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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Colussi, Tommaso (IZA); Isphording, Ingo E. (IZA); Pestel, Nico (IZA) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies electoral effects of exposure to religious minorities in the context of Muslim communities in Germany. Using unique data on mosques' construction and election results across municipalities over the period 1980-2013, we find that the presence of a mosque increases political extremism. To establish causality, we exploit arguably exogenous variation in the distance of the election date to the month of Ramadan, when Muslim communities become more visible to the general public. Our findings show that vote shares for both right- and left-wing extremist parties become larger when the election date is closer to Ramadan. We additionally show that the change in minority salience also increases the likelihood of politically motivated crimes against Muslims. |
| Keywords: | minority salience, Muslims, voting, conflict |
| JEL: | D72 D74 J15 |
| Date: | 2016–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp10417&r=pol |
| By: | Egidio Farina (University of Sussex) |
| Abstract: | Does the race of a politician have an impact on the incidence of crime? I answer this question by focusing on large US cities, where active participation in the political life of the African-American candidates has undergone a strong upsurge since 1965. In order to deal with the endogeneity of black candidates to city characteristics, a regression discontinuity is used, exploiting the multi-racial elections decided by a narrow margin of victory. The results show that the number of motor vehicles stolen increases considerably the year after the election of an African-American candidate. I investigate, as a possible channel of influence, how police employment responds to the election of a black mayor, finding a negative effect the year after the electoral race. |
| Keywords: | African-American mayor; close elections; regression discontinuity; crime |
| JEL: | D72 H70 J15 |
| Date: | 2017–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sus:susewp:0217&r=pol |
| By: | Anja Prummer (Queen Mary University of London) |
| Abstract: | This paper characterizes the optimal advertising strategy of candidates in an election campaign, where groups of heterogeneous voters are targeted through media outlets. We discuss its effects on the implemented policy and relate it to the well-documented increase in polarization. Additionally, we empirically establish that polarization displays electoral cycles. These cycles emerge in the model as candidates find it optimal to cater to different groups of voters and thus to adjust policies. Further, technologies that allow targeting voters more precisely tend to increase polarization. Our prediction is confirmed empirically as an increase in internet penetration leads to higher polarization. |
| Keywords: | Targeting, Media, Networks, Voting |
| JEL: | D85 D72 D83 |
| Date: | 2016–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp805&r=pol |
| By: | Horacio A. Larreguy; John Marshall; James M. Snyder, Jr. |
| Abstract: | Voters are often uncertain about and biased against non-dominant political parties. By reducing the information gap with dominant parties, political advertising may thus disproportionately benefit non-dominant parties electorally. We test this argument in Mexico, where three main parties dominate many localities. To identify the effects of exposure to partisan advertising, we exploit differences across neighboring precincts in campaign ad distributions arising from cross-state media coverage spillovers induced by a 2007 reform that equalized access to ad slots across all broadcast media. Our results show that ads on AM radio increase the vote shares of the PAN and PRD, but not the previously-hegemonic PRI. Consistent with our model, campaign advertising is most effective in poorly informed and politically uncompetitive electoral precincts, and against locally dominant parties of intermediate strength. |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2016–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22949&r=pol |
| By: | Borooah, Vani; tagat, Anirudh |
| Abstract: | This paper uses village level data on individual voters to ask what are the factors which determine the probability of whether an individual votes? Is this probability greater for national compared to local elections? And is there evidence that people are more likely to vote today than they were in the past? Allied to these questions is another set of questions relating to the choice of candidates. What are the factors that make for women’s autonomy in voting, meaning that they cast their vote without reference to their spousal instructions? What are the factors which contribute to people voting for candidates who are of their own caste? And, lastly, what are the factors which contribute to people voting for candidates who have a reputation for honesty and fairness? Needless to say, voting in elections is just one facet of political participation. Another