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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Poutvaara, Panu (University of Munich); Graefe, Andreas (Macromedia University of Applied Sciences) |
| Abstract: | Women are severely underrepresented in American politics, especially among Republicans. This underrepresentation may result from women being less willing to run for office, from voter bias against women, or from political structures that make it more difficult for women to compete. Here we show how support for female candidates varies by voters' party affiliation and gender. We conducted experimental elections in which participants made their vote choices based solely on politicians' faces. When choosing between female and male candidates, Democrats, and especially Democratic women, preferred female candidates, while Republicans were equally likely to choose female and male candidates. These patterns held after controlling for respondents' education, age, and political knowledge, and for candidates' age, attractiveness, and perceived conservatism. Our findings suggest that voter bias against women cannot explain women's underrepresentation. On the contrary, American voters appear ready to further narrow the gender gap in politics. |
| Keywords: | gender, elections, gender discrimination, political candidates, redistribution |
| JEL: | D72 J16 H23 |
| Date: | 2024–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17376 |
| By: | Hall, Andrew B. (Stanford U and Hoover Institution); Miyazaki, Sho (Stanford U) |
| Abstract: | Since the 19th century, political reformers have proposed broadening civic and corporate governance by allowing voters to delegate to any other voter — sometimes known as liquid democracy. Today, systems like liquid democracy have become an important part of ongoing efforts to create democratic online platforms governed by users rather than elites. We provide a first empirical political science study of liquid democracy in a high-stakes, real-world setting, analyzing data from over 250, 000 voters and 1, 700 proposals across 18 crypto projects (“DAOs†) built on the Ethereum blockchain. We find that, on average, 17% of voting tokens are delegated, with substantial clumping on the most-popular delegates. Delegation is primarily bottom-up, with smaller token-holders more likely to delegate. More active voters receive more delegations, suggesting somewhat informed decision-making. Using a difference-in-differences design, we estimate that creating online hubs to coordinate delegation significantly increases delegation and overall voting rates. In sum, liquid democracy can foster bottom-up participation, particularly when paired with tools for coordination. On the other hand, real-world participation remains relatively low among both voters and delegates, posing an important challenge to liquid democracy not yet contemplated in existing theoretical literature. |
| Date: | 2024–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:stabus:4220 |
| By: | Frédéric Docquier; Chrysovalantis Vasilakis |
| Abstract: | We test whether the level of right-wing populism in a given country influences the size and skill composition of its immigration and emigration flows. To do so, we use an instrumental variable approach, where we instrument variations in right-wing populism using a combination of collective memory, represented by the average vote share of right-wing parties between 1900 and 1950, and trigger variables, such as economic insecurity shocks. Our results show that an increase in right-wing populism leads to a decrease in the inflow of college-educated migrants, and this relationship is twice as strong as the effect on the inflow of low-skilled migrants. To a lesser extent, we also find that right-wing populism leads to an increase in high-skilled emigration, while leaving low-skilled emigration unaffected. These effects are not necessarily associated with the election of a populist government or stricter migration policies, suggesting that both in- and out-migration decisions may be influenced by the broader political climate and prevailing voter attitudes. As a result, right-wing populism tends to lower the average educational attainment of both immigrants and left-behind voters, which helps explain the persistence of right-wing populism despite its proven negative impact on the economy. |
| Keywords: | Immigration; Emigration; Selection; Right-Wing Populism |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2024–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:irs:cepswp:2024-10 |
| By: | Emanuel Ornelas |
| Abstract: | I study how political competition affects the feasibility of free trade agreements (FTAs). I show that the possibility of political turnover creates strategic motivations for the formation of FTAs. Specifically, a government facing a high enough probability of losing power will have an incentive to form a trading bloc to 'tie the hands' of its successor. This incentive mitigates inefficiencies in the incumbent's decision to form FTAs, regardless of its bias toward special interests. An FTA can affect the likelihood of political turnover as well. Accounting for that effect, I show that an incumbent party with a known bias toward special interests could seek an FTA as a commitment device toward less distortionary policies, thereby enhancing its own electoral prospects. Overall, the analysis reveals the importance of considering the time horizon of policymakers when studying their decision to enter in FTAs. |
| Keywords: | regionalism, free trade agreements, political competition, lobbying |
