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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Valsecchi, Michele (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University) |
| Abstract: | Modern state bureaucracies are designed to be insulated from political interference. Successful insulation implies that politicians' electoral incentives do not affect bureaucrats' corruption. I test this prediction by assembling a unique dataset on corruption, promotions and demotions for more than 4 million Indonesian local civil servants. To identify the effect of reelection incentives, I exploit the existence of term limits and a difference-indifference strategy. I find that reelection incentives decrease the corruption behaviour of both top and administrative bureaucrats, which constitutes new evidence of the deep, farreaching effects of politicians' accountability on local civil servants. I explore a mechanism where bureaucrats have career concerns and politicians facing reelection manipulate such concerns by increasing the turnover of top bureaucrats. Consistent with this mechanism, I find that reelection incentives increase demotions of top bureaucrats and promotions of administrative bureaucrats. |
| Keywords: | Corruption; Elections; Bureaucracy |
| JEL: | D72 D73 H83 K40 O17 |
| Date: | 2016–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0684&r=pol |
| By: | Johansson, Anders C. (Stockholm China Economic Research Institute) |
| Abstract: | Social media provides political actors, opinion makers, and the electorate with the opportunity to bypass traditional media and engage in direct exchange of political information. This article explores how political candidates in the 2014 legislative election in Indonesia used social media during their political campaign. Exploiting a unique hand-collected data set, the study sheds light on personal characteristics that have explanatory power for political candidates’ choice to engage over social media. It also provides insight into the content of politicians’ messages and drivers for different types of content. The findings suggest that social media is used by a relatively large percentage of politicians in Indonesia and that they use social media platforms such as Twitter to engage with their electorate on several topics related to their campaign during election periods. |
| Keywords: | Indonesia; Social media; Elections; Politics; Democratic process; Political process; Media industry |
| JEL: | D72 L82 |
| Date: | 2016–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:hascer:2016-043&r=pol |
| By: | Jessica Leight (Williams College); Rohini Pande (Harvard University and NBER); Laura Ralston (World Bank) |
| Abstract: | Though vote-buying is observed in a diverse set of polities worldwide, relatively little is known about the channels through which it affects subsequent governance outcomes. Using laboratory experiments conducted in the U.S. and Kenya, we show that vote-buying reduces voters' willingness to punish politicians and increases rent-seeking by the incumbent politician. Specifically, we collect data from 816 subjects engaged in a simple voting game in which voters can punish a politician who expropriates rents from a common treasury. Voters who receive "a payment in exchange for your vote" increase the maximum amount they will allow the politician to expropriate while still voting to reelect him. Politicians, in turn, expropriate more when vote-buying is introduced. We provide evidence that social preferences, particularly reciprocity, are an important channel for this response. |
| Keywords: | Corruption, vote buying, political economy |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2016–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wil:wileco:2016-15&r=pol |
| By: | Micael Castanheira De Moura; Laurent Bouton; A. Llorente-Saguer |
| Abstract: | We propose a theory-based experimental approach to compare the properties of approval voting (AV) with thoseof plurality. This comparison is motivated by the theoretical prediction that, in our aggregate uncertainty setup,AV should produce close to first-best outcomes,while pluralitywill not. The experiment shows, first, thatwelfaregains are substantial. Second, both aggregate and individual responses are in line with theoretical predictions,and thus with strategic voting. Finally, subjects' behavior under AV highlights the need to study equilibria inasymmetric strategies. |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/242105&r=pol |
| By: | Johansson, Anders C. (Stockholm China Economic Research Institute) |
| Abstract: | Does social media have the potential to influence the political process more in certain countries? How do political actors and citizens use social media to participate in the political process? This paper analyzes these questions in the context of contemporary Indonesia, a country with a young democracy and a vibrant emerging economy. First, the relationships between traditional and social media and politics are discussed. Then, the current situation in Indonesia’s traditional media industry and how it may have helped drive the popularity of social media in Indonesia is analyzed. Finally, the paper discusses social media in today’s Indonesia and provides examples of how political actors and citizens use social media in the political process. |
