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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Berliant, Marcus; Tabuchi, Takatoshi |
| Abstract: | We consider information aggregation in national and local elections when voters are mobile and might sort themselves into local districts. Using a standard model of private information for voters in elections in combination with a New Economic Geography model, agglomeration occurs for economic reasons whereas voter stratification occurs due to political preferences. We compare a national election, where full information equivalence is attained, with local elections in a three district model. A stable equilibrium accounting for both the economic and political sectors is shown to exist. Restricting to an example, we show that full information equivalence holds in only one of the three districts when transportation cost is low. The important comparative static is that full information equivalence is a casualty of free trade. When trade is more costly, people tend to agglomerate for economic reasons, resulting in full information equivalence in the political sector. Under free trade, people sort themselves into districts, most of which are polarized, resulting in no full information equivalence in these districts. We examine the implications of the model using data on corruption in the legislature of the state of Alabama and in the Japanese Diet. |
| Keywords: | information aggregation in elections; informative voting; new economic geography; local politics |
| JEL: | D82 D72 R12 |
| Date: | 2011–12–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:35169&r=pol |
| By: | Zudenkova, Galina |
| Abstract: | This paper studies party discipline in a congress within a political agency framework with retrospective voting. Party discipline serves as an incentive device to induce office- motivated congress members to perform in line with the party leadership's objective of controlling both the executive and the legislative branches of government. I show fi…rst that the same party is more likely to control both branches of government (i.e., uni…ed government) the stronger the party discipline in the congress is. Second, the leader of the governing party imposes more party discipline under uni…ed government than does the opposition leader under divided government. Moreover, the incumbents' aggregate performance increases with party discipline, so a representative voter becomes better off. JEL classi…cation: D72. Keywords: Party discipline; Political agency; Retrospective voting; Office-motivated politicians. |
| Keywords: | Disciplina de partit, 32 - Política, |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/151813&r=pol |
| By: | Gabrielle Demange (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS : UMR8545 - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - Ecole des Ponts ParisTech - Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris - ENS Paris - INRA, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris) |
| Abstract: | The paper presents the problem of choosing the representatives in an assembly when the whole electoral region is subdivided into electoral districts. Because of the two dimensions, geographical (districts) and political (parties), the problem is called bi-apportionment. The main focus of the paper is to discuss fairness and proportionality axioms as well as their implementation. |
| Keywords: | Party Proportional Representation ; Power Indics ; (Bi-) Apportionment ; (Bi-) Divisor Methods ; Fair Shares |
| Date: | 2011–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00644439&r=pol |
| By: | Zudenkova, Galina |
| Abstract: | This paper contrasts the incentives for cronyism in business, the public sector and politics within an agency problem model with moral hazard. The analysis is focused on the institutional differences between private, public and political organizations. In business, when facing a residual claimant contract, a chief manager ends up with a relatively moderate rst-best level of cronyism within a …firm. The institutional framework of the public sector does not allow explicit contracting, which leads to a more severe cronyism problem within public organizations. Finally, it is shown that the nature of political appointments (such that the subordinate's reappointment is conditioned on the chief's re-election) together with implicit contracting makes political cronyism the most extreme case. JEL classifi…cation: D72, D73, D86. Keywords: Cronyism; Meritocracy; Manager; Bureaucrat; Politician. |
| Keywords: | Clientelisme, Burocràcia, Polítics, 32 - Política, |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/151814&r=pol |
| By: | E Bracco |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a theory of socially optimal districting in a legislative-election model with endogenous party platforms. We generalize the model of Coate and Knight (2007), allowing parties to strategically condition their platforms on the districting. The socially optimal districting re ects the ideological leaning of the population, so that parties internalize voters' preferences in their policy platforms. The optimal seat-vote curve is unbiased when voters are risk-neutral, and -contrary to previous findings-biased against the largest partisan group when voters are risk-averse. The model is then calibrated by an econometric analysis of the elections of U.S. State legislators during the 1990s. |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lan:wpaper:1591&r=pol |
