|
on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Prato, Carlo; Wolton, Stephane |
| Abstract: | Elections have long been understood as a mean to encourage candidates to act in voters' interest as well as a way to aggregate dispersed information. This paper juxtaposes these two key features within a unified framework. As in models of electoral control, candidates compete for office by strategically proposing policy platforms. As in models of information aggregation, agents are not always informed about the policy which maximizes the electorate welfare. Candidates face a trade-off between acting in the electorate's best interest and maximizing their chance of being elected. We provide conditions under which electoral institutions encourage candidates' conformism---thereby stifling proper competition among ideas---and render information aggregation unfeasible in equilibrium. In extensions, we highlight that the new political failure we uncover cannot be fully resolved by liberalizing access to candidacy or reducing voter information. |
| Keywords: | Elections, Information Aggregation, Access to Candidacy, Restrictions to Candidacy |
| JEL: | D70 D72 D82 D83 |
| Date: | 2017–11–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:82753&r=pol |
| By: | Brown, Ryan (University of Colorado Denver); Mansour, Hani (University of Colorado Denver); O'Connell, Stephen D. (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) |
| Abstract: | Gender gaps in leadership roles may be reduced by increasing the number of women in career stages that typically precede high-status positions. This can occur by increasing the supply of experienced women, inspiring new female candidates for these positions, and/or changing beliefs about women as leaders. In this study, we investigate whether and how adding women to a career pipeline can reduce gender gaps in higher-ranking positions over time. Specifically, we examine the effects of women's local electoral success on subsequent female candidacy at higher levels of government in India from 1977 to 2014. We use close elections won by women contesting state legislature seats to identify the effect of pipeline expansion on later candidacy for the national parliament. The results indicate that for each additional lower-level seat won by a woman, there is a 30 percent increase in the number of female candidates in subsequent national legislature elections. This effect is driven by new candidates and not by career politicians, and women receive a disproportionately favorable increase in the vote share. These effects are strongest in areas with low levels of existing female political participation and empowerment. The findings are consistent with a mechanism in which exposure reduces bias, allowing for updated beliefs about the viability of latent candidates who then run for higher office. |
| Keywords: | gender gap, political candidacy, female politicians, India |
| JEL: | J16 J71 P16 |
| Date: | 2018–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11263&r=pol |
| By: | Anthony Edo; Yvonne Giesing; Jonathan Öztunc; Panu Poutvaara |
| Abstract: | Immigration has become one of the most divisive political issues in the United States, the United Kingdom, France and several other Western countries. We estimate the impact of immigration on voting for far-left and far-right parties in France, using panel data on presidential elections from 1988 to 2017. To derive causal estimates, we instrument more recent immigration flows by past settlement patterns in 1968. We find that immigration increases support for far-right candidates and has no robust effect on far-left voting. The increased support for far-right candidates is driven by low educated immigrants from non-Western countries. |
| Keywords: | Voting;Immigration |
| JEL: | D72 F22 J15 P16 |
| Date: | 2017–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cii:cepidt:2017-20&r=pol |
| By: | Hideo Konishi (Boston College); Chen-Yu Pan (Wuhan University) |
| Abstract: | Until recently, both Republican and Democratic administrations have been promoting free trade and market deregulation for decades without intensive policy debates. We set up a two-party electoral competition model in a two-dimensional policy space with campaign contributions by an interest group that promotes a certain agenda that many voters disagree. Assuming that voters are impressionable to campaign spending for/against candidates, we analyze incentive compatible contracts between the interest group and the candidates on agenda policy positions and campaign contributions. If the interest group pushes its agenda more than the candidates want by providing contributions, then the candidates can compete only over the other (ideological) dimension. As the agenda is pushed further by the interest group, ideological policy polarization and campaign contributions surge. |
| Keywords: | electoral competition, probabilistic voting, campaign contributions, interest groups, impressionable voters, polarization |
| JEL: | C72 D72 F02 F13 |
| Date: | 2018–01–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boc:bocoec:944&r=pol |
| By: | Chong, Alberto; Le�n, Gianmarco; Roza, Vivian; Valdivia, Martin; Vega, Gabriela |
