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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Nunnari, Salvatore; Zapal, Jan |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a theoretical model of voters' and politicians' behavior based on the notion that voters focus disproportionately on, and hence overweight, certain attributes of policies. We assume that policies have two attributes-benefits and costs-and that voters focus more on the attribute in which their options differ more. First, we consider exogenous policies and show that voters' focusing polarizes the electorate. Second, we consider the endogenous supply of policies by office-motivated politicians who take voters' distorted focus into account. We show that focusing leads to inefficient policies, which cater excessively to a subset of voters: social groups that are larger, have more distorted focus, and are more sensitive to changes in a single attribute are more influential. Finally, we show that augmenting the classical models of voting and electoral competition with focusing can contribute to explain puzzling stylized facts as the inverse correlation between income inequality and redistribution or the backlash effect of extreme policies. |
| JEL: | D03 D72 D78 |
| Date: | 2017–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12407&r=pol |
| By: | Roel M. W. J. Beetsma; Xavier Debrun; Randolph Sloof |
| Abstract: | The global surge in independent fiscal councils (IFCs) raises three related questions: How can IFCs improve the conduct of fiscal policy? Are they simultaneously desirable for voters and elected policymakers? And are they resilient to changes in political conditions? We build a model in which voters cannot observe the true competence of elected policymakers. IFCs’ role is to mitigate this imperfection. Equilibrium public debt is excessive because policymakers are “partisan” and “opportunistic.” If voters only care about policymakers’ competence, both the incumbent and the voters would be better off with an IFC as the debt bias would shrink. However, when other considerations eclipse competence and give the incumbent a strong electoral advantage or disadvantage, setting up an IFC may be counterproductive as the debt bias would increase. If the incumbent holds a moderate electoral advantage or disadvantage, voters would prefer an IFC, but an incumbent with a large advantage may prefer not to have an IFC. The main policy implications are that (i) establishing an IFC can only lower the debt bias if voters care sufficiently about policymakers’ competence; (ii) not all political environments are conducive to the emergence of IFCs; and (iii) IFCs are consequently vulnerable to shifts in political conditions. |
| Date: | 2017–09–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:17/195&r=pol |
| By: | Alberto Chong; Gianmarco León; Vivian Roza; Martin Valdivia; Gabriela Vega |
| Abstract: | We use a field experiment to evaluate the impact of two informational get-out-the-vote (GOTV) campaigns to boost female electoral participation in Paraguay. We find that public rallies have no effect either on registration or on voter turnout in the 2013 presidential elections. However, households that received door-to-door (D2D) treatment are 4.6 percentage points more likely to vote. Experimental variation on the intensity of the treatment at the locality level allows us to estimate spillover effects, which are present in localities that are geographically more concentrated, and thus may favor social interactions. Reinforcement effects to the already treated population are twice as large as diffusion to the untreated. Our results underscore the importance of taking into account urbanization patterns when designing informational campaigns. |
| Keywords: | Voter behavior, electoral politics, urbanization, spillover effects, Paraguay |
| JEL: | O10 D72 O53 D71 |
| Date: | 2017–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:upf:upfgen:1589&r=pol |
| By: | Aniekwe, Chika Charles |
| Abstract: | African elections are usually highly contested and competitive because of the winner takes all making of most of the political systems on the continent. Since the third wave of democracy (Huntington, 1991), due to the competitive nature of these elections, attention is usually focused on making these elections peaceful and often relatively credible. Little attention has been paid to documenting good practices across these retinue of elections with the bid to providing election practitioners opportunity to learn from good practices that could be applied in similar context and circumstances. This paper is an attempt at that. It chronicles some of the important measures deployed by different stakeholders towards successful 2016 General Elections in Ghana. It recommends that managing electoral competition in African election requires commitment of political stakeholders, development of mechanisms and measures for both political and judicial redress and commitment to rule of law through independence of the judiciary. |
| Keywords: | elections; democracy; political parties; Ghana; electoral commission |
| Date: | 2017–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iob:wpaper:201711&r=pol |
| By: | Alberto Chong; Gianmarco León; Vivian Roza; Martín Valdivia; Gabriela Vega |
| Abstract: | We use a field experiment to evaluate the impact of two informational get-out-the-vote (GOTV) campaigns to boost female electoral participation in Paraguay. We find that public rallies have no effect either on registration or on voter turnout in the 2013 presidential elections. However, households that received door-to-door (D2D) treatment are 4.6 percentage points more likely to vote. Experimental variation on the intensity of the treatment at the locality level allows us to estimate spillover effects, which are present in localities that are geographically more concentrated, and thus may favor social interactions. Reinforcement effects to the already treated population are twice as large as diffusion to the untreated. Our results underscore the importance of taking into account urbanization patterns when designing informational campaigns. |