might be attending and participating in political meetings. This is particularly relevant in Indian villages since the Constitution (73rd Amendment) Act of 1993. This made it mandatory for all villages to have a village council (hereafter, Gram Sabha) consisting of all registered voters on the electoral roll of a village. The Gram Sabha was to be entrusted with the power of supervising the functioning of the elected village panchayat and to approve the panchayat’s development plan for the village and the associated budget. Consequently, in addition to voting, electors in villages had another form of political participation: they could attend Gram Sabha meetings and also participate in its discussions. This paper also analyses the factors which determine attendance and participation in such meetings. A worrisome feature of the results was the high proportion of married women reporting that they cast their vote according to their husbands’ instructions and further that, this proportion was impervious to the education level of the women. Women’s education would not appear, from these results, to reduce the power of patriarchy. Another source of anxiety was the gender gap in the proportion of men and women who took part in Gram Sabha discussions. This would suggest that the reservation of village panchayat positions (including that of panchayat pradhan, or village president) for women was a step in the right direction for the empowerment of women. In contrast, there were no inter-social group differences in participation in Gram Sabha meetings. |
| Keywords: | India, Villages, Political Participation, Local government |
| JEL: | H11 H4 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:75687&r=pol |
| By: | Christian Bergholz (University of Kassel); Ivo Bischoff (University of Kassel) |
| Abstract: | We analyze data from a survey among local council members in 59 German municipali-ties. We ask council members whether their home municipality should cooperate with neigh-boring municipalities in the provision of public services like childcare or road maintenance. Their answers are clearly driven by office-related self-interest. Council members who have more political power and thus have more power to lose if their home municipality cooperates are more likely oppose inter-municipal cooperation. This interpretation receives further backing by the fact that delegates’ support for inter-municipal cooperation increases in the population size of their home municipality but decreases in the size of its neighbors. |
| Keywords: | inter-municipal cooperation, politicians, survey, Germany, public choice |
| JEL: | H77 D72 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:201647&r=pol |
| By: | Shino Takayama (School of Economics, The University of Queensland); Yuki Tamura (Department of Economics, University of Rochester); Terence Yeo (School of Economics, The University of Queensland) |
| Abstract: | We study the existence problem of Nash equilibrium as well as party polarization in an electoral competition model. In our model, political parties also value holding office (office rent) in addition to maximizing their party members’ utility. A class of models with an uncertainty about the median voter position has been increasingly important and Drouvelis, Saporiti and Vriend (2014) present an experimental study to support a model with office rent. But the inclusion of office rent renders the payoff of each party discontinuous. This makes it difficult to apply a usual fixed point argument to prove the existence of Nash equilibrium. By using a recently developed concept, C-security in McLennan, Monteiro and Tourky (2011), we provide conditions under which a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSE) or a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSE) exists within a fairly general setting, and further the analysis by presenting conditions under which various types of policy choices, including polarization, arise in equilibrium. |
| Keywords: | Noncooperative games, electoral competition, existence of equilibrium |
| Date: | 2016–12–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qld:uq2004:575&r=pol |
| By: | Natalia Jimenez (Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide & Middlesex University); Angel Solano-Garcia (Departamento de Teoria e Historia Economica, University of Granada & Globe) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we analyze how the punishment behavior of a democratically elected official varies when facing an electoral process (opportunism). To this aim, we conduct an economic experiment in which officials are third party punishers in a public goods game. We consider two different scenarios which differ in the degree of cooperation within the society. We find that officials increase their punishment when they face elections in both scenarios. Contrary to candidates’ expectations, voters always vote for the least severe candidate. |
| Keywords: | Opportunism, Punishment, Public Goods Games, Voting, Experiments. |
| JEL: | C92 D72 H4 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pab:wpaper:16.15&r=pol |
