|
on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Carlos Sanz (PRINCETON UNIVERSITY) |
| Abstract: | I exploit the unique institutional framework of Spanish local elections, where municipalities follow different electoral systems depending on their population size, as mandated by a national law. Using a regression discontinuity design, I compare turnout under closed-list proportional representation and under an open-list, plurality-at-large system where voters can vote for individual candidates from the same or different party lists. I find that the openlist system increases turnout by between one and two percentage points. The results suggest that open-list systems, which introduce competition both across and within parties, are conducive to greater voter turnout. |
| Keywords: | voter turnout, electoral system, open list, regression discontinuity |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2016–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bde:wpaper:1623&r=pol |
| By: | Jean-François Laslier (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC), PSE - Paris School of Economics); Karine Van Der Straeten (Institute for Advanced Study Toulouse - Institute for Advanced Study Toulouse, TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - Toulouse School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We propose a theory of strategic voting under “Commitee Approval”: a fixed-sized commitee of M members is to be elected; each voter votes for as many candidates as she wants, and the M candidates with the most votes are elected. We assume that voter preferences are separable and that there exists a tiny probability that any vote might be misrecorded. We show that best responses involve voting by pairwise comparisons. Two candidates play a critical role: the weakest expected winner and the strongest expected loser. Expected winners are approved if and only if they are preferred to the strongest expected loser and expected losers are approved if and only if they are preferred to the weakest expected winner. At equilibrium, if any, a candidate is elected if and only if he is approved by at least half of the voters. With single-peaked preferences, an equilibrium always exists, in which the first M candidates according to the majority tournament relation are elected. |
| Keywords: | Strategic Voting,Theory |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01168767&r=pol |
| By: | Romain Lachat (Universitat Pompeu Fabra [Barcelona]); Jean-François Laslier (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC), PSE - Paris School of Economics); Karine Van Der Straeten (TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - Toulouse School of Economics, Institute for Advanced Study Toulouse - Institute for Advanced Study Toulouse) |
| Abstract: | In several cantons in Switzerland the regional government, i.e. a set of governors who share the executive power in the canton, is elected according to an original voting rule, in which voters can vote for several candidates (up to a maximal number of votes). Up to some details, these elections are instances of what is known in Social Choice Theory as “Committee Approval Voting”. The paper makes use of data from a panel survey collected during the 2011 Zurich cantonal election to check whether a strategic voting theory is consistent with individual behaviour observed during that election. We show that roughly 70% of the individual decisions on candidates are consistent with our model of rational voting. |
| Keywords: | Switzerland,Strategic Voting |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01168743&r=pol |
| By: | Christian Dustman (University College London and CReAM); Kristine Vasiljeva (Kraka); Anna Piil Damm (Aarhus University) |
| Abstract: | To estimate the causal effect of refugee migration on voting outcomes in parliamentary and municipal elections in Denmark, our study is the first that addresses the key problem of immigrant sorting by exploiting a policy that assigned refugee immigrants to municipalities on a quasi-random basis. We find that – in all but the most urban municipalities - allocation of larger refugee shares between electoral cycles leads to an increase in the vote share not only for parties with an anti-immigration agenda but also for centre-right parties, while the vote share for centre-left parties decreases. However, in the largest and most urban municipalities refugee allocation has – if anything – the opposite effect on vote shares for anti-immigration parties. We demonstrate response heterogeneity according to municipal characteristics, with a more pronounced response in less urban municipalities in which the pre-policy shares of both immigrants and the more affluent is high, and in urban municipalities with high unemployment. At the same time, higher pre-policy crime rates are associated with more support for anti-immigration parties in response to refugee allocation in both urban and non-urban municipalities. We also find some evidence that refugee allocation influences voter turnout. Moreover, it has a large impact on the decision of anti-immigration parties’ choice of where to stand for municipal election. |
| Keywords: | immigration, political preferences, re-distribution, welfare, random allocation |
| JEL: | H53 I38 |
| Date: | 2016–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:1619&r=pol |
| By: | Jorge Gallego |