| By: | Gans, Joshua S. (University of Melbourne); Leigh, Andrew (Australian National University) |
| Abstract: | We employ several different approaches to estimate the political position of Australian media outlets, relative to federal parliamentarians. First, we use parliamentary mentions to code over 100 public intellectuals on a left-right scale. We then estimate slant by using the number of mentions that each public intellectual receives in each media outlet. Second, we have independent raters separately code front-page election stories and headlines. Third, we tabulate the number of electoral endorsements that newspapers give to each side of politics in federal elections. Overall, we find that the Australian media are quite centrist, with very few outlets being statistically distinguishable from the middle of Australian politics. It is possible that this is due to the lack of competition in the Australian media market. To the extent that we can separate content slant from editorial slant, we find some evidence that editors are more partisan than journalists. |
| Keywords: | media slant, media bias, competition, economics of elections |
| JEL: | D72 L82 |
| Date: | 2011–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6156&r=pol |
| By: | Caselli, Francesco; Tesei, Andrea |
| Abstract: | We study theoretically and empirically whether natural resource windfalls affect political regimes. We document the following regularities. Natural resource windfalls have no effect on the political system when they occur in democracies. However, windfalls have significant political consequences in autocracies. In particular, when an autocratic country receives a positive shock to its flow of resource rents it responds by becoming even more autocratic. Furthermore, there is heterogeneity in the response of autocracies. In deeply entrenched autocracies the effect of windfalls on politics is virtually nil, while in moderately entrenched autocracies windfalls significantly exacerbate the autocratic nature of the political system. To frame the empirical work we present a simple model in which political incumbents choose the degree of political contestability by deciding how much to spend on vote-buying, bullying, or outright repression. Potential challengers decide whether or not to try to unseat the incumbent and replace him. The model uncovers a reason for the asymmetric impact of resource windfalls on democracies and autocracies, as well as the differential impact within autocratic regimes. |
| Keywords: | autocracy; resource windfalls |
| Date: | 2011–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8662&r=pol |
| By: | Francesco Caselli; Andrea Tesei |
| Abstract: | We study theoretically and empirically whether natural resource windfalls affect political regimes. We document the following regularities. Natural resource windfalls have no effect on the political system when they occur in democracies. However, windfalls have significant political consequences in autocracies. In particular, when an autocratic country receives a positive shock to its flow of resource rents it responds by becoming even more autocratic. Furthermore, there is heterogeneity in the response of autocracies. In deeply entrenched autocracies the effect of windfalls on politics is virtually nil, while in moderately entrenched autocracies windfalls significantly exacerbate the autocratic nature of the political system. To frame the empirical work we present a simple model in which political incumbents choose the degree of political contestability by deciding how much to spend on vote-buying, bullying, or outright repression. Potential challengers decide whether or not to try to unseat the incumbent and replace him. The model uncovers a reason for the asymmetric impact of resource windfalls on democracies and autocracies, as well as the differential impact within autocratic regimes. |
| JEL: | E0 F0 |
| Date: | 2011–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17601&r=pol |
| By: | van Jaarsveldt, Leon |
| Abstract: | Based on a dataset by Pew Internet and American life project on the 2008 Post election results in the United States, this research aims to determine whether the frequency of SNS usage, the amount of SNS profiles, the number of SNS platforms and the use of SNS platforms for political purposes, especially through the 'friend' function, positively predict online political engagement and online political information seeking. The findings show that while the number of SNS profiles have no impact on either dependent variable, the number of SNS platforms plays a role in online political engagement while the frequency of use plays a strong role in both online political engagement and online political information seeking. The findings also indicate a strong relationship between using SNSs for political purposes, especially for finding campaign or candidate information on the site and for learning friends' political interests or affiliation, and online political engagement and online political information seeking, as well as for starting or joining a cause and becoming a 'friend' of a political candidate. -- |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itsp11:52311&r=pol |
