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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Drago, Francesco (University of Naples Federico II); Nannicini, Tommaso (Bocconi University); Sobbrio, Francesco (European University Institute) |
| Abstract: | This paper evaluates the effects of changes in the supply of news provided by newspapers on electoral participation, political selection, and government efficiency. We address these issues in the Italian context by constructing a new dataset covering the presence of local news by different types of newspapers (i.e., local and national) for all cities above 15,000 inhabitants in the period 1993-2010. The identification strategy exploits discrete changes in the number of newspapers supplying local news and the precise timing of these events. The results show that the entry of newspapers in the market for local news leads to an increase in turnout in municipal elections, a higher probability of the incumbent mayor being reelected, and an improvement in the efficiency of the municipal government (as measured by the speed of revenue collection). The effect of newspapers on government efficiency is larger when mayors are not term-limited and thus face reelection incentives. Our evidence shows that newspapers do not have a major impact on the selection of politicians, but they play a relevant role in keeping politicians accountable once they are in office. Competition plays a relevant role, as the effects are not limited to the first newspaper entering the market. |
| Keywords: | newspapers, media competition, turnout, political selection, accountability |
| JEL: | L82 D72 H70 |
| Date: | 2013–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7169&r=pol |
| By: | Christian Weyand (CGS, University of Cologne) |
| Abstract: | Since governmental transparency is considered to be a key mechanism for democratic accountability and representation, we compare three analytically distinctive motivations that could potentially explain transparency support among political elites: (1) From a principal-agent perspective, elites have no incentive to reduce their informational advantage over voters inherent in the policy process. (2) From an office-seeking perspective, it should be beneficial to support popular issues such as transparency. (3) From a democratic-elitism perspective, a specific elite-socialisation should lead to high support of civil liberties like transparency. Analysing survey data of candidates for the German Bundestag 2009, we find high variance among elites and complementary influence of the three motivations. Socialization in left-leaning parties has the most dominant positive effect. We find anticipation effects among candidates that are highly dependent on voters' support and whose voters are in favour of transparency at the same time. Further, transparency support is higher among young candidates. The findings imply that more transparency policies might be implemented in the future if public support for transparency increases and older candidate cohorts are replaced. Examining underlying motivations for policy changes, this work contributes to the literature of policy representation and is the first to investigate elites' preferences towards governmental transparency. |
| Keywords: | Transparency, Elites, Political Process |
| JEL: | D72 Z13 |
| Date: | 2013–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cgr:cgsser:04-02&r=pol |
| By: | Rebecca B. Morton; Daniel Müller; Lionel Page; Benno Torgler |
| Abstract: | We exploit a voting reform in France to estimate the causal effect of exit poll information on turnout and bandwagon voting. Before the change in legislation, individuals in some French overseas territories voted after the election result had already been made public via exit poll information from mainland France. We estimate that knowing the exit poll informa- tion decreases voter turnout by about 12 percentage points. Our study is the first clean empirical design outside of the laboratory to demonstrate the effect of such knowledge on voter turnout. Furthermore, we find that exit poll information significantly increases bandwagon voting; that is, voters who choose to turn out are more likely to vote for the expected winner. |
| Date: | 2013–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cra:wpaper:2013-01&r=pol |
| By: | Ashima Goyal (Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research) |
| Abstract: | Nations that were able to sustain high catch-up growth followed flexible and contextual policies. Inclusive institutions make correct policy choices more likely. India started out with highly inclusive political institutions since it adopted democracy with universal suffrage at independence. But extractive economic institutions, inherited from the British, were made more so by economic controls. In addition, a heterogeneous electorate allowed politicians to cultivate vote-banks and populist schemes instead of delivering better public services and governance. India's opening out was adequately nuanced and flexible but was sometimes used as a substitute for harder domestic reforms. It, however, added to the growing constituencies that benefit from growth, and are pushing for more inclusive economic institutions, that enable productivity, not just redistribution. Broader interest groups create better institutions and incentives. Examples from general governance, the regulation of industry, and agricultural marketing show the process, although messy and prolonged, is in the right direction. |
| Keywords: | catch-up growth, institutions: political and economic, democracy, vote-banks, governance, active inclusion |
| JEL: | O43 D78 F54 |
| Date: | 2013–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ind:igiwpp:2013-001&r=pol |
| By: | Ari Kuncoro (Institute of Economic and Social Research, Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia); Vid Adrison (Institute of Economic and Social Research, Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia); Ifa Isfandiarni (Institute of Economic and Social Research, Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia) |
