|
on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Aidt, Toke; Albornoz, Facundo; Gassebner, Martin |
| Abstract: | In this paper we analyze the role of the IMF and the World Bank in triggering changes in the political regime, i.e., democracy and autocracy. We develop a theoretical model which predicts that anticipation of financial flows from international financial institutions may trigger political regime changes which would not take place otherwise. We test the implications of our model empirically and find support both for the role of perfectly foreseen IMF and World Bank programs and of the history of previous World Bank programs. The magnitude of this effects is quite substantial. -- |
| Keywords: | political transitions,democracy,autocracy,political instability |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:gdec10:48&r=pol |
| By: | Emmanuel Sigalas, Monika Mokre, Johannes Pollak, Peter Slominski; Jozef Bátora |
| Abstract: | This paper builds upon the theoretical premises developed by Erik O. Eriksen and John Erik Fossum and empirically examines if democracy at the EU level is closer to the ideal-type of delegated, federal or regional-cosmopolitan democracy. We focus on a particular dimension of parliamentary representation, namely, party politics at the European level, and we concentrate on the 2009 European election party manifestoes. We hypothesise that under the delegated democracy model there should hardly be any similarities between the Euro-party and their member party manifestoes. The opposite should hold for the federal model, whereas in the case of the regional-cosmopolitan model the manifestoes should have a post-national outlook. Even though most manifestoes have a discernible European outlook and the national and Euro-party manifestoes share a number of common features, the differences remain more than the similarities. Our empirical findings suggest that the PES, the EPP and the EGP cannot be placed under the same EU democracy model. |
| Keywords: | democracy; political representation |
| Date: | 2010–08–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erp:reconx:p0070&r=pol |
| By: | Khemani, Stuti |
| Abstract: | This paper examines a puzzle in the political economy of infrastructure in India -- the co-existence of relatively low shares of capital spending in public budgets alongside evidence of large demand for village infrastructure from poor voters. It argues that this pattern is due to infrastructure projects being used at the margin for political rent-seeking, while spending on employment and welfare transfers are the preferred vehicles to win votes for re-election. New suggestive evidence on the variation of public spending composition across states, and within states over time is offered that is consistent with this argument. This evidence underscores a growing argument in the development literature that the level and composition of public spending per se may not be sufficient metrics to assess the quality of public goods policies -- greater infrastructure spending in some contexts may go to political rents rather than to the actual delivery of broad public goods for growth and poverty reduction. |
| Keywords: | Public Sector Economics,National Governance,Public Sector Management and Reform,Parliamentary Government,Debt Markets |
| Date: | 2010–09–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:5423&r=pol |
| By: | Bittencourt, Manoel |
| Abstract: | We test for the populist view of inflation in Latin America between 1970 and 2007. The empirical results - based on the relatively novel panel time-series data and analysis - confirm the theoretical prediction that recently elected governments coming into power after periods of political dictatorship, and which are faced with high economic inequality, end up generating high inflation and macroeconomic instability. All in all, we suggest that the implementation of democracy as such requires not only the right political context - or an appropriately constrained executive - to work well, but it also must come with certain economic institutions (e.g. central bank independence and a credible and responsible fiscal authority), institutions which would raise the costs of pursuing populist policies in the first place. -- |
| Keywords: | Polarisation,populism,hyperinflation,Latin America. |
| JEL: | E31 E65 N16 O23 O54 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:gdec10:47&r=pol |
| By: | Aisbett, Emma |
| Abstract: | International economists often refer to multinational enterprises and foreign firms interchangeably, yet one of the enduring divisions in the globalization debate is whether international law should be strengthened to protect foreign firms from predatory host governments, or rather strengthened to protect host governments from powerful multi- national firms. We contribute to this debate conceptually by distinguishing between foreign firms and multinational firms. We then use firm level data on government-firm relations from eighty countries to contribute empirical evidence on the debate. We find that multinational firms (both foreign and local) are indeed relatively influential over government, and find no evidence that foreign firms (multinational or otherwise) suffer significant disadvantages in terms of self-reported influence. -- |