| By: | Ryo Arawatari (Graduate School of Economics, Nagoya University); Tetsuo Ono (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the determinants of government debt and social security for the old in a closed-economy, overlapping-generation model. Under the probabilistic voting, the model presents (i) an intergenerational link of resource allocation via debt and social security; (ii) multiple political equilibria; and (iii) a negative cor- relation between tax and debt. These three results are robust to the introduction of public goods as an alternative government expenditure or to the introduction of income heterogeneity within a generation. |
| Keywords: | Government debt; Social security; Overlapping generations; Proba- bilistic voting |
| JEL: | D72 H55 H63 |
| Date: | 2011–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osk:wpaper:1133&r=pol |
| By: | Díaz Serrano, Lluís; Rodríguez Pose, Andrés |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses whether the different powers and resources at the disposal of local and regional governments across Europe deliver greater satisfaction with political institutions and lead to greater personal happiness. The analysis uses microdata from the four available waves of the European social survey (2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008), including more than 160,000 observations of individuals living in 29 European countries. Our results reveal that political and fiscal decentralization have a positive and significant effect on individuals’ overall happiness. Fiscal decentralization also exerts a significant effect on the level of satisfaction with political and economic institutions and with the education and health systems, whereas the effect of political decentralization on these variables is more limited. The results show that citizens seem to be happier with the actual capacity of their local governments to deliver than with the general principle that they can have a say on their daily politics and policies. Keywords: Happiness, well-being, satisfaction, fiscal and political decentralization, Europe. JEL codes: H11, H77 |
| Keywords: | Felicitat, Benestar, Satisfacció, Descentralització administrativa, 32 - Política, |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/151812&r=pol |
| By: | Dmitriy Vorobyev |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a method for detecting electoral fraud in the form of ballot stuffing. As ballot stuffing increases both turnout and the incumbent‘s vote share in precincts where it occurs, precincts with low reported turnout are more likely to be clean. Information on clean precincts is used to simulate counterfactual data for "infected" precincts, which are then compared to the observed data. The method is applied to the 2006 Finnish presidential elections. The test fails to reject the hypothesis of no ballot stuffing for the original data, but detects artificially imputed 1.6% fraud. The same test implies that in the 2004 presidential elections in Russia at least 4.7% of the votes were stuffed in favor of the incumbent. |
| Keywords: | elections; fraud detection; |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cer:papers:wp447&r=pol |
| By: | Rota, Mauro |
| Abstract: | The Kantian thought had advanced the idea that wars and military expenditure should decrease as long as democracy widens across the World. Historical evidence seems to invalidate this wisdom because frequency of wars is ncreasing over time and a large amount of public resources is still being committed to military spending. This paper contributes to explain this point by considering the effect of polity regimes on the military spending during the period 1880-1938. Indeed, before World War I the more democratic countries spent more for military purposes than autocracies whereas the reverse is true after 1920. This puzzling behaviour is therefore explained by the inconsistent timing between the ability of a state to drain resources by taxation (state fiscal capacity) and the political participation. Thus, the Kantian idea of a democratic and peaceful world seems to hold only for full democracy with large political participation. |
| Keywords: | Military spending; polity regimes; war; political participation |
| JEL: | H56 N40 |
| Date: | 2011–11–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:35254&r=pol |
| By: | Joachim Fuenfgelt; Guenther G. Schulze (Department of International Economic Policy, University of Freiburg) |
| Abstract: | We analyze the formation of environmental policy to regulate transboundary pollution if governments are self-interested. In a common agency framework, we portray the environmental policy calculus of two political supportmaximizing governments that are in a situation of strategic interaction with respect to their environmental policies, but too small to affect world market prices. We show how governments systematically deviate from socially optimal environmental policies. Taxes may be too high if environmental interests and pollution-intensity of production are very strong; under different constellations they may be too low. Governments may actually subsidize the production of a polluting good. Politically motivated environmental policy thus may be more harmful to the environment as compared to the benevolent dictators’ solution. In other cases it may enhance environmental quality and welfare beyond what a benevolent government would achieve. |
