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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Luiz Bines (Department of Economics, PUC-Rio); Juliano Assuncao (Department of Economics, PUC-Rio); Ricardo Dahis (Department of Economics, Monash University) |
| Abstract: | This study investigates the effects of ”Red Alerts”, siren warnings of rocket threats, on voting behavior in Israel, focusing on the Likud party during the 2013 and 2015 elections. Using a novel dataset on Red Alert timing and location, we apply a difference-in-differences approach to compare voting patterns in areas newly exposed to Gaza’s rocket range in 2014. Our analysis shows that Red Alerts on the days immediately before the election boosted Likud’s vote share by 2.5 p.p., or 15% of the average, while earlier alerts had no significant effect, highlighting the impact of threat salience on electoral outcomes. This research advances our understanding of how security threats influence political behavior |
| Keywords: | terrorism, salience, issue ownership. |
| JEL: | F5 |
| Date: | 2024–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2024-16 |
| By: | Bruno Caprettini (Universität St. Gallen - School of Economics and Political Sciences Swiss Institute for International Economics and Applied Economic Research); Lorenzo Casaburi (Universität Zürich - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakutält); Miriam Venturini (Department of Economics, University of California Riverside) |
| Abstract: | Governments often implement large-scale redistribution policies to gain enduring political support. However, little is known on whether such policies generate sizable gains, whether these gains are persistent, and why. We study the political consequences of a major land reform in Italy. A panel spatial regression discontinuity design shows that the reform generated large electoral gains for the incumbent Christian Democratic party. The electoral effects persist over four decades. We explore several channels and find that clientelist brokering and patronage are plausible mechanisms for this persistence. |
| Keywords: | redistribution, voting, clientelism, land reform, Italy |
| JEL: | P16 N44 Q15 D72 |
| Date: | 2023–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ucr:wpaper:202408 |
| By: | Diogo G. C. Britto; Gianmarco Daniele; Marco Le Moglie; Paolo Pinotti; Breno Sampaio |
| Abstract: | We study the prevalence and effects of individuals with past criminal charges among candidates and elected politicians in Brazil. Individuals with past criminal charges are twice as likely to both run for office and be elected compared to other individuals. This pattern persists across political parties and government levels, even when controlling for a broad set of observable char-acteristics. Randomized anti-corruption audits reduce the share of mayors with criminal records, but only when conducted in election years. Using a regression discontinuity design focusing on close elections, we demonstrate that the election of mayors with criminal backgrounds leads to higher rates of underweight births and infant mortality. Additionally, there is an increase in political patronage, particularly in the health sector, which is consistent with the negative impacts on local public health outcomes. |
| Keywords: | politicians, crime, audits, policies, patronage |
| JEL: | K42 J45 P16 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11382 |
| By: | Thea How Choon; Giovanna Marcolongo; Paolo Pinotti |
| Abstract: | Pressure groups may use bribes, violence, or a combination of both to bend politics to their will, and the choice between these methods of influence can vary depending on the type of institutional regime. We empirically investigate the dynamics of bribes and violence around elections in democracies and autocracies using a novel measure of corruption based on the Panama Papers and other massive data leaks on offshore entities in tax havens, which are often used as vehicles for bribes, and data on attacks against politicians around the world between 1990 and 2015. Evidence from staggered difference-in-differences and regression discontinuity in time models shows that in democracies attacks against politicians escalate before elections, whereas in autocracies bribes increase after elections. These findings align with a theoretical framework in which pressure groups use political violence to sway democratic elections in favor of their preferred candidates, while resorting to bribes to influence the behavior of newly appointed bureaucrats and public officials in autocracies. |
| Keywords: | elections, violence, corruption, pressure groups |
| JEL: | K42 D72 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11323 |
| By: | Sarah Spycher |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the role of domestic elections and political polarisation in shaping international environmental agreements and how electoral dynamics may explain the limited success of current climate cooperation. I focus on two key factors: the impact of domestic electoral pressure on international policy decisions and the mismatch between short election cycles and long-term treaty commitments. Using a 4-stage game modelling a bilateral environmental agreement, I analyse how incumbents strategically balance policy preferences with reelection prospects. Results show that while a green incumbent is often forced to temper their ambitions, a brown incumbent faces fewer electoral constraints, explaining why stringent policies are harder to achieve. Nonetheless, electoral pressure can moderate policies, producing outcomes more aligned with the preferences of the median voter. Finally, I discuss how political polarisation, particularly in two party systems, adds complexity to international cooperation on global public goods. |
| JEL: | Q58 C72 D62 H41 P16 |
| Date: | 2024–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp1196 |
| By: | Heyna, Philipp |
| Abstract: | Can TikTok drive support for populist radical right parties? In light of apparent trends among younger cohorts in Germany toward radical right populism both in terms of party preferences and political ideology, this question has frequently been raised in the political debate. TikTok users are relatively young, and the populist radical right AfD’s stark dominance on the platform suggests that it is a driving force behind these trends. I seek to answer this question by employing coarsened exact matching and instrumental variable analysis on data from a GLES online survey. My results suggest that TikTok use raises support for the AfD and its candidates, but does not increase issue agreement for attitudes towards immigration and evaluations of government performance. This suggests that TikTok indeed promotes support for the AfD among younger cohorts, but implies that it can only account in part for these trends, as it does not seem to cause corresponding shifts in political ideology. |