| Date: | 2024–10–21 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp2043 |
| By: | Jessica Di Cocco; Eugenio Levi; Rama Dasi Mariani; Steven Stillman |
| Abstract: | Existing research has identified several economic and cultural determinants of populist voting. We focus on a related explanation: whether populist leaders are able to capitalize on a sense of distrust between individuals. There is currently limited causal evidence on the relationship between interpersonal trust and support for populist parties, and the underlying mechanisms driving this relationship are not well understood. Using three distinct causal identification strategies, each grounded in different assumptions, we find consistent evidence that a deficit in trust significantly bolsters support for populist political parties throughout Europe. Notably, this influence extends beyond ideological boundaries, encompassing both far-right and far-left populist parties. |
| Keywords: | populism, trust, immigration |
| JEL: | D72 P00 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11394 |
| By: | Laura Barros; Aiko Schmei{\ss}er |
| Abstract: | The supply of politicians affects the quality of democratic institutions. Yet little is known about the economic motivations that drive individuals into politics. This paper examines how experiencing a job loss affects individuals' decisions to enter political life and explores its implications for political selection. Using highly granular administrative data linking individual records of political participation with comprehensive employer-employee data for all formal workers in Brazil, and leveraging mass layoffs for causal identification, we find that job loss significantly increases the likelihood of joining a political party and running for local office. Layoff-induced candidates are positively selected on various competence measures, suggesting that economic shocks may improve the quality of political entrants. Further, we observe that the increase in candidacies is more pronounced among laid-off individuals with greater financial incentives from office holding and higher predicted income losses. Finally, using a regression discontinuity design, we find that eligibility for unemployment benefits increases the likelihood of becoming a party member and running for local office. These results are consistent with the reduction in private-sector opportunity costs and the increased time resources explaining the rise in political entry. |
| Date: | 2024–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2410.23705 |
| By: | Chun Chee Kok (Monash University); Gedeon J. Lim (University of Hong Kong) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the long-run effects of a colonial-era, large-scale resettlement program of ethnic minorities, on contemporary economic outcomes and political preferences of ethnic majority individuals in receiving areas. In ethnic Malay-majority Malaysia, the colonial British relocated 500, 000 rural ethnic Chinese minorities into fenced-up, isolated, monoethnic camps (1948 – 1960) all across rural Malaysia. This brought some pre-existing ethnic Malay-majority areas into closer contact with ethnic Chinese minorities but not others. Criteria for resettlement locations were largely military in nature. Using a spatial randomization inference-type approach, we construct counterfactual village locations based on this criteria. We find that areas located immediately next to Chinese New Villages (0-2km) experienced better economic outcomes and, in turn, had lower vote shares for the ethno-nationalistic coalition, than polling districts located next to similarly suitable, counterfactual locations. We provide suggestive evidence that these lower vote shares were driven by all voters, not just the ethnic Chinese. Together, our results suggest that persistent differences in inter-ethnic proximity can have a lasting, negative impact on voter preferences for ethno-nationalistic politics through improvements in economic outcomes and sustained increases in casual, interethnic interactions. |
| Keywords: | ethnic diversity, inter-group contact, immigration, Southeast Asia, voting |
| JEL: | D72 J15 P50 |
| Date: | 2024–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajr:sodwps:2024-06 |
| By: | Andr s Rodr guez-Pose; Javier Terrero-Davila; Neil Lee |
| Abstract: | Economic change over the past twenty years has rendered many individuals and territories vulnerable, leading to greater interpersonal and interterritorial inequality. This rising inequality is seen as a root cause of populism. Yet, there is no comparative evidence as to whether this discontent is the consequence of localised interpersonal inequality or stagnant growth in ‘left-behind’ places. This paper assesses the association between levels and changes in local GDP per capita and interpersonal inequality, and the rise of far-right populism in Europe and in the US. The analysis —conducted at small region level for Europe and county level for the US— shows that there are both similarities and differences in the factors connected to populist voting on both sides of the Atlantic. In the US, neither interpersonal inequality nor economic decline can explain populist support on their own. However, these factors gain significance when considered together with the racial composition of the area. Counties with a large share of white population where economic growth has been stagnant and where inequalities have increased supported Donald Trump. Meanwhile, counties with a similar economic trajectory but with a higher share of minorities shunned populism. In Europe, the most significant factor behind the rise of far-right populism is economic decline. This effect is particularly large in areas with a high share of immigration. |
