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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Davide Cipullo |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates how direct election regimes (à la presidential democracy) affect the selection of women into political offices compared to indirect appointment (à la parliamentary). Exploiting the staggered phase-in across Italian municipalities of a reform to the local institutional regime, I find that the introduction of direct elections increased the fraction of female mayors substantially. The results are stronger in cities with a high pre-reform share of female politicians and driven by high-quality female officials replacing undereducated incumbents. Taken together, the results of this paper inform that direct election regimes ease the selection of competent politicians into office. |
| Keywords: | political selection, voting systems, gender gaps, female representation |
| JEL: | C24 D02 D72 J16 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10229&r=pol |
| By: | Roxana Gutiérrez-Romero; Nayely Iturbe |
| Abstract: | When does organized crime resort to assassinating politicians? In narcocracies, criminal groups co-opt political elites through bribery in exchange for protection to traffic illegal drugs. When criminal groups compete, they may also resort to political violence to influence which candidate wins local elections in strategic areas and retaliate when state action threatens their survival. |
| Keywords: | Crime, Drug trafficking, Political violence, Voter turnout |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2023-7&r=pol |
| By: | Marco Bertoni; Giorgio Brunello; Lorenzo Cappellari (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore; Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore); Maria De Paola |
| Abstract: | We estimate the effect of winning a mayoral election on long-run licit earnings, which plays a key role in the selection of local political leaders. We use Italian administrative social security data from 1995 to 2017 and a sharp regression discontinuity design based on close elections. Over a 15-year horizon, the average present discounted value of winning an election is equal to 35, 000€, or 85 percent of the annual labor and social security earnings for the average candidate in our sample, a modest effect driven by the compensations for political service and concentrated during the first five years after the election. Net of compensations for service, this effect is negative during the first ten years after the election, and almost fades away afterwards. Differences in the political careers of winners and runners-up and a two-term limit rule on mayors’ office contribute to explain our results. |
| Keywords: | returns to office; political selection; revolving door; rent-seeking; close elections. |
| JEL: | D72 J44 J45 |
| Date: | 2023–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ctc:serie1:def123&r=pol |
| By: | Damien Bol; André Blais; Maxime Coulombe; Jean François Laslier; Jean-Benoît Pilet |
| Abstract: | We study the choice of multi-person bargaining protocols in the context of politics. In politics, citizens are increasingly involved in the design of democratic rules, for instance via referendums. If they support the rule that best serves their self-interest, the outcome inevitably advantages the largest group. In this paper, we challenge this pessimistic view with an original lab experiment, in which 252 subjects participated. In the first stage, these subjects experience elections under plurality and approval voting. In the second stage, they decide which rule they want to use for extra elections. We find that egalitarian values that subjects hold outside of the lab shape their choice of electoral rule in the second stage when a rule led to a fairer distribution of payoffs compared to the other one in the first stage. The implication is that people have consistent ‘value-driven preferences’ for decision rules. |
| Keywords: | lab experiment; choice of decision rules; electoral rules; voting |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/355145&r=pol |
| By: | Massimo Bordignon (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore; Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore); Federico Franzoni (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore; Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore); Matteo Gamalerio |
| Abstract: | We study the effect of economic insecurity on electoral outcomes using data on municipal elections in Italy. We implement a difference-in-differences approach that exploits exogenous variation across municipalities in the share of inactive workers due to the economic lockdown introduced by the central government to deal with the Covid-19 pandemic. We show that lockdown-induced economic insecurity positively affected the electoral performance of progressive and left-wing parties, while it negatively affected conservative and far-right parties. Conversely, we find no effect for the populist Five Star Movement, local independent parties (i.e., Civic Lists), and electoral turnout. We provide evidence that extraordinary economic measures introduced by the central government to compensate workers for the economic insecurity can explain this shift in partisanship toward the left and the increasing support for pro-EU parties, away from euro-skeptic and populist forces. |
| Keywords: | COVID-19, Elections, Voting behaviour, Populism, Economic Insecurity. |
| JEL: | D70 D72 D91 |
| Date: | 2023–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ctc:serie1:def124&r=pol |
| By: | Adam Graham-Squire; David McCune |
| Abstract: | From the perspective of social choice theory, ranked-choice voting (RCV) is known to have many flaws. RCV can fail to elect a Condorcet winner and is susceptible to monotonicity paradoxes and the spoiler effect, for example. We use a database of 182 American ranked-choice elections for political office from the years 2004-2022 to investigate empirically how frequently RCV's deficiencies manifest in practice. Our general finding is that RCV's weaknesses are rarely observed in real-world elections, with the exception that ballot exhaustion frequently causes majoritarian failures. |
| Date: | 2023–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2301.12075&r=pol |
| By: | Leonardo D’Amico; Guido Tabellini |
