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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Brian Duricy |
| Abstract: | This paper formalizes the lattice structure of the ballot voters cast in a ranked-choice election and the preferences that this structure induces. These preferences are shown to be counter to previous assumptions about the preferences of voters, which indicate that ranked-choice elections require different considerations for voters and candidates alike. While this model assumes that voters vote sincerely, the model of ranked-choice elections this paper presents allows for considerations of strategic voting in future work. |
| Date: | 2023–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2301.02697&r=pol |
| By: | Apolte, Thomas |
| Abstract: | According to a number of democratization hypotheses, the (old) elite of a so far non-democratic regime can have incentives to democratize voluntarily. We add to this literature the hypothesis that an old elite refrains from democratizing unless it can rely on the newly established democratic constitution to be self-enforcing. We develop a model that identifies a number of politico-institutional traits which are decisive for a future democracy to be self-enforcing and which, in turn, represent the preconditions for an old elite to democratize. Given considerable path dependencies in the evolution of politico-institutional structures, some of the new democracies' politico-institutional traits are inevitably inherited from their respective pre-democratic history. If, in this light, the shift of an inherited politico-institutional structure to a self-enforcing democracy is too large, the old elite refrains from democratizing in the first place. This explains why many countries' old elites voluntarily democratized while others did not. |
| Keywords: | Democratization; Political Elite; Self-enforcing Democracy |
| JEL: | D72 D74 P48 |
| Date: | 2023–01–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:116028&r=pol |
| By: | Bursztyn, Leonardo; Kolstad, Jonathan T.; Rao, Aakaash; Tebaldi, Pietro; Yuchtman, Noam |
| Abstract: | We study how the politicization of policies designed to correct market failures can undermine their effectiveness. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) was among the most politically divisive expansions of the US government. We examine whether partisanship distorted enrollment and market outcomes in the ACA insurance marketplaces. Controlling for observable characteristics and holding fixed plans and premiums available, Republicans enrolled less than Democrats and independents in ACA marketplace plans. Selection out of the ACA marketplaces was strongest among Republicans with lower expected healthcare costs, generating adverse selection. Computing enrollment and average cost with and without partisan differences, we find that this political adverse selection reduced enrollment by around three million people and raised average costs in the marketplaces, increasing the level of public spending necessary to provide subsidies to low-income enrollees by around $105 per enrollee per year. Lower enrollments and higher costs are concentrated in more Republican areas, potentially contributing to polarized views of the ACA. |
| JEL: | J1 |
| Date: | 2022–07–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:117908&r=pol |
| By: | Kunz-Kaltenhäuser, Philipp; Gänßle, Sophia; Budzinski, Oliver |
| Abstract: | Experts' voting behavior is conjectured to be more objective than peer voting (own group/peers) and public voters (everyone interested), who are supposedly influenced by all sorts of subjective aspects. We examine differences in voting behavior between these groups by analyzing the voting outcomes for all-star teams in American Football. This paper analyzes the impact of performance as well as non-performance markers and team effects on the voting outcome. It contains a comparative analysis across the mentioned groups to elaborate on differences. The econometric analysis uses unbalanced panel data of All-Pro and Pro Bowl player selections over 78 seasons (1951-2019). It applies panel probit regression to assess the impact of the markers on the outcome probability of winning one of the All-Star awards. We find that expert, peer, and public voting show similarities and are partially driven by the same performance and non-performance markers. However, none of the three analyzed voting systems is free from the influence of non-performance markers. We find exposure effects as well as effects from team affiliation in all of them, including in fact expert voting. Positive effects of team success are found in expert and, to a lesser extent, in peer voting. Team-specific effects are found in public voting, providing evidence for partisanship voting by fans. Our results shed doubt on the suspected objectiveness of expert voting. Furthermore, they fortify the notion of public voting being inefficient at identifying objective quality and extend the literature on voting biases among experts, peers, and the general public. |
| Keywords: | Voting Behavior, Voting Bias, Expert Voting, Public Voting, Sports Economics, National Football League, American Football |
| JEL: | D72 Z20 L83 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:tuiedp:170&r=pol |
| By: | Schmutz, Benoît (CREST); Verdugo, Gregory (University of Evry) |
| Abstract: | Using thirty years of municipal elections in France, we show that election results affect the share of immigrants across municipalities. In municipalities where a left- instead of right-wing mayor has been elected, the share of immigrants in the population grows faster by 1.5 p.p. within six years after the elections, and by 3 p.p. within twelve years. To a large extent, these effects are driven by partisan differences in public housing constructions and changes in the composition of the population within existing public housing units. They also are associated with greater incumbency advantage, in line with a model of strategic partisan behavior. |
| Keywords: | immigration, public housing, local elections |
| JEL: | D72 H4 H7 R38 |
| Date: | 2023–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp15849&r=pol |
| By: | Michael Rochlitz; Olga Masyutina; Koen Schoors; Yulia Khalikova (-) |
