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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Chun-Fang Chiang (National Taiwan Univ); Semin Kim (Yonsei Univ); SunTak Kim (National Taiwan Univ); Chien-Hsun Lin (Univ. of California, Santa Barbara); Ming-Jen Lin (National Taiwan Univ) |
| Abstract: | We conduct a field experiment to investigate the elects of partisan news on the 2016 Taiwan Presidential and Legislative Elections. Sub- jects are divided into four groups: rightist (KMT), leftist (DPP), new third-party and control, and provided with distinct partisan news ar- ticles. To ensure readership of assigned newspapers, subjects join multiple experimental sessions in which they are asked to solve quiz questions about the news articles and rewarded according to their quiz scores. We measure the elects of partisan news by comparing the reported vote choices in the 2016 Elections with subjects' initial political preferences. We find that the leftist news articles have signif- icantly increased the support for the DPP candidate Tsai by reinforc- ing the existing preferences. The articles about the third-parties have changed subjects' voting intentions to support the new party GSD. We also find that the estimated baseline and reinforcement treatment elects are driven by undecided subjects or swing voters. |
| Keywords: | partisan news, media e ect, swing voter, persuasion rate, voting, election, field experiment |
| JEL: | D72 L82 C92 C93 |
| Date: | 2019–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:yon:wpaper:2019rwp-147&r=all |
| By: | Raúl Duarte; Frederico Finan; Horacio Larreguy; Laura Schechter |
| Abstract: | Throughout much of the developing world, politicians rely on political brokers to buy votes prior to elections. We investigate how social networks help facilitate vote-buying exchanges by combining village network data of brokers and voters with broker reports of vote buying. We show that networks diffuse politically-relevant information about voters to brokers who leverage it to target voters. In particular, we find that brokers target reciprocal voters who are not registered to their party and about whom they can hear more information through their social network. These results highlight the importance of information diffusion through social networks for vote buying and ultimately for political outcomes. |
| JEL: | D72 O1 |
| Date: | 2019–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26241&r=all |
| By: | Jonathan L. Clayton (Fort Hays State University, Hays, USA) |
| Abstract: | This report provides a methodology for defining and identifying true swing states in US presidential elections. After these states are identified by cross-tabulating high-performing states under the categories of battleground (states with the lowest margin between competitors), shift (states with the highest frequency of flipping from Republican to Democrat or vice-versa), and bellwether (the accuracy of a state to vote concurrently with the winner of the electoral college) during the US presidential elections from 1992 through 2016, an examination is completed to determine any similarities among these states in terms of median household income, population density, racial demographics, political party affiliation, voter behavior, and voter registration. These states are then compared to national averages to determine if the “average swing state†can be identified. Hecht and Schultz utilize a four-point method for identifying swing states. This report attempts to utilize less arbitrary data, using a three-point methodology: battleground, shift, and bellwether. |
| Keywords: | swing state, bellwether, battleground, election |
| Date: | 2019–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:smo:dpaper:017jc&r=all |
| By: | Marina Pilkina (Master student National Research University “Higher School of Economics,†Moscow,) |
| Abstract: | The aim is to determine whether the descriptive political representation of women is acceptable and achievable for the Russian political reality. Understanding the quality of democracy assumes going beyond mere political participation. It requires the actual representation of traditionally marginalized groups - women. Gender mainstreaming and the involvement of both sexes in political sphere is a sine qua non for any democratic structure. In fact, it may seem that women are included in the democracy, but in practice they are often excluded. Such situation is observed in Russia. The formal female representation in Russian politics exists only to eliminate direct discrimination against women. This nature of women's participation is confirmed by the fact that “women are involved in Russian politics to meet the needs of the regime.†The low level of female representation is also linked to the lack of prominent political parties supporting women's rights. Formal female representation does not imply equal gender representation. Balanced representation may require a descriptive political representation – a visible match between the electorate and representatives. If women are half of the population, they should also compose approximately half of the legislative and executive bodies. Given the nature of the gender situation in the Russian political arena, it is not yet possible to represent marginalized groups in a descriptive manner, even though women are about 54% of the Russian population. The inclusion of women's issues in the agenda and mainstreaming of gender inequality is likely to make the descriptive female representation in Russia achievable. |
| Keywords: | women, Russia, democratization, formal and descriptive representation, gender |
| Date: | 2019–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:smo:cpaper:14mp&r=all |
| By: | Mariella Gonzales; Gianmarco León-Ciliotta; Luis R. Martínez |