| Date: | 2024–10–24 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:yju9n |
| By: | Miriam Venturini (Department of Economics, University of California Riverside) |
| Abstract: | Can exposing corruption have unintended negative consequences? I tackle this question in the context of labor unions in the U.S., where the U.S. Senate McClellan Committee (1957-1960) publicly exposed corruption and organized crime infiltrations in their ranks. Using a difference-in-differences identification strategy and novel data, I examine the consequences of the Committee’s investigation on unionization, the capacity of unions to mobilize voters during elections, and their ability to influence public policy. I study both the direct effects of the investigation in areas where investigated union locals were present and the indirect effects (or spillovers) in areas where no investigated union locals were present. First, I find that the negative spillover effects on unionization were stronger than the direct effects. Second, I show that the investigation caused a persistent decrease in the capacity of unions to foster voters' political participation in presidential elections. Finally, I provide evidence suggesting that the spillovers are at least partially explained by a large-scale news and reputation shock that had negative consequences on the entire American labor movement. |
| Keywords: | labor unions, corruption, turnout |
| JEL: | J50 J51 D72 D73 N32 |
| Date: | 2023–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ucr:wpaper:202407 |
| By: | Depetris-Chauvin, Emilio; Durante, Ruben; Gutierrez, Emilio |
| Abstract: | We investigate the relationship between neighboring municipal authorities’ shared party affiliation and inter-jurisdictional cooperation agreements in Mexico. Exploiting a Regression Discontinuity Design in close municipal elections, we show that political alignment with neighboring municipalities translates into higher levels of inter-jurisdictional cooperation. Focusing particularly on crime prevention, we then document that cooperation has observable returns (homicide rates decline significantly) and that the difference in the probability of observing a cooperation agreement between same and different party mayors is larger when the returns to cooperation are higher. |
| Keywords: | Gobernabilidad, Investigación socioeconómica, |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dbl:dblwop:2298 |
| By: | Raúl Duarte; Frederico Finan; Horacio Larreguy; Laura Schechter |
| Abstract: | Politicians rely on political brokers to buy votes throughout much of the developing world. We investigate how social networks facilitate these vote-buying exchanges. Our conceptual framework suggests brokers should be particularly well-placed within the network to learn about non-copartisans’ reciprocity in order to target transfers effectively. As a result, parties should recruit brokers who are central among non-copartisans. We combine village network data from brokers and citizens with broker reports of vote buying, allowing us to use broker and citizen fixed effects. We show that networks diffuse information about citizens to brokers who leverage it to target transfers. In particular, among those citizens who are not registered to their party, brokers target reciprocal citizens about whom they can learn more through their network, and these citizens are more likely to support the brokers’ party. Moreover, recruited brokers are significantly more central than other citizens among non-copartisans, but not among copartisans. These results highlight the importance of information diffusion through social networks for vote buying, broker recruitment, and ultimately for political outcomes. |
| Keywords: | vote buying, brokers, social networks |
| JEL: | D72 O12 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11349 |
| By: | Mariza Montes de Oca Leon; Achim Hagen; Franziska Holz |
| Abstract: | We study the impact of fossil fuel subsidy removal on presidential popularity using difference-indifference approaches and a stylized theoretical model. Analyzing macro level data for two subsidy removal events in Mexico and Bolivia in the early 2010s, we find evidence of a negative impact on presidential approval. Our theoretical probabilistic voting model predicts that the decline in popularity is driven by high income groups if subsidies are regressive, and that lack of trust in the government lowers popularity of the removal in all income groups. We confirm these predictions using micro level data for the Mexican subsidy removal event. |
| Keywords: | Political economy; Fossil fuels; Subsidy removal |
| Date: | 2024–11–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2024/230 |
| By: | Clara Andresciani; Debora Di Gioacchino; Laura Sabani |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the †decongestion effect†argument, which suggests that the expansion of the private healthcare sector can reduce pressure on the public healthcare system, thereby improving access and quality of care for public sector patients. To this purpose, we develop a probabilistic voting model that endogenizes the public healthcare budget and incorporates a private sector where agents, differentiated by income, can opt out of the public system while still contributing to it fiscally. Our findings indicate that a higher proportion of individuals opting out leads to lower political support for public healthcare and a decline in public healthcare quality, ultimately negating the decongestion effect argument. Using data from 26 European countries, we empirically test our model by examining the relationship between unmet medical needs -used as a proxy for the quality of public healthcare sector- and private health insurance coverage. After controlling for individual and country-level characteristics, our results indicate that as private insurance coverage expands, income disparities in unmet medical needs widen: wealthier individuals benefit more, while poorer individuals face increased unmet needs, providing no evidence supporting the decongestion effect. |
| Keywords: | public/private healthcare mix, voluntary health insurance, unmet medical needs, probabilistic voting, bivariate probit model |
| JEL: | I13 I14 H51 P35 C35 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:frz:wpaper:wp2024_23.rdf |
| By: | Dhammika Dharmapala |