| By: | Marco Battaglini; Bård Harstad |
| Abstract: | In recent decades, democratic countries have signed hundreds of international environmental agreements (IEAs). Most of these agreements, however, are weak: they generally do not include effective enforcement or monitoring mechanisms. This is a puzzle in standard economic models. To study this phenomenon, we propose a positive theory of IEAs in which the political incumbents negotiate them in the shadow of reelection concerns. We show that, in these environments, incumbents are prone to negotiate treaties that are simultaneously overambitious (larger than what they would be without electoral concerns) and weak (might not be implemented in full). The theory also provides a new perspective for understanding investments in green technologies, highlighting a channel through which countries are tempted to rely too much on technology instead of sanctions to make compliance credible. We present preliminary evidence consistent with these predictions. |
| JEL: | D72 F55 Q58 |
| Date: | 2016–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22968&r=pol |
| By: | Dang, Thang |
| Abstract: | In this study, I estimate the causal effects of education on political outcomes in Vietnam using data from Vietnam’s World Values Survey. To address the potential endogeneity problem of education, I employs the 1991 compulsory schooling reform in Vietnam to instrument for exogenous changes in schooling years with a regression discontinuity design. I find that in general education does cause favorable impacts on political outcomes in Vietnam using the whole sample. In particular, one more year of schooling results in increases in the probabilities of political concern and political participation by about 6–12% points and 6–8% points, respectively. However, I strikingly find that for those whose at least lower secondary degree, more schooling years they achieve less political concern they have. |
| Keywords: | education, political outcomes, regression discontinuity, Vietnam |
| JEL: | D72 I25 |
| Date: | 2017–01–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:75678&r=pol |
| By: | Andrea Mattozzi; Marcos Y. Nakaguma |
| Abstract: | This paper studies a committee decision-making problem. Committee members are heterogeneous in their competence, they are biased towards one of the alternatives and career oriented, and they can choose whether to vote or abstain. The interaction between career concern and bias affects the voting behavior of members depending on transparency of individual votes. We show that transparency attenuates the pre-existing biases of competent members and exacerbates the biases of incompetent members. Public voting leads to better decisions when the magnitude of the bias is large, while secret voting performs better otherwise. We provide experimental evidence supporting our theoretical conclusions. |
| Keywords: | Committees; Voting, Career Concern; Transparency |
| JEL: | D72 C92 D71 |
| Date: | 2016–11–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:spa:wpaper:2016wpecon29&r=pol |
| By: | Alberto Alesina (Harvard University); Stefanie Stantcheva (Harvard University); Edoardo Teso (Harvard University) |
| Abstract: | Using newly collected cross-country survey and experimental data, we investigate how beliefs about intergenerational mobility affect preferences for redistribution in five countries: France, Italy, Sweden, U.K., and U.S. Americans are more optimistic than Europeans about intergenerational mobility, and too optimistic relative to actual mobility. Our randomized treatment that shows respondents pessimistic information about mobility increases support for redistribution, mostly for equality of opportunity policies. A strong political polarization exists: Left-wing respondents are more pessimistic about intergenerational mobility, their preferences for redistribution are correlated with their mobility perceptions, and they respond to pessimistic information by increasing support for redistribution. None of these apply to right-wing respondents, possibly because of their negative views of government. |
| Keywords: | redistribution, intergenerational mobility, taxation, online experiment, fairness |
| JEL: | D31 D72 H21 H23 H24 H41 |
| Date: | 2016–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hka:wpaper:2016-037&r=pol |
| By: | Gehrsitz, Markus; Ungerer, Martin |
| Abstract: | Millions of refugees made their way to Europe between 2014 and 2015, with over one million arriving in Germany alone. Yet, little is known about the impact of this inflow on labor markets, crime, and voting behavior. This article uses administrative data on refugee allocation and provides an evaluation of the short-run consequences of the refugee inflow. Our identification strategy exploits that a scramble for accommodation determined the assignment of refugees to German counties resulting in exogeneous variations in the number of refugees per county even within states. Our estimates suggest that migrants have not displaced native workers but have themselves struggled to find gainful employment. We find very small increases in crime in particular with respect to drug offenses and fare-dodging. Our analysis further suggests that counties which experience a larger influx see neither more nor less support for the main anti-immigrant party than counties which experience small migrant inflows. |