| Keywords: | Political economy, environmental policy, transboundary pollution, common agency, strategic interaction |
| JEL: | Q58 F5 |
| Date: | 2011–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fre:wpaper:14&r=pol |
| By: | Tetsuo Ono (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University) |
| Abstract: | This paper develops an overlapping-generation model featuring four types of households: single female, single male, one-breadwinner couple and two-breadwinner couple. The paper considers majority voting over public pension in the presence of derived pension rights for one-breadwinner couples. In an economy with a low in- tertemporal elasticity of substitution, borrowing-constrained one-breadwinner cou- ples may prefer a lower tax rate than do other types of households, although the for- mer attain a higher benefit-to-cost ratio of public pension than do others. Changes in the gender wage gap, the level of derived pension rights, and the fraction of two- breadwinner couples produce an inverse U-shaped relationship between the relevant variable and the tax rate. |
| Keywords: | Borrowing constraint; Marital status; Gender wage gap; Derived pen- sion rights; Political economy |
| JEL: | D72 H55 J12 |
| Date: | 2011–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osk:wpaper:1132&r=pol |
| By: | Yan, Isabel K.; Chan, Kenneth S.; Dang, Vinh Q.T. |
| Abstract: | We empirically examine some listed Chinese firms’ political connection, ownership, and financing constraints. Politically-connected firms display no financing constraints whereas firms without connection experience significant constraints. Non-connected family-controlled firms bear greater constraints than non-connected state-owned firms. |
| Keywords: | Political connection; investments; financing constraints; Chinese firms |
| JEL: | G31 G18 E22 O16 |
| Date: | 2011–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:35221&r=pol |
| By: | Daniel Horn (Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, TÁRKI Social Research Institute (TÁRKI)) |
| Abstract: | The paper looks at the link between inequality and voter turnout, and derives three hypothesis from previous literature. It is shown that inequality associates negatively with turnout at the national elections (hypothesis 1). Although this is not a very strong effect, but it is net of several factors affecting voter turnout that are empirically well proven – such as individual characteristics or different features of the political system. The literature suggests that this negative association is either due to the lower turnout of the poor relative to the rich in high inequality countries (hypothesis 2) or due to the effects of the universal welfare state, which increases turnout through altered social norms as well as decreases inequality through government intervention (hypothesis 3). Although none of the hypotheses were refuted, neither was really supported by the data. I also tested whether inequalities at the top or at the bottom have a different affect on turnout. Although the results, again, are not very robust, it seems that larger differences in income between the very rich and the middle decreases overall turnout, while higher difference between the middle and the very poor increases turnout. This is just the opposite of what is expected from the Downsian rational voter model. JEL codes: D72, D63 |
| Date: | 2011–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aia:ginidp:dp16&r=pol |
| By: | Eric Guerci (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - CNRS : UMR6579); Nobuyuki Hanaki (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - CNRS : UMR6579, Economics Department - Université de Tsukuba); Naoki Watanabe (Economics Department - Université de Tsukuba); Gabriele Esposito (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - CNRS : UMR6579); Xiaoyan Lu (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - CNRS : UMR6579) |
| Abstract: | We conducted a sensitivity analysis of results in weighted voting experiments by varying the following two features of the protocol by Montero et al. (2008): (a) the way subjects' roles are reassigned in each round (random versus semi-fixed roles) and (b) the number of proposals that subjects can approve simultaneously (multiple versus single approval). We found that the possibility of simultaneously approving many proposals (multiple approvals) may result in more confusion and mistakes by subjects than the case without such a possibility (single approval). We also found that frequencies of minimal winning coalitions (MWCs) observed under the protocol with semi-fixed roles and single approval are consistent with our hypothesis: each subject prefers a MWC in which his or her relative weight is larger, and the probability of each MWC occurring depends on a score in the social ordering determined by the Borda count, when there is no veto player. |
| Keywords: | weighted voting; experiment; cooperative game; mistakes; winning coalition |
| Date: | 2011–11–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00645867&r=pol |
| By: | Brian Burgoon |
