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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Herault, Nicolas (University of Bordeaux); Kollmann, Trevor (Swinburne University of Technology); Thomson, Russell (Swinburne University of Technology) |
| Abstract: | We estimate the causal effect of partisan media on voter behavior by exploiting a natural experiment in which Sky News Australia – a conservative 24-hour news channel – became freely available to 8 million people. Using comprehensive national polling-station-level electoral data and broadcast signal strength variation, we implement a continuous treatment difference-in-differences design comparing voting patterns in areas with and without access to the channel before and after its September 2018 free-to-air launch. We find that exposure to partisan media increased the conservative party's lead by 1.5 percentage points in Australia's 2019 federal election. These findings shed light on the role of partisan media in shaping electoral outcomes by influencing swing voters, not just by affecting who turns out to vote. |
| Keywords: | partisan news, elections, spatial economics |
| JEL: | D72 L82 R19 |
| Date: | 2024–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17452 |
| By: | Aytimur, R. Emre; Suen, Richard M. H. |
| Abstract: | How does the quality of information received by voters affect political polarisation? We address this long-standing question using an election competition model in which voters have to infer an unknown state from some noisy and biased signals. Their policy preferences are shaped by the posterior belief, which is unknown to the parties when they choose their platforms. The greater the uncertainty faced by the parties, the greater the incentive to polarise. We show that better information can either promote or suppress polarisation, depending on the gap between voters' and politicians' beliefs (disagreement). We also examine the welfare implications of polarisation. |
| Keywords: | Polarisation, Voter Information, Bayesian Learning, Election |
| JEL: | D72 D80 |
| Date: | 2024–05–17 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:122695 |
| By: | Amaral, Ernesto F. L. (Texas A&M University) |
| Abstract: | Current analyses of the 2024 U.S. Presidential Election have tended to: (1) overlook the potential impact of lower voter turnout among Democratic candidates due to their gender and race; (2) blame (or credit) African American, Hispanic, and female voters for increasing their support for Trump; and (3) focus on overall turnout rather than examining turnout rates. I provide some thoughts for this debate, based on overall election results and voter registration information from the 2016, 2020, and 2024 elections. |
| Date: | 2024–11–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:gbsdy |
| By: | RAMACHANDRA, VARUN KAREKURVE |
| Abstract: | This paper uses the staggered implementation of gender quota policy in India to understand whether women who won office due to quotas go on to win higher-level office. Indian local government elections impose mandatory gender quotas, but state elections do not. This provides a setting to assess if there is an increase in women's representation at higher levels of governance due to quotas at the local level. The identification strategy allows me to ascribe an increase of three percentage points in the share of women at the state-level to gender quotas in local government. Additionally, to establish upward political mobility of local-level leaders I tracked political biographies of over 1000 women legislators across India's 15 major state assemblies. In doing so, I identify that political dynasties, and ground-level leadership --- those who entered politics due to mandatory gender quotas --- are the two primary channels that enable entry of women into state-level politics. Further, I show that the effect of democratic entry of women into politics via quotas is pronounced in states with parties that are reliant on empowered rank and file members. Overall, these results highlight the importance of gender quotas as a democratic state-building tool and provide evidence for career advancement of women in politics whose democratic entry into politics was facilitated by the implementation of mandatory gender quotas. |
| Date: | 2024–11–22 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:4zqve |
| By: | Däubler, Thomas; Linek, Lukáš |
| Abstract: | Do party selectors or voters choose more productive politicians? Selectors may promote quality candidates and have an informational advantage over voters, but quality need not be the key criterion for nominations, and voters may be sufficiently informed to correct inferior decisions. We empirically examine whether the type of principal responsible for the selection affects individual parliamentary work (attendance, bills, amendments, questions, speeches). Flexible-list proportional representation systems are both interesting and analytically useful in this context, since seats within parties are first allocated to candidates reaching a certain number of personal votes, while any remaining seats are awarded based on the pre-electoral list rank. This allows us to compare three types of elected candidates: selector-chosen, voter-chosen, and doubly-chosen representatives. Analysing data from the Czech Republic in the period between 2002 and 2021, we find that voters have a stronger preference for candidates with high formal education than selectors. We do not find differences in parliamentary behaviour between selector-chosen and voter-chosen types. The results speak against a potential trade-off between giving voters more influence on within-party seat allocation and the quality of chosen representatives. |
| Keywords: | list proportional representation, political selection, ballot structure, preference voting, candidate selection, flexible-list system, parliamentary behaviour |
| JEL: | H11 |
| Date: | 2024–11–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:122594 |
| By: | Tung, Hans |
| Abstract: | Experimental studies on political behavior are on the rise in economics and political science. Especially, apart from traditional forms of political participation such as voting and petitions, we have also seen a burgeoning literature on protests, a non-institutional and contentious form of political participation. Despite various ethical concerns with recreating artificially contentious environments for conducting experiments, this literature is robust and still growing to cover all analytic issues about the genesis and effects of protests. This essay provides a comprehensive framework and a critical review for the recent experimental literature on protests in social sciences. |
| Date: | 2024–11–22 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:85mjs |
| By: | Panarello, Christian |