| Abstract: | We study how individuals comment on political news posted on Reddit’s main political forum during the 2016 US Presidential Election. We show that partisan users behave very differently from independents if the news is bad for a candidate. They avoid commenting unfavorable polls and scandals on their favorite candidate, but seek such news on its opponent. When they do comment bad news on their favorite candidate, they try to rationalize it, display a more negative sentiment, and are more likely to cite scandals of the opponent. This behavior is consistent with motivated reasoning, and with the predictions of a model of costly attention, where the cost of attention depends on whether the news is pleasant or unpleasant. |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:igi:igierp:687&r=pol |
| By: | d’Este Rocco (Department of Economics, University of Sussex and IZA); Draca, Mirko (Department of Economics & CAGE Research Centre, University of Warwick); Fons-Rosen, Christian (Department of Economics at University of California in Merced, CEPR, and Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition in Munich.) |
| Abstract: | Special interest influence via lobbying is increasingly controversial and legislative efforts to deal with this issue have centred on the principle of transparency. In this paper we evaluate the effectiveness of the current regulatory framework provided by the US Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA). Specifically, we study the role of ex-Congressional officials who join US lobbying firms in positions that could be related to lobbying activity but without officially registering as lobbyists themselves. We find that firm lobbying revenues increase significantly when these potential ‘shadow lobbyists’ join, with effects in the range of 10-20%. This shadow lobbyist revenue effect is comparable to the effect of a registered lobbyist at the median of the industry skill distribution. As such, it is challenging to reconcile the measured shadow lobbyist effect with the 20% working time threshold for registering as a lobbyist. Based on our estimates, the unaccounted for contributions of unregistered lobbyists can be valued at $149 million USD in revenue terms and this effect is concentrated within the industry’s largest and most active firms. JEL Codes: D72 |
| Keywords: | Lobbying ; Revolving Door ; Political Money |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1449&r=pol |
| By: | d’Este, Rocco (Department of Economics, University of Sussex and IZA); Draca, Mirko (Department of Economics & CAGE Research Centre, University of Warwick); Fons-Rosen, Christian (Department of Economics at University of California in Merced, CEPR, and Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition in Munich) |
| Abstract: | Special interest influence via lobbying is increasingly controversial and legislative efforts to deal with this issue have centred on the principle of transparency. In this paper we evaluate the effectiveness of the current regulatory framework provided by the US Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA). Specifically, we study the role of ex-Congressional officials who join US lobbying firms in positions that could be related to lobbying activity but without officially registering as lobbyists themselves. We find that firm lobbying revenues increase significantly when these potential ‘shadow lobbyists’ join, with effects in the range of 10-20%. This shadow lobbyist revenue effect is comparable to the effect of a registered lobbyist at the median of the industry skill distribution. As such, it is challenging to reconcile the measured shadow lobbyist effect with the 20% working time threshold for registering as a lobbyist. Based on our estimates, the unaccounted for contributions of unregistered lobbyists can be valued at $149 million USD in revenue terms and this effect is concentrated within the industry’s largest and most active firms. |
| Keywords: | Lobbying, Revolving Door, Political Money JEL Classification: D72 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:wacage:652&r=pol |
| By: | Theo Aphecetche; Erik Canton; Maria Garrone; Alexandr Hobza |
| Abstract: | This Economic Brief identifies the main political economy conditions facilitating or hindering the implementation of reforms. It analyses and draws lessons from some of the most significant reform efforts by EU countries over the past decade. First, reform implementation is easier when the government has a strong political mandate. Second, providing a strong evidence base for the reform helps to build support. Finally, reform design needs to consider adequate compensatory measures, and an effective communication and consultation process. The note concludes by indicating how the design of the Recovery and Resilience Facility addresses some of these political economy factors. |
| Keywords: | Political economy, structural reforms, COVID-19 crisis, recovery, RRF, Aphecetche, Canton, Garrone, Hobza. |
| JEL: | P11 P16 |
| Date: | 2022–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:euf:ecobri:070&r=pol |
| By: | Adelaide Baronchelli (Department of Economics (University of Verona)); Roberto Ricciuti (Department of Economics (University of Verona)); Mattia Viale (Department of Economics (University of Verona)) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the effect that the plague in 1348 had on the structure of power in Venice. Using data from “The Rulers of Venice, 1332-1524” dataset, we conceptualize the Venetian structure of power as a two-mode network where relevant political houses are associated with the offices their members were elected. We find that, after the shock of the Black Death, the major houses were able to cling to power and even increase their importance. |
| Keywords: | Political elite; Economic elite; Black Death; Venice. |
| JEL: | N43 C45 D71 |
| Date: | 2023–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ver:wpaper:01/2023&r=pol |
| By: | Ingela Alger (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Jean-François Laslier (Unknown) |
| Abstract: | This paper revisits two classical problems in the theory of voting—viz. the divided majority problem and the strategic revelation of information—in the light of evolutionarily founded partial Kantian morality. It is shown that, compared to electorates consisting of purely self-interested voters, such Kantian morality helps voters solve coordination problems and improves the information aggregation properties of equilibria, even for modest levels of morality. |
