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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | P. Battiston; M. Magnani; D. Paolini; L. Rossi |
| Abstract: | We empirically analyze the strategic proofness of a positional voting system. We exploit the setting of the Eurovision Song Contest, where each country participates both as a candidate — with an artist and a song — and with a set of voters, — including jury members, and the popular vote – and where voters attribute points according to a modified version of the Borda rule. Despite voters being forbidden from voting their country’s song, we find evidence of strategic behavior in the competition final, particularly among industry experts (jury members), who tend to attribute lower votes to close competitors of their country’s candidate. By matching Eurovision voting data to Spotify data on success and musical featuresof each competing song, we show that this behaviour is not explained by intrinsic quality or commercial success of individual songs, but is rather driven by strategic considerations. Strategic voting potentially aspects any settings where voters have an interest in specific candidates being elected, a relevant example being the election of members of international bodies: our analysis provides empirical evidence that forbidding votes for own candidates is not enough to neutralize strategic behavior. |
| Keywords: | Strategical Voting, Positional Voting, Eurovision Song Contest |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:par:dipeco:2024-ep02&r= |
| By: | Jésus Fernández-Villaverde; Carlos Sanz; Jesús Fernández-Villaverde |
| Abstract: | Due to a last-minute fight among the candidates, Vox, a party at the right end of the Spanish political spectrum, could not run in Santa Cruz de Tenerife, a relatively representative electoral constituency, in the general election of July 23, 2023. Since this fight was a power struggle within Vox unrelated to any fundamental in the constituency or ideological differences among the candidates, we can exploit this event as a quasi-natural experiment to measure the effects of new parties on electoral outcomes. Using three different but complementary research designs (matching, synthetic controls, and a triple-difference analysis), we get to the same main result: Vox’s presence significantly increases votes for the right as a whole. The increase in votes for the right caused by Vox’s presence is particularly strong in areas with high unemployment. The presence of Vox also reduces protest votes but, on the other hand, votes for the left are unaffected. |
| Keywords: | new parties, quasi-natural experiments, electoral outcomes |
| JEL: | D72 N30 N40 Z13 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11179&r= |
| By: | Hessami, Zohal (Ruhr University Bochum); Khasanboev, Temurbek (Ruhr University Bochum) |
| Abstract: | This paper sheds light on a neglected reason for women's underrepresentation in politics: crisis-induced gender gaps in incumbents' reelection with lasting negative effects on female representation. We use hand-collected data on 173, 339 candidates in open-list local council elections (1997-2021) in the German state of Hesse. We exploit the March 2021 election one year into the Covid-19 pandemic and exclusive local Covid-19 mortality data in a continuous DiD framework. In a setting where (individual) councilors had no role in fighting the pandemic, we provide robust evidence for a gender blame attribution gap: at an average of one death/1, 000 inhabitants, an additional death (≈ one SD treatment) leads to a 4.3 and 7.8 ppt lower reelection probability for male and female incumbents, respectively. Further results exclude various alternative mechanisms. Simulations predict persistent negative effects on future female councilor shares of 3-4 ppts. |
| Keywords: | gender, retrospective voting, incumbency, crisis, local elections, political selection |
| JEL: | D72 H12 H70 I18 J16 |
| Date: | 2024–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17081&r= |
| By: | Antoinette Baujard (Université Jean Monnet Saint-Etienne, CNRS, Université Lumière Lyon 2, emlyon business school, GATE, 42023, Lyon, France); Roberto Brunetti (Université Lumière Lyon 2, CNRS, Université Jean Monnet Saint-Etienne, emlyon business school, GATE, 69007, Lyon, France, and Univ Rennes, CNRS, CREM-UMR6211, F-35000 Rennes, France); Isabelle Lebon (Normandie Univ., CREM, UMR CNRS 6211, Caen, France and TEPP-CNRS, Caen, France); Simone Marsilio (Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milano) |