| Abstract: | We combine two natural experiments, multiple empirical strategies and administrative data to study voters' response to marginal changes to the fine for electoral abstention in Peru. A smaller fine leads to a robust decrease in voter turnout. However, the drop in turnout caused by a full fine reduction is less than 20% the size of that caused by an exemption from compulsory voting, indicating the predominance of the non-monetary incentives provided by the mandate to vote. Additionally, almost 90% of the votes generated by a marginally larger fine are blank or invalid, lending support to the hypothesis of rational abstention. Higher demand for information and larger long-run effects following an adjustment to the value of the fine point to the existence of informational frictions that limit adaptation to institutional changes. |
| Keywords: | voter turnout, voter registration, compulsory voting, informational frictions, external validity, Peru |
| JEL: | D72 D78 D83 K42 |
| Date: | 2019–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:1111&r=all |
| By: | Jerrold Rusk (Rice University) |
| Abstract: | The author theorizes that residence requirements will increase the costs of individual participation in U.S. elections. Different stringencies in voter residency laws will lead to different vote turnout results. This hypothesis is tested using both cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses for the period 1824-1968. The hypothesis is confirmed for both the nation at large and the separate regions of the South and non-South when using state residency requirements as the explanatory factor. County residency requirements also show an effect on voter turnout but only in the South. The effect of residency requirements is demonstrated for several races (presidential, congressional, gubernatorial) and for both presidential and midterm election years The basic conclusion of this study is that residency requirements place an important barrier to voter participation and hence must be recognized as a significant part of the legal-institutional effect on voting behavior. |
| Keywords: | turnout, residency, region |
| Date: | 2019–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sek:iacpro:9011583&r=all |
| By: | Youngsoo Kim (University of Regina); Jung Chul Park (University of South Florida) |
| Abstract: | Recent studies highlight positive effect of political connections on firm performance and stock returns. This paper shows that the positive effect of political connections on the cross-sectional stock returns disappears in the weak presidency period, defined as the last two years before the presidential party change, or period of low job approval ratings. The extent of the presidential party?s control over the Congress does not affect our main result. The result is driven by small firms, who typically do not have financial resources to hedge away political risks, and by the firms located in the states where residents more strongly support the president. Additional test suggests that the industries that rely on heavy government expenditure use a variety of political strategies to maintain the value of their political capital even during the weak presidency period. |
| Keywords: | Political geography; political connections; policy risk; returns; performance; Presidential Power; Presidential job approval rating |
| JEL: | G10 G11 G14 |
| Date: | 2019–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sek:iacpro:8710820&r=all |
| By: | Sascha O. Becker; Erik Hornung |
| Abstract: | Did the Prussian three-class franchise, which politically over-represented the economic elite, affect policy-making? Combining MP-level political orientation, derived from all roll call votes in the Prussian parliament (1867–1903), with constituency characteristics, we analyze how local vote inequality, determined by tax payments, affected policymaking during Prussia’s period of rapid industrialization. Contrary to the predominant view that the franchise system produced a conservative parliament, higher vote inequality is associated with more liberal voting, especially in regions with large-scale industry. We argue that industrialists preferred self-serving liberal policies and were able to coordinate on suitable MPs when vote inequality was high. |
| Keywords: | inequality, political economy, three-class franchise, elites, Prussia |
| JEL: | D72 N43 N93 P26 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7801&r=all |
| By: | KUNLI LIN (Feng Chia University) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the relation between ownership structure and bank stock price informativeness across 59 countries over the period 2002?2014. We also evaluate how political uncertainty affects the impact of bank ownership on informative stock prices. Using a regression?s R-squared value of individual stock returns on market and industry indexes to gauge bank informative stock prices, we find evidence that more state-owned banks located in developing countries tend to have higher synchronous, i.e., lower informative, stock prices than their domestic private-owned and foreign-owned banks. The paper finds no strong correlation between ownership and stock price informativeness for banks located in developed countries. With respect to the impact of politics, we find that in developing countries political uncertainty dampens bank informative stock prices during election years, whereas in developed countries elections do not affect the stock price informativeness. Next, in order to test whether the differential in informative stock prices between state-owned banks and non-state banks is driven by political uncertainty, the paper checks whether this differential widens during election years; it finds strong support for this conjecture. The impact of elections on the relation between bank ownership and stock price informativeness also varies with different legal origins and political systems. These findings suggest that the political channel plays an important role in determining the expropriation behavior of government controlling shareholders, especially in developing countries. |
| Keywords: | Ownership structure; political uncertainty; stock prices informativeness |
| JEL: | G14 G15 |
| Date: | 2019–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sek:iacpro:8711223&r=all |
| By: | Fabian Gouret (Université de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA) |