| Abstract: | What are the effects of war on political behavior? Colombia is an interesting case in which conflict and elections coexist, and illegal armed groups intentionally affect electoral outcomes. Nonetheless, groups use different strategies to alter these results. This paper argues that differential effects of violence on electoral outcomes are the result of deliberate strategies followed by illegal groups, which in turn, are a consequence of military conditions that differ between them. Using panel data from Senate elections from 1994 to 2006 and an instrumental variable approach to address potential endogeneity concerns, this paper shows that guerrilla violence decreases turnout, while paramilitary violence has no effect on participation, but reduces electoral competition and benefits non-traditional third parties. FARC violence is significantly higher during election years, while paramilitary violence is lower. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the guerrilla’s strategy is to sabotage elections, while paramilitaries establish alliances with certain candidates |
| Keywords: | Conflicto armado, Elecciones, Grupos armados ilegales |
| Date: | 2016–09–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000092:015162&r=pol |
| By: | MORITA Tadashi; SATO Yasuhiro; YAMAMOTO Kazuhiro |
| Abstract: | We examine the possible impacts of demographics on the outcomes of capital tax competition in political economy. For this purpose, we develop an overlapping generations model wherein public good provision financed by capital tax is determined by majority voting. When a population is growing, younger people represent the majority, whereas when a population is decreasing, older people represent the majority. We show that the race to the bottom is likely to emerge in the economy with growing population whereas the race to the top might emerge in the economy with decreasing population. |
| Date: | 2016–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:dpaper:16091&r=pol |
| By: | Jean-François Laslier (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC), PSE - Paris School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | This theoretical paper contrasts two voting heuristics: overstating and replacing. Under the Alternative Vote, overstatement is inefficient but replacement is efficient. The paper argues that the “replacing" manipulation corresponds to a psychologically and politically plausible voter behavior. |
| Keywords: | Alternative vote,Manipulation,Behavioral voting |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01168670&r=pol |
| By: | Damien Bol (Université de Montréal - UdeM (CANADA) - Université de Montréal - UdeM (CANADA)); André Blais (Université de Montréal - UdeM (CANADA) - Université de Montréal - UdeM (CANADA)); Jean-François Laslier (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC), PSE - Paris School of Economics); Antonin Macé (AMSE - Aix-Marseille School of Economics - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - Ecole Centrale de Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales) |
| Abstract: | We know that electoral systems have an effect on the number of competing candidates. However, a mystery remains concerning the impact of majority runoff. According to theory, the number of competing candidates should be equal (or only marginally larger) under majority runoff than under plurality. However, in real-life elections, this number is much higher under majority runoff. To provide new insights on this puzzle, we report the results of a laboratory experiment where subjects play the role of candidates in plurality and majority runoff elections. We use a candidate-only and sincere-voting model to isolate the effect of the electoral system on the decision of candidates to enter the election. We find very little difference between the two electoral systems. We thus re-affirm the mystery of the number of competing candidates under majority runoff. |
| Keywords: | Electoral System |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01168722&r=pol |
| By: | Chrysanthou, Georgios Marios (University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory); Guilló, María Dolores (University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory) |
| Abstract: | We explore the dynamics of the Scottish National Party support using longitudinal data from the BHPS during 1999-2006. Exploiting the Scottish extension sample, available since the establishment of the new Scottish Parliament in 1999, we study the relative importance of political sentiments and egocentric economic evaluations by disentangling the e¤ects of state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity by gender. Egocentric economic evaluations are more important for the male electorate, while initial party affiliation constitutes the overriding determinant of party support among the partisan electorates regardless of gender. The electors hold the incumbent governing party accountable for their personal financial situation, but financial security and optimism augment the nationalist propensity of the partisan electorate. |
| Keywords: | egocentric economic evaluations; political preferences; unobserved heterogeneity; voting |
| JEL: | C23 C25 D72 |
| Date: | 2016–10–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:qmetal:2016_003&r=pol |
| By: | Ozlem Akin; Nicholas S. Coleman; Christian Fons-Rosen; José-Luis Peydró |
| Abstract: | We exploit the 2008-2010 TARP bank bailouts after Lehman’s failure to test for private information leakages from banking regulators to top corporate bank executives using insider trading data and information on political connections. In politically-connected banks, buying during the pre-TARP period is associated with increases in abnormal returns around TARP. For unconnected banks, insider trading and returns are uncorrelated. Results hold when comparing connected to unconnected executives within the same bank and are driven by political connections to financial branches of government. Through a FOIA request we obtained the previously unknown TARP funds requested by each bank. The ratio of requested to received funds strongly correlates with abnormal returns and is also a predictor of buying behavior by connected banks. |
| Keywords: | political connections, political economy in banking, Insider Trading, TARP |
