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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Jon H. Fiva; Oda Nedregård |
| Abstract: | How important are political parties in motivating and disciplining elected officials? Using a difference-in-discontinuity design, we study how shocks to incumbents’ re-election probabilities affect legislative behavior in a setting where parties fully control candidate selection. We find that within-session variation in lame-duck status has a strong negative effect on the probability of showing up in parliament to vote. We find, however, no clear evidence that lame-duck status affects the extent to which legislators deviate from the party line. Our findings align well with the citizen-candidate framework, where candidates have fixed ideological positions that do not vary based on electoral incentives. |
| Keywords: | political parties, party discipline, roll-call votes, legislative speech, difference-in-discontinuity design |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9697&r= |
| By: | Rumilda Cañete (Independent Researcher); Josepa Miquel-Florensa (TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Stéphane Straub (TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Karine van der Straeten (TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that giving voters more power both formally through the use of more "open" electoral systems and informally through easier access to information on politicians' wrongdoings will necessarily result in them voting corrupt politicians out of office. Focusing on a comparison between closed-list and open-list proportional representation systems, we theoretically show that opening the lists is likely to generate a large shift of vote shares in favor of the traditional, most corrupt parties. We design a survey experiment to test these predictions in Paraguay and nd strong supporting evidence. We do not nd in our context that the lack of information is a major obstacle preventing voters from voting out corrupt politicians; if anything, under the more open system, supporters of the incumbent party tend to cast more votes for politicians with a recent history of corruption. |
| Keywords: | Corruption,Electoral systems,Information |
| Date: | 2022–04–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03629643&r= |
| By: | Toke S. Aidt (Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge); Jean Lacroix (Université Paris-Saclay, Faculté Jean Monnet, RITM); Pierre-Guillaume Méon (Centre Emile Bernheim, Université libre de Bruxelles) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies a new mechanism that allows political elites from a non-democratic regime to survive a democratic transition: connections. We document this mechanism in the transition from the Vichy regime to democracy in post-World War II France. The parliamentarians who had supported the Vichy regime were purged in a two-stage process where each case was judged twice by two di erent courts. Using a di erence-in-di erences strategy, we show that Law graduates, a powerful social group in French politics with strong connections to one of the two courts, had a clearance rate that was 10 percentage points higher than others. This facilitated the persistence of that elite group. A systematic analysis of 17,589 documents from the defendants' dossiers is consistent with the hypothesis that the connections of Law graduates to one of the two courts were a major driver of their ability to avoid the purge. We consider and rule out alternative mechanisms. |
| Keywords: | Purges, Political transitions, Elite persistence, Connections |
| JEL: | D73 K40 N44 P48 |
| Date: | 2022–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dia:wpaper:dt202204&r= |
| By: | Mohammad Reza Farzanegan (University of Marburg); Hassan F. Gholipour (Western Sydney University) |
| Abstract: | Why did some countries vote not to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at the United National General Assembly’s first emergency session since 1997? Our study examines different economic, political, geographic and historical reasons behind the voting behaviour of several countries in favour of Russia. Probit regressions show that higher dependence on military exports from Russia, years ruled by leftists, access to Russian markets for exports, being a major recipient of Russian aid, being former members of Soviet Union and sharing borders with Russia are positively associated with the probability of voting in favour of Russia. Factors which reduce the probability of support for Russia over the Ukraine invasion are higher levels of civil and political freedom within a country and percentage of exports from Russia to partners in total Russia exports. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:202217&r= |
| By: | Eric Kamwa (LC2S - Laboratoire caribéen de sciences sociales - UA - Université des Antilles - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | A voting rule that permits some voters to favor a candidate by providing only the initial segment of their sincere rankings is said to be vulnerable to the truncation paradox. In this paper, we consider four models for counting truncated ballots, optimistic, pessimistic (the most common), averaged, and round-down. Under the impartial anonymous culture assumption, the choice of model generally has a real impact on truncation-paradox vulnerability, but there are exceptions. When the election is decided by a one-shot scoring rule, the optimistic model is invulnerable to the truncation paradox, but all other models are vulnerable. We identify new voting rules immune to the truncation paradox, such as the Modified Borda Count. To obtain a more complete picture of the impact of processing model, we assess the likelihood of the truncation paradox in three-candidate elections with large electorates, focusing not only on oneshot scoring rules but also scoring rules with one-by-one or below-average elimination. Our assessment confirms that the processing model for truncated ballots may really matter. |
| Keywords: | Impartial and Anonymous Culture.,Paradox,Probability,Scoring model,Rankings,Truncation |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03632662&r= |