| Keywords: | Multinational Firms,Foreign Firms,Political Economy,Government |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:gdec10:39&r=pol |
| By: | Kotera, Go; Okada, Keisuke; Samreth, Sovannroeun |
| Abstract: | Previous studies on the effect of government size on corruption have produced mixed results. For the purpose of explaining these ambiguous results, our study investigates the effect of government size on corruption by taking into account the role of democracy level in each country. Using annual data from 82 countries from 1995 to 2008, the estimation results indicate that an increase in government size can lead to a decrease in corruption if democracy level is sufficiently high and, in contrast, can lead to an increase in corruption if it is too low. As a robustness check, estimations using a different index of corruption and a different proxy for government size are also conducted. The results show that our main results are robust. Furthermore, to deal with endogeneity problems, we conduct an instrumental variable estimation, the results of which support our main results. These findings provide some important implications for policymakers seeking to conduct government intervention without aggravating corruption. |
| Keywords: | Corruption; Government Size; Democracy; Instrumental Variable Estimation |
| JEL: | D73 H50 H11 |
| Date: | 2010–09–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:25015&r=pol |
| By: | Branosa, Boris; Klasen, Stephan; Ziegler, Maria |
| Abstract: | Institutions are a major factor explaining development outcomes. This study focuses on social institutions related to gender inequality understood as long-lasting norms, values and codes of conduct that shape gender roles, and presents evidence on why they matter for development. We derive hypotheses from existing theories and empirically test them at the cross-country level with linear regressions using the newly created Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) and its subindices as measures for social institutions. We find that apart from geography, political system, religion, and the level of economic development, one has to consider social institutions related to gender inequality to better account for differences in development. Our results show that social institutions that deprive women of their autonomy and bargaining power in the household, or that increase the private costs and reduce the private returns to investments into girls, are associated with lower female education, higher fertility rates and higher child mortality. Moreover, social institutions related to gender inequality are negatively associated with governance measured as rule of law and voice and accountability. -- |
| Keywords: | Social institutions,SIGI,Gender inequality,Fertility,Child mortality,Female education,Governance |
| JEL: | D63 I10 I20 H1 J16 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:gdec10:50&r=pol |
| By: | Francisco Gallego |
| Abstract: | Public schools in Chile receive a per-student subsidy depending on enrollment, and are managed by local governments that operate under soft budget constraints. In this paper, we study the effects of this system on per-student expenditures. Per-student expenditures on rural areas are 30% higher than in urban areas. We find that about 75% of this difference is due to the fact that rural public schools are significantly smaller and thus do not benefit from economies of scale. Besides, we also show that in our preferred estimates about 50% of the students in rural areas could be moved to schools that could exploit economies of scale—i.e., these students could attend bigger schools traveling at most an hour a day in total. We show that even if we use conservative average speed rates or control for transportation, utility and infrastructure costs, there is a sizeable share of the students that could be consolidated. We argue that local governments that have soft budget constraints do not consolidate these schools giving the existing potential because of political factors: closing schools is harmful for mayors in electoral terms. Consistent with this claim, we find that a decrease in the degree of political competition in areas with better access to non-voucher transfers from the central government (i.e. with softer budget constraints) decreases the extent of the inefficiency. |
| Keywords: | School size, rural schools, consolidation, Chile, education decentralization, political economy, soft budget constraints |
| JEL: | I22 H52 H75 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ioe:doctra:375&r=pol |
| By: | Shonchoy, Abu |
| Abstract: | The paper focuses on the recent pattern of government expenditure for developing countries and estimates the determinants which may have influenced government expenditure. Using a panel data set for 111 developing countries from 1984 to 2004, this study finds evidence that political and institutional variables as well as governance variables significantly influence government expenditure. Among other results, the paper finds new evidence of Wagner's law which states that peoples' demand for service and willingness to pay is income-elastic hence the expansion of public economy is influenced by the greater economic influence of a nation Cameron (1978). Corruption is found to be influential in explaining the public expenditure of developing countries. On the contrary, size of the economy and linguistic fractionalization is found to have significant negative association over government expenditure. The study finds that military governments are more conservative in terms of large public expenditure other than spending on defence equipments. -- |
