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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Sophie Augustin (Department of Economics, Vienna University of Economics and Business); Daniela Rroshi (Department of Economics, Vienna University of Economics and Business); Alyssa Schneebaum (Department of Economics, Vienna University of Economics and Business) |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a method to study the relationship between voters' attitudes towards immigration and the educational attainment of immigrants and their children, and applies it to Austrian data. We measure attitudes towards immigration using data on political parties' positions regarding immigration and the share of votes that each party received at the regional level. We then study the educational attainment and intergenerational educational mobility of immigrants who grew up in the regions whose political environment we observe. Preliminary results for Aus- tria suggest that, surprisingly, better attitudes towards migration are associated with lower educational attainment for immigrants. However, immigrants are more likely than their native peers to obtain more education than their parents. Here, the returns to more positive attitudes towards immigration play a large role in explaining the mobility gap across migration background. |
| Keywords: | educational attainment, immigration, voting behaviour, social attitudes |
| JEL: | I24 J15 I21 D72 |
| Date: | 2019–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wiw:wiwwuw:wuwp287&r=all |
| By: | Paul Harrenstein; Marie-Louise Lackner; Martin Lackner |
| Abstract: | We provide a mathematical analysis of an election system proposed by the eminent logician Gottlob Frege (1848--1925). His proposal was written presumably in 1918, was (re)discovered around the turn of the millennium, and published for the first time in the original German in 2000. A remarkable feature of Frege's proposal is its concern for the representation of minorities and its sensitivity to past election results. Frege's proposal is based on some highly original and relevant ideas; his core idea is that the votes of unelected candidates are carried over to the next election. All candidates thus accumulate votes over time and eventually each candidate is elected at some point. We provide a mathematical formulation of Frege's election system and investigate how well it achieves its aim of a fair representation of all political opinions in a community over time. We can prove that this goal is fulfilled remarkably well. However, we also show that, in other aspects, it falls short of Frege's high ambition that no voter's vote be lost. We propose a slight modification of his voting rule, the modified Frege method, that remedies these shortcomings. We analyse both methods from the perspective of modern social choice and apportionment theory, and can show that they are novel contributions with noteworthy proportionality properties over time. |
| Date: | 2019–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1907.03643&r=all |
| By: | Junze Sun (Amsterdam School of Economics); Arthur Schram (Amsterdam School of Economics); Randolph Sloof (Amsterdam School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We develop a tractable theory to study the impact of biased media on election outcomes, voter turnout and welfare. News released by media allows voters to infer the relative appeal of the two candidates, and the closeness of elections. In large elections, the former determines the election outcome, whereas the latter drives voter turnout. With a single media outlet, a rise in media bias affects the election outcome in a non-monotonic way, and reduces voter welfare by decreasing the probability of electing the efficient candidate and increasing aggregate turnout costs. Introducing extra media outlets can systematically shift the election outcome and voter turnout in either direction, but it weakly improves voter welfare. The impact of other ways to strengthen media competition – such as increased polarization and prevention of collusion – critically depends on whether media have commitment power; if not, they can worsen information transmission and voter welfare. |
| Keywords: | media bias, voting, Poisson games, media competition, commitment |
| JEL: | D72 D82 D83 |
| Date: | 2019–07–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20190048&r=all |
| By: | Eric Kamwa (LC2S - Laboratoire caribéen de sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UA - Université des Antilles) |
| Abstract: | Under Approval Voting (AV), each voter just distinguishes the candidates he approves of from those appearing as unacceptable. The Preference Approval Voting (PAV) is a hybrid version of the approval voting first introduced by Brams and Sanver (2009). Under PAV, each voter ranks all the candidates and then indicates the ones he approves. In this paper, we provide analytical representations for the probability that PAV elects the Condorcet winner when she exists in three-candidate elections with large electorates. We also provide analytical representations for the probability that PAV elects the Condorcet loser. We perform our analysis by assuming the assumption of the Extended Impartial Culture. This analysis allows us to measure at which extend, PAV performs better than AV both on the propensity of electing the Condorcet loser and on that of the non-election of the Condorcet loser. |
| Keywords: | Probability,Condorcet,Extended Impartial Culture,Ranking,Approval Voting |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01786121&r=all |
| By: | Eric Kamwa (LC2S - Laboratoire caribéen de sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UA - Université des Antilles) |
| Abstract: | The Borda Effect, first introduced by Colman and Poutney (1978), occurs in a preference aggregation process using the Plurality rule if given the (unique) winner there is at least one loser that is preferred to the winner by a majority of the electorate. Colman and Poutney (1978) distinguished two forms of the Borda Effect:-the Weak Borda Effect describing a situation under which the unique winner of the Plurality rule is majority dominated by only one loser; and-the Strong Borda Effect under which the Plurality winner is majority dominated by each of the losers. The Strong Borda Effect is well documented in the literature as the Strong Borda Paradox. Colman and Poutney (1978) showed that the probability of the Weak Borda Effect is not negligible; they only focused on the Plurality rule. In this note, we extend the work of Colman and Poutney (1978) by providing in three-candidate elections, the representations for the limiting probabilities of the (Weak) Borda Effect for the whole family of the scoring rules and scoring runoff rules. We highlight that there is a relation between the (Weak) Borda Effect and the Condorcet efficiency. We perform our analysis under the Impartial Culture and the Impartial Anonymous Culture which are two well-known assumptions often used for such a study. |
