, such as air and bathing water pollution. These results underscore the importance of cooperative political endeavors in managing development spillovers, with environmental considerations assuming a central role. |
| Keywords: | Local government; Land use policy; Political parties |
| JEL: | D72 H70 R52 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2024-10 |
| By: | Anna Balestra (Dipartimento di Politica Economica, DISCE, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano, Italy); Raul Caruso (Dipartimento di Politica Economica, DISCE, & Centro Studi Economia Applicata (CSEA), Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano, Italy - Catholic University ‘Our Lady of Good Counsel’, Tirana, European Center of Peace Science, Integration and Cooperation (CESPIC)) |
| Abstract: | This study examines the relationship between the US political cycle and the revenues of US military manufacturing companies from 1996 to 2022. The research introduces a novel approach by utilizing data on military manufacturing companies’ revenues, diverging from the prevalent use of SIPRI data in the existing literature on military revenues. The primary challenge in collecting defense revenues is dual engagement namely the fact that most companies are engaged in both military and civilian production. This challenge is addressed through cross-referencing company data with patent information. Furthermore, to distinguish revenues stemming from military sales versus those from civilian and commercial sales, we exclusively select data from business lines directly involved in military production. Data has been collected for 103 US military manufacturing companies from 1996 to 2022. Consistent with existing literature, the empirical analysis demonstrates that in the year preceding executive election years, the growth rate of US defense revenues is lower compared to non-preceding executive election years. Conversely, in executive election years, the growth rate of defense revenues is higher compared to other years. |
| Keywords: | Military Spending, Political Cycle, Military Companies |
| JEL: | H56 D72 L25 |
| Date: | 2025–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ctc:serie5:dipe0042 |
| By: | Ethan Kaplan; Jorg L. Spenkuch; Cody Tuttle |
| Abstract: | In 1975, a federal court ordered the desegregation of public schools in Jefferson County, KY. In order to approximately equalize the share of minorities across schools, students were assigned to a busing schedule that depended on the first letter of their last name. We use the resulting quasi-random variation to estimate the long-run impact of attending an inner-city school on political participation and preferences among whites. Drawing on administrative voter registration records and an original survey, we find that being bused to an inner-city school significantly increases support for the Democratic Party and its candidates more than forty years later. Consistent with the idea that exposure to an inner-city environment causes a permanent change in ideological outlook, we also find evidence that bused individuals are much less likely to believe in a "just world" (i.e., that success is earned rather than attributable to luck) and, more tentatively, that they become more supportive of some forms of redistribution. Taken together, our findings point to a poverty-centered version of the contact hypothesis, whereby witnessing economic deprivation durably sensitizes individuals to issues of inequality and fairness. |
| JEL: | D72 H75 I21 I28 J15 N32 |
| Date: | 2025–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33365 |
| By: | John Echeverri-Gent (University of Virginia); Renuka Sane (TrustBridge Rule of Law Foundation) |
| Abstract: | This essay shows how the sectoral political network in India's banking sector has structured its development from the era of dirigisme beginning under the Nehru government in 1947 to the more liberalized contemporary period starting in 1991. We show that political bargains, or institutionalized agreements among actors in a sectoral political network, are mechanisms through which the legacies of earlier eras shape developments in subsequent periods. Our study of India's banking sector examines two varieties of political bargains. Politicians created an entrenched political bargain during the dirigiste era by nationalizing India's banks to assert control over bank governance. Entrenched bargains limit subsequent reforms to policies that address their negative consequences but not the underlying causes emanating from the interests of powerful actors. Principal-agent relations are the second type of political bargain. Politicians struck this evolving bargain by establishing an asymmetric relationship between the government and India's central bank, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). We analyze how these entrenched and principal-agent bargains have shaped the development of Indian banking by examining their impact on the banking sector's recurring non-performing asset problem and its dynamic payment system. |
| Date: | 2025–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bjd:wpaper:8 |
| By: | Mª Carmen Pardo-López ("IPVC (Polytechnic University Viana do Castelo), CITUR (Centre for Tourism Research, Development and Innovation) ESTG- Avda do Atlántico, 4900- , Viana do Castelo, Portugal " Author-2-Name: María Pardal Author-2-Workplace-Name: Universidade do Minho, CICP, Centro de Investigação em Ciência Política, 4710-057 Braga, Portugal Author-3-Name: Mónica Cecilia Cortés García Author-3-Workplace-Name: Next Educación; Almagro 42, 28010, Madrid, Spain. Author-4-Name: Author-4-Workplace-Name: Author-5-Name: Author-5-Workplace-Name: Author-6-Name: Author-6-Workplace-Name: Author-7-Name: Author-7-Workplace-Name: Author-8-Name: Author-8-Workplace-Name:) |
