nep-pol New Economics Papers
on Positive Political Economics
Issue of 2023‒01‒30
nine papers chosen by
Eugene Beaulieu
University of Calgary

  1. Comparing Voting Methods : 2016 US Presidential Election By Herrade Igersheim; François Durand; Aaron Hamlin; Jean-François Laslier
  2. Who is mobilized to vote by short text messages? Evidence from a nationwide field experiment with young voters. By Salomo Hirvonen; Maarit Lassander; Lauri Sääksvuori; Janne Tukiainen
  3. Pre-suffrage impartiality, democratic experience and clientelism: How sequencing matters By Kyriacou, Andreas
  4. (I Think) I Don’t Think Like You and I Don’t Like You: Perception of Polarization and Out-Group Animosity By Chonnakan Rittinon; Boontida Sa-ngimnet; Suparit Suwanik; Tanisa Tawichsri; Thiti Tosborvorn
  5. Viability of the Political System: A Neglected Issue in Public Finance By John Komlos
  6. Past Exposure to Macroeconomic Shocks and Populist Attitudes in Europe By Despina Gavresi; Anastasia Litina; Sofia Tsitou
  7. Why Are All Communist Countries Dictatorial? By C.Y. Cyrus Chu; Meng-Yu Liang
  8. The Status Quo and Belief Polarization of Inattentive Agents: Theory and Experiment By Vladimir Novak; Andrei Matveenko; Silvio Ravaioli
  9. The Status Quo and Belief Polarization of Inattentive Agents: Theory and Experiment By Vladimir Novak; Andrei Matveenko; Silvio Ravaioli