| Keywords: | voter behavior, electoral politics, urbanization, spillover effects, Paraguay |
| JEL: | O10 D72 O53 D71 |
| Date: | 2017–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:1004&r=pol |
| By: | G. Bellettini; C. Berti Ceroni; C. Monfardini |
| Abstract: | We exploit a unique dataset merging data on individual socio-economic characteristics and political participation in an Italian municipality to investigate the relationship between ethnic diversity in residential neighborhoods and individuals' propensity to vote. We document a sizable negative impact of diversity on overall electoral turnout which reects differential effects at the individual level, depending on household equivalent income. Speciffically, we show that ethnic heterogeneity in the neighborhood reduces the political participation of the poor, while it fosters that of the more affluent. These results highlight a potential democratic deficit stemming from reduced and unequal electoral turnout in increasingly ethnically heterogeneous neighborhoods. |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2017–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp1114&r=pol |
| By: | Nikolas Tsakas; Dimitrios Xefteris |
| Abstract: | Electoral competition between two vote-share maximizing candidates in the context of the unidimensional spatial model leads to platform convergence: both candidates end up proposing the ideal policy of the median voter (Downs, 1957). Palfrey (1984) famously argued that if third candidate entry is expected after the two main candidates choose their platforms, the unique equilibrium is such that the two main candidates locate substantially far from each other. By conducting a laboratory experiment, we put this popular idea to test, for the first time. We allow entry to take place with a probability p [0; 1] and we find that, indeed, the degree of polarization of the two main candidates’ platforms increases as third candidate entry becomes more likely to occur, providing strong evidence in support of Palfrey’s (1984) formal results and underlying intuition. |
| Keywords: | electoral competition; entry; third party; spatial model; experiment |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2017–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ucy:cypeua:09-2017&r=pol |
| By: | Caselli, Francesco; Tesei, Andrea |
| Abstract: | We study theoretically and empirically whether natural resource windfalls affect political regimes. We show that windfalls have no effect on democracies, while they have heterogeneous political consequences in autocracies. In deeply entrenched autocracies, the effect of windfalls is virtually nil, while in moderately entrenched autocracies, windfalls significantly exacerbate the autocratic nature of the political system. To frame the empirical work, we present a simple model in which political incumbents choose the degree of political contestability and potential challengers decide whether to try to unseat the incumbents. The model uncovers a mechanism for the asymmetric impact of resource windfalls on democracies and autocracies, as well as the the differential impact within autocracies. |
| Keywords: | democratization; commodity prices; resource curse |
| JEL: | O10 P16 Q00 |
| Date: | 2016–07–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:64587&r=pol |
| By: | Nastassia Leszczynska |
| Abstract: | Activities outside of public office or combining specific public offices simultaneously is a topic of ongoing heated debates. An element crucial to these discussions is whether moonlighting is detrimental for politicians’ performance. In Belgium, the combination of local executive and regional legislative offices, i.e. double hat politicians, is a frequent habit for a majority of politicians. This accumulation of activities might lead to (un-)desirable outcomes in terms of political achievements. This paper investigates the impact of holding several remunerated and honorary positions on regional MPs parliamentary activities and mayor’s municipality performance in Wallonia. I use a database of all public and private positions held by Belgian politicians in Wallonia since the disclosure of positions became compulsory for those holding at least one public position, i.e. from 2004 to 2016. For members of Parliament, wearing a double hat reduces global parliamentary activity. For mayors, it seems that holding more remunerated positions is associated with less efficient municipality management. |
| Keywords: | political moonlighting; municipality governance; careers in politics |
| Date: | 2017–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/261072&r=pol |
| By: | de Bresser, Jochem (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research); van Soest, Arthur (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | This paper evaluates the predictive validity of stated intentions for actual behaviour. In the context of the 2017 Dutch parliamentary election, we compare how well polls based on probabilistic and deterministic questions line up with subsequent votes. Our empirical strategy is built around a randomised experiment in a representative panel. Respondents were either simply asked which party they will vote for, or were asked to allocate probabilities of voting for each party. The results show that for the large majority of the respondents, probabilities predict individual behaviour better than deterministic statements. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the predictive power of the subjective probabilities. We find evidence that they work better for those with higher probability numeracy, even though probability numeracy was measured eight years earlier. |
| Keywords: | subjective probabilities; predictive validity; probabilistic polling; elections |
| JEL: | D84 C81 C25 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tiu:tiucen:67bd2341-45c7-4e60-99e5-ff32b1be1668&r=pol |