| Abstract: | This paper uses data from the 2004 pre-election survey of the American National Election Study to test empirically different ways of incorporating a valence parameter into a Downsian utility function. We call particular attention to the problem of interpersonal incomparability of responses to the liberal-conservative scale, and use the Aldrich-McKelvey’s pathbreaking method to obtain accurate distances between respondents and candidates, the key regressors. We find that the utility function the most supported by the empirical evidence, the intensity valence utility function, is the one which permits to make the better predictions for the 2004 presidential election. We also consider counterfactual analyses wherein we test if Bush, the candidate with the highest intensity valence, has dominant strategies which would have insured him to obtain a majority of the popular vote. According to the theory, it is known that the candidate with the highest intensity valence does not have such dominant strategies if the distribution of voters in the policy space is too heterogenous. Nevertheless, we show the distribution of voters in 2004 is sufficiently homogenous for Bush to have dominant strategies. |
| Keywords: | spatial models of voting, valence, survey, Aldrich-McKelvey scaling. |
| JEL: | D72 C81 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ema:worpap:2019-10&r=all |
| By: | Toke Aidt; Felix Grey; Alexandru Savu |
| Abstract: | Why do politicians rebel and vote against the party line when high stakes bills come to the floor of the legislature? We leverage the three so-called Meaningful Votes that took place in the British House of Commons between January and March 2019 on the Withdrawal Agreement that the Conservative government had reached with the European Union to address this question. The Withdrawal Agreement was decisively defeated three times and a major revolt amongst Conservative backbench Members of Parliament (MPs) was instrumental in this. We find that three factors influenced their rebellion calculus: the MP’s own preference, constituency preferences and career concerns. Somewhat paradoxically, the rebellion within the Conservative Party came from MPs who had supported Leave in the 2016 Brexit referendum and from MPs elected in Leave leaning constituencies. |
| Keywords: | Brexit, roll call votes, rebellions, party discipline, party coherence, House of Commons |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7819&r=all |
| By: | Toke Aidt; Christopher Rauh |
| Abstract: | We document a remarkable increase over the past two and a half decades in the fraction of people in England feeling close to no party – the rise of the “no party” – which, today, is close to constituting an absolute majority. We develop a new method to distinguish between age, period, and cohort effects based on individual longitudinal survey data and we show that the rise of the “no party” is driven much more by a secular trend (period effects) than by generation replacement (cohort effects). We show that the increase in “no party” supporters and in their turnout behavior can explain 80% of the observed decline in election turnout in England over the period. A detailed investigation of the dynamics of party identification shows that party political disengagement has become more persistent over time. |
| Keywords: | age-period-cohort effects, party identification, democracy, England, Secular Disengagement Hypothesis |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7812&r=all |
| By: | John Ryan |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the shortcomings in the UK government’s Brexit negotiation strategy which reflected Prime Minister Theresa May’s weak political leadership. The Prime Minister focused on securing the short-term political survival of her government amidst turbulent and fractious domestic politics, over negotiations with the EU27. Brexit negotiations were poorly planned and the government was woefully unprepared. Brexit also threatens a serious re-opening of old wounds in Northern Ireland, as debate grows around the prospect of a united Ireland inside the EU. UK politics is in turmoil and in a chronic crisis. What route the Brexit saga takes next is uncertain. But the crossroads is approaching – either the UK leaves on 31 October 2019 with no deal or it finds a route towards an accommodation with the EU. The phenomenon of British exceptionalism towards the EU is set to take a new dramatic turn, while the UK’s chaotic political divisions will not disappear any time soon. |
| Keywords: | Brexit, withdrawal agreement, European Union, United Kingdom Republic of Ireland |
| JEL: | F15 F50 F51 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7803&r=all |
| By: | Giuseppe Albanese (Bank of Italy); Guglielmo Barone (University of Padua); Guido de Blasio (Bank of Italy) |
| Abstract: | Economic roots of populism in Western countries are quite well understood but much less is known about policy implications. We study a large redistribution program that conveyed, within the EU cohesion framework, a relevant amount of money to some Italian municipalities. Our identification strategy is based on a spatial regression discontinuity design, which exploits the allocation rule of funds. We focus on the 2013 general elections and show that municipalities favored by redistribution exhibit a drop in populism of about 5% of the mean of the dependent variable. |
| Keywords: | populism, voting, redistribution |
| JEL: | D72 R58 |
| Date: | 2019–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pad:wpaper:0239&r=all |
| By: | Florian Scheuer; Joel Slemrod |
| Abstract: | The nexus between corruption and economic growth has been examined for a long time. Many empirical studies measured corruption by the reversed Transparency International’s Perception of Corruption Index (CPI) and ignored that the CPI was not comparable over time. The CPI is comparable over time since the year 2012. We employ new data for 175 countries over the period 2012-2018 and re-examine the nexus between corruption and economic growth. The cumulative long-run effect of corruption on growth is that real per capita GDP decreased by around 17% when the reversed CPI increased by one standard deviation. The effect of corruption on economic growth is especially pronounced in autocracies and transmits to growth by decreasing FDI and increasing inflation. |