| Abstract: | How does the prospect of an autocrat remaining in office affect individual expectations and behavior? To answer this question, we implemented a survey experiment in May 2021 in Russia by treating respondents with three hypothetical outcomes of the 2024 Russian presidential elections – Vladimir Putin remaining in office, his close associate Sergei Shoigu winning the elections, or a young reformer becoming president. Respondents then had to answer a range of questions on individual expectations and intended behavior. We find that respondents agree on economic stagnation being a concern under Putin, but not under the two political alternatives. For most other questions, we find a strong division along political lines, as well as – less systematically – with respect to income, age and education. Most importantly, we find that pro-regime respondents were more likely to invest and be economically active under Putin, despite concerns about economic stagnation. Our results show the importance of regime legitimacy for individual incentives, and provide an explanation why unpopular authoritarian regimes might be less economically successful. |
| Keywords: | authoritarian durability, individual attitudes, economic incentives, survey experiment, Russia |
| JEL: | D84 P16 P52 |
| Date: | 2023–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rug:rugwps:23/1061&r=pol |
| By: | Laureti, Lucio; Costantiello, Alberto; Leogrande, Angelo |
| Abstract: | In this article we estimate the level of Government Effectiveness-GE in 193 countries in the period 2011-2020 using data of the ESG World Bank Database. Different econometric techniques are used i.e. Panel Data with Random Effects, Panel Data with Fixed Effects, and Pooled OLS. Results show that GE is positively related among others to “Control of Corruption”, “Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism”, and negatively associated with “Percentage Annual GDP Growth”. We perform a cluster analysis with the k-Means algorithm optimized with the Elbow Method and we find the presence of four clusters. Finally, we confront eight machine learning algorithms for the prediction of GE. Results show that the Polynomial Regression is the best predictive algorithm. The value of GE is expected to growth on average by 15.97%. |
| Keywords: | Analysis of Collective Decision-Making, General, Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior, Bureaucracy, Administrative Processes in Public Organizations, Corruption, Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation, and Implementation. |
| JEL: | D7 D70 D72 D73 D78 |
| Date: | 2023–01–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:115998&r=pol |
| By: | Kruse, Tobias; Atkinson, Giles |
| Abstract: | While the importance of climate change adaptation is not in doubt, adaptation funding in developing countries remains scarce. Therefore, climate finance institutions and national decision-makers face difficult trade-offs when allocating funds. While not a substitute for expert judgement, we argue that understanding how the public thinks could play a role in building support. Using a representative sample of the UK population, we use a discrete choice experiment to explore in particular the way in which distributional considerations drive respondent decisions in two dimensions: (a) among recipients of adaptation finance in recipient developing countries, and (b) among those who contribute to this finance (via taxation). We categorise our results as follows. First, respondents show strong distributional preferences for funds to reach the poorest individuals, supporting adoption of egalitarian policy mandates among climate adaptation funds. Secondly, respondents prefer an ‘ability-to-pay’ approach over the ‘polluter-pays-principle’ as a way of funding. Thirdly, our results suggest that a focus on communicating future benefits to UK residents can increase policy support. Overall, however, our findings also reveal that public support for global climate adaptation payments is insufficient. Yet we provide means of understanding how to allocate all-too-scarce funds and how to increase support for adaptation finance. |
| Keywords: | climate policy; choice modelling; climate change adaption; public acceptability |
| JEL: | J1 |
| Date: | 2022–04–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:112963&r=pol |
| By: | Manuel Funke (Kiel Institute for the World Economy); Moritz Schularick (University of Bonn); Christoph Trebesch (Kiel Institute for the World Economy) |
| Abstract: | The rise of populism in the past two decades has motivated much work on its drivers, but less is known about its economic and political consequences. This column uses a comprehensive cross-country database on populism dating back to 1900 to offer a historical, long-run perspective. It shows that (1) populism has a long history and is serial in nature – if countries have been governed by a populist once, they are much more likely to see another populist coming to office in the future; (2) populist leadership is economically costly, with a notable long-run decline in consumption and output; and (3) populism is politically disruptive, fostering instability and institutional decay. The analysis suggests that populism is here to stay. |
| Date: | 2021–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkpbs:015&r=pol |
| By: | Di Bartolomeo Giovanni; Saltari Enrico; Semmler Willi |
| Abstract: | We study the dynamic problem of pollution control enacted by some policies of regulation and mitigation. The transition dynamics from one level of regulation and mitigation to another usually involve inter-temporal trade-offs. We focus on how different policymaker’s time horizons affect these trade-offs. We refer to shorter lengths in policymaker’s time horizons as political short-termism or inattention, which is associated with political econ-omy or information constraints. Formally, inattention is modeled by using Nonlinear Model Predictive Control. Therefore, it is a dynamic concept: our policymakers solve an inter-temporal decision problem with a finite horizon that involves the repetitive solution of an optimal control problem at each sampling instant in a receding horizon fashion. We find that political short-termism substantially affects the transition dynamics. It leads to quicker but costlier transitions. It also leads to an under-evaluation of the environmental costs that may accelerate climate change. |
| Date: | 2022–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ter:wpaper:00154&r=pol |