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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Berliant, Marcus; Tabuchi, Takatoshi |
| Abstract: | We consider information aggregation in national and local elections when voters are mobile and might sort themselves into local districts. Using a standard model of private information for voters in elections in combination with a New Economic Geography model, agglomeration occurs for economic reasons whereas voter stratification occurs due to political preferences. We compare a national election, where full information equivalence is attained, with local elections in a three-district model. We show that full information equivalence holds at a stable equilibrium in only one of the three districts when transportation cost is low. The important comparative static is that full information equivalence is a casualty of free trade. When trade is more costly, people tend to agglomerate for economic reasons, resulting in full information equivalence in the political sector. Under free trade, people sort themselves into districts, most of which are polarized, resulting in no full information equivalence in these districts. We examine the implications of the model using data on corruption in the legislature of the state of Alabama and in the Japanese Diet. |
| Keywords: | information aggregation in elections; informative voting; new economic geography; local politics |
| JEL: | D82 D72 R12 |
| Date: | 2012–06–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:39596&r=pol |
| By: | Otto, Alkis Henri; Steinhardt, Max Friedrich |
| Abstract: | This paper provides new evidence on the effect of immigration on election outcomes. Our analysis makes use of data on city districts in Hamburg, Germany, during a period of substantial inflows of immigrants and asylum seekers. We find significant and robust effects for changes in foreigner shares on the electoral success of parties that built up a distinctive reputation in immigration politics. In particular, our fixed-effects estimates indicate a positive effect for xenophobic, extreme right-wing parties and an adverse effect for the Green party that actively campaigned for liberal immigration policies and minority rights. Overall, our results support the hypothesis that changes in local compositional amenities shape individual attitudes towards immigration. -- |
| Keywords: | immigration,elections,xenophobia |
| JEL: | D72 J15 R23 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:hsbawp:022012&r=pol |
| By: | Giacomo Ponzetto; Ugo Troiano |
| Abstract: | Countries with greater social capital have higher economic growth. We show that social capital is also highly positively correlated across countries with government expenditure on education. We develop an infinite-horizon model of public spending and endogenous stochastic growth that explains both facts through frictions in political agency when voters have imperfect information. In our model, the government provides services that yield immediate utility, and investment that raises future productivity. Voters are more likely to observe public services, so politicians have electoral incentives to underprovide public investment. Social capital increases voters' awareness of all government activity. As a consequence, both politicians' incentives and their selection improve. In the dynamic equilibrium, both the amount and the efficiency of public investment increase, permanently raising the growth rate. |
| Keywords: | Social Capital, Government Expenditures, Economic Growth, Public Investment, Elections, Imperfect Information |
| JEL: | D72 D83 H50 H54 O43 Z13 |
| Date: | 2012–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:upf:upfgen:1307&r=pol |
| By: | , Aili Mari |
| Abstract: | Tanzania has been a relative success story in Africa in terms of political reform. While foreign aid has helped strengthen institutions that advance accountability, it simultaneously supports a status quo that undermines accountability and democratization |
| Keywords: | Tanzania, democratization, accountability, foreign aid, decentralization, public goods |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp2012-37&r=pol |
| By: | Dinuk Jayasuriya (Development Policy Centre, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University); Paul J. Burke (Arndt-Corden Department of Economics, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT Australia 0200) |
| Abstract: | This article investigates whether female political representation affects economic growth. Panel estimates for 119 democracies using fixed effects specifications and a system generalized method of moments approach suggest that, over recent decades, countries with higher shares of women in parliament have had faster growing economies. |
| JEL: | D72 J16 O11 O43 |
| Date: | 2012–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:een:devpol:1218&r=pol |
| By: | Gazibo, Mamoudou |
| Abstract: | In the 1990s, analysts were almost unanimous in considering Benin to be one of the most important aid recipients among the newly democratizing African countries. After more than two decades of democratic practice, the country has clearly completed the pha |
| Keywords: | Benin, foreign aid, democratic consolidation, accountability, corruption, elections |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp2012-33&r=pol |