| Date: | 2019–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01786590&r=all |
| By: | Hangartner, Dominik; Ruiz, Nelson A.; Tukiainen, Janne |
| Abstract: | What effect does using open (as opposed to closed) lists in proportional representation elections have on party performance and the quality of candidate selection? We provide novel evidence by studying local elections in Colombia, where parties have discretion to field either open or closed lists. Using panel data covering the 1,100 Colombian municipalities for the 2003–2015 period, we leverage within-party, within-municipality, and over-time variation to identify the effect of ballot structure. We find that the adoption of open list dramatically increases parties’ vote and seat shares. Semi-structured interviews with a representative sample of candidates reveal that parties that use closed list struggle to attract high-quality candidates and to incentivize them to campaign. Consistent with these mechanisms, our statistical analyses confirm that open-list candidates are more experienced, more engaged in their constituencies and campaigns, and less likely to have committed election fraud in the past. |
| Keywords: | Electoral Systems, Ballot Structure, Closed vs Open Party List, Political Selection, Local public finance and provision of public services, C23, D72, |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fer:wpaper:120&r=all |
| By: | Michael J. Boskin; Diego J. Perez; Daniel S. Bennett |
| Abstract: | We identify which types of Social Security reforms are supported when people vote in their financial self-interest, under alternative economic and demographic projections and voting proclivity assumptions. While 40% of voters have negative lifetime net transfers, less than 10% have negative future transfers under the un- sustainable status quo. Framing the problem as a choice between reforms is necessary for any to receive majority support. Delayed reforms are often preferred, but immediate tax hikes or slower benefit growth win in some circumstances. Inter-generational AND intragenerational heterogeneity of economic interests combine to affect which reforms are blocked and which are feasible. |
| JEL: | H55 H62 H68 |
| Date: | 2019–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25985&r=all |
| By: | Augustin, Sophie; Rroshi, Daniela; Schneebaum, Alyssa |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a method to study the relationship between voters' attitudes towards immigration and the educational attainment of immigrants and their children, and applies it to Austrian data. We measure attitudes towards immigration using data on political parties' positions regarding immigration and the share of votes that each party received at the regional level. We then study the educational attainment and intergenerational educational mobility of immigrants who grew up in the regions whose political environment we observe. Preliminary results for Austria suggest that, surprisingly, better attitudes towards migration are associated with lower educational attainment for immigrants. However, immigrants are more likely than their native peers to obtain more education than their parents. Here, the returns to more positive attitudes towards immigration play a large role in explaining the mobility gap across migration background. |
| Keywords: | educational attainment, immigration, voting behaviour, social attitudes |
| Date: | 2019–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wiw:wus005:7043&r=all |
| By: | Bernecker, Andreas; Boyer, Pierre; Gathmann, Christina |
| Abstract: | This paper shows that electoral incentives matter for the decision to implement novel policies. Our empirical setting is the period prior to and following the U.S. welfare reform in 1996, which marked the most dramatic shift in social policy since the New Deal. Our findings indicate that governors with strong electoral support are less likely to experiment than governors with little support. Yet, governors who cannot be reelected actually experiment more than governors striving for reelection. These findings are robust to controlling for ideology, preferences for redistribution, the state legislature, and cross-state learning. |
| Keywords: | Electoral incentives; Policy innovation; Spillovers; Welfare reform |
| JEL: | D72 D78 H75 I38 |
| Date: | 2019–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13763&r=all |
| By: | Jeffry Frieden (Harvard University) |
| Abstract: | A backlash against globalization has led to widespread political movements hostile both to economic integration and to existing political institutions throughout the advanced industrial world. Openness to the movement of goods, capital, and people has had important distributional effects. These effects have been particularly marked in communities dependent upon traditional manufacturing, some of which have experienced a downward spiral from the direct economic effects of foreign competition through broader economic decline to serious social problems. Those harmed by globalization have lashed out both at economic integration, and at the elites they hold responsible for their troubles. Political discontent is in part due to failures of compensation – insufficient provision of social safety nets for those harmed by economic trends. It is also due to failures of representation – the belief that prevailing political parties and politicians have not paid adequate attention to the problems faced by large groups of voters. Countries vary on both dimensions, as do national experiences with the populist upsurge. Previously dominant socio-economic interests and political actors may act to try to address this dissatisfaction, but the path faces serious economic and political obstacles. |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cth:wpaper:gru_2018_001&r=all |
| By: | Clay, Chad K; Bakker, Ryan; Brook, Anne-Marie; Hill, Daniel W.; Murdie, Amanda |
