nep-pol New Economics Papers
on Positive Political Economics
Issue of 2024‒08‒19
fifteen papers chosen by
Eugene Beaulieu, University of Calgary


  1. Partisan Voting Under Uncertainty By Lily Ling Yang
  2. Pocketbook and Sociotropic Economic Voting: How Does Inflation Affect Voting Decisions? By Afzal, Muhammad Hassan Bin
  3. Objectifying the Measurement of Voter Ideology with Expert Data By Patrick Mellacher; Gernot Lechner
  4. Single Transferable Vote and Paradoxes of Negative and Positive Involvement By David McCune
  5. On the Effectiveness of Gendering Politics By Arcangelo Dimico; Francesco Lancia; Alessia Russo
  6. Ideology, Incidence and the Political Economy of Fuel Taxes: Evidence from California 2018 Proposition 6 By Epstein, Lucas; Muehlegger, Erich
  7. Local Decline and Populism By Edenhofer, Jacob; Fetzer, Thiemo; Garg, Prashant
  8. The Political Economy of Industrial Policy By Réka Juhász; Nathan Lane
  9. Resource Windfalls and Political Sabotage: Evidence from 5.2 Million Political Ads By Ehud Lehrer; David Lagziel; Ohad Raveh
  10. Political Party Manifestos Reform Paradox in Pakistan By Shujaat Farooq; Azwar Muhammad Aslam; Nadeem Ul Haque
  11. Gender and the pandemic in political ideology: The case of Spain By Zuazu, Izaskun
  12. Electoral incentive dynamics, leaders' capability, and economic performance: New evidence of national executives By Shi, Xiangyu
  13. Worker Representatives By Julian Budde; Thomas Dohmen; Simon Jäger; Simon Trenkle
  14. Environmental Tax Competition and Welfare: The Good News about Lobbies By Bontems, Philippe; Cheikbossian, Guillaume; Hafidi, Houda
  15. Populist opposition is threatening progress on climate change By Edoardo Campanella; Robert Z. Lawrence

  1. By: Lily Ling Yang
    Abstract: We consider a common-value voting model in which voters are uncertain about the precision of the information they receive. With incomplete preference, party supporters adopt their own party as their status quo and vote for it whenever it is justi able under some belief. Uncertainty is ampli ed by strategic consideration. As a result, voting becomes fully partisan and party supporters stick to their own party in large elections, even though all voters share the same preference. Additionally, voting is more partisan when voting is compulsory or when the population of party supporters is sufficiently large.
    Keywords: Common values, Elections, Information aggregation, Knightian uncertainty, Partisan voting
    JEL: C72 D72 D81
    Date: 2024–07
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2024_574
  2. By: Afzal, Muhammad Hassan Bin
    Abstract: Economic hardships significantly affect public perception and voting intentions in general elections. The primary focus of my study is to capture the degree of influence that individual economic hardships have on their voting. I utilize the ANES 2024 Pilot Study Survey dataset and introduce a novel composite Inflation Behavior Index (IBR) that captures individuals' cumulative economic and cost of living experience. To that effect, the primary objectives of the current study are threefold: first, to develop a composite economic behavior index from available data and variables to capture the overall economic experience of U.S. individuals due to ongoing inflation; second, to examine how this economic behavior impacts political engagement and voting behavior utilizing appropriate and fitting mathematical models; and finally which specific personal experiences and perceptions about economy and cost of living likely to revoke party loyalty in upcoming U.S. presidential election. My study finds that increased personal economic struggles (pocketbook voting) due to inflation make it more likely for individuals to express an intention to vote against the Incumbent even if the Incumbent is from their self-identified political party. On the contrary, having a negative perception of the national economy (sociotropic voting) is less likely to revoke party loyalty in the upcoming General election. In simpler terms, voters are more likely to vote along party lines even if they perceive their party (the Incumbent) is not handling the economy and cost of living well. Having a higher level of Education, they are more likely to vote for the incumbents in both pocketbook and sociotropic scenarios. Therefore, the current research shows that party loyalty during general elections often persists but is expected to be undermined if the voter experiences adverse economic conditions due to inflation in the past. The findings of the current study provide tools and resources to craft agendas, policies, and strategies not only for policymakers and campaign strategists but also for the political parties to take focused and evidence-based actions to protect and ensure the economic well-being of the general population as well as increase the likelihood to perform better in elections and public opinion measures in a highly polarized political environment.