| Abstract: | We use a field experiment to evaluate the impact of two informational get-out-the-vote (GOTV) campaigns to boost female electoral participation in Paraguay. We find that public rallies have no effect either on registration or on voter turnout in the 2013 presidential elections. However, households that received door-to-door (D2D) treatment are 4.6 percentage points more likely to vote. Experimental variation on the intensity of the treatment at the locality level allows us to estimate spillover effects, which are present in localities that are geographically more concentrated, and thus may favor social interactions. Reinforcement effects to the already treated population are twice as large as diffusion to the untreated. Our results underscore the importance of taking into account urbanization patterns when designing informational campaigns. |
| Keywords: | Electoral Politics; Paraguay; spillover effects; Urbanization; Voter Behavior |
| JEL: | D71 D72 O10 O53 |
| Date: | 2017–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12516&r=pol |
| By: | Fafchamps, Marcel; Vaz, Ana; Vicente, Pedro C |
| Abstract: | Voter education campaigns often aim to increase voter participation and political accountability. Randomized interventions were implemented nationwide during the 2009 Mozambican elections using leaflets, text messaging, and a free newspaper. We study the local peer effecs triggered by the campaign. We investigate whether treatment effects are transmitted through social networks and geographical proximity at the village level. For individuals personally targeted by the campaign, we estimate the reinforcement effect of proximity to other individuals in our sample. For untargeted individuals, we estimate how the campaign diffuses as a function of proximity to others in the sample. We find evidence for both effects, similar across treatments and proximity measures. The campaign raises the level of interest in the election through networks, in line with the average treatment effect. However, we find a negative network effect of the treatment on voter participation, implying that the positive effect of treatment on more central individuals is smaller. We interpret this result as consistent with free-riding through pivotal reasoning and we provide additional evidence to support this claim. |
| Date: | 2018–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12580&r=pol |
| By: | Anna Lo Prete (University of Turin); Elsa Fornero (University of Turin and CeRP-Collegio Carlo Alberto) |
| Abstract: | Economic reforms affecting people’s lives are generally quite unpopular and may imply an electoral cost. This can derive, among other things, from lack of understanding of the basic elements of reforms. Our paper shows that the electoral cost of a pension reform is significantly lower in countries where the level of financial literacy is higher. The evidence from data on legislative elections held between 1990 and 2010 in 21 advanced countries is robust when we control for macro-economic conditions, demographic factors, and characteristics of the political system. Interestingly, these findings are not robust when we use less specific indicators of human capital – such as general schooling – supporting the view that knowledge of basic economic and financial concepts has distinctive features that may help reduce the electoral cost of reforms having a relevant impact on the life cycle of individuals. |
| Date: | 2018–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crp:wpaper:171&r=pol |
| By: | Tjaša Bjedov (Distance Learning University of Switzerland Ueberlandstrasse 12 CH-3900 Brig, Switzerland); Simon Lapointe (VATT Institute for Economic Research, Arkadiankatu 7, 00100 Helsinki, Finland); Thierry Madiès (University of Fribourg, Bd. de Pérolles 90, 1700 Fribourg, Switzerland); Marie Claire Villeval (Univ Lyon, CNRS, GATE L-SE UMR 5824, F-69131 Ecully, France; IZA, Bonn, Germany) |
| Abstract: | Using a laboratory experiment with nested local and global public goods, we analyze the stability of global groups when individuals have the option to separate, according to the degree of decentralization of decision-making. We show that increasing the number of decisions made at the local level within a smaller group reduces the likelihood that individuals vote in favor of a break-up of the global group. Voting for a break-up of the global group is more likely when global group members are less cooperative and local group members are more cooperative. Reinforcing local group identity has no impact on votes. |
| Keywords: | Break-up of groups; decision rights, voting behavior, public goods, experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D72 H77 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1802&r=pol |
| By: | Troiano, Ugo A. |
| Abstract: | In this paper I first present a novel fact: women who have experienced democratic institutions during their adolescence are more likely to participate in the labor market, keeping constant the country, age and many other confounding factors. I then present evidence suggesting that discriminatory attitudes may be a channel for such a finding. Other explanations receive less support from the data. |
| Keywords: | gender economics, institutions, democratization, discrimination, labor supply. |
| JEL: | D72 J16 J71 |
| Date: | 2018–01–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:83927&r=pol |
| By: | In Do Hwang (Economic Research Institute, The Bank of Korea) |