| Keywords: | Government expenditure,Panel data,Corruption,Fractionalization,Governance. |
| JEL: | E01 E61 E62 H2 H4 H5 H6 O11 O5 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:gdec10:2&r=pol |
| By: | Jean L. Cohen |
| Abstract: | Constitutionalism beyond the state is a deeply contested project. The emergence of global governance and global laws that directly affect individuals and regulate the conduct of states toward their own citizens raise questions about the basic hierarchy of authority among states, regional bodies and global institutions. States no longer have a monopoly of the production of international or global law. Thus questions about the legitimacy of global law and governance arise particularly, but not only, when they have constitutionalism- and democracy eviscerating effects. The discourse of global constitutionalism as a possible characterization of or response to the expanded juridification and exercise of coercive public power on the supra state level follows from these developments. But what kind of constitutionalism is appropriate beyond the state and what should be the relation among distinct and at times competing legal orders? This article addresses these questions focusing on the global political system and using the lens of the recent ECJ decision in the Kadi case to formulate the appropriate conceptual issues. I argue for a constitutional pluralist approach but I also argue that this requires reform of the global political system. I claim that a human rights-oriented constitutionalism is compatible with state sovereignty, appropriately understood. We should drop unhelpful dichotomous frameworks such as cosmopolitanism versus sovereignty, monism versus dualism and think creatively with respect to changing sovereignty regimes, federal unions of states that are not themselves states but which are constitutional and potentially constitutionalist legal orders. In this way we can try to preserve the best of what the older sovereignty regime of international law had to offer – constitutionalism, democracy, self determination of states, sovereign equality – while conceptualizing and (re-)designing the new, especially in light of international human rights concerns, in ways compatible with these and other, individual-oriented normative principles. |
| Keywords: | constitutional change; democracy; governance; law; legitimacy; pluralism |
| Date: | 2010–09–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erp:reconx:p0072&r=pol |
| By: | Francisco Gallego (Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.); Carlos Rodríguez (Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.); Enzo Sauma (Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.) |
| Abstract: | Public schools in Chile receive a per-student subsidy depending on enrollment, and are managed by local governments that operate under soft budget constraints. In this paper, we study the effects of this system on per-student expenditures. Per-student expenditures on rural areas are 30% higher than in urban areas. We find that about 75% of this difference is due to the fact that rural public schools are significantly smaller and thus do not benefit from economies of scale. Besides, we also show that in our preferred estimates about 50% of the students in rural areas could be moved to schools that could exploit economies of scale – i.e., these students could attend bigger schools traveling at most an hour day a day in total. We show that even if we use conservative average speed rates or control for transportation, utility and infrastructure costs, there is a sizeable share of students that could be consolidated. We argue that local governments that have soft budget constraints do not consolidate these schools giving the existing potential because of political factors: closing schools is harmful for mayors in electoral terms. Consistent with this claim, we find that a decrease in the degree of political competition in areas with better access to non-voucher transfers from the central government (i.e. with softer budget constraints) decreases the extent of the inefficiency. |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ioe:clabwp:8&r=pol |
| By: | Rainer Forst |
| Abstract: | In current social conflicts in European societies such as the ones concerning the crucifix in classrooms or the foulard or the burka worn in public, toleration is a concept claimed by all involved. The paper uncovers the historical and conceptual reasons for such ambivalence about the notion of toleration. It starts from a conceptual analysis and then reconstructs two stories about toleration which lead to two different conceptions of it – the hierarchical permission conception and the democratic respect conception. The paper applies these to current conflicts and argues for an understanding of toleration based on a certain form of mutual respect despite deep ethical disagreement. |