| Abstract: | If individuals are to be empowered in their selection or use of a voting rule, it is necessary that they understand it. This paper analyzes people’s understanding of two voting rules: evaluative voting and majority judgment. We first distinguish three components of understanding in this context: how to fill in the ballot; how votes are aggregated; and how to vote strategically. To measure each component, we draw on results from a lab experiment on incentivized voting where participants are exogenously assigned single-peaked preferences and answer comprehension questions on the rules employed. We find that most participants understand how to fill in the ballot and how votes are aggregated; however, participants’ understanding of vote aggregation under majority judgment is lower and more heterogeneous. While some participants correctly understand its aggregation property, a sizable group fails to grasp it. We also observe no difference in voting behavior between evaluative voting and majority judgment: the data confirm the theoretical prediction that under evaluative voting there will be a greater incidence of strategic voting through the use of extreme grades, but contradict the prediction that under majority judgment voters will vote more sincerely. Finally, we find that with majority judgment, the better voters understand how votes are aggregated, the more they make use of extreme grades. |
| Keywords: | voting rules; understanding; evaluative voting; majority judgment; laboratory experiment |
| JEL: | A13 C92 D71 D72 O35 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:2408&r= |
| By: | Roxana Guti\'errez-Romero; Nayely Iturbe |
| Abstract: | Mexico has experienced a notable surge in assassinations of political candidates and mayors. This article argues that these killings are largely driven by organized crime, aiming to influence candidate selection, control local governments for rent-seeking, and retaliate against government crackdowns. Using a new dataset of political assassinations in Mexico from 2000 to 2021 and instrumental variables, we address endogeneity concerns in the location and timing of government crackdowns. Our instruments include historical Chinese immigration patterns linked to opium cultivation in Mexico, local corn prices, and U.S. illicit drug prices. The findings reveal that candidates in municipalities near oil pipelines face an increased risk of assassination due to drug trafficking organizations expanding into oil theft, particularly during elections and fuel price hikes. Government arrests or killings of organized crime members trigger retaliatory violence, further endangering incumbent mayors. This political violence has a negligible impact on voter turnout, as it targets politicians rather than voters. However, voter turnout increases in areas where authorities disrupt drug smuggling, raising the chances of the local party being re-elected. These results offer new insights into how criminal groups attempt to capture local governments and the implications for democracy under criminal governance. |
| Date: | 2024–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2407.06733&r= |
| By: | Marco Battaglini; Valerio Leone Sciabolazza; Mengwei Lin; Eleonora Patacchini |
| Abstract: | It has long been observed that there is little money in U.S. politics compared to the stakes. But what if contributions are not fully observable or non-monetary in nature and thus not easily quantifiable? We study this question with a new data set on the top 1000 donors in U.S. congressional races. Since top donors do not randomly support candidates, we propose an identification strategy based on information about top donors' deaths and the observed variations in candidates' performance after these events. The death of a top donor significantly decreases a candidate's chances of being elected in the current and future election cycles. Moreover, it affects the legislative activities of elected candidates. These effects do not depend on top donors' monetary contributions to a candidate but on their prominence and their total contributions during the election campaign. |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2024–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32649&r= |
| By: | Emmanuel Dhyne (Economics and Research Department, National Bank of Belgium); Pablo Muylle (Ghent University) |
| Abstract: | While past decades were characterized by economic liberalization and deregulation, there re-mains an enduring presence of political influence over the private economy. Such influence can either benefit (e.g. government support addressed at survival and growth prospects) or harm (e.g. reduced efficiency and innovation) firms. This study investigates the impact of government ownership among suppliers on the behavior and performance of privately-held firms. We argue that this channel of government influence on the private economy plays a prominent role, in addition to that of political connections (i.e. the direct presence of politicians on the boards of firms), a more established channel of political influence. Leveraging Belgian firm-level trans-action data, the research reveals that purchasing inputs from state suppliers is associated with lower firm profitability and productivity, along with higher leverage and employment. Notably, the relationship between state suppliers and performance persists even when controlling for the direct presence of politicians on the boards of firms. These findings underscore the influence of government support on firms’ behavior and financial performance and highlight the importance of considering both state suppliers and political connections when assessing the comprehensive impact of government influence on private enterprises |