    Keywords: Economic Voting, Inflation Behavior Index (IBR), Voting Behavior, Pocketbook Voting, Elections, Sociotropic Voting
    JEL: E31 D72
    Date: 2024
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:300581
  3. By: Patrick Mellacher (University of Graz, Austria); Gernot Lechner (University of Graz, Austria)
    Abstract: Many surveys require respondents to place themselves on a left-right ideology scale. However, non-experts may not understand the scale or their “objective†position. Furthermore, a uni-dimensional approach may not suffice to describe ideology coherently. We thus develop a novel way to measure voter ideology: Combining expert and voter survey data, we use classification models to infer how experts would place voters based on their policy stances on three axes: general left-right, economic left-right and libertarian-authoritarian. We validate our approach by finding i) a strong connection between policies and ideology using data-driven approaches, ii) a strong predictive power of our models in cross-validation exercises, and iii) that “objective†ideology as predicted by our models significantly explains the vote choice in simple spatial voting models even after accounting for the subjective ideological distance between voters and parties as perceived by the voters. Our results shed new light on debates around mass polarization.
    Keywords: machine learning, random forest, voter ideology, political economy, spatial voting.
    JEL: C38 D70 D72
    Date: 2024–01
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:grz:wpaper:2024-03
  4. By: David McCune
    Abstract: We analyze a type of voting paradox which we term an involvement paradox, in which a candidate who loses an election could be made into a winner if more of the candidate's non-supporters participated in the election, or a winner could be made into a loser if more of the candidate's supporters participated. Such paradoxical outcomes are possible under the voting method of single transferable vote (STV), which is widely used for political elections throughout the world. We provide a worst-case analysis of involvement paradoxes under STV and show several interesting examples of these paradoxes from elections in Scotland.
    Date: 2024–06
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2406.20045
  5. By: Arcangelo Dimico (Queens’ University Belfast); Francesco Lancia (Department of Economics, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice; CEPR); Alessia Russo (University of Padua; CEPR)
    Abstract: We examine the effectiveness of gender reforms in increasing women's representation in selected offices. We generate exogenous variations in representation at the Italian regional and municipal elections using the passage of two gender reforms: i) party-list gender quotas, a supply-side reform intended to influence party decisions regarding candidacy, and ii) double-gender preference systems, a demand-side reform intended to influence voting decisions on candidates. We show that party-list gender quotas have no effect on the likelihood of women winning a seat, whereas double-gender preference systems are effective in increasing women's representation. Furthermore, we provide evidence that supply-side reforms are susceptible to party-list manipulations, which undermine their effectiveness. In constituencies with a stronger voter gender bias, supply-side reforms may also unintentionally have a negative impact on women's representation in leadership positions.