| Keywords: | Immigration,Refugees,Unemployment,Crime,Voting |
| JEL: | J6 J15 K4 D72 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:16086&r=pol |
| By: | Italo Colantone; Piero Stanig |
| Abstract: | Using disaggregated referendum returns and individual-level data, we show that support for the Leave option in the referendum regarding European Union membership of the United Kingdom was systematically higher in regions hit harder by economic globalization. We focus on the shock of surging imports from China over the past three decades. An instrumental variables approach supports a causal interpretation. We claim that this effect is driven by the displacement determined by globalization in the absence of effective compensation of its losers. On the other hand, neither stocks nor inflows of immigrants in a region are associated with support for the Leave option. The analysis of individual data from the British Election Study shows that attitudes towards immigration are strongly correlated with vote choice. Yet, attitudes about immigration are more closely related to the import shock than to the actual incidence of immigration in a region. |
| Keywords: | Brexit, Globalization, Economic Vote |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp1644&r=pol |
| By: | Mehlum, Halvor (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo); Moene, Kalle (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo) |
| Abstract: | By incorporating positional dynamics into a conflict model relevant to battlefields and politics, we show that the conditions that induce regime stability can also induce hard conflicts. We show that in contests with incumbent-challenger turnover, i) asymmetric power across groups and positions may magnify conflicts; ii) more severe conflicts can occur with lower turnover of incumbents; iii) power can be self-defeating, as cost advantages can reduce payoffs; and iv) double inequality across positions and groups can maximize the graveness of conflicts and the social waste of resources. The propositions in our paper are contrary to the standard implications of static conict models. |
| Keywords: | Contests; political stability; incumbency advantage; conflict and civil war |
| JEL: | C73 D72 D74 |
| Date: | 2016–09–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:osloec:2016_013&r=pol |
| By: | Thomas Groll (Columbia University); Anja Prummer (Queen Mary University of London) |
| Abstract: | We study lobbying in a setting in which decision-makers share resources in a network. Two opposing interest groups choose which decision-maker they want to target with their resource provision, and their decision depends on the decision-makers' ideologies as well as the network structure. We characterize the lobbying strategies in various network settings and show that a higher resource flow as well as homophily reinforce decision-makers' ideological bias. We highlight that competing lobbyists' efforts do not neutralize each other and their payoffs and competitive advantages depend on the networks they face. Our findings are consistent with empirically established lobbying activities. |
| Keywords: | Networks, Lobbying, Targeting, Flow of resources, Ideology, Centrality, Homophily, Colonel Blotto, Externalities |
| JEL: | D72 D78 D83 D85 |
| Date: | 2016–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp808&r=pol |
| By: | Batiston Marques, Thales; Seixas dos Santos, Nelson |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the relation between political news and market returns. To do so we applied a Garch filter to a sample of the main Brazilian stock market index returns (Ibovespa Index) and of short-term interest rates (Selic Over and DI) which ranged from 01/02/2014 to 04/29/2016. Then we looked for periods of abnormal volatility which might be associated with political events using a parametric and a nonparametric method. Notwithstanding there were news like important politician been arrested and even speculation about the beginning of an impeachment process, we found relation between abnormal volatilities and political news only in Ibovespa returns during Presidential Elections. |
| Keywords: | Political Events, Financial Markets, Information, GARCH. |
| JEL: | G14 |
| Date: | 2016–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:75530&r=pol |