| Keywords: | democracy; diversity/homogeneity; normative political theory |
| Date: | 2010–08–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erp:reconx:p0071&r=pol |
| By: | Farfan-Vallespin, Antonio |
| Abstract: | This paper addresses the question of whether a decentralized government is subject to a stronger level of electoral control than a centralized government. When electoral control is strong an incumbent investing a low level of effort in providing public goods will face a serious threat of being voted out of office. This threat should provide the incentives to the incumbent to exert effort in order to be re-elected as shown by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986). According to the literature decentralization should increase electoral control due to the fact that under centralization the incumbent only needs to please the half plus one of the electorate in order to be re-elected. This paper presents analytically two new sources of differences in electoral control: assuming that public goods can be classified in lower tier public goods (e.g. sub-national or local level) and upper tier public goods (e.g. national public goods), then under centralization there are potential advantages derived from bundling the provision of both types of public goods, whereas under decentralization there are potential advantages derived from a clear delimitation of the responsibilities of the provider of each type of public good. We show that the trade-off depends on the probability distribution of the shocks and on the size of these shocks. -- |
| Keywords: | Decentralization,electoral control,provision of public goods,bundling of issues |
| JEL: | H11 H41 H77 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:gdec10:37&r=pol |
| By: | Branisa, Boris; Ziegler, Maria; Klasen, Stephan |
| Abstract: | In this paper we construct the Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) and its five subindices Family code, Civil liberties, Physical integrity, Son Preference and Ownership rights using variables of the OECD Gender, Institutions and Development database. Instead of measuring gender inequality in education, health, economic or political participation, these indices allow a new perspective on gender issues in developing countries. The SIGI and the subindices measure long-lasting social institutions which are mirrored by societal practices and legal norms that frame gender-relevant meanings and form the basis of gender roles. The subindices measure each one dimension of the concept and the SIGI combines the subindices into a multidimensional index of deprivation of women caused by social institutions. Methodologically, the SIGI is inspired by the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty measures. It offers a new way of aggregating gender inequality in several dimensions, penalizing high inequality in each dimension and allowing only for partial compensation between dimensions. The SIGI and the subindices are useful tools to identify countries and dimensions of social institutions that deserve attention. Empirical results confirm that the SIGI provides additional information to that of other well-known gender-related indices. -- |
| Keywords: | SIGI,Composite index,Gender inequality,Social institutions,OECD-GID database |
| JEL: | D63 I39 J16 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:gdec10:16&r=pol |
| By: | Unknown |
| Abstract: | Between 2000 and 2006, many Minnesota communities were engaged in protracted campaigns to pass ordinances that regulated smoking. Challenges were compounded in communities where multiple cities and counties shared regulatory power within what was, for economic purposes, a single population center. In 2005, ClearWay MinnesotaSM awarded the Public Health Law Center a two-year research grant to study the legal and political obstacles that seven multi-jurisdictional Minnesota regions faced in smoke-free campaigns over this six-year period. The purpose of our study was to examine the approaches regulatory authorities took in these campaigns; to analyze the significance of legal and political obstacles in obstructing or supporting progress toward smoke-free regulation; and to develop recommendations to help public health advocates, health organizations, policymakers, and legal professionals anticipate, avoid, and address these obstacles. |
| Date: | 2010–02–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:ctcres:1250566&r=pol |
| By: | Leela Kasturi; Vina Mazumdar |
| Abstract: | The political role of women as a subject for research is of recent origin in India. It is significant that there are so few studies of women's role in the nationalist movement or of the implications-social or political-of their momentous entry into the public sphere. Important works on the national movement mostly fail to examine the significance of women's participation in the struggles. Analysis in this area so far has received insufficient attention in histories of India both before and after 1975 when the need to study women's role in history began to be acknowledged world-wide. One searches in vain for an adequate study of women's participation in nationalist historiography. |
| Keywords: | political, recent origin, India, national movement, nationalist historiography |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:2868&r=pol |