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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Justina AV Fischer (Faculty of Economics, University of Rome "Tor Vergata") |
| Abstract: | This paper asks whether trust in political institutions depends on individual’s political leaning and the political ideology of the national government. We employ information on 140'000 individuals in 30 democratic OECD countries from the World Values Survey, 1981 – 2007, and estimate so-called micro-based pseudo-panel two-way fixed effects models. Distinguishing between extreme and moderate versions of leftist and rightist political leaning, our estimates reveal that political trust increases non-linearly in the degree of individual’s conservatism. We also find that political leaning is not instrumental to improving one's own socio-economic situation, thus rather constituting an expressive behavior. If government ideology matches individual’s political preferences, trust in political institutions is increased. In contrast, the ‘apolitical’ appears to distrust the political system as such. We also find evidence for a symmetric, but incomplete convergence of party ideologies to the median voter position. Implications for vote abstention are discussed. |
| Keywords: | political trust, government ideology, political leaning, World Values Survey |
| JEL: | D72 H11 Z13 |
| Date: | 2011–10–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:212&r=pol |
| By: | Fabian Gouret (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I); Guillaume Hollard (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris); Stéphane Rossignol (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I) |
| Abstract: | Spatial models of voting have dominated mathematical political theory since the seminal work of Downs. The Downsian model assumes that each elector votes on the basis of his utility function which depends only on the distance between his preferred policy platform and the ones proposed by candidates. A succession of papers introduces valence issues into the model, i.e. candidates' characteristics which are independent of the platforms they propose. So far, little is known about which of the existing utility functions used in valence models is the most empirically founded. Using a large survey run prior to the 2007 French presidential election, we evaluate and compare several spatial voting models with valence. Existing models perform poorly in ¯tting the data. However, strong empirical regularities emerge. This leads us to a new model of valence that we call the partisan valence model. This new model makes sense theoretically and is sound empirically |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00633567&r=pol |
| By: | Daron Acemoglu; Georgy Egorov; Konstantin Sonin |
| Date: | 2011–10–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000281&r=pol |
| By: | Bertocchi, Graziella (University of Modena and Reggio Emilia); Dimico, Arcangelo (Queen's University Belfast) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the long term determinants of political and economic outcomes over a new data set composed of Mississippi counties. We analyze the effect of disfranchisement on voting registration at the end of the nineteenth century (1896-9), as well as the impact of voting registration on education outcomes at different points in time, namely in 1917 and in the 1950s. Finally, we turn to the determinants of a broad array of development indicators for the year 1960 and for the 1960-2000 period. Our main conclusion is that race, rather than political institutions and education policies, is the main force driving the above outcomes. |
| Keywords: | race, institutions, development, inequality, education |
| JEL: | E25 H52 J15 N31 O11 P16 |
| Date: | 2011–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6017&r=pol |
| By: | Graziella Bertocchi; Arcangelo Dimico |
| Abstract: | We investigate the long term determinants of political and economic outcomes over a new data set composed of Mississippi counties. We analyze the effect of disfranchisement on voting registration at the end of the nineteenth century (1896-9), as well as the impact of voting registration on education outcomes at different points in time, namely in 1917 and in the 1950s. Finally, we turn to the determinants of a broad array of development indicators for the year 1960 and for the 1960-2000 period. Our main conclusion is that race, rather than political institutions and education policies, is the main force driving the above outcomes |
| Keywords: | Race, institutions, development, inequality, education |
| JEL: | E25 H52 J15 N31 O11 P16 |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mod:depeco:0665&r=pol |
| By: | Go Kotera (Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University); Nobuhiro Mizuno (Faculty of Commerce and Economics, Chiba University of Commerce); Keisuke Okada (Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University,); Sovannroeun Samreth (Faculty of Liberal Arts, Saitama University) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the relationship between ethnic composition, political regimes, and the quality of public policy. Specifically, based on the citizen-candidate model, we assume individuals who have heterogeneous policy preferences and investigate how ethnic diversity affects selection of a politician and the resulting policy choices in democratic and dictatorial regimes. In the theoretical analysis, our model derives (1) a negative relationship between ethnic diversity and the quality of public policy, both in a democracy with a dominant group and in a dictatorship, and (2) a non-monotonic relationship in a democracy without a dominant group. In the empirical examination, using health outcomes as the proxy for the quality of public policy, our theoretical results are supported by evidence from the data of 154 countries. |
| Keywords: | Citizen-candidate model; Ethnic fractionalization; Infant mortality. |
| Date: | 2011–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kyo:wpaper:790&r=pol |
| By: | Louis Puttermann; Jean-Robert Tyran; Kenju Kamei |
| Abstract: | The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support public goods provision has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable both of resolving and of exacerbating the free-rider problem, depending on parameter settings. Most groups quickly learned to choose parameters inducing efficient outcomes. But despite uniform money payoffs implying common interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes, and of gender and intelligence. |