| By: | Diogo Britto (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore; Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore); Stefano Fiorin |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the role of council size on government corruption in Brazil. We leverage on the discontinuous relationship between the population size of municipalities and council size dictated by the law to implement a regression discontinuity design. We document a substantial positive causal effect of the number of city councilors on the incidence of corruption detected during federal audits. Results also show that hav- ing an extra councilor does not affect the size of the public budget, but in uences its composition. It increases expenditures related to public housing and recreation, which we interpret as items related to clientelis- tic policies. Finally, we find a negative relationship between council size and its productivity: namely, the numbers of legislative bills proposed by councilor and approved are both lower in municipalities with larger councils. |
| Keywords: | Corruption, Council Size, Regression Discontinuity. |
| JEL: | D72 D73 H72 |
| Date: | 2016–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ctc:serie1:def054&r=pol |
| By: | Ozili, Peterson K |
| Abstract: | This paper presents a discussion on whistle-blowing and take the view that whistle-blowing is an important fraud detection technique. A discussion of some factors that influence the whistle-blowers’ incentive to blow the whistle or to remain silent in the face of persuasive fraud red flags, is also presented. The paper suggests that the tradeoff between the cost and benefit of whistle-blowing may compel the whistle-blower to apply some degree of conservatism in their whistle-blowing activities. Also, some discussion on how whistle-blowing might be influenced by firm-level politics, country-level political economy, firm ownership and other institutional factors is presented. Finally, although the provision of incentives can increase the appeal to encourage whistle-blowing, the appeal to blow the whistle may be weakened when the whistle-blower takes into account the larger context that influence the decision to blow the whistle or to remain silent. |
| Keywords: | Forensic Accounting, Fraud Detection, Whistle Blowing, Politics, Conservatism, Ownership Control, Political Economy |
| JEL: | M4 M41 M42 M48 |
| Date: | 2016–11–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:74982&r=pol |
| By: | Facchini, Giovanni; Margalit, Yotam; Nakata, Hiroyuki |
| Abstract: | Popular sentiment toward immigration is often antagonistic, making the integration of migrants one of the most important yet daunting challenges facing societies in advanced economies. Can information campaigns decrease public opposition to immigration? This paper reports results from a large-scale experiment conducted in Japan, a country with widespread anti-immigration sentiment. Embedded in a comprehension study, we randomly exposed a large national sample of citizens to information pertaining to potential social and economic benefits from immigration. Depending on the treatment, we find that this exposure led to a substantial increase in support for a more open immigration policy. The treatments also motivated citizens to take political action in support of this cause. Notably, while smaller in magnitude, many effects also persisted 10-12 days after the treatment. The results highlight the potential value of combating enmity to incoming foreigners with campaigns that inform the public about key positive impacts of immigration. |
| Keywords: | Experiment; Immigration; information campaigns; Japan; Public Opinion |
| JEL: | F12 F16 L11 |
| Date: | 2016–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11709&r=pol |
| By: | Hanappi, Hardy; Scholz-Waeckerle, Manuel |
| Abstract: | In this paper we present the major theoretical and methodological pillars of evolutionary political economy. We proceed in four steps. Aesthetics: In chapter 1 the immediate appeal of evolutionary political economy as a specific scientific activity is described. Content: Chapter 2 explores the object of investigation of evolutionary political economy. Power: The third chapter develops the interplay between politics and economics. Methods: Chapter 4 focusses on the evolution of methods necessary for evolutionary political economy. The conclusion positions the field of evolutionary political economy – as we proposed to establish it in this paper - within the wider area of scientific activity. In particular, demarcation lines towards some fashionable economic schools (institutionalism, behavioural economics, post-Keynesianism, etc.) are indicated. |
| Keywords: | Evolutionary Theory, Political Economy, Methodology of Social Sciences |
| JEL: | B00 B52 C63 |
| Date: | 2015–10–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:75447&r=pol |
| By: | Hankins, William (University of Alabama); Cheng, Chak (University of South Carolina); Chiu, Jeremy (Bank of England); Stone, Anna-Leigh (Samford University) |
| Abstract: | This paper explores how US partisan conflict impacts the cash management decisions of US firms. Using a sign restrictions approach to identify structural shocks to partisan conflict, we find that an exogenous 10% rise in the Partisan Conflict Index above trend is associated with a 0.4 percentage point increase in average cash-to-total assets above trend. These baseline results hold for both the mean and median ratio of cash-to-total assets for all firms in our sample, across the total assets distribution, as well as for different classifications of firms. Additionally, we conduct a series of robustness checks, including a firm-level regression analysis, all of which uphold these results. Our findings reinforce the signalling effect that political dysfunction can have on corporate managers. |