| Abstract: | Lichtman's Thirteen Keys Model has, after ten elections of success, succumbed to its first failure in Donald Trump's first victory in both the popular vote and electoral college measures. For his protection of the Keys, he has cited mass misinformation (as he suggests is produced by Elon Musk's ownership of Twitter/X) and right-wing podcasters’ assumedly uncritical support of the presidential nominee. However, this hypothesis appears arbitrary, especially relative to recent elections where the Keys have been successful. This article instead postulates a Structuralist argument – functioning to describe innate administrative normativities (the structure of government as described by its electoral and legislative composition) – which hinges on the consistency that Lichtman interpreted (particularly in his introductory work with Keilis-Borok) in showing the Keys to be a consistent model; the Keys are further shown to be unswayed by projected collective social proclivities. |
| Date: | 2024–11–21 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:v2kxm |
| By: | Wu, Cheng |
| Abstract: | Consumption theory and its optimization mechanism may be applied to the U.S. presidential elections. Based on Clower’s Dual-Decision Hypothesis (DDH), Wu (2017) derived the result showing change in savings is a function of labor income growth. Under DDH, consumers make optimal decision based on a set of data, including labor income. Later, if they were to realize that these assumptions, specifically labor income growth were lower, further optimization is done with proper adjustments. Thus, we have a feedback optimization every four years, which may affect the “consumption” of a presidential election. Current U.S. presidential electoral system is biased towards farm voters. Most “red” states and battleground states have substantial number of voters related to farm business. As farm income fell, it should not be a surprise that Hillary Clinton lost in 2016, Biden won in 2020 and Kamala Harris lost in 2024. In other words, Trump was beneficiary of farm income decline prior to the years 2016 and 2024 but not in 2020. To extend the original paper of 2016, “Economics and How Obama Could Have Lost the 2016 Election Too.” A chart with farm income all the way back to Kennedy in 1959 was added. During these 17 presidential elections and 65 years of income data, only Johnson in 1964 and Clinton II in 1996 failed the farm income hypothesis. There may be secondary variables, such as Kennedy’s assassination, Covid, weather, bird/swine virus, wars, inflation/interest rate, immigration, crime, stock prices and so on, to consider in any model. Still, under the current U.S. electoral system and consumption theory, it is not surprising that only one variable, farm income, holds basically the key to any presidential election success. |
| Keywords: | consumption; martingale; savings; growth; income; election; trade; Trump; Kamala Harris |
| JEL: | A1 A19 C0 E2 E21 E24 H0 O4 O40 R1 R19 R2 R5 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:122718 |
| By: | Tung, Hans |
| Abstract: | Experimental studies on political behavior are on the rise in economics and political science. Especially, apart from traditional forms of political participation such as voting and petitions, we have also seen a burgeoning literature on protests, a non-institutional and contentious form of political participation. Despite various ethical concerns with recreating artificially contentious environments for conducting experiments, this burgeoning literature is robust and still growing to cover all analytic issues about the genesis and effects of protests. This essay provides a comprehensive framework and a critical review for the recent experimental literature on protests in social sciences. |
| Date: | 2024–11–22 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:czgeb |
| By: | Aristiyaningrum, Umi Laila; , Falikhatun |
| Abstract: | This research aims to provide empirical evidence regarding thin capitalisation, transfer pricing, and tax avoidance, with political connections serving as moderating variables. The research employs a purposive sampling technique, resulting in a sample of 31 mining companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2013 to 2022. The technique used for hypothesis testing is panel data analysis through the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) approach. The results of this research indicate that thin capitalisation and transfer pricing have a significant effect on tax avoidance. Additionally, this research reveals that the role of political connections can strengthen the impact of transfer pricing on tax avoidance but does not demonstrate that political connections can reinforce the effect of thin capitalisation on tax avoidance. The findings of this research are expected to serve as a basis for government considerations in establishing tax-related regulations. This study recommends that future research utilise different research subjects for comparison, add other independent variables outside the current model that may influence tax avoidance, and apply alternative tax avoidance measures, such as book-tax differences and tax shelters. |
| Date: | 2024–11–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:ykfph |
| By: | Boris Ginzburg |
| Abstract: | A committee consisting of two factions is considering a project whose distributive consequences are unknown. This uncertainty can be resolved at some unknown future time. By delaying approval, the committee can gradually learn which faction benefits from the project. Because support of both factions is required for approval, it can only happen when there is sufficient amount of uncertainty about the identities of winners and losers. I show that in many situations, a project is more likely to be approved if it gives a lower payoff to everyone. The probability of approval and expected payoffs of both factions are higher if the project is ex ante less likely to benefit the faction that tends to receive good news faster. Equilibrium amount of learning is excessive, and a deadline on adopting the project is often optimal. |
| Date: | 2024–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2411.06998 |
| By: | Qiang Fu; Zenan Wu; Yuxuan Zhu |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the optimal organizational rules that govern the process of dividing a fixed surplus. The process is modeled as a sequential multilateral bargaining game with costly recognition. The designer sets the voting rule -- i.e., the minimum number of votes required to approve a proposal -- and the mechanism for proposer recognition, which is modeled as a biased generalized lottery contest. We show that for diverse design objectives, the optimum can be achieved by a dictatorial voting rule, which simplifies the game into a standard biased contest model. |
| Date: | 2024–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2411.08419 |