| By: | Zim Nwokora (Deakin University, Australia); Riccardo Pelizzo (Nazarbayev University, Kazakhstan) |
| Abstract: | The term ‘party system’, explained Giovanni Sartori, refers to the pattern of interactions among major parties. That pattern can be represented as a type and treated as a proper unit of analysis. When ‘party system’ is defined in this way, it becomes clear that the scholarship lacks a direct measure of ‘party system change’. The Sartori approach to party system change is not the only legitimate way to understand this concept, but it does target an undoubtedly important feature of political systems—namely, the stability of major-party interactions. This article develops a new indicator, the index of fluidity, which measures the extent of such stability. Applying the index to Africa, we show there is significant cross-national variation in fluidity and weak correlation between fluidity and (Pedersen) volatility. |
| Keywords: | party systems, party system change, Africa, Sartori typology, fluidity |
| JEL: | D02 D72 H00 H11 H89 O00 O10 O43 O55 |
| Date: | 2017–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:agd:wpaper:17/048&r=pol |
| By: | Pablo Duarte; Gunther Schnabl |
| Abstract: | Based on the concepts of justice by Hayek, Rawls and Buchanan we argue that the growing political dissatisfaction in industrialized countries is rooted in the asymmetric pattern in monetary policies since the 1980s for two reasons. First, the structurally declining interest rates and the unconventional monetary policy measures have granted privileges to specific groups. Second, the increasingly expansionary monetary policies have negative growth effects, which reduce the scope for compensation of the ones excluded from the privileges. The result is the fading acceptance of the economic order and growing political instability. |
| Keywords: | Hayek, Rawls, Buchanan, privileges, inequality, monetary policy, order of rules, difference principle, economic order |
| JEL: | D63 E02 E52 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6734&r=pol |
| By: | Ahlfeldt, Gabriel M.; Maennig, Wolfgang; Osterheider, Tobias |
| Abstract: | Attitudes for a common currency differ from nation to nation, or from region to region. We analyze regionally differing voting results of a referendum held in Sweden in lieu of joining the European Monetary Union. We put a special focus on the role of the industrial mix – being a potential factor influencing heterogeneous transmission – and find a significant, but subordinated, impact on voting behavior. |
| Keywords: | Currency Unions; EMU; industrial structure; referenda |
| JEL: | J1 |
| Date: | 2016–05–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:66158&r=pol |
| By: | Antonin Macé (Aix-Marseille Univ. (Aix-Marseille School of Economics), CNRS, EHESS and Centrale Marseille); Rafael Treibich (University of Southern Denmark) |
| Abstract: | We study the design of voting rules for international unions when countries’ participation is voluntary. While efficiency recommends weighting countries proportionally to their stakes, we show that accounting for participation constraints entails overweighting some countries, those for which the incentive to participate is the lowest. When decisions are not enforceable, cooperation requires the satisfaction of more stringent constraints, that may be mitigated by granting a veto power to some countries. The model has important implications for the problem of apportionment, the allocation of voting weights to countries of differing populations, where it provides a rationale for setting a minimum representation for small countries. |
| Keywords: | international unions, constitutional design, veto, participation constraints |
| JEL: | F53 D02 C61 C73 |
| Date: | 2017–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1742&r=pol |
| By: | Ermolaeva, Lyubov A.; Pantic, Bojan |
| Abstract: | It is widely recognized that corporate political ties (CPT) in general lead to better organizational performance and higher firm value (Fisman, 2001; Frynas, Mellahi and Pigman, 2006; Goldman, Rocholl and So, 2009) however there are empirical evidence that the presence of CPT under certain circumstances causes negative effects on firm value (e.g. Aggarwal, Meshke & Wang, 2012; Hersh, Netter & Pope, 2008). The investigated case of RusalÙ³ investments in Montenegrin aluminum plant demonstrates that CPT did not improve the organizational performance but even result in Rusal escaping from Montenegro. The aim of the study is to reveal/uncover the process through which corporate political ties (CPT) transform from valuable asset to a costly liability by unswerving following research questions: why corporate political ties change over time? And how this change impacts the MNE strategy in the foreign market? |
| Keywords: | political ties, EMNEs, multinational companies, entreprises, Balkans, |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sps:cpaper:8619&r=pol |
| By: | Christos Mavridis; Nikolas Tsakas |
| Abstract: | We study how different forms of social capital lead to different distributions of multidimensional opinions by affecting the channels through which individuals communicate. We develop a model to compare and contrast the evolution of opinions between societies whose members communicate through bonding associations and societies where communication is through bridging associations. Both processes converge towards opinion distributions where there are groups within which there is consensus in all issues. Bridging processes converge to distributions that have, on average, fewer opinion groups and lower fractionalisation. We provide additional results that highlight the distinct characteristics of the two processes. |
| Keywords: | Social Capital; Opinion Formation; Bounded Confidence; Bonding versus Bridging Associations |
| JEL: | D71 D83 P16 Z1 |
| Date: | 2017–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ucy:cypeua:08-2017&r=pol |