| Abstract: | Although an increasing number of studies demonstrate the importance of trust in economic growth, they only focus on interpersonal trust. This paper considers various types of trust including interpersonal trust (i.e., trust in people), institutional trust (e.g., trust in the fair administration of justice, or trust in the protection of property rights), and political trust (e.g., trust in government or political parties), and investigates their impacts on growth. Using novel cross-country survey data, this paper finds that institutional trust is most robustly related to the economic growth in a cross-section of 46 countries. This paper also shows that there is a causal relationship between institutional trust and growth using panel data from those 46 countries. Hence, in contrast with the previous trust literature which focuses on trust in "people" as a "time-invariant cultural feature," this paper stresses trust in "social system" as an "institutions- dependent feature." |
| Keywords: | Institutions and economic growth, Trust, Social capital |
| JEL: | O17 P16 Z13 |
| Date: | 2017–05–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bok:wpaper:1715&r=pol |
| By: | Jessica Leight; Dana Foarta; Rohini Pande; Laura Ralston |
| Abstract: | Community targeting of vote payments — defined as the saturation of entire neighborhoods with cash prior to elections — is widespread in the developing world. In this paper, we utilize laboratory experiments conducted in the U.S. and Kenya to demonstrate that, relative to individual targeting, a vote-buying regime that distributes payments widely renders voters more tolerant of politician rent-seeking, and increases the level of politician rent-seeking observed in equilibrium. The most parsimonious model of preferences consistent with these patterns is a model in which both politicians and voters are characterized by multifaceted social preferences, encompassing reciprocity, altruism, and inequality aversion. |
| JEL: | O1 P16 |
| Date: | 2018–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24194&r=pol |
| By: | Antoinette Baujard (GATE - CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Frédéric Gavrel (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Herrade Igersheim (CEPERC - Centre d'EPistémologie et d'ERgologie Comparatives - UMR 7304 - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Jean-François Laslier (PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics); Isabelle Lebon (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | During the first round of the 2012 French presidential election, participants in an in situ experiment were invited to vote according to " evaluative voting " , which involves rating the candidates using a numerical scale. Various scales were used: (0,1), (-1,0,1), (0,1,2), and (0,1,...,20). The paper studies scale calibration effects, i.e., how individual voters adapt to the scale, leading to possibly different election outcomes. The data show that scales are not linearly equivalent, even if individual ordinal preferences are not inconsistent. Scale matters, notably because of the symbolic power of negative grades, which does not affect all candidates uniformly. |
| Keywords: | Range voting,Evaluative Voting, In Situ Experiment, Approval voting, Calibration |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01618039&r=pol |
| By: | Adnan, Wifag (New York University, Abu Dhabi); Miaari, Sami H. (Tel Aviv University) |
| Abstract: | Striving for gender equality presents major challenges but the benefits are vast, ranging from reduced conflict, both within and between communities, to higher economic growth. Unfortunately, Israel's gender wage gap remains one of the highest among developed countries, despite a growing reverse gender gap in educational attainment. Investigating the gender wage gap for the Jewish majority and for the Arab minority, we find evidence of gender segregation by industry and occupations in addition to a glass ceiling effect for Jewish and Arab women. Using data from the Israeli Household Income Survey and electoral data from the Israeli parliamentary elections (2009), this paper provides novel evidence of the role of voter preferences in explaining the persistence of gender pay gaps. Importantly, we find strong evidence of an association between a higher share of votes allocated to nationalist parties, in a given locality, and a larger, (adjusted), gender wage gap for both Jewish-Israelis and Arab-Israelis. |
| Keywords: | gender wage gap, voting behavior, glass ceiling, glass door, social attitudes, discrimination |
| JEL: | J21 J31 J61 J45 C14 C24 |
| Date: | 2018–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11261&r=pol |
| By: | Foarta, Dana; Leight, Jessica; Pande, Rohini; Ralston, Laura |
| Abstract: | Community targeting of vote payments - defined as the saturation of entire neighborhoods with cash prior to elections - is widespread in the developing world. In this paper, we utilize laboratory experiments conducted in the U.S. and Kenya to demonstrate that, relative to individual targeting, a vote-buying regime that distributes payments widely renders voters more tolerant of politician rent-seeking, and increases the level of politician rent-seeking observed in equilibrium. The most parsimonious model of preferences consistent with these patterns is a model in which both politicians and voters are characterized by multifaceted social preferences, encompassing reciprocity, altruism, and inequality aversion. |
| Date: | 2018–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12575&r=pol |
| By: | Paola Conconi; Nicolas Sahuguet; Maurizio Zanardi |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/264406&r=pol |