| Abstract: | Does inequality fuel anti-globalization backlash? This paper answers this question by analyzing how income inequality affects the embrace or eschew of globalization by political parties. It focuses on party opposition to and support for trade openness, European-Union integration, and general internationalism in all party platforms of 22 advanced-industrial democracies between 1960 and 2008. The analysis considers how and under what conditions inequality affects such position-taking. The main finding is that inequality tends to increase parties’ anti-globalization backlash, an effect that does not significantly differ across party families or globalization exposure but does get diminished with more generous redistributional policies. These findings clarify the nature and origins of anti-EU and other aspects of anti-globalization backlash, and suggest how socio-economic conditions may be central to such backlash. Word count (text, footnotes, references): 8713 |
| Date: | 2011–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aia:ginidp:dp14&r=pol |
| By: | Clem Brooks; Inés Calzada |
| Abstract: | In comparative social science, policy feedback has become a widely popular device with which to understand policy persistence and the impacts of state-making and political entrepreneurship on mass opinion. Although the existence of such effects is frequently taken for granted, recent work has challenged prevailing assumptions about the unproblematic nature of feedback from policy change to mass opinion. This is an opportune time to put policy feedback to further test. We do so by bringing to bear the two main theoretical perspectives that underlie established and recent scholarship, and applying for the first time survey experiments to evaluate key expectations. Focusing on the relatively novel domain of counter-terrorism policy, we analyze data drawn from a national survey conducted in 2009. Results from embedded experiments suggest new evidence for policy feedback effects. Analysis of mechanisms suggests limits in interest-centered explanations, and the relevance of some under-studied, cognitive factors. We discuss implications and limits of our study for policy feedback scholarship, and with further reference to the case of U.S. attitudes toward the war on terror. |
| Date: | 2011–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipp:wpaper:1102&r=pol |
| By: | Daniel Montolio (University of Barcelona (UB) and Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB)); Amedeo Piolatto (University of Barcelona (UB) and Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB)) (Universitat de Barcelona) |
| Abstract: | Human capital and, therefore, education have an impact on the societys future welfare. In this paper we study the connection between the voters support to public education and the retirement concerns. We show that voters anticipate the positive effect of education on future pensions. The support for a publicly financed education system increases, the more redistributive the pension system is, and this is true also amongst citizens preferring a private school. We also show that the ends against the middle equilibrium can occur even when the voters preferred tax rate is decreasing in income. |
| Keywords: | olg, pension system, altruism, education, voting |
| JEL: | D72 H55 H31 H42 H52 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bar:bedcje:2011268&r=pol |
| By: | Yan, Isabel K.; Chan, Kenneth S.; Dang, Vinh Q.T. |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the impact of recent financial liberalization in China on the financing constraints of publicly-listed Chinese firms with and without politically-connected CEO/Chairman. Two continuous indices are used to measure the evolution and intensity of financial reforms: a financial liberalization index and a capital control index. The results indicate that while firms without politically-connected CEO/Chairman face significant financing constraints and politically-connected firms do not, financial liberalization has reduced the constraints for the former. Similarly, lower capital control in China’s equity market lessens credit constraints for non-connected firms. No statistically-significant impact is detected with regards to firms that have CEO/Chairman with powerful political background. |
| Keywords: | Financial liberalization; investments; financing constraints; political connection; Chinese firms |
| JEL: | G31 G18 E22 O16 |
| Date: | 2011–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:35223&r=pol |
| By: | Riboni, Alessandro |
| Abstract: | We study a legislature where decisions are made by playing an agenda-setting game. Legislators are concerned about their electoral prospects but they are also genuinely concerned for the legislature to make the correct decision. We show that when ideological polarization is positive but not too large (and the status quo is extremely inefficient), institutions in which the executive has either no constraints (autocracy) or many constraints (unanimity) are preferable to democracies that operate under an intermediate number of constraints (simple majority rule). When instead ideological polarization is large (and the status quo is only moderately inefficient), simple majority turns out to be preferable. |
| Keywords: | Majority rule; Position-taking preferences; Ideological polarization; Strategic interactions; Agenda-setting game; |
| JEL: | D7 D02 |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ner:dauphi:urn:hdl:123456789/7723&r=pol |