| Abstract: | For Indonesia the fall of Suharto in 1998 brought dramatic changes in the political landscape. It signified the beginning of transformation from an authoritarian regime towards a more democratic society where the distribution power is more devolved. In this respect Indonesia follow what is called a big-bang approach in the transition. First in the agenda of socio-economic reform is decentralization which changes the relationship between the center and local governments. Next in the country’s reform was democratization at the local government level. In this paper we examine how decentralization and democratization affect governance at the local government level. Our particular interest is to assess the impact of decentralization and local democratization on the quality of road. We find that although the temptation to produce lower quality roads is high the combination of democratization, free media, an ad-hoc anti-corruption agency and well educated bureaucrats keep the quality of roads reasonably good while the corruption is held in check. |
| Keywords: | Governance, Decentralization, Democratization, Infrastructure Provision |
| JEL: | D73 H73 O17 |
| Date: | 2013–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lpe:wpecbs:201301&r=pol |
| By: | Andreas Fuchs; Peter Nunnenkamp; Hannes Öhler |
| Abstract: | Development assistance has been criticized for a lack of coordination between aid donors. This paper argues that competition for export markets and political support prevents donor countries from closer coordination of aid activities. To test these hypotheses, we perform logit and fractional logit estimations for a large sample of recipient countries and aid activities since the early 1970s. Our empirical results reveal that export competition between donors is a major impediment to aid coordination. Tough less conclusive, we also find some evidence that donors’ competition over political support prevents them from coordinating aid activities more closely |
| Keywords: | Development aid, donor coordination, trade interests, export similarity, UN voting |
| JEL: | F35 F42 F53 |
| Date: | 2013–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kie:kieliw:1825&r=pol |
| By: | Mostapha Diss (Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne,F-69130 Ecully, France, Université Jean Monnet, Saint-Etienne, F-42000, France) |
| Abstract: | We provide exact relations giving the probability of individual and coalitional manipulation of three specific social choice functions (Borda rule, Copeland rule, Plurality rule) in three-alternative elections when the notion of self-selectivity is imposed. The results suggest that the Borda rule is more vulnerable to coalitional manipulation than the Copeland rule and the Plurality rule. However, Plurality rule seems to be more vulnerable to individual manipulability when the number of voters is greater than a certain threshold value. In addition, the probability of individual and coalitional manipulation tends to vanish significantly when the notion of selfs-electivity is imposed. |
| Keywords: | Voting rules, Self-selectivity, Stability, Manipulability, Probability |
| JEL: | D |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1302&r=pol |
| By: | Bargain, Olivier (University of Aix-Marseille II); Dolls, Mathias (IZA); Immervoll, Herwig (World Bank); Neumann, Dirk (IZA); Peichl, Andreas (IZA); Pestel, Nico (IZA); Siegloch, Sebastian (IZA) |
| Abstract: | We assess the effects of U.S. tax policy reforms on inequality by applying a new decomposition method that allows us to disentangle the direct policy effect from the effect of changing market incomes. Over the whole period 1979-2007 the cumulative tax policy effect aggravated income inequality by increasing the income share of the top 20% in contrast to the middle class' share. The tax policy effect accounts for up to 29% of the total change in inequality; its contribution increases up to 41% if we take into account behavioral responses. Using our unique policy effect measure and variation in tax policies across U.S. states and time, we also identify the redistributive intention of policymakers. The estimated effect of partisan politics on the U.S. income distribution is statistically significant and economically important. Republican policymakers increased inequality especially at the top whereas Democrats increased the income share of the bottom 80% of the distribution. |
| Keywords: | tax policy, inequality, redistribution, partisan politics, political economy |
| JEL: | H23 H31 H53 P16 |
| Date: | 2013–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7190&r=pol |
| By: | Mostapha Diss (GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS : UMR5824 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - École Normale Supérieure - Lyon) |
| Abstract: | We provide exact relations giving the probability of individual and coalitional manipulation of three specific social choice functions (Borda rule, Copeland rule, Plurality rule) in three-alternative elections when the notion of self-selectivity is imposed. The results suggest that the Borda rule is more vulnerable to coalitional manipulation than the Copeland rule and the Plurality rule. However, Plurality rule seems to be more vulnerable to individual manipulability when the number of voters is greater than a certain threshold value. In addition, the probability of individual and coalitional manipulation tends to vanish significantly when the notion of selfs-electivity is imposed. |
| Keywords: | Voting rules; Self-selectivity; Stability; Manipulability; Probability |
| Date: | 2013–02–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00785366&r=pol |
| By: | James Lake (Southern Methodist University); Maia Linask (University of Richmond) |
| Abstract: | Governments routinely practice binding overhang by setting applied tariffs below their binding WTO commitments. We explain this phenomenon using a dynamic theory of lobbying. The government is captured by import-competing industries (or exporters), whose applied tariff concessions in response to lobbying threats by exporters (import-competing industries) cause fluctuations in binding overhang. We relate the mean and variance of binding overhang over time to the model's parameters. A stronger lobbying threat induces larger applied tariff concessions, increasing the variance of binding overhang. However, the effect on the mean of binding overhang depends on the direction of tariff concessions and thus on which group has captured the government. The model yields a number of empirically testable predictions and questions the interpretation of some simple empirical exercises. |
| Keywords: | Binding overhang, lobbying, tariff bindings, applied tariffs. |
| JEL: | C73 D72 F13 |
| Date: | 2013–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:smu:ecowpa:1302&r=pol |