| Date: | 2022–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03682814&r=pol |
| By: | Efisio Manunta (CLLE - Cognition, Langues, Langage, Ergonomie - EPHE - École pratique des hautes études - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - UT2J - Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - TMBI - Toulouse Mind & Brain Institut - UT2J - Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès - UT3 - Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées); Maja Becker (CLLE - Cognition, Langues, Langage, Ergonomie - EPHE - École pratique des hautes études - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - UT2J - Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - TMBI - Toulouse Mind & Brain Institut - UT2J - Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès - UT3 - Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées); Matthew Easterbrook (University of Sussex); Vivian Vignoles (University of Sussex) |
| Abstract: | Populism has been a major political phenomenon in liberal democracies throughout the last decade. Focusing on economic distress as one of the basic triggers of populism, we proposed a model integrating individual-level indices of economic distress and status-based identity threat (i.e., frustration of identity motives) as predictors of populism. We conducted two survey studies operationalizing populism as an individual-level thin ideology among members of the general French population (Study 1: N = 458; Study 2: N = 1, 050). Structural equation models supported status-based identity threat as a partial mediator in the links between indices of relative deprivation and populism (Study 1). Additional analyses revealed frustrated belonging (i.e., feelings of social exclusion) as the central identity motive in this pattern. Reproducing the same model with belonging frustration instead of global-identity motive frustration gave similar results (Studies 1 and 2). These findings provide the first evidence implicating identity threat—and belonging threat in particular—in the development of populist thin ideology and showed how identity motives are related to the economic distress pattern that predicts populism. |
| Keywords: | populism, identity threat, identity motives, economic distress, social exclusion |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03642436&r=pol |
| By: | Catherine Benjamin (Univ Rennes, CNRS, CREM - UMR 6211, F-35000 Rennes); Sebastian Irigoyen (Univ Rennes, CNRS, CREM - UMR 6211, F-35000 Rennes); David Masclet (Univ Rennes, CNRS, CREM - UMR 6211, F-35000 Rennes and CIRANO, Montreal Canada) |
| Abstract: | Several environmental policies are efficient in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. However these policies remain still very unpopular among the public and climate issues often provide ideal targets for populists who frame these issues as elite matters. In this current paper we attempt to answer the following question : are environmental issues a matter of elites? We conjecture that this is not necessarily the case but that there exists several factors that may refrain the poorest and less educated individuals from accepting environmental policies. The first explanation relies on the household’s budget constraint and the fact that high income and high educated individuals are in a better financial position to accept costly environmental policies. This explanation relates to the Maslow’s hierarchy of needs that stipulates that individuals must have fulfilled lower needs before addressing higher levels of needs such as environmental issues. The second explanation is that education may affect support of environmental policies indirectly by reducing ignorance and mistrust, which constitute key barriers to public acceptance of environmental policies. We ran an empirical analysis based on the data from the European Social Survey (2016). We find that higher educated and income individuals are more likely to favor most of environmental policies, suggesting that educational background play both a direct and an indirect role. We also find that both mistrust in institutions and right wing populism, as proxies of skepticism constitute important barriers to most of environmental policies. |
| Keywords: | Public support, Environmental policies, trust, populism |
| JEL: | Q50 H11 H12 D02 D12 |
| Date: | 2023–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tut:cremwp:2023-02&r=pol |
| By: | Avner Greif (Stanford University); Jared Rubin (Chapman University) |
| Abstract: | This paper highlights the importance of endogenous changes in the foundations of legitimacy for political regimes. Specifically, it highlights the central role of legitimacy changes in the rise of constitutional monarchy in England. It first highlights the limitations of the consensus view regarding this transition, which claims that Parliament’s military power enabled it to force constitutional monarchy on the Crown after 1688. It then turns to define legitimacy and briefly elaborates a theoretical framework enabling a historical study of this unobservable variable. The third and primary section substantiates that the low-legitimacy, post-Reformation Tudor monarchs of the 16th century promoted Parliament to enhance their legitimacy, thereby changing the legislative process from the Crown-and-Parliament to the Crown-in-Parliament that still prevails in England. |
| Keywords: | political legitimacy, England, Reformation, Parliament, constitutional governance |
| JEL: | N44 N33 D02 D73 P48 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:23-01&r=pol |
| By: | Gilles Le Garrec (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po) |
| Abstract: | After the Esping-Andersen' (1990) seminal study, welfare states are standardingly clustered in three identifiable regimes, liberal for Anglo-Saxon countries, corporatist for Continental Europe and social-democratic for Nordic countries, into which the levels of income redistribution can be ranked, from the lowest for the first to the highest for the last. By finding that most European continental countries are now clustered in the high-taxation group along with Nordic countries, a recent study by Péligry and Ragot (2022) has suggested that the welfare states can evolve and change over time, casting doubt on the long-term stability of the canonical clustering. |
| Keywords: | Redistribution, voting behavior, fairness, endogenous preferences |
| Date: | 2023–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03954024&r=pol |