| Keywords: | perceived corruption, economic growth, panel data |
| JEL: | C23 H11 K40 O11 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7817&r=all |
| By: | Thomas Douenne (Paris School of Economics, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne); Adrien Fabre (Paris School of Economics, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne) |
| Abstract: | This paper aims to assess the prospects for French climate policies after the Yellow Vests crisis halted the planned increase in the carbon tax. From a large representative survey, we elicit knowledge, perceptions and values over climate change, we examine opinions relative to carbon taxation, and we assess support for other climate policies. Specific attention is given to the link between perceptions of climate change and attitudes towards policies. The paper also studies in details the determinants of attitudes in terms of political and socio-demographic variables. Among many results, we find limited knowledge but high concern for climate change. We also document a large rejection of the carbon tax but majority support for stricter norms and green investments, and reveal the rationales behind these preferences. Our study entails policy recommendations, such as an information campaign on climate change. Indeed, we find that climate awareness increases support for climate policies but no evidence for the formation of opinions through partisan cues as in the US, suggesting that better access to science could foster support for the ecology. |
| Keywords: | Climate Policy, Carbon tax, Preferences, Acceptability, France |
| JEL: | D78 H23 Q54 Q58 |
| Date: | 2019–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fae:wpaper:2019.15&r=all |
| By: | Maiko Ichihara |
| Abstract: | East Asian countries have traditionally been recognized as prioritizing sovereignty over democracy and human rights norms in their foreign policies. However, this sovereignty-weighted approach appears to have changed somewhat since the mid-2000s as East Asian democracies such as Japan and Indonesia have upgraded their support for democracy abroad. These countries began sharing their own experiences with democratization and providing the capacity-building assistance necessary for the operation of democratic institutions as well as material and financial assistance for elections, state institutions, and civil society organizations that promote democratic governance. This paper examines the state of and the motivations for their support of democracy, positioning the work as a pilot study from which to make an argument applicable to, and testable with, the cases of democracy support by other third-generation democracy promoters. This paper argues that the support from Japan and Indonesia for democracy has significant commonalities not only in terms of the timing of its emergence, but also in terms of content, and that both countries use regime-compatible approaches. Concerning the motivations behind support for democracy, the paper argues that while democratic norms function as the background identity of the countries, they are not explanatory variables. Rather, the two countries commonly began supporting democracy strategically as a foreign policy tool: Indonesia intended to expand its international influence to match its rising international status as a middle-income country, and Japan sought to strengthen its own ties with the US and to expand its influence vis-a-vis China at the time of its declining international status. In other words, the two countries f strategic incentives were motivated by the tectonic shift in the international power structure, which thus functions as the independent variable while the strategic incentives can be identified as intervening variables. |
| Keywords: | Democracy support, international power structure, strategic incentives, democratic norms, ODA, regime-compatible approach, Japan, Indonesia |
| Date: | 2019–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jic:wpaper:194&r=all |
| By: | Klaus Gründler; Niklas Potrafke |
| Abstract: | The nexus between corruption and economic growth has been examined for a long time. Many empirical studies measured corruption by the reversed Transparency International’s Perception of Corruption Index (CPI) and ignored that the CPI was not comparable over time. The CPI is comparable over time since the year 2012. We employ new data for 175 countries over the period 2012-2018 and re-examine the nexus between corruption and economic growth. The cumulative long-run effect of corruption on growth is that real per capita GDP decreased by around 17% when the reversed CPI increased by one standard deviation. The effect of corruption on economic growth is especially pronounced in autocracies and transmits to growth by decreasing FDI and increasing inflation. |
| Keywords: | perceived corruption, economic growth, panel data |
| JEL: | C23 H11 K40 O11 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7816&r=all |
| By: | Jaume Ventura |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a simple theoretical framework to study a set of regions, each with its own regional government, who share a union or central government. These governments must decide whether to implement or discard a large number of projects that produce local benefits for the region that implements them, and externalities for the rest of the regions. Conflict or disagreement arises since different regions value projects differently. The classic assignment problem consists of deciding who decides these projects, either the union or the regional governments. It is well known that regional governments are insensitive to externalities. The key observation here is that the union government is insensitive to local benefits. Thus, each government maximizes only a piece of the value of projects, and disregards the other one. This observations leads to simple and clear rules for solving the assignment problem. |
| Keywords: | European integration, centralization and decentralization, Public Goods, Externalities, fiscal federalism |
| JEL: | D72 D79 F15 F55 H77 |
| Date: | 2019–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:1112&r=all |