    Keywords: Gender Reforms, Italian Local Elections, Political Representation
    JEL: D72 H52 P16
    Date: 2023
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ven:wpaper:2023:34
  6. By: Epstein, Lucas; Muehlegger, Erich
    Abstract: In 2018, California voters rejected Proposition 6, a ballot initiative that sought to repeal state gasoline taxes and vehicle fees enacted as part of the 2017 Road Repair and Accountability Act. This paper examines the relationship between support for the proposition, political ideology and the economic burdens imposed by the Act. For every hundred dollars of annual per-household costs imposed by the Road Repair and Accountability Act, support for proposition rose by 3–5 percentage points, roughly comparable to a commensurate increase in the share of ”liberal” voters. Notably, the relationship between voting and the economic burden of the policy is seven times strong in the most conservative tracts relative to the most liberal tracts. This heterogeneity has important implications for the popular support for environmental taxes, as conservative areas in California and elsewhere tend to bear a higher burden from transportation and energy taxes than liberal areas. View the NCST Project Webpage
    Keywords: Social and Behavioral Sciences, Transportation taxes, Political economy, Voting
    Date: 2024–07–01
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:itsdav:qt6k58771s
  7. By: Edenhofer, Jacob (University of Oxford); Fetzer, Thiemo (University of Warwick & Bonn and affiliated with CEPR, CAGE, NIESR, ECONtribute, Grantham Institute); Garg, Prashant (Imperial College London)
    Abstract: Support for right-wing populist parties is characterised by considerable regional heterogeneity and especially concentrated in regions that have experienced economic decline. It remains unclear, however, whether the spatial externalities of local decline, including homelessness and crime, boost support for populist parties, even among those not directly affected by such decline. In this paper, we contribute to filling this gap in two ways. First, we gather novel data on a particularly visible form of local decline, high-street vacancies, that comprise 83, 000 premises in England and Wales. Second, we investigate the influence of local decline on support for the right-wing populist UK Independence Party (UKIP) between 2009 and 2019. We find a significant positive association between high-street vacancy rates and UKIP support. These results enhance our understanding of how changes in the lived environment shape political preferences and behaviour, particularly in relation to right-wing populism.
    Keywords: Local Economic Conditions ; Populism ; High-street Vacancies ; Unemployment ; Urban Transformation JEL Codes: D72 ; R11 ; R12 ; R23
    Date: 2024
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1508
  8. By: Réka Juhász; Nathan Lane
    Abstract: We examine the ways in which political realities shape industrial policy through the lens of modern political economy. We consider two broad “governance constraints”: i) the political forces that shape how industrial policy is chosen and ii) the ways in which state capacity affects implementation. The framework of modern political economy suggests that government failure is not a necessary feature of industrial policy; rather, it is more likely to emerge when countries pursue industrial policies beyond their governance capacity constraints. As such, our political economy of industrial policy is not fatalist. Instead, it enables policymakers to constructively confront challenges.
    Keywords: industrial policy, political economy, state capacity, embedded autonomy
    JEL: O25 L52 P00
    Date: 2024
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11143
  9. By: Ehud Lehrer (Durham University); David Lagziel (BGU); Ohad Raveh (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
    Keywords: Resource windfalls, political sabotage, negative campaigns, contests
    JEL: Q32 D72 P18
    Date: 2024
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bgu:wpaper:2404
  10. By: Shujaat Farooq (Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad); Azwar Muhammad Aslam (Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad); Nadeem Ul Haque (Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad)
    Abstract: A political partys manifesto is a manuscript that chalks out a partys vision, goals, and plans- aligning the aspirations and needs of the public. Commonly, it signifies the policy package a political party uses to attract voters at election time.
    Date: 2024
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pid:rrepot:2024:16
  11. By: Zuazu, Izaskun
    Abstract: Gender gaps in political ideology transformed from traditional gaps (women showing more right-leaning than men) to modern gaps (women showing more left-leaning) in the last four decades in Western countries. However, Spain lagged behind in this transformation. This paper analyses how labour market status and the pandemic can affect gender differences in left-right self-placement using data on 600, 000 individuals during 2008-2021. Using various indicators of the incidence of COVID-19, the paper associates the pandemic with an increasing rightwing leaning for both women and men. However, this correlation is stronger for men. While the pandemic made men more moderate and less leftist, it made women less moderate. The estimates crucially account for labour market status and generational replacement: the results show greater polarization among younger generations. The results point to gender as a relevant political cleavage in Spain in the near future.
    Keywords: political ideology, COVID-19 pandemic, gender-generational gap, labour market status
    JEL: D72 J16
    Date: 2024
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifsowp:300519
  12. By: Shi, Xiangyu
    Abstract: In this paper, I provide the first cross-country empirical analysis to establish three stylized facts on electoral incentive dynamics, national leaders' capability, and economic performance, using a novel data set of national leaders' personal and tenure characteristics and countries' institutional features: (1) In democracies with (exogenous) term limits, the positive association between leaders' performance and their capability is significantly less pronounced in their last term, when they do not have any re-election incentives; (2) In democracies with term limits, the positive association between leaders' performance and their capability is decreasing over time on average in their entire tenure, but exhibits a jump in the term right before the last term; and (3) The above patterns are more salient in presidential democracies with binding term limits than parliamentary democracies while non-existent in non-democracies where leaders are not appointed via elections. These facts are consistent with a theoretical model of the dynamic decision-making of a politician with re-election concerns.