| Abstract: | This paper details a new methodology developed to measure civil and political rights violations in a pilot sample of 13 diverse countries. In doing so, we discuss the problems present in previous attempts to measure civil and political rights cross-nationally and argue that our approach overcomes many of those problems. Using an expert survey that draws on the knowledge of human rights researchers, advocates, lawyers, journalists, and others responsible for directly monitoring the human rights situation in countries worldwide, we present new measures of the intensity and distribution of respect for seven separate areas of civil and political rights and compare those data with existing work. The results demonstrate that our technique for producing data on civil and political rights produces outcomes with strong face validity vis-à-vis existing measures, while providing more and better information than any previous cross-national data collection effort. We aim to extend this approach to most other countries in the world over the coming years. |
| Keywords: | Labor and Human Capital |
| Date: | 2018–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:motuwp:290506&r=all |
| By: | François, Abel; Panel, Sophie; Weill, Laurent |
| Abstract: | Since political uncertainty is greater in dictatorships than in democracies, we test the hypothesis that foreign investors scrutinize public information on dictators to assess this risk. In particular, we as-sume they use five suitable dictators’ characteristics: age, political experience, education level, ed-ucation in economics, and prior experience in business. We perform fixed effects estimations on an unbalanced panel of 100 dictatorial countries from 1973 to 2008 to explain foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. We find that educated dictators are more attractive to foreign investors. We obtain strong evidence that greater educational attainment of the leader is associated with higher FDI. We also find evidence that the leader having received education in economics and prior experience in business is associated with greater FDI. By contrast, the leader’s age, and political experience have no relationship with FDI. Our results are robust to several tests and checks, including a comparison with democracies. |
| JEL: | F21 F23 |
| Date: | 2019–07–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bof:bofitp:2019_012&r=all |
| By: | Chandan Kumar Jha (Madden School of Business, New York, USA); Oasis Kodila-Tedika (University of Kinshasa, The DRC) |
| Abstract: | This study explores the relationship between social media and democracy in a cross- section of over 125 countries around the world. We find the evidence of a strong, positive correlation between Facebook penetration (a proxy for social media) and democracy. We further show that the correlation between social media and democracy is stronger for low-income countries than high-income countries. Our lowest point estimates indicate that a one-standard deviation (about 18 percentage point) increase in Facebook penetration is associated with about 8-point (on a scale of 0–100) increase for the world sample and over 11 points improvement for low-income countries. |
| Keywords: | Democracy; Information; Facebook; Internet; Social Media |
| JEL: | D72 D83 O1 |
| Date: | 2019–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:exs:wpaper:19/031&r=all |
| By: | Salvatore Nunnari |
| Abstract: | Many voting bodies grant one or several of their members a veto right, that is, the right to block decisions even when a proposal has secured the necessary majority. The existence of veto power raises two concerns: first, it increases the possibility of status quo inertia; second, although it only grants the power to block decisions, it could allow veto members to impose their ideal decision on the rest of the committee. While these concerns have been investigated from the perspective of ad hoc committees, which bargain on a single policy, most committees are standing and bargain over a sequence of policies while an endogenous status quo is in place. In this paper, I present the results of a laboratory experiment designed to study the consequences of veto power in these committees. I show that (i) non-veto players are substantially less willing to support the expropriation of other non-veto players when dynamic incentives are strong and (ii) veto power substantially reduces proposal power; nonetheless, (iii) the allocation to the veto player displays a ratchet effect, and (iv) committees with a veto player have more status quo inertia and inequality of outcomes than committees without a veto player. I relate these results to the theoretical literature on the impact of veto power in standing committees. JEL Classiffications: C72, C73, C78, C92, D71, D72, D78 Keywords: Legislative Bargaining; Endogenous Status Quo; Veto Power; Laboratory Experiments; Status Quo Inertia; Policy Capture; Redistribution; Inequality |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:igi:igierp:649&r=all |
| By: | Doron Klunover; John Morgan |
| Abstract: | Presidential debates are thought to provide an important public good by revealing information on candidates to voters. However, this may not always be the case. We consider an endogenous model of presidential debates in which an incumbent and a contender (who is privately informed about her own quality) publicly announce whether they are willing to participate in a public debate, after taking into account that a voter's choice of candidate depends on her beliefs regarding the candidates' qualities and on the state of nature. Surprisingly, it is found that in equilibrium a debate occurs or does not occur independently of the contender's quality or the sequence of the candidates' announcements to participate and therefore the announcements are uninformative. |
| Date: | 2019–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1907.01362&r=all |
| By: | Marco Battaglini; Eleonora Patacchini; Edoardo Rainone |
| Abstract: | We present a model of the U.S. Congress in which social connections among Congress members are endogenous and matter for their legislative activity. We propose a novel equilibrium concept for the network formation game that allows for a sharp characterization of equilibrium behavior and that yields a unique prediction under testable conditions. While the equilibrium is characterized by a large number of nonlinear equations, we show that the model can be structurally estimated by an appropriately designed Approximate Bayesian Computation method. Estimating the model using data from the 109th to 113th U.S. Congresses, we show that social connections are important for legislators' productivities and we identify some of the key determinants of social centralities in Congress. |
| JEL: | D71 D72 |
| Date: | 2019–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25988&r=all |