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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | E Bracco |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a theory of socially optimal districting in a legislative-election model with endogenous party platforms. We generalize the model of Coate and Knight (2007), allowing parties to strategically condition their platforms on the districting. The socially optimal districting re ects the ideological leaning of the population, so that parties internalize voters' preferences in their policy platforms. The optimal seat-vote curve is unbiased when voters are risk-neutral, and -contrary to previous findings-biased against the largest partisan group when voters are risk-averse. The model is then calibrated by an econometric analysis of the elections of U.S. State legislators during the 1990s. |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lan:wpaper:1622&r=pol |
| By: | Giovanni Valensisi (UNCTAD. Corresponding address giovanni.valensisi@unctad.org); Junior Davis (UNCTAD. Corresponding address junior.davis@unctad.org) |
| JEL: | Q54 O13 |
| Date: | 2011–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:msm:wpaper:2011/27&r=pol |
| By: | Geys, Benny |
| Abstract: | Politicians often implement popular changes in public policies prior to elections, with the aim of improving their Election Day outcome. This research note evaluates whether such electioneering carries over also into politicians' extra-parliamentary activities. Evidence from the UK House of Commons over the period 2005-2010 suggests adjustments do occur in MPs' outside activities over the election cycle. The safety of the politicians' seat and his/her decision to stand for re-election play an important mediating role. -- |
| Keywords: | Outside interests,election cycles,House of Commons |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbfff:spii2011104&r=pol |
| By: | Rodrigo Martins (Faculdade de Economia, Universidade de Coimbra); Francisco José Veiga (Universidade do Minho - NIPE) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the impact of economic conditions on voter turnout at Portuguese legislative and municipal elections. We use four extensive datasets to estimate an economic turnout model in which local economic variables are included in quadratic form, so that non-linear effects can be taken into account. The first two datasets cover all mainland municipalities (currently 278), from 1979 to 2005. The other two are cross-sections of all 4037 mainland freguesias, used to analyze the determinants of turnout at the 2001 municipal elections and at the 2002 legislative elections. Empirical results indicate that the performance of the national economy is important only in legislative elections and that, in accordance with our expectations, the regional and local unemployment rates tend to have a non-linear relationship with turnout. |
| Keywords: | Turnout, Local governments, Elections, Portugal, Economic conditions |
| JEL: | D72 H7 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nip:nipewp:01/2012&r=pol |
| By: | Kai A. Konrad; Florian Morath |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the role of narrowly selfish and other-regarding preferences for the median voter in a Meitzer-Richard (1981) framework. We use computerized and real human co-players to distinguish between these sets of motivations. Redistribution to real co-players has a negative effect on the median voter's tax rate choice. Further, perceived income mobility decreases the desired amount of redistribution. Our results suggest the importance of concerns about own mobility as well as status concerns of the median voter who tends to keep distance to the low-income group, whereas inequity aversion does not play a role in the political economy context. |
| Keywords: | redistribution, other-regarding preferences, median voter, experiments |
| JEL: | C91 D03 D72 D78 H20 |
| Date: | 2011–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpi:wpaper:aspirations_of_the_middle_class&r=pol |
| By: | Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the role of narrowly selfish and other-regarding preferences for the median voter in a Meltzer-Richard (1981) framework. We use computerized and real human co-players to distinguish between these sets of motivations. Redistribution to real co-players has a negative effect on the median voter's tax rate choice. Further, perceived income mobility decreases the desired amount of redistribution. Our results suggest the importance of concerns about own mobility as well as status concerns of the median voter who tends to keep distance to the low-income group, whereas inequity aversion does not play a role in the political economy context. -- |
| Keywords: | Redistribution,other-regarding preferences,median voter,experiments |
| JEL: | C91 D03 D72 D78 H20 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbfff:spii2011102&r=pol |
| By: | Sophie Bade (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn) |
| Abstract: | A robust feature of models of electoral competition between two opportunistic, purely office-motivated parties is that both parties become indistinguishable in equilibrium. I this short note, I show that this strong connection between the office motivation of parties and their equilibrium choice of identical platforms depends on the following two - possibly counterfactual - assumptions: 1. Issue spaces are uni-dimensional and 2. Parties are unitary actors whose preferences can be represented by expected utility functions. The main goal here is to provide an example of a two-party model in which parties offer substantially different platforms in equilibrium even though no exogenous asymmetries are assumed. In this example, some voters’ preferences over the 2-dimensional issue space are assumed to exhibit non-convexities and parties evaluate their actions with respect to a set of beliefs on the electorate. |