| Abstract: | " Objective - This research aims to examine the influence of populist movements on the reputation of nations as travel destinations, addressing the gap in the literature regarding the relationship between populism and the tourist image of destinations. The study adopts a theoretical approach supported by empirical indicators to analyse this global phenomenon (Lopes, 2011) (Martínez & Alvarez, 2010) (Chaulagain et al., 2019). Methodology - The study utilises indicators from the Travel & Tourism Competitive Index (TTDI - Travel and Tourism Development Index) of the World Economic Forum (World Economic Forum, 2019), chosen for their coherence, interpretability, and comparability. Additionally, a review of political, economic, and tourism literature complements the analysis to provide a comprehensive understanding of the interplay between populism and tourism (Gallarza, Saura, & Garcia, 2002; Pike, 2007). Findings - The findings highlight a complex relationship between the rise of populism and the deterioration of a tourism destination's image. While populist movements are not the sole cause of a decline in destination attractiveness, their impact on political stability, economic conditions, international relations, openness, and other related factors collectively contributes to the reputation and competitiveness of these destinations. Novelty - This study fills a significant gap in the academic literature by exploring the connection between populism and tourism destination images on a global scale, an area previously addressed only in specific case studies (Gallarza, Saura, & Garcia, 2002; Pike, 2007). The originality lies in integrating TTDI indicators with the theoretical implications of political phenomena, offering valuable insights for both researchers and policymakers. Type of Paper - Empirical" |
| Keywords: | Populism; Tourism Destination Image; Destination Branding; Tourism Competitiveness. |
| JEL: | D72 Z32 R11 |
| Date: | 2024–12–31 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gtr:gatrjs:jber252 |
| By: | Casas, Andreu (Royal Holloway, University of London); Dagher, Georgia; O'Loughlin, Ben |
| Abstract: | In this report we provide an overview of the kinds of data academics need in order to conduct independent research into political online safety matters on social media platforms, and the challenges they currently face. Additionally, we put forward ideas regarding novel governance structures that would enable high-quality independent research, while protecting users’ rights and data privacy, in the United Kingdom. |
| Date: | 2025–01–16 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:7pcjd |
| By: | Bennett, Daniel L. (Center for Free Enterprise, Department of Economics); Bjørnskov, Christian (Department of Economics, Aarhus University, Denmark, and); Gohmann, Stephan F. (Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Understanding the consequences and recovery for countries hit by adverse national events such as political crises is central to understanding long-run development dynamics. Utilizing the Coleman boat framework, we develop a micro-foundation based theoretical framework grounded in public choice theory and institutional economic theory to theorize about the productivity consequences of political coups. Our theory suggests two consequences. First, coups create regime uncertainty that distorts the judgment of entrepreneurs and firm managers, resulting in their delaying or abandoning altogether investment in potential productivity-enhancing innovation projects. Second, in addition to regime uncertainty, institutional changes in the aftermath of a coup exert long-run impacts on national productivity by creating a misalignment of the formal institutional environment. Our model allows us to disentangle the productivity effects of institutional uncertainty from actual institutional change following a political crisis. We assemble a unique longitudinal dataset consisting of 39 nations covering the period 1950-2012 to empirically test our hypotheses using panel data methods. We further explore some of the boundary conditions of our analysis. |
| Keywords: | Coups; Regime change; Institutional change; Productivity |
| JEL: | E02 O31 O43 P47 |
| Date: | 2025–01–20 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:1518 |
| By: | Choi, Dahyun |
| Abstract: | Scientific research has been considered a primary source of information for improving policy outcomes, but its use is inevitably intertwined with political considerations. Using a comprehensive dataset of peer-reviewed journal articles evaluated for the National Ambient Air Quality Standards, this paper examines the trade-off between partisan bias and evidence quality in internal science evaluation by government agencies. I find that the integration of science into policymaking is guided by a pursuit of expertise but biased in favor of the presidential administration. The evaluation of low-quality studies is more susceptible to partisan bias, while high-quality studies remain relatively unaffected. This work not only provides an empirical examination of long-standing questions about how information is used by politically divergent factions but also illuminates the pathways through which academic research connects the contours of evidence-based policymaking. |
| Date: | 2025–01–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:ujyec |