| JEL: | D72 G01 G21 G28 |
| Date: | 2016–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:935&r=pol |
| By: | Davis, Christina L.; Fuchs, Andreas; Johnson, Kristina |
| Abstract: | Can governments still use trade to reward and punish partner countries? While WTO rules and the pressures of globalization restrict states’ capacity to manipulate trade policies, politicization of trade is likely to occur where governments intervene in markets. We examine state ownership of firms as one tool of government control. Taking China and India as examples, we use new data on imports disaggregated by firm ownership type, as well as measures of political relations based on bilateral events and UN voting data to estimate the effect of political relations on import flows since the early 1990s. Our results support the hypothesis that imports controlled by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are more responsive to political relations than imports controlled by private enterprises. This finding suggests that politicized trade will increase as countries with partially state-controlled economies gain strength in the global economy. |
| Keywords: | International trade, Diplomatic tensions, State-owned enterprises, Firm ownership, Event data, UN voting, China, India |
| JEL: | D74 F13 P16 P26 |
| Date: | 2016–10–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:74597&r=pol |
| By: | Benjamin Michallet (PSE - Paris School of Economics, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Giuseppe Gaeta (University of Naples); François Facchini (UP11 - Université Paris-Sud - Paris 11, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | Why do parties offer environmental policies in their political programs? While a number of papers examine the determinants of citizens' pro-environmental behaviour, we know little about the extent to which political parties adjust their platform towards environmentalism. We investigate this process through data provided by the Manifesto Project Dataset (CMP) for 20 European countries over the period 1970-2008. Following the literature on public concern towards environment, we examine economic, environmental and political determinants. Our findings provide evidence that political parties' environmental concern is strongly correlated with their political ideology and with country-level economic conditions. |
| Keywords: | environmental concern,political parties,electoral manifestos |
| Date: | 2015–05–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01154006&r=pol |
| By: | Fałkowski, Jan |
| Abstract: | Though there is a vibrant debate about the determinants of structural change in agricultural sector, the broad consensus is that it is mainly driven by economic environment and farmers' characteristics. In this paper, we try to complement this view and study whether the pattern of farm exits is shaped by rural politics. Using local-level data for Poland, and accounting for variables commonly used in other studies, we show that in the period 1996-2010, the scope and speed of structural change in agricultural sector were heavily influenced by the extent to which municipality councils were captured by agricultural interests. More specifically, we find that in regions with higher political representation of farmers there were less exits from farming and land consolidation process was slower. Thus, our findings suggest that investigating the distribution of political resources at the local level might be as important for our understanding of structural change as studying the impact of farm size or the development of non-agricultural job opportunities. |
| Keywords: | special-interest benefits, rural politics, structural change, Poland, Agricultural and Food Policy, |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:eaa149:245115&r=pol |
| By: | Ieva Skarda |
| Abstract: | When resource allocation in a recipient country is characterized by an economic contest between the rent-seeking elite and economically active masses, foreign aid is more effective when there is lower economic inequality. This finding is supported by empirical evidence: increasing the aid/GDP ratio by one standard deviation is estimated to boost recipient growth by 0.25 points in the most equal aid recipients but reduce growth by 2.30 points in the least equal recipients; similarly, it is estimated to decrease the Gini coeficient by 0.35 points in the most equal recipients but increase it by 1.45 points in the least equal recipients. |
| Keywords: | Foreign aid; Aid effectiveness; Growth; Inequality; Contest; Elite |
| Date: | 2016–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:yor:yorken:16/12&r=pol |
| By: | Martín Rossi (Department of Economics, Universidad de San Andres) |
| Abstract: | I investigate the relationship between tenure length in the House and posterior political success. Since tenure length in the House is potentially endogenous in a model for political success, I exploit a natural experiment in the Argentine Congress—where terms length were assigned randomly in the first Congress after the return to democracy in 1983—that provides a source of exogenous variation to initial political power. I find that having a longer tenure in the House increases both the probability of moving to higher political positions (an intrapersonal effect) and the probability of having a relative in future congresses (dynastic success or an interpersonal effect). I also find evidence that name recognition is a mechanism behind dynastic success. Finally, I explore the consequences of dynastic power and report evidence of negative correlation between being a dynastic legislator and political effort in Congress. |
| Keywords: | political power, self-perpetuation, elites, legislators, political dynasties |
| Date: | 2016–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sad:wpaper:127&r=pol |