| Abstract: | A substantial literature studies franchise extension, focusing primarily on class-based – rather than race-based – voting restrictions. This paper constructs and analyzes a novel dataset that codes the presence of race-based restrictions on voting in 131 jurisdictions over 1730-2000 (consisting primarily of English-speaking subnational jurisdictions with substantial power to determine their electoral law). It documents extensive variation in these restrictions over time and across jurisdictions. To explain this variation, the paper uses a framework that emphasizes the distinction between centralized imperial control versus the empowerment of local European settlers. A difference-in-difference analysis of the impact of US independence (using “Loyalist” British colonies in the Americas as a control group) suggests a substantial positive effect of US independence on the probability of a racially restrictive franchise. More generally, a stacked event study analysis implies that the independence of colonies of settlement (and, to a lesser extent, other forms of settler empowerment) had a substantial positive effect on the probability of a racially restrictive franchise. These results are robust to controlling for the existence and abolition of property qualifications for voting. They are consistent with a framework in which an imperial government is less subject to capture by local settler elites, and thus more likely to promote franchise extension than is an empowered local settler-dominated government. |
| Keywords: | voting, franchise extension, race, discrimination |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11347 |
| By: | Kreitmeir, David Hajo (Monash University) |
| Abstract: | Over the past two decades, violence against land and environmental activists has been on the rise, besetting even stable democracies. Using a unique, fine-grained data set on social conflict events in Peru and exogenous variation in world mineral prices, I document a strong link between local mineral rents and violent state repression of socioenvironmental protests in a democratic institutional setting. I show that the increase in the use of excessive force cannot be explained by changes in protester behavior. Empirical findings highlight the role of local authorities: the election of a pro-mining mayor is associated with a higher prevalence of state repression and corruption in the constituency. The legal and democratic accountability of local authorities is, however, found to be limited. The reported increase in corruption does not translate into more investigations against pro-mining mayors for corruption offenses nor are reelection results of incumbents found to be negatively affected by state violence against protesters. Finally, I show that violent state repression is successful in forestalling conflict resolution agreements that acknowledge protesters’ demands. |
| Date: | 2024–10–19 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:e7avt |
| By: | Jacobson, Sophie (Columbia University) |
| Abstract: | Can citizens' firsthand experiences with government policies shape their political opinions? Research on mass "policy feedback" effects increasingly raises doubts about the capacity of even salient policies to overcome partisan and ideological divisions to shift citizen attitudes. I advance this debate with causal estimates of recent, substantial, and broad-based belief change through personal experience with a child in public preschool. Using a difference-in-differences design with an original opinion panel of New York parents universally eligible for too few free full-day seats, I show that experience with public pre-K creates new political beliefs within months. Parents’ baseline preferences for government-provided childcare over private options doubles after a single semester. This profound shift does not differ between Republicans or conservatives with UPK seats and their more liberal counterparts. Social scientists have shown that universal preschool could transform children's life chances, GDP, and gender parity in economic life; this study suggests profound political effects, too. |
| Date: | 2024–10–25 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:9nfg7 |
| By: | Flores Zendejas, Juan; Nodari, Gianandrea; Dávalos, Jorge |
| Abstract: | What are the effects of political instability on the banking sector? This article examines the short-term impacts on banking activities in Mexico during the late 1920s, a decade marked by civil conflicts and political violence. Although political upheavals affected some regions more than others, banks and depositors were compelled to respond to a general atmosphere of political violence. Drawing on new qualitative and quantitative evidence, this article analyzes how banks and depositors behaved in the context of armed conflicts and assesses the consequences for the banking sector. Our results show a negative effect of political violence on bank deposits and banks' capitalization. We also account for the geographic proximity of violent regions to neighboring municipalities and observe that political instability promoted capital flight, particularly in the northern region of the country, where episodes of political violence were more severe. We conclude that political instability likely contributed to the lack of financial development in Mexico. |
| Keywords: | Political instability, Mexico, Banking fragility, Financial development, Political violence, Banking sector |
| JEL: | N16 N26 E58 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gnv:wpaper:unige:180827 |
| By: | Nyagweta, David Tinashe |
| Abstract: | This article examines the associated factors that contribute to differences in awareness of chapter 9 and 10 institutions, which are specialised democratic institutions in South Africa, among different sociodemographic groups. Using data from the South Africa -Governance, Public Safety, and Justice Survey (GPSJS) of 2018-2019, the article analyses the levels and factors associated with awareness of all eight institutions. Findings show that awareness of these institutions is generally low, except for the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), and the Public Protector (PP). When considering sociodemographic factors using both binomial quasi-MLE and binary logit, awareness is found to be significantly associated with gender, race, age, income, education, political discussions, awareness of the constitution, and location. This points to the reproduction of structural inequalities into the functioning and reach of democratic institutions. Implications from these findings for the functioning and legitimacy of these institutions are discussed with suggestions of ways to improve visibility, accessibility, and outreach to the public. |
| Keywords: | Institutions, political knowledge, democracy |
| JEL: | H11 K40 Z13 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:122443 |