  1. By: Herrade Igersheim (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg); François Durand (Nokia Bell Labs); Aaron Hamlin (The Center for Election Science, Redding); Jean-François Laslier (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)
    Abstract: This paper presents data from a survey leading up to the 2016 US presidential elections. Participants were asked their opinions about the candidates and were also asked to vote according to three alternative voting rules, in addition to plurality: approval voting, range voting, and instant runoff voting. The participants were split into two groups, one facing a set of four candidates (Clinton, Trump, Johnson, and Stein) and the other a set of nine candidates (the previous four plus Sanders, Cruz, McMullin, Bloomberg, and Castle). The paper studies three issues: (1) How do US voters use these alternative rules? (2) What kinds of candidates, in terms of individual preferences, are favored by which rule? (3) Which rules empirically satisfy the independence of eliminated alternatives? Our results provide evidence that, according to all standard criterion computed on individual preferences, be there utilitarian or of the Condorcet type, the same candidate (Sanders) wins, and that evaluative voting rules such as approval voting and range voting might lead to this outcome, contrary to direct plurality and instant runoff voting (that elects Clinton) and to the official voting rule (that elected Trump).
    Keywords: US Presidential election., Approval voting, range voting, instant runoff, strategic voting
    Date: 2022–01–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-03926997&r=pol
  2. By: Salomo Hirvonen (Department of Economics, University of Turku.); Maarit Lassander (Prime Minister's Office, Finland.); Lauri Sääksvuori (Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare, Finland.); Janne Tukiainen (Department of Economics, University of Turku.)
    Abstract: We conduct a large-scale randomized controlled trial to evaluate the effectiveness of short text messages (SMS) as a tool to mobilize young voters, and thus, ameliorate the stubborn gap in political participation between younger and older citizens. We find that receiving an SMS reminder before the Finnish county elections in 2022 increases the probability of voting among 18-29 year-old voters by 0.9 percentage points. Moreover, we observe that the most simplified message is more effective than messages appealing to expressive or rational motivations to vote. Using comprehensive administrative data and data-driven machine learning methods, we also examine treatment effect heterogeneity and spillover effects. We document that SMS based mobilization of voters does not only reduce existing social inequalities in voting between the age cohorts but also among the young citizens. Moreover, we remarkably find that over 100 percent of the direct treatment effect spilled over to non-treated household members. Our results highlight the importance of understanding spillover effects and treatment effect heterogeneities in the evaluation of get-out-the-vote interventions.
    Keywords: Get-out-the-vote, Field experiments, Spillover effects, Voter turnout
    JEL: C93 D72
    Date: 2023–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp157&r=pol
  3. By: Kyriacou, Andreas
    Abstract: It has been asserted that clientelism today is weaker in countries that were endowed with impartial public administrations prior to the extension of suffrage because the presence of bureaucratic checks undermines clientelism as a viable political strategy. We empirically examine this claim based on a cross-section of up to 136 countries. While we do not find evidence of a direct link between pre-suffrage impartiality and contemporary clientelism we do find evidence of an indirect effect working through post-suffrage democratic experience. Pre-suffrage impartiality in the guise of impartial public administrations or, more generally, the rule of law, enhances both democratic stability and democratic quality. Experience with democracy in turn helps rein in clientelism by increasing the credibility of programmatic promises thus reducing the need for vote-maximizing politicians to seek political support through clientelistic exchange.
    Keywords: sequencing, impartial bureaucracy, rule of law, democratic experience, extension of suffrage
    JEL: D72 D73
    Date: 2023–01–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:115910&r=pol
  4. By: Chonnakan Rittinon; Boontida Sa-ngimnet; Suparit Suwanik; Tanisa Tawichsri; Thiti Tosborvorn
    Abstract: Polarization deteriorates social trust and hinders economic development. Interestingly, it has been previously shown that one of the factors driving polarization is the mere perception of polarization. Using data from an original survey done in Thailand in 2021 (N = 2, 016), this paper provides an empirical evidence that people with extreme political identity and those who consume media from outlets similar to their political peers tend to exaggerate the degree of polarization in the society. We also show that those exaggerations increase negative feelings toward members of the opposite group.
    Keywords: Perceived polarization; Out-group animosity; Media bias; Echo chamber
    JEL: D72 D74 P48 Z13
    Date: 2022–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pui:dpaper:194&r=pol
  5. By: John Komlos
    Abstract: The textbook theory of public finance delineates three primary functions of government: 1) to provide for public goods, 2) to provide for an equitable distribution of income, and 3) to stabilize the economy. However, it has become evident with the rise of right-wing populism especially, but not exclusively, in the U.S., that this conceptualization contains a crucial oversight of historic proportions because the gap between the haves and have-nots in a society is not merely a question of equity but also a question of the maintenance of political stability. The January 6, 2021 insurrection against the U.S. Congress by an angry mob made it evident that the distribution of income has bounds beyond which social forces exert such pressure on the political system that the whole edifice of liberal democracy is seriously threatened. Hence, democratic governments must consider income distribution also from the vantage point of sustaining itself.
    Date: 2022
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10127&r=pol
  6. By: Despina Gavresi (University of Ioannina); Anastasia Litina (Department of Economics, University of Macedonia); Sofia Tsitou (Department of Economics, University of Macedonia)
    Abstract: This paper explores the interplay between two dimensions of trust i.e., political and interpersonal trust, and the spread of COVID-19 in European regions. To undertake our analysis we combine sub-national (NUTS 1 regions) data for trust from ten consecutive rounds of the European Social Survey and data on COVID-19 measures, derived from the COVID-19 European Regional Tracker. Exploiting regional variation, we empirically establish that in places with a higher degree of political and interpersonal trust, the number of confirmed cases and deaths due to COVID-19 spread is lower. Our underlying hypothesis is that due to this higher level of trust, individuals tend to comply more with the policies promoted by national governments, thereby diminishing the COVID-19 spread and mortality rates in societies.
    Keywords: COVID-19, Political Trust, Interpersonal Trust, Culture
    JEL: I10 O4 Z12
    Date: 2023–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mcd:mcddps:2023_01&r=pol
  7. By: C.Y. Cyrus Chu (Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan); Meng-Yu Liang (Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan)
    Abstract: Suppose that people in a capitalist society order policies mainly by comparing their wealth changes induced by various policies. We show that property prices play the role of aligning individual preferences, which naturally modifies the axiom of universal domain of the social decision function. Under reasonable and testable assumptions, we prove that this alignment effect eliminates the possibility of Condorcet Cycles (Condorce 1785) and warrants the transitivity of the majority voting mechanism. Taking away private property will reinstitute Condorcet Cycles, returning the inescapable conclusion of a dictatorial social decision rule, as claimed by Arrow (1951). Our result provides partial support to the practices of voting eligibility tests implemented in many democratic countries.
    Date: 2022–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sin:wpaper:22-a002&r=pol
  8. By: Vladimir Novak; Andrei Matveenko; Silvio Ravaioli
    Abstract: We show that rational but inattentive agents can become polarized ex-ante. We present how optimal information acquisition, and subsequent belief formation, depend crucially on the agent-specific status quo valuation. Beliefs can systematically - in expectations over all possible signal realizations conditional on the state of the world - update away from the realized truth and even agents with the same initial beliefs might become polarized. We design a laboratory experiment to test the model’s predictions. The results confirm our predictions about the mechanism (rational information acquisition), its effect on beliefs (systematic polarization) and provide general insights into demand for information.
    Keywords: Polarization, Beliefs Updating, Rational Inattention, Status Quo, Experiment
    JEL: C92 D72 D83 D84 D91
    Date: 2023–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2023_382&r=pol
  9. By: Vladimir Novak; Andrei Matveenko; Silvio Ravaioli
    Abstract: We show that rational but inattentive agents can become polarized ex-ante. We present how optimal information acquisition, and subsequent belief formation, depend crucially on the agent-specific status quo valuation. Beliefs can systematically - in expectations over all possible signal realizations conditional on the state of the world - update away from the realized truth and even agents with the same initial beliefs might become polarized. We design a laboratory experiment to test the model’s predictions. The results confirm our predictions about the mechanism (rational information acquisition), its effect on beliefs (systematic polarization) and provide general insights into demand for information.
    Keywords: Polarization, Beliefs Updating, Rational Inattention, Status Quo, Experiment
    JEL: C92 D72 D83 D84 D91
    Date: 2023–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2022_382&r=pol

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