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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Despina Gavresi (DEM, University of Luxembourg); Anastasia Litina (Department of Economics, University of Macedonia) |
| Abstract: | This paper establishes population aging as a driving force of populism in a multilevel regression analysis of individuals living in European countries over the period 2002-2019. The focus is on the effect of ``aggregate'' population aging as opposed to individual aging. Populism expressed as populist attitudes is measured with individual-level data of nine consecutive rounds of the European Social Survey. We use data on voting for populist parties, political trust, and attitudes towards immigration. Our findings suggest an association of population aging with a declining electoral turnout, a higher support for populist parties, lower trust in political institutions, and a rise in anti-immigrant hostility. These effects are observed across both young and elderly voters. |
| Keywords: | Population Aging, Populist Voting, Immigrant Attitudes, Trust |
| JEL: | D72 J10 P00 Z13 |
| Date: | 2024–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mcd:mcddps:2024_07 |
| By: | Hortala-Vallve, Rafael; Meriläinen, Jaakko; Tukiainen, Janne |
| Abstract: | Pre-electoral coalitions (PECs) may increase parties’ chances of winning an election, but they may also distort electoral results and policies away from citizens’ preferences. To shed light on how PECs shape post-electoral power distribution, we study the causes and consequences of PECs in Finland where elections use an open-list proportional representation system, and parties may form joint lists. We present descriptive evidence showing that PECs are more common between parties of equal size and similar ideology, and when elections are more disproportional or involve more parties. Using difference-in-differences and density discontinuity designs, we illustrate that voters punish coalescing parties and target personal votes strategically within the coalitions, and that PECs are formed with the particular purpose of influencing the distribution of power. PECs increase small parties’ chances of acquiring leadership positions, lead to more dispersed seat distributions, and sometimes prevent absolute majorities. They can thus enable a broader representation of citizens’ policy preferences. |
| Keywords: | coalition formation; local elections; multi-party systems; open-list proportional representation; pre-electoral coalitions |
| JEL: | D72 P00 |
| Date: | 2024–01–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:121600 |
| By: | Muhammad Hassan Bin Afzal |
| Abstract: | Economic hardships significantly affect public perception and voting intentions in general elections. The primary focus of my study is to capture the degree of influence that individual economic hardships have on their voting. I utilize the ANES 2024 Pilot Study1 Survey dataset and introduce a novel composite Inflation Behavior Index (IBR) that captures individuals' cumulative economic and cost of living experience. To that effect, the primary objectives of the current study are threefold: first, to develop a composite economic behavior index from available data and variables to capture the overall economic experience of U.S. individuals due to ongoing inflation; second, to examine how this economic behavior impacts political engagement and voting behavior utilizing appropriate and fitting mathematical models; and finally which specific personal experiences and perceptions about economy and cost of living likely to revoke party loyalty in upcoming U.S. presidential election. My study finds that increased personal economic struggles (pocketbook voting) due to inflation make it more likely for individuals to express an intention to vote against the Incumbent even if the Incumbent is from their self-identified political party. Conversely, having a negative perception of the national economy (sociotropic voting) is less likely to revoke party loyalty in the upcoming General election. In simpler terms, voters are more likely to vote along party lines even if they perceive their party (the Incumbent) is not handling the economy and cost of living well. |
| Date: | 2024–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2408.05223 |
| By: | Cevat Giray Aksoy (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), King’s College London); Barry Eichengreen (University of California, Berkeley); Anastasia Litina (Department of Economics, University of Macedonia); Cem Özgüzel (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) a); Chan Yu (University of International Business and Economics) |
| Abstract: | Scholars and politicians have expressed concern that immigrants from countries with low levels of political trust transfer those attitudes to their destination countries. Using large-scale survey data covering 38 countries and exploiting origin-country variation across different cohorts and surveys, we show that, to the contrary, immigrants more exposed to institutional corruption before migrating exhibit higher levels of political trust in their new country. Higher trust is observed for national political institutions only and does not carry over to other supra-national institutions and individuals. We report evidence that higher levels of political trust among immigrants persist, leading to greater electoral participation and political engagement in the long run. The impact of home-country corruption on political trust in the destination country is further amplified by large differences in levels of income and democracy between home and host countries, which serve to highlight the contrast in the two settings. It is lessened by exposure to media, a source of independent information about institutional quality. Finally, our extensive analyses indicate that self-selection into host countries based on trust is highly unlikely and the results also hold when focusing only on forced migrants who were unlikely to have been subject to selection. |
| Keywords: | Corruption, Institutions, Immigrants, Political Trust |
| JEL: | Z1 D73 |
| Date: | 2024–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mcd:mcddps:2024_08 |
| By: | Anna Becker (Stockholm University); Steffen Huck (University College London and WZB Berlin) |