| Keywords: | Public good; voluntary contribution; formal sanction; experiment; penalty; voting |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D71 D72 H41 |
| Date: | 2010–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jku:nrnwps:2010_20&r=pol |
| By: | Niklas Potrafke (Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Germany) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines whether government ideology influenced economic freedom across the German states. The results show that in former West Germany rightwing governments promoted economic freedom, whereas leftwing governments confined it. In former East Germany, however, rightwing governments have not been associated with propagating economic freedom. This finding appears to conflict with the common notion of policy convergence at the federal level. In fact, the observed variation in political preferences across states may indicate that politicians gratify the local electorate and, in return, offer moderate policies at the federal level. |
| Keywords: | economic freedom, government and political ideology, institutions, panel data |
| JEL: | D72 O52 R11 R50 C23 |
| Date: | 2011–10–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:knz:dpteco:1141&r=pol |
| By: | Gupta, Poonam; Panagariya, Arvind |
| Abstract: | With the exception Brander and Drazen (2008), who use a comprehensive cross-country database consisting of both developed and developing countries, the hypothesis that rapid growth helps incumbents win elections has been tested exclusively for the developed countries (e.g., Ray Fair 1978). But since sustained rapid growth offers the prospect of pulling vast numbers of the voters out of poverty within a generation, such an effect is far more likely to be present in the developing rather than developed countries. In this paper, we offer the first test of the hypothesis on a large developing and poor country, India, which has seen its economy grow 8 to 9 percent recently. We first generalize the Fair model to allow for multiple candidates instead for just two and then test it using cross-state data. We find quantitatively large and statistically robust effect of growth on the prospects of the candidates of the state incumbent parties to win elections. Specifically, we use the data on 422 candidates in the 2009 parliamentary elections and show that the candidates of incumbent parties in high-growth states have much better prospects of victory than those in low-growth states. |
| Keywords: | India; elections; growth; incumbents |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2011–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:34322&r=pol |
| By: | Raghbendra Jha; Sharmistha Nag; Hari K. Nagarajan |
| Abstract: | In a developing economy with an ethnically diverse society, such as India's, household welfare and its distribution within the household unambiguously depend on how much time each member of the household spends on productive activity. In this paper we examine the welfare impact of reducing the time spent by members of households, particularly women, through political reservations in rural India. Using a unique data set we find that (i) Political reservations and the ability of women to participate in the process of governance contribute to household welfare by allowing women to participate in labor markets, essentially because provision of public goods and in particular water, increases the productivity of household labor time. (ii) The concomitant decline in household work and increase in labor market participation is a robust indicator of increased productivity of household labor time being translated into productive work. In particular women participate in self employment and on cultivation. The effect on household incomes caused by members engaged in self-employment activities and own-cultivation is higher compared to effects caused by participation in off-farm wage labor. (iii) Further, our results are robust to the inclusion of residential location, access to credit, and shocks. |
| Keywords: | Political Reservations for Women, Water, Time in Unproductive Activity, IV estimation |
| JEL: | B21 H41 H42 J22 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pas:asarcc:2011-15&r=pol |
| By: | René Van Den Brink (Department of Econometrics - Timbergen Institute - VU University); Agnieszka Rusinowska (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I); Frank Steffen (University of Liverpool Management School (ULMS) - University of Liverpool Management School) |
| Abstract: | A well known and established model in communication policy in sociology and marketing is that of opinion leadership. Opinion leaders are actors in a society who are able to affect the behavior of other members of the society called followers. Hence, opinion leaders might have a considerable impact on the behavior of markets and other social agglomerations being made up of individual actors choosing among a number of alternatives. For marketing or policy purposes it appears to be interesting to investigate the effect of different opinion leader-follower structures in markets or any other collective decision-making situations in a society. We study a two-action model in which the members of a society are to choose one action, for instance, to buy or not to buy a certain joint product, or to vote yes or no on a specific proposal. Each of the actors has an inclination to choose one of the actions. By definition opinion leaders have some power over their followers, and they exercise this power by influencing the behavior of their followers, i.e. their choice of action. After all actors have chosen their actions, a decision-making mechanism determines the collective choice resulting out of the individual choices. Making use of bipartite digraphs we introduce novel satisfaction and power scores which allow us to analyze the actors' satisfaction and power with respect to the collective choice for societies with different opinion leader-follower structures. Moreover, we study common dictator and opinion leader properties of the above scores and illustrate our findings for a society with five members. |
| Keywords: | Bipartite digraph ; influence ; inclination ; collective choice ; opinion leader ; follower ; satisfaction ; power ; dictator properties ; opinion leader properties |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00633881&r=pol |