| Keywords: | Indonesia; Social media; Media; Politics; Democratic process; Political process; Media industry |
| JEL: | D72 L82 |
| Date: | 2016–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:hascer:2016-042&r=pol |
| By: | Panagiotis Th. Konstantinou (Department of International and European Economic Studies, Athens University of Economics and Business, Greece); Theodore Panagiotidis (Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, Greece; The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis, Italy); Costas Roumanias (Department of International and European Economic Studies, Athens University of Economics and Business, Greece) |
| Abstract: | In an simple model of voter participation, the effects of election margin and campaign expenditure are shown to be state-dependent – varying with low/high turnout. We empirically assess these implications for observed turnout, employing data from US House elections from 2000 to 2008 by means of quantile regression analysis. We document that the effects of expected election margin and campaign spending on turnout are state-dependent: the later is positive and decreasing, whereas the former is negative and U-shaped. Other determinants' influence on turnout (e.g. education, population density) is also shown to vary across the conditional distribution of turnout rate. |
| Keywords: | Voter Turnout, Election Margin, Campaign Expenditure, Quantile Regression |
| JEL: | C21 D72 |
| Date: | 2016–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rim:rimwps:16-29&r=pol |
| By: | Micael Castanheira De Moura; Laurent Bouton; A. Llorente-Saguer |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/242106&r=pol |
| By: | Sergio Espuelas Barroso (Universitat de Barcelona) |
| Abstract: | Over the past century and a half, Spain has had a tumultuous political history. What impact has this had on social policy? Democracy has had a positive effect on both the levels of social spending and its long-term growth trend. With the arrival of democracy in 1931, the transition began from a traditional regime (with low levels of social spending) to a modern regime (with high levels of social spending). Franco’s dictatorship, however, reversed this change in direction, retarding the positive growth in social spending. At the same time, the effect of left-wing parties was statistically significant only in the nineteen-thirties (prior to the Keynesian consensus) and in the period of the Bourbon Restoration (when the preferences of low-income groups were systematically ignored). |
| Keywords: | Welfare State, Dictatorship, Democracy, Redistribution, Spain, History of social policy. |
| JEL: | I30 H53 N30 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ewp:wpaper:355web&r=pol |
| By: | Jakob de Haan; Sylvester Eijffinger |
| Abstract: | This paper reviews recent research on the political economy of monetary policy-making, both by economists and political scientists. The traditional argument for central bank independence (CBI) is based on the desire to counter inflationary biases. However, studies in political science on the determinants of central bank independence suggest that governments may choose to delegate monetary policy in order to detach it from political debates and power struggles. This argument would be especially valid in countries with coalition governments, federal structures and strongly polarized political systems. The recent financial crisis has changed the role of central banks as evidenced by the large set of new unconventional monetary and macro-prudential policy measures. But financial stability and unconventional monetary policies have much stronger distributional consequences than conventional monetary policies and this has potential implications for the central bank's independence. It may also have changed the regime from monetary dominance to fiscal dominance. However, our results do not suggest that CBI has been reduced since the Great Financial Crisis. This holds both for legal measures of CBI and the turnover rate of central bank governors. |
| Keywords: | central bank independence; fiscal dominance; determinants of CBI |
| JEL: | E42 E52 E58 |
| Date: | 2016–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:539&r=pol |