| Abstract: | We study the relationship between moral values (“ought” statements) and factual beliefs (“is” statements). We show that thinking about values affects the beliefs people hold. This effect is mediated by prior political leanings, thereby contributing to the polarization of factual beliefs. We document these findings in a pre-registered online experiment with a nationally representative sample of over 1, 800 individuals in the US. We also show that participants do not distort their beliefs in response to financial incentives to do so, suggesting that deep values exert a stronger motivational force than financial incentives. |
| Keywords: | motivated beliefs; values; polarization; experiment; reasoning; |
| JEL: | C90 D72 D74 D83 P16 |
| Date: | 2024–09–16 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rco:dpaper:510 |
| By: | Hans Gersbach; Rodrigo Casado Noguerales; Samuel Schenk |
| Abstract: | When a counter-proposal is made to an initiative to change the Swiss constitution, the citizenry makes three binary majority choices: the initiative versus the status quo, the initiative versus the counter-proposal, and the status quo versus the counterproposal as a tie-breaker. If there is a cycle, the alternative that beats the status-quo wins. This system invites strategic voting, as exemplified by the 2010 case of the “Ausschaffungsinitiative”. We suggest to break cycles differently by choosing the middle alternative in case of a cycle, which will normally be the counter-proposal. More precisely, we show that there always exists a strong Nash equilibrium in which all citizens vote sincerely. Moreover, the outcome of all alternative strong equilibria with strategic voting is the same as if everybody votes sincerely. We also show that other common cycle-breaker rules cannot achieve the same result. |
| Keywords: | Swiss democracy, three-way referendum, Condorcet Winner, manipulation, information sharing, initiative |
| JEL: | C72 D70 D72 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11265 |
| By: | Bharti Nandwani (Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research); Punarjit Roychowdhury (Shiv Nadar University) |
| Abstract: | The paper examines whether granting property inheritance rights to females improves their participation in politics as election candidates in India. Conservative gender norms in patriarchal societies like India discourage women from actively participating in politics, with socially enforced sanctions for non-compliance. Additionally, being politically active is costly, requiring significant contributions of time and resources. Improvement in property rights is likely to financially empower women, easing both the constraints. Using state-level variation in legal changes to women's property rights and employing a large administrative data on elections in India, we show that better property rights for women lead to an increase in women contesting for elections and likelihood of winning for women candidates. We also document that regional parties contest more female candidates and there is increased entry of new female candidates after the reform. Further, using a large household survey data, we provide evidence that the increased political participation is driven by improved financial autonomy of women after the inheritance reforms. We confirm that pre-existing trends are not confounding our results. |
| Keywords: | Gender, India, Female Political Participation, Property Rights |
| JEL: | J16 D72 K11 O12 |
| Date: | 2024–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ind:igiwpp:2024-012 |
| By: | Guinaudeau, Benjamin; Jankowski, Michael |
| Abstract: | When do populist radical-right parties (PRRP) foster the (descriptive) representation of women? In a recently published paper, Weeks et al. (2023) coin the concept of 'strategic descriptive representation'. When facing electoral struggles, PRRP would exploit the existing gender gap and strategically increase the descriptive representation of women to attract female votes and fare better in the election. Using data on 58 elections across 19 countries, the authors test their argument and find conclusive evidence supporting it. In this paper, we offer a replication of the study. First, we assess the numerical reproducibility of the published findings ('verification'). Second, we investigate the 'robustness' of the findings and evaluate the results under alternative model specifications. While our replication study identifies minor issues with the verification and some of themodel specifications, itmost importantly shows that the main results of the paper are driven by a single outlier. The paper's key finding is hence contingent on the inclusion of a single observation (French Front National in 2012), which is a questionable observation as it only elected two MPs, one of whom was a woman. Additionally, this woman's election was seemingly caused by a combination of idiosyncratic factors discussed in the study. Once the case is excluded from the analysis the key model parameter shrinks close to zero and loses its statistical significance. Accordingly, in light of our findings, there is no clear evidence supporting strategic descriptive representation and electoral pressures do not seem sufficient to encourage PRRP to increase their share of female representatives. Correcting this empirical finding has important implications for both understanding PRRP's electoral strategies and women's representation. |
| Keywords: | descriptive representation, women, populist radical-right, replication, robustness, small-N studies |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:i4rdps:149 |