| JEL: | D31 D72 R11 |
| Date: | 2023–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lis:liswps:859 |
| By: | OECD |
| Abstract: | Competition authorities rarely consider democracy in their day-to-day functioning, yet the notion that competition is important for the maintenance of a healthy democracy was a core part of the motivation for introducing antitrust laws in some jurisdictions. This paper explores the link between competition and democracy and the potential for reduced competition to allow firms to acquire economic power. When economic power grows large, firms may be able, through mechanisms such as lobbying or political donations, to convert it into political power, allowing them to influence and affect political outcomes independent of democratic will. However, the link between competition and economic power is complex and further research is warranted. Furthermore, the paper identifies several approaches to the role of democracy within competition law, arguing irrespective of any changes in policy, increased competition benefits democracy and provides another reason for robust and resourced competition policy to champion and preserve competition. |
| Date: | 2024–11–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:dafaac:316-en |
| By: | Diego Marino Fages (Durham University) |
| Abstract: | The growing political polarization may influence a critical input for policymaking: people’s economic expectations. This study examines whether political preferences shape individuals’ forecasts for key economic indicators (using a preregistered online experiment in the context of Argentina’s 2023 election). The experiment (N=1, 162) exogenously manipulates (a) the incentives to report accurate forecasts and, (b) the information about current indicators. The results show that providing incentives for accuracy reduces the gap between subjects’ forecasts regarding different candidates’ performance. Providing information regarding the current economic indicators reduces the variance of the forecasts but not the gaps. These findings are relevant for survey design. |
| Keywords: | motivated reasoning; forecasts; prediction; expectations; survey experiment |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2024-08 |
| By: | Mitchell Linegar; R. Michael Alvarez |
| Abstract: | What are the opinions of American registered voters about election fraud and types of election fraud as we head into the final stages of the 2024 Presidential election? In this paper we use data from an online national survey of 2, 211 U.S. registered voters interviewed between June 26 - July 3, 2024. Respondents were asked how common they thought that ten different types of election fraud might be in the U.S. In our analysis, we show that substantial proportions of U.S. registered voters believe that these types of election fraud are common. Our multivariate analysis shows that partisanship correlates strongly with endorsement of types of election fraud, with Republicans consistently more likely to state that types of election fraud are common, even when we control for a wide variety of other factors. We also find that conspiratorial thinking is strongly correlated with belief in the occurrence of types of election fraud, even when we control for partisanship. Our results reported in this paper provide important data regarding how American registered voters perceive the prevalence of types of election fraud, just months before the 2024 Presidential election. |
| Date: | 2024–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2410.21988 |
| By: | Peter Lambert; Chris Larkin |
| Abstract: | Since 2020, the dramatic rise in remote work has coincided with increased geographic mobility in the United States. We examine the relationship between these trends and their effects on the electoral landscape. Using IRS microdata, online job postings, and Census surveys, we find that remote work opportunities concentrate in Democratic-leaning areas, with interstate migration strongly linked to individuals who mostly work from home. Our analysis reveals significant population shifts from Democratic to Republican and swing regions, potentially impacting electoral outcomes in key battleground states. |
| Keywords: | remote work, geographic mobility, electoral demographics, political geography |
| Date: | 2024–11–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepops:67 |
| By: | Sergei Mikhalishchev (Durham University Business School); Vladimir Novak (National Bank of Slovakia) |
| Abstract: | We study a model with rationally inattentive voters and investigate how an office-seeking challenger designs a policy platform in the presence of the incumbent who offers a simple stability-providing policy that preserves the status quo. We show that the incumbent’s simple policy, while not in the best interest of the electorate, creates negative externalities by encouraging the challenger to propose a more moderate platform, which is sub-optimal for the voter. The model also explains why and when the incumbent benefits from the high uncertainty and intermediate cost of information. |
| JEL: | H0 P16 D72 D83 |
| Date: | 2024–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:svk:wpaper:1112 |
| By: | Jerg Gutmann; Pascal Langer; Matthias Neuenkirch |