| Keywords: | Governmental Influence, SOE Suppliers, Political Connections, Economic Liberalization, Firm Performance. |
| JEL: | D22 D72 G38 H11 H32 L33 |
| Date: | 2024–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbb:reswpp:202407-451&r= |
| By: | Gay, Victor; Dazey, Margot |
| Abstract: | How is support for right-wing populist parties affected by exposure to Muslim visibility? Using an original database on French mosques, this article analyzes the relationship between the presence of mosques and support for the Front National at the polling station level in the late 2000s. It finds that the propensity to vote for the Front National increases in polling stations up to intermediate distances from mosques and then decreases, suggesting a spatial mechanism known as the halo effect. The analysis also shows that larger mosques and those with minarets are associated with an accentuated halo effect, suggesting the importance of the salience of minority groups rather than their relative size in influencing political behavior. |
| Keywords: | Radical right; mosque; immigration; France; halo effect |
| Date: | 2024–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:iastwp:129453&r= |
| By: | Eleonora Brandimarti; Giacomo De Giorgi; Jeremy Laurent-Lucchetti |
| Abstract: | There is a tight connection between credit access and voting. We show that uncertainty in access to credit pushes voters toward more conservative candidates in US elections. Using a 1% sample of the US population with valid credit reports, we relate access to credit to voting outcomes in all county-by-congressional districts over the period 2004-2016. Specifically, we construct exogenous measures of uncertainty to credit access, i.e. credit score values around which individual total credit amount jumps the most (e.g. around which uncertainty on access to credit is the highest). We then show that a 10pp increase in the share of marginal voters located just around these thresholds increases republican votes by 2.7pp, and reduces that of democrats by 2.6pp. Furthermore, winning candidates in more uncertain constituencies tend to follow a more conservative rhetoric. |
| Date: | 2024–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2407.06808&r= |
| By: | Nunnari, Salvatore (Bocconi University); Proto, Eugenio (University of Glasgow); Rustichini, Aldo (University of Minnesota) |
| Abstract: | Rational choice theories assume that voters accurately assess the outcomes of policies. However, many important policies—such as regulating prices and introducing Pigouvian taxation—yield outcomes through indirect or equilibrium effects that may differ from their direct effects. Citizens may underestimate these effects, leading to a demand for bad policy, that is, opposition to reforms that would increase welfare or support for reforms that would decrease it. This appreciation might be linked to cognitive functions, raising important research questions: Do cognitive abilities influence how individuals form preferences regarding policies, especially untried reforms? If so, what is the underlying mechanism? We use a simple theoretical framework and an experiment to show that enhanced cognitive abilities may lead to better policy choices. Moreover, we emphasize the crucial role of beliefs about other citizens' cognitive abilities. These findings have important policy implications as they suggest that educational programs developing cognitive skills or interventions increasing trust in others' understanding could improve the quality of democratic decision-making in our societies. |
| Keywords: | voting, policy reform, political failure, cognition, experiment |
| JEL: | C90 D72 D91 |
| Date: | 2024–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17112&r= |
| By: | Carola Binder; Rupal Kamdar; Jane M. Ryngaert |
| Abstract: | We document that, during the COVID-19 era, the inflation expectations of Democrats remained strongly anchored, while those of Republicans did not. Republicans' expectations not only rose well above the inflation target, but also became more sensitive to a variety of shocks, including CPI releases and energy prices. We then exploit geographic variation in political affiliation at the MSA level to show that the partial de-anchoring of expectations had implications for realized inflation. Counterfactual exercises imply that, had all expectations become as unanchored as those of Republicans, average inflation would have been two to three percentage points higher for much of the pandemic period, ceteris paribus. |
| JEL: | D72 E03 E31 |
| Date: | 2024–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32650&r= |