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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Aron Kiss (National Bank of Hungary) |
| Abstract: | The paper analyzes a political accountability game with an electorate of 'partisan' and 'independent' voters. It is shown that politicians have a strategic incentive to engage in 'divisive politics', that is, to force some independent voters to take sides, even if the direct electoral benefits are higher for their opponents than for themselves. By polarizing the electorate, the incumbent politician weakens the ability of independent voters to make him accountable for his policies in the common interest. Moreover, the interests of the incumbent and the opposition are aligned: the opposition also benefits from divisive politics because, in equilibrium, its election probability increases. |
| Keywords: | political accountability, political agency, divisive politics, democracy in divided societies |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2011–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:has:discpr:1115&r=pol |
| By: | Andrew E. Clark (EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris, IZA - Institute for the Study of Labor - IZA, PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS : UMR8545 - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - Ecole des Ponts ParisTech - Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris - ENS Paris); Carine Milcent (EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris, PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS : UMR8545 - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - Ecole des Ponts ParisTech - Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris - ENS Paris) |
| Abstract: | This paper uses an unusual administrative dataset covering the universe of French hospitals to consider hospital employment: this is consistently higher in public hospitals than in Not-For-Profit or private hospitals, even controlling for many measures of hospital output (such as the type of operations and care provided, and the bed capacity rate). Public-hospital employment is positively correlated with the local unemployment rate, whereas no relationship is found in non-Public hospitals. This is consistent with public hospitals providing employment in depressed areas. We appeal to the Political Science literature and calculate local political allegiance, using expert evaluations on various parties political positions and local election results. The relationship between public hospital employment and local unemployment is stronger the more left-wing the local municipality. This latter result holds especially when electoral races are tight, consistent with a concern for re-election. |
| Keywords: | hospitals ; public employment ; overmanning ; political preferences |
| Date: | 2011–04–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00586792&r=pol |
| By: | Pivato, Marcus |
| Abstract: | We adopt an `epistemic' interpretation of social decisions: there is an objectively correct choice, each voter receives a `noisy signal' of the correct choice, and the social objective is to aggregate these signals to make the best possible guess about the correct choice. One epistemic method is to fix a probability model and compute the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE), maximum a posteriori estimator (MAP) or expected utility maximizer (EUM), given the data provided by the voters. We first show that an abstract voting rule can be interpreted as MLE or MAP if and only if it is a scoring rule. We then specialize to the case of distance-based voting rules, in particular, the use of the median rule in judgement aggregation. Finally, we show how several common `quasiutilitarian' voting rules can be interpreted as EUM. |
| Keywords: | voting; maximum likelihood estimator; maximum a priori estimator; expected utility maximizer; statistics; epistemic democracy; Condorcet jury theorem; scoring rule |
| JEL: | D81 D70 C44 |
| Date: | 2011–04–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:30292&r=pol |
| By: | Matteo Cervellati; Sunde, Uwe |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the empirical role of violent conflicts for the causal effect of democracy on economic growth. Exploiting within-country variation to identify the effect of democratization during the "Third Wave", we find evidence that the effect of democratization is weaker than reported previously once one accounts for the incidence of conflict, while the incidence of conflict itself significantly reduces growth. The results show in turn that permanent democratic transitions significantly reduce the incidence and onset of conflict, which suggests that part of the positive growth effect of democratization arises because democratization reduces conflict incidence. When accounting for the role of violence during democratization, we find evidence that peaceful transitions to democracy have a significant positive effect on growth that is even larger than reported in the previous literature, while violent transitions to democracy have no, or even negative, effects on economic growth. |
| Keywords: | Democratization, Armed Conict, Civil War, Economic Growth, Democratization Scenario, Peaceful Transition. |
| JEL: | O43 N10 N40 |
| Date: | 2011–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usg:econwp:2011:14&r=pol |
| By: | Braggion, F.; Moore, L. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | The late-Victorian era was characteristed by especially close links between politicians and firms in the UK. Roughly half of all members of Parliament served as company directors, many as directors of multiple firms. We analyze 467 British companies over the period 1895 to 1904 to investigate the interaction of firms and politicians. We find that new-technology firms with politicians serving on their boards were more likely to issue equity finance and had higher Tobin's Q. Our evidence suggests that causality runs from director-politicians to a firm's performance, rather than in the opposite direction. |
| Keywords: | Political Connections;Second Industrial Revolution;External Finance. |
| JEL: | G20 N23 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2011039&r=pol |
| By: | Tiago Freire; Vernon Henderson; Ari Kuncoro |
| Abstract: | Using three waves of survey data from fishing villages in Aceh, Indonesia for 2005-2009, we examine the determinants of local volunteer labor after the tsunami. Pre-existing social capital and the form of aid delivery (but not trauma) strongly affect village volunteerism initially, but these effects weaken with time. What persists is the effect of essentially a new institution, formal village elections. While recent work suggests democratization increases cooperation, the differentially timed introduction of elections negatively affects volunteerism, suggesting a regime switch effect where traditional leaders chosen by elites want more volunteer labor projects than democratically elected leaders do. |
| Keywords: | # |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bro:econwp:2011-8&r=pol |
| By: | René Van Den Brink (Department of Econometrics - Timbergen Institute - VU University); Agnieszka Rusinowska (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I); Frank Steffen (University of Liverpool Management School (ULMS) - University of Liverpool Management School) |
| Abstract: | A well-known model in sociology and marketing is that of opinion leadership. Opinion leaders are actors who are able to affect the behavior of their followers. Hence, opinion leaders have some power over their followers, and they can exercise this power by influencing their followers choice of action. We study a two-action model for a society with opinion leaders. We assume that each member of the society has an inclination to choose one of these actions and that the collective choice is made by simple majority of the actions chosen by each member. For this model, we axiomatize satisfaction and power scores, which allow us to investigate the effects of different opinion leader-follower structures. |
| Keywords: | Collective choice, follower, opinion leader, power, satisfaction, axiomatization. |
| Date: | 2011–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00587726&r=pol |
| By: | Geys, Benny; Osterloh, Steffen |
| Abstract: | Studies of spatial policy interdependence in (local) public policies usually concentrate on the relations between jurisdictions within a single analysed region, and disregard possible extra-regional effects. This paper evaluates the validity of such restriction by studying German local politicians' assessments of their jurisdictions' main competitors in the struggle to attract firms. We find that location near a border significantly undermines politicians' perception that the fiercest competitive pressure derives from jurisdictions within their own state. This effect sets in about 20km (12.5km) from a national (international) border. We also confirm that intranational borders are perceived as much less constraining for firms than international ones, even in a highly integrated area such as the European Union. Overall, these results indicate that nearest municipalities perceive each other as competitors regardless of the state or country where they are located. The practical implications of these findings for future studies on spatial policy interdependence are discussed. -- |
| Keywords: | government interaction,competition,border effects,policy interdependence |
| JEL: | D24 D60 H71 H72 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:11020&r=pol |