| Abstract: | Political leaders matter, but statistical evidence for their relevance in international politics is scarce. We estimate panel probit models with data for the period 1970 to 2004 and sender-year and dyad fixed effects to evaluate whether more similar leaders are less likely to sanction each other. We find that higher leader similarity significantly reduces the likelihood of sanction imposition. The effect is especially pronounced when UN and EU sanctions are excluded, that is, when focusing on sanctions imposed through unilateral political decisions. In this case, going from no correlation to perfect correlation in the characteristics of the leader pair lowers the likelihood of sanctions by 5.7 pp. Moreover, leader similarity seems to matter especially for sanctions aimed at democratic change or human rights improvements, where political leaders are expected to enjoy more discretion. |
| Keywords: | International sanctions, Leader similarity, Political leaders |
| JEL: | D70 F51 K33 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trr:wpaper:202411 |
| By: | Papadopoulos, Georgios; Karatzas, Antonios; Martin, Thomas |
| Abstract: | Zhang (2023) used an online, pre-registered, large-scale controlled experiment to test the effect of an endorsement of Joe Biden by the scientific journal Nature on several perceptual and behavioural outcomes. The main results of the paper were the following: the endorsement of Biden caused a large reduction in Trump supporters' trust in Nature and a considerably smaller reduction in their 'trust in US scientists'. The estimated effects are larger for individuals who, prior to the treatment, believed that Nature was unlikely to have endorsed a presidential candidate. The endorsement also made Trump supporters less likely to request COVID and vaccine related information from the endorsing journal. For Biden supporters, the respective estimated effects were generally positive, but small and insignificant. In his abstract, the author summarizes his key causal claim as follows: "political endorsement by scientific journals can undermine and polarize public confidence in the endorsing journals and the scientific community" (p.696). In this replication study, we computationally reproduced all results, with few and trivial exceptions. We then tested the robustness of those results that gave rise to Zhang's (2023) main causal claim. These tests include an alternative estimation method, an alternative way to capture support for the candidates, and a series of heterogeneity analyses by demographics. All test results support the author's findings but add interesting nuance. Some of our tests exploit variables from the raw data that were not included in the clean, published dataset, but the author willingly provided: a post-treatment 'manipulation check' that asked respondents to indicate the candidate that Nature actually endorsed, and data on requests for COVID related articles from other outlets besides Nature. We used these variables to conduct an Instrumental Variables (IV) procedure and test a 'causal mediation' model. Overall, and for Trump supporters in particular, our report corroborates the author's main finding of a strong negative effect of the endorsement on the overall perception of the endorser (Nature). However, the additional analysis provides weaker evidence for a reduction in trust in the scientific community more generally. |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:i4rdps:175 |
| By: | Christoph Koenig (DEF, University of Rome "Tor Vergata") |
| Abstract: | Election forensics are a widespread tool for diagnosing electoral manipulation out of statistical anomalies in publicly available election micro-data. Yet, in spite of their popularity, they are only rarely used to measure and compare variation in election fraud at the sub-national level. The typical challenges faced by researchers are the wide range of forensic indicators to choose from, the potential variation in manipulation methods across time and space and the difficulty in creating a measure of fraud intensity that is comparable across geographic units and elections. This paper outlines a procedure to overcome these issues by making use of directly observed instances of fraud and machine learning methods. I demonstrate the performance of this procedure for the case of post-2000 Russia and discuss advantages and pitfalls. The resulting estimates of fraud intensity are closely in line with quantitative and qualitative secondary data at the cross-sectional and time-series level. |
| Keywords: | Bayesian Additive Regression Trees, Election Forensics, Election Fraud, Election Monitoring, Machine Learning, Russia |
| Date: | 2024–10–28 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:584 |
| By: | Moamen Gouda; Jingyeong Song |
| Abstract: | This study empirically explores the economic, political and cultural, and socio-demographic determinants of Koreans’ attitudes toward immigrants. Employing waves 6 and 7 of World Values Survey (WVS), our descriptive statistics show that Koreans, on average, are becoming more acceptable to foreigners living in Korea. Our results show that economic determinants, as well as educational attainment, were consistently playing a significant role in shaping Koreans’ perception of immigrants. Socio-demographic factors and only a few political variables were significant in the period 2017-2020. We discuss this result and argue that, despite the looming demographic crisis, Koreans’ attitude towards immigration is based on economic underpinnings rather than on political ones. |
| Keywords: | immigration, South Korea, World Values Survey, attitudes |
| JEL: | F22 J15 J61 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11354 |
| By: | Mahdi Goldani |