| By: | Wildmer Daniel Gregori (Prometeia Associazione (Italy)); Wildmer Agnese Sacchi (Sapienza University of Rome (Italy) and Governance and Economics research Network (Spain)) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates whether speculation about Greece.s exit from the euro has spilled over into other euro area countries. sovereign bond yields. Our empirical analysis is based on more than 64,000 news items on Grexit between December 2014 and October 2015, collected daily via the Factiva database. We can take account of Grexit news generally and, also, distinguish news items according to individual country press, domestic political leaders, supranational executives and institutions. Our results suggest that more news about Grexit drives up bond yields in European peripheral countries, but that there are no effects on European core countries. Thus, speculations about Grexit seem to be confined to more vulnerable economies. In addition, financial markets in peripheral countries react more to Grexit news associated to supranational executives and related institutions compared to news related to domestic politicians and European political bodies, due possibly to higher perceived credibility of the former with respect to the latter. |
| Keywords: | Grexit, Financial markets, Government bond, News, Spillovers, Euro area, GARCH. |
| JEL: | E43 E62 G12 G14 |
| Date: | 2016–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:anc:wmofir:134&r=pol |
| By: | de Haan, J.; Eijffinger, Sylvester (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | This paper reviews recent research on the political economy of monetary policy-making, both by economists and political scientists. The traditional argument for central bank independence (CBI) is based on the desire to counter inflationary biases. However, studies in political science on the determinants of central bank independence suggest that governments may choose to delegate monetary policy in order to detach it from political debates and power struggles. This argument would be especially valid in countries with coalition governments, federal structures and strongly polarized political systems. The recent financial crisis has changed the role of central banks as evidenced by the large set of new unconventional monetary and macro-prudential policy measures. But financial stability and unconventional monetary policies have much stronger distributional consequences than conventional monetary policies and this has potential implications for the central bank’s independence. It may also have changed the regime from monetary dominance to fiscal dominance. However, our results do not suggest that CBI has been reduced since the Great Financial Crisis. This holds both for legal measures of CBI and the turnover rate of central bank governors. |
| Keywords: | central bank independence; fiscal dominance; determinantsof CBI |
| JEL: | E42 E52 E58 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tiu:tiucen:54f2c3e3-46f2-4763-b1ac-b865f90cb42b&r=pol |
| By: | Dinda, Soumyananda |
| Abstract: | This study investigates the relationship between social choice and fiscal performance in India since 1991. Social choice is simple measurement in public affair activities like participating in election. Vote turnover in a democracy is taken to measure trust on institution. Social trust is considered as a proxy of social capital. Truly, the percentage vote turnover is the measurement of the level of citizens’ chance to express their preferences, which certainly help to increase governmental responsibility and accountability and thereby government performance. Here, the government is forced to be responsive to citizens’ preferences and the underlying social contract rule, which leads to a higher level of fiscal discipline. Using principal component analysis we construct social capital index that captures both structural and cultural aspects. Fiscal institution in India becomes weak in the post reform era. Group of politicians are much more interest about their local or regional issues than national issues even they are not interested to formulate regional development policy through discussion in the Parliament of India. Here higher value of social index indicates higher level of social trust as proxy of higher social capital. High social capital inversely affects the fiscal performance. |
| Keywords: | Social Preference, Trust, Social Capital, Vote Turnover, Institution, Performance of Government, Fiscal Performance |
| JEL: | D7 H0 H3 O1 O2 Z1 Z18 |
| Date: | 2015–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:75828&r=pol |
| By: | Gerling, Lena |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the impact of urban protests on coup attempts in a sample of 39 Sub- Saharan African countries for the period 1990 to 2007. Widespread public discontent, especially when occurring in urban centers, can act as a trigger of coups d'état in autocratic regimes by opening a window of opportunity for leadership removals by the ruling elite. The main difficulty in testing this relationship is that public revolts are rarely exogenous to coup risk. To address this problem, variation in rainfall is used to create an instrument for urban protests. The results show that rainfall-related popular uprisings in urban areas increase the likelihood of a coup attempt and thus help to solve the collective-action problems associated with coup plots. |
| Keywords: | coup d'état,public protest,regime change,autocracy |
| JEL: | C26 D74 P16 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ciwdps:22017&r=pol |