| By: | Brice Fabre (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, IPP - Institut des politiques publiques); Marc Sangnier (UNamur - Université de Namur [Namur], AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | This paper uses French data to simultaneously estimate the impact of two types of connections on government subsidies allocated to municipalities. Investigating different types of connection in a same setting helps to distinguish between the different motivations that could drive pork-barreling. We differentiate between municipalities where ministers held office before their appointment to the government and those where they lived as children. Exploiting ministers' entries into and exits from the government, we show that municipalities where a minister was mayor receive 30% more investment subsidies when the politician they are linked to joins the government, and a similar size decrease when the minister departs. We show that these effects are driven by ministers who will participate in local elections after their time in the central government. In contrast, we do not observe these outcomes for municipalities where ministers lived as children. These findings indicate that altruism towards childhood friends and family does not fuel pork-barreling and suggest that future electoral prospects account for at least one quarter of reported pork-barreling. The remaining share can indistinctly be attributed to sentimental attachment or political favouritism at large. |
| Keywords: | Local favouritism, distributive politics, political connections, personal connections |
| Date: | 2024–09–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:ipppap:halshs-04687331 |
| By: | Alexandre Chirat; Cyril Hédoin |
| Abstract: | This paper contributes to the Democracy versus Epistocracy debate (Brennan and Landemore 2022) by providing a theoretical framework and a criterion to choose between democratic, hybrid and epistocratic modes of political governance. From a normative perspective, we claim that the specificity of information should (at least partially) guide the choice between these modes of political governance because of its impact on costs of political governance. The main logic of the model is the following: an issue has a degree of information specificity that determines costs of political governance combined in a Social Costs Function. Therefore, the model helps to assess the relative efficiency between democratic, hybrid and epistocratic decision-making procedures to reach collective choices. |
| Keywords: | Democracy – Epistocracy – Social Choice – Information – Social Costs Function |
| JEL: | D71 D83 P35 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:drm:wpaper:2024-25 |
| By: | Kerola, Eeva; McCully, Tuuli; Nuutilainen, Riikka |
| Abstract: | Over the past twenty years, China has become the world's largest trading nation and a significant trading partner for most countries. Despite these important links, concerns regarding China's commercial and diplomatic goals persist due to its unique state-centric economic structure. This paper applies an augmented gravity model to tease out drivers of China's bilateral trade relationships, asking why some countries are more important than others as sources of Chinese imports. Our results show that both business and political considerations drive China's import decisions. Political friendliness with China, as measured by UN General Assembly voting records, or established trade agreements, has a positive impact on exports to China. The results further suggest that countries with official diplomatic ties with Taiwan export less to China. Membership in China's Belt and Road Initiative, however, does not generally translate into a significant increase in Chinese imports from the member country. |
| Keywords: | gravity model, international trade, China |
| JEL: | C23 F14 F15 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:bofitp:302570 |
| By: | Leonardo Matone; Ben Abramowitz; Nicholas Mattei; Avinash Balakrishnan |
| Abstract: | Aggregating the preferences of multiple agents into a collective decision is a common step in many important problems across areas of computer science including information retrieval, reinforcement learning, and recommender systems. As Social Choice Theory has shown, the problem of designing algorithms for aggregation rules with specific properties (axioms) can be difficult, or provably impossible in some cases. Instead of designing algorithms by hand, one can learn aggregation rules, particularly voting rules, from data. However, the prior work in this area has required extremely large models, or been limited by the choice of preference representation, i.e., embedding. We recast the problem of designing a good voting rule into one of learning probabilistic versions of voting rules that output distributions over a set of candidates. Specifically, we use neural networks to learn probabilistic social choice functions from the literature. We show that embeddings of preference profiles derived from the social choice literature allows us to learn existing voting rules more efficiently and scale to larger populations of voters more easily than other work if the embedding is tailored to the learning objective. Moreover, we show that rules learned using embeddings can be tweaked to create novel voting rules with improved axiomatic properties. Namely, we show that existing voting rules require only minor modification to combat a probabilistic version of the No Show Paradox. |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2408.13630 |
| By: | RezaeeDaryakenari, Babak (Leiden University) |
| Abstract: | While politicians often argue that economic sanctions can induce policy changes in targeted states by undermining elite and public support for the reigning government, the efficacy of these measures, particularly against non-democratic regimes, is debatable. We propose that, counterintuitively, economic sanctions can bolster rather than diminish support for the sanctioned government, even in non-democratic contexts. However, this support shift and its magnitude can differ across various political factions and depend on the nature of the sanctions. To empirically evaluate our theoretical expectations, we use supervised machine learning to scrutinize nearly 2 million tweets from over 1, 000 Iranian influencers, assessing their responses to both comprehensive and targeted sanctions during Donald Trump’s presidency. Our analysis shows that comprehensive sanctions generally improved sentiments toward the Iranian government, even among its moderate oppositions, rendering them more aligned with the state's stance. Conversely, while targeted sanctions elicited a milder rally-around-the-flag response, the identity of the targeted entity plays a crucial role in determining the scale of this reaction. |
| Date: | 2024–08–29 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:r7ae4 |