| Abstract: | Political stability is crucial for the socioeconomic development of nations, particularly in geopolitically sensitive regions such as the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain. This study focuses on predicting the political stability index for these six countries using machine learning techniques. The study uses data from the World Banks comprehensive dataset, comprising 266 indicators covering economic, political, social, and environmental factors. Employing the Edit Distance on Real Sequence method for feature selection and XGBoost for model training, the study forecasts political stability trends for the next five years. The model achieves high accuracy, with mean absolute percentage error values under 10, indicating reliable predictions. The forecasts suggest that Oman, the UAE, and Qatar will experience relatively stable political conditions, while Saudi Arabia and Bahrain may continue to face negative political stability indices. The findings underscore the significance of economic factors such as GDP and foreign investment, along with variables related to military expenditure and international tourism, as key predictors of political stability. These results provide valuable insights for policymakers, enabling proactive measures to enhance governance and mitigate potential risks. |
| Date: | 2024–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2410.21516 |
| By: | Verónica Amarante (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía); Marisa Bucheli (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Sociales); Tatiana Pérez (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Sociales) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the link between the ideological profile of Uruguayan economists and their opinions regarding inequality and discrimination. Drawing on data from an online survey of Uruguayan economists, we explore the links between their economic opinions and three dimensions of ideology: political orientation, sexist attitudes (benevolent and hostile sexism), and pro-market views. Economists' opinions encompass diagnostic assessments of inequality and discrimination, as well as views on specific policies designed to address these issues. Using ordered probit models, we find that right-wing political ideology, hostile sexism, and pro-market attitudes are associated with a lower likelihood of agreeing that income distribution in Uruguay should be more equitable and that women face barriers to full-time employment. These ideological factors are also linked to a higher likelihood of believing that there are equal gender and race opportunities in Uruguay. Benevolent sexism exhibits a more mixed relationship with opinions on inequality and discrimination. Furthermore, we show that economists' diagnoses of inequality and discrimination mediate the relationship between ideological variables and their policy preferences. Our results point to the need for greater introspection within the discipline regarding the influence of personal values and beliefs on economic analysis and policy recommendations. Our findings challenge the notion of economics as a purely objective and unbiased discipline, revealing significant associations between ideological factors, economists' perceptions of inequality and discrimination, and their support for specific policies. |
| Keywords: | Ideology, Discrimination, Sexism, Inequality |
| JEL: | A13 D63 J16 |
| Date: | 2024–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulr:wpaper:dt-07-24 |
| By: | Giani, Marco |
| Abstract: | Using a staggered difference-in-difference design, we study the consequence of the largest ever market-oriented transformation in higher education – the ‘Bologna process’ – on the ideology and socioeconomic outcomes of European Millennials. We find that the reform persistently and substantially elevated the students’ individualist concern for social status over their universalist concern for global justice, values conforming with ‘liquid modernity’ over ‘solid modernity’ and the salience of economic over sociocultural goals. The ‘self-interest bias’ is orthogonal to the traditional left-right cleavage in attitudinal or behavioural metrics and emerges absent any significant change in long-term income, wealth, unemployment, or occupational prestige. Through a direct mechanism of political socialisation, the globalisation of European higher education increased the perceived importance of status without improving it, shifting the educated class away from its presumed role in endorsing cosmopolitan causes. Institutionally-driven status anxiety, not idiosyncratic generational morals, constructs the ‘student customer’. |
| Date: | 2024–10–14 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:5shpt |
| By: | Speit, Andre; Voss, Paul (HEC Paris); Danis, Andras (Central European University) |
| Abstract: | The equity lending and option market both allow investors to decouple voting and cash flow rights of common shares. We provide a theory of this decoupling. While either market enables investors to acquire voting rights without cash flow exposure, empirical studies demonstrate a substantial difference in implied vote prices. Our model explains this surprising difference by uncovering the mechanism by which vote prices in the equity lending market are endogenously lower than those implied by the option market. We show that even though votes are cheaper in the equity lending market, activists endogenously choose to purchase votes in both markets. |
| Keywords: | decoupling; empty voting; shareholder activism; vote trading; empty creditor |
| JEL: | G30 G34 |
| Date: | 2024–01–24 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:heccah:1501 |