| Keywords: | Partisan conflict; cash holdings; economic policy uncertainty; VAR; sign restrictions |
| JEL: | E32 G30 G32 |
| Date: | 2016–12–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boe:boeewp:0638&r=pol |
| By: | Rafael Di Tella; Julio J. Rotemberg |
| Abstract: | We present a simple model of populism as the rejection of “disloyal” leaders. We show that adding the assumption that people are worse off when they experience low income as a result of leader betrayal (than when it is the result of bad luck) to a simple voter choice model yields a preference for incompetent leaders. These deliver worse material outcomes in general, but they reduce the feelings of betrayal during bad times. We find some evidence consistent with our model in a survey carried out on the eve of the recent U.S. presidential election. Priming survey participants with questions about the importance of competence in policymaking usually reduced their support for the candidate who was perceived as less competent; this effect was reversed for rural, and less educated white, survey participants. |
| JEL: | D64 K42 P16 |
| Date: | 2016–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22975&r=pol |
| By: | Sharon G. M. Goh; Grace H.Y. Lee; Eduard Bomhoff |
| Abstract: | Globally income inequality is on the rise. With growing income inequality, market outcomes are no longer Pareto efficient as it is benefiting only a small group of individuals. Working with the World Values Survey data, this paper aims to provide an additional perspective on income inequality in Malaysia. We find evidence that individuals’ underlying beliefs, ideologies and education level are important determinants of their attitudes toward income distribution. In addition, the paper concludes that individuals’ preference for income distribution is significantly shaped by the experiences and economic condition in their local communities. States that are poorer and more ethnically diverse prefer more equal income. |
| Keywords: | The New Economic Policy, income inequality, beliefs, preferences, redistribution, World Values Survey |
| Date: | 2016–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2016-02&r=pol |
| By: | Jamal Bouoiyour (CATT); Refk Selmi (CATT) |
| Abstract: | Many analysts, who had anticipated a great market anxiety resulting in market-wide stock price losses over the event of a Trump presidential victory, remain puzzling through why the market rebounded since the next election day. Whatever the reason, investors appear to be digesting Trump's win speedier than expected. The present paper examines, at sectoral level, the behavior of a variety of US stock price indices (Dow Jones Industrial Average, S\&P 500 and Nasdaq Composite) surrounding the announcement of the Republican candidate's win on 08 November 2016. Although all companies face ongoing uncertainty, the 2016 US election outcome is likely to divide the stock market into losing (technology and utilities) and winning sectors (health care, oil and gas, real estate, defense, financials and consumer goods and services). Judging by the campaign promises, the best-performing companies are generally those that will gain directly from Trump's proposals revolving around rising infrastructure spending, renegotiating trade agreements, loosening financial regulation, easing restrictions on energy production, and repealing Obamacare. |
| Date: | 2016–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1612.06200&r=pol |
| By: | Irina V. Ubozhenko (National Research University Higher School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | The paper gives the author’s view on the cognitive political discourse analysis procedure by researching the case of teaching creative translation. Of a particular interest is the fact that the research material is based on the example of the discourse analysis of modern political terminology and other non-equivalent vocabulary within the bounds of political contexts. Unlike traditional approaches connecting creativity to literary texts studies, the paper deals with the methodology of comprehending and translating foreign academic and scientific texts. Cognitive study of the aspects of contextual actualization of political concepts in the English and Russian discourses by means of comparative analysis is aimed at professional explanation of motivation in choosing translation equivalents. The algorithm of making up an associative thesaurus based on cognitive signs of lexical marking has been used as the major tool of political discourse analysis as well as the foundation for the original creative model of teaching translation suggested by the author. |
| Keywords: | political discourse, cognitive discourse analysis, associative thesaurus, push-word methodology, teaching translation creativity |
| JEL: | Z |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hig:wpaper:41/ps/2016&r=pol |