    Keywords: leader; institution; economic performance; election and re-election incentives; electoral dynamics
    JEL: D7 H5
    Date: 2024–07
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:121574
  13. By: Julian Budde (University of Bonn); Thomas Dohmen (University of Bonn, Institute of Labor Economics); Simon Jäger (Massachusetts Institute of Technology); Simon Trenkle (Institute of Labor Economics)
    Abstract: We study the descriptive and substantive representation of workers through worker representatives, focusing on the selection of German works council representatives and their impact on worker outcomes. Becoming a professional representative leads to substantial wage gains for the elected, concentrated among blue-collar workers. Representatives are positively selected in terms of pre-election earnings and person fixed effects. They are more likely to have undergone vocational training, show greater interest in politics, and lean left politically compared to the employees they represent; blue-collar workers are close to proportionally represented among works councilors. Drawing on a retirement-IV strategy and event-study designs around council elections, we find that blue-collar representatives reduce involuntary separations, consistent with blue-collar workers placing stronger emphasis on job security.
    Keywords: Worker representatives, works councils, linked administrative and survey data
    JEL: J51 J53 P16
    Date: 2024–07
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:330
  14. By: Bontems, Philippe; Cheikbossian, Guillaume; Hafidi, Houda
    Abstract: This paper focuses on the welfare effects of domestic and international lobbying in the context of two countries linked by both trade and pollution. We consider a reciprocal-markets model where, in each country, a domestic firm produces a polluting good, that can result in a cross-national environmental externality, and competes in quantities in each market with a foreign firm. Each government independently sets a pollution tax under political pressure from green and industrial lobbies `a la Grossman and Helpman (1994). Our results mainly show that political pressure from domestic and/or international lobbies can help mitigate tax competition between the two countries, resulting in an improvement in social welfare. In fact, lobbying acts much like a strategic delegation device by changing the social welfare weights in the objective function of each government. The (potential) welfare-improving effect of political pressure depends on the relative strengths of the lobbies and on the nature of the strategic interactions in taxes.
    Keywords: Lobbying; transboundary pollution; international trade; international politics; environmental tax
    JEL: D72 F12 F18 Q58
    Date: 2024–07
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:129516
  15. By: Edoardo Campanella (Harvard Kennedy School); Robert Z. Lawrence (Peterson Institute for International Economics)
    Abstract: Driven by the push to decarbonize the world and achieve net zero emissions by 2050, a new anti-elite revolt is in the making in developed economies: If mainstream parties ignore the losers of the green transition as they did with globalization, climate populism not only will slow the adoption of climate policies but could also shake Western democracies. Climate policies are a perfect target for populist rhetoric: They rely on expert knowledge, entail globalist thinking and action, and the counterfactual nature of their benefits--avoiding disasters that would otherwise happen--gives ample fodder for conspiracy theories. And their costs are unevenly shared, hitting those at the bottom of the income distribution significantly harder than those at the top. Climate populism is particularly a problem on the far right, where doubts about science and opposition to international cooperation are strongest. Policies need to deal with this rising political opposition. Given the depth of their grievances, and as is often the case with populism, it is unlikely that voters antagonistic to climate policies will be persuaded by rational arguments. What will change their behavior are economic incentives. If green technologies are cheaper than fossil fuel ones, they will be adopted to save money rather than the planet. Thus the costs of the green transition need to be reduced through more open trade in the short run and more innovation in the long run. In addition, those who support climate policies need to be mobilized through more engaging political strategies, more emotional narratives, and more bottom-up policy approaches.
    Keywords: Climate change, populism, green transition
    JEL: F6 P5
    Date: 2024–07
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iie:wpaper:wp24-16

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