| By: | Matías Strehl Pessina (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía); Marcelo Bérgolo (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía); Martín Leites (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía) |
| Abstract: | Do top-income individuals support different levels of redistribution compared to the rest of society? If so, what drives these differences? We address these questions using a novel dataset combining administrative tax records with unique survey data on the social and economic preferences of workers in Uruguay. We document a marked decline in support for redistribution among the Top 1% of the income distribution. By comparing this group to the Top 50-2%, we show that differences in redistribution support are not solely explained by income or demographics. A set of beliefs, perceptions, and views, including political ideology, meritocratic beliefs, and views on government, account for much of the observed differences. Instead, a set of behavioral traits and social preferences, such as altruism and risk aversion, measured through incentivized online games, contribute little to explaining the gap. Finally, the differences in support for redistribution persist even when comparing the Top 1% with other high-income groups. Together, these findings suggest that the Top 1% is a distinct group with preferences for redistribution that differ from the rest of society, even from other high-income groups |
| Keywords: | Top-income individuals, Perceptions, Behavioral traits, Preferences for redistribution, Beliefs, Social preferences |
| JEL: | D31 D63 D91 H20 H30 |
| Date: | 2024–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulr:wpaper:dt-13-24 |
| By: | Bulfone, Fabio; Ergen, Timur; Maggor, Erez |
| Abstract: | Conditionality was a central concern in the development literature of the 1990s. With the massive expansion of targeted public support to private firms since the Great Financial Crisis, the question of conditionality is once again at the center of industrial policy debates. Despite the growing interest in the concept, the existing literature does not provide a systematic conceptualization of conditionality in the context of industrial policy, nor does it outline the political factors that facilitate the introduction of conditionality by state actors. This paper addresses this gap by offering a systematic political economy of conditionality. We provide an overview of the literature on conditionality, focusing on different industries, historical periods, and national contexts. In doing so, we make three contributions to the debate on industrial policy. First, we distinguish between two broad instruments of conditionality: performance standards and corporate control devices. Next, we map the coalitional, institutional, ideational, and global contextual factors that facilitate conditionality. Finally, we offer two vignettes of recent industrial policy initiatives in the EU and the US as illustrative cases. We make two arguments. First, the presence of conditionality is not primarily a technical matter of political design, but is shaped by combinations of political economy factors. Second, industrial policy conditionality provides an important theoretical lens for assessing how and where the recent revival of state activism represents a substantive break from the neoliberal order. |
| Abstract: | Konditionalität war ein zentrales Thema der Literatur zur wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung der 1990er-Jahre. Mit der massiven Ausweitung der gezielten öffentlichen Unterstützung für Privatunternehmen seit der Finanzkrise 2008 steht die Frage der Konditionalität wieder im Mittelpunkt industriepolitischer Debatten. Trotz des wachsenden Interesses am Problem der Konditionalität bietet die vorhandene Literatur weder eine systematische Konzeptualisierung im Kontext der Industriepolitik noch beschreibt sie die politischen Faktoren, die die Einführung von Konditionalitäten durch staatliche Akteure begünstigen. Dieser Aufsatz schließt diese Lücke, indem er eine systematische politische Ökonomie industriepolitischer Konditionalität entwickelt. Wir geben einen Überblick über die Literatur zur Konditionalität und decken dabei verschiedene Branchen, historische Zeiträume und nationale Kontexte ab. Wir leisten drei Beiträge zur Debatte zur Industriepolitik: Erstens unterscheiden wir zwischen zwei umfassenden Instrumenten der Konditionalität: Leistungsstandards und Bedingungen zur Unternehmenskontrolle. Zweitens arbeiten wir die koalitionellen, institutionellen, ideellen und globalen Kontextfaktoren heraus, die Konditionalität begünstigen. Drittens illustrieren wir die Nützlichkeit unserer konzeptuellen Überlegungen am Beispiel von zwei gegenwärtigen industriepolitischen Initiativen in der EU und den USA. Unser Aufsatz entwickelt zwei übergreifende Argumente. Erstens ist das Vorhandensein von Konditionalität nicht in erster Linie eine technische Frage der politischen Gestaltung, sondern wird durch eine Kombination von politisch-ökonomischen Faktoren bedingt. Zweitens bieten industriepolitische Konditionalitäten eine wichtige theoretische Grundlage, um zu beurteilen, wie und wo die viel diskutierte Wiederbelebung staatlicher Interventionen in die Wirtschaft einen substanziellen Bruch mit der neoliberalen Ordnung darstellt. |
| Keywords: | conditionality, developmental state, EU, geopolitics, industrial policy, political economy, US, EU, Geopolitik, Industriepolitik, Konditionalität, Politische Ökonomie, US |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:mpifgd:305292 |