| Keywords: | Downs model, Games with Incomplete Preferences, Knightian Uncertainty, Uncertainty Aversion, Platform Divergence |
| JEL: | D81 D72 C79 |
| Date: | 2011–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2011_25&r=pol |
| By: | Laurent Pauwels (The University of Sydney Business School); Li-Gang Liu (ANZ Research ANZ, Hong Kong) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates whether external political pressure for faster renminbi (RMB) appreciation affect both the daily returns and the conditional volatility of the RMB central parity rate. We construct several political pressure indicators pertaining to the RMB exchange rate, with a special emphasis on the US pressure, to test the hypothesis. After controlling for Chinese macroeconomic surprise news, we find that US and non-US political pressure does not have a significant influence on RMB's daily returns. However, evidence suggests that political pressures, and especially those from the US, have statistically significant impacts on the conditional volatility of the RMB. Furthermore, we conduct the same exercise on the 12-month RMB nondeliverable forward rate (NDF). We find that the NDF market is highly responsive to macroeconomic surprise news and there is some evidence that Sino-US bilateral meetings affect the conditional volatility of the RMB NDF. |
| Keywords: | Renminbi exchange rate, Event studies, Political pressures, Non-deliverable forward, Macroeconomic news |
| JEL: | F31 G10 |
| Date: | 2011–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:syb:wpbsba:10/2011&r=pol |
| By: | Benjamin Goldsmith (The University of Sydney); Yusaku Horiuchi (Australian National University) |
| Abstract: | Does 'soft power' matter in international relations? Specifically, when the U.S. seeks cooperation from countries around the world, do the views of their publics about U.S. foreign policy affect the actual foreign policy behavior of these countries? We examine this question using multinational surveys covering 58 countries, combined with information about their foreign policy decisions in 2003, a critical year for the U.S. We draw our basic conceptual framework from Joseph Nye, who uses various indicators of opinion about the U.S. to assess U.S. soft power. But we argue that his theory lacks the specificity needed for falsifiable testing. We refine it by focusing on foreign public opinion about U.S. foreign policy, an under-emphasized element of Nye’s approach. Our regression analysis shows that it has a significant and large effect on troop commitments to the war in Iraq, even after controlling for various hard power factors. It also has significant, albeit small, effects on policies towards the International Criminal Court, and on voting decisions in the U.N. General Assembly. These results support our refined theoretical argument about soft-power: Public opinion about U.S. foreign policy in foreign countries does affect their policies towards the U.S., but this effect is conditional on the salience of an issue for mass publics. |
| Keywords: | soft power, US foreign policy, public opinion, Iraq War |
| JEL: | C21 D74 D78 |
| Date: | 2011–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:een:crwfrp:1108&r=pol |
| By: | Álvaro Aguirre |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a specific mechanism to explain differences in political institutions based on the asymmetric and uncertain costs of civil conflicts. Asymmetry implies that the net benefit of fighting an insurgency is not shared equally by members of the elite. But uncertainty implies that these benefits are more evenly distributed ex-ante. The members of the elite face a commitment problem: they would like to commit in advance to a strong response to insurgencies, but ex-post they have the incentives to block any response if the conflict mainly affects other members of the elite. One way of solving this is empowering the executive so he may react forcefully to conflicts, despite the opposition of some fraction of the elite. In the model this group has to decide on the constraints imposed on the executive. Fewer constraints lead to a higher risk of expropriation. But more constraints lead to a suboptimal response to conflicts. The main prediction is that, conditional on asymmetric and uncertain costs, the higher is the likelihood of a civil conflict in the future, the lower are the constraints imposed on the executive. The paper empirically validates this implication using two types of evidence. First, it uses a sample of former colonies that became independent after WWII and geographic variables to identify the exogenous component of the likelihood of civil conflicts at the moment of the independence. Second, the model is used to explain the political events in the Americas after independence. Countries less prone to internal conflicts were the ones that imposed more constraints on the executive during the second half of the nineteenth century. |
| Date: | 2011–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chb:bcchwp:649&r=pol |
| By: | Geys, Benny; Mause, Karsten |
| Abstract: | Elected representatives in many countries are legally allowed to carry out (un)paid jobs in addition to their political mandate, often referred to as moonlighting. Despite the important selection and incentive effects such outside positions might engender, academic studies evaluating the prevalence, desirability and/or consequences of politicians' moonlighting have remained relatively scarce; often due to severe data restrictions. In recent years, however, more stringent disclosure rules have increased data availability, and large-sample analyses are becoming increasingly feasible. Besides surveying recent empirical contributions to this developing research field, this paper also outlines unresolved issues and thereby develops an agenda for future enquiry. -- |
| Keywords: | Moonlighting,outside interests,outside income,shirking,disclosure rules |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbfff:spii2011101&r=pol |