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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Potrafke, Niklas |
| Abstract: | This paper empirically evaluates whether government ideology and electoral motives influenced the growth of public health expenditures in 18 OECD countries over the 1971-2004 period. The results suggest that incumbents behaved opportunistically and increased the growth of public health expenditures in election years. Government ideology did not have an influence. These findings indicate (1) the importance of public health in policy debates before elections and (2) the political pressure towards re-organizing public health policy platforms especially in times of demographic change. |
| Keywords: | public health expenditures; health policies; government ideology; partisan politics; electoral cycles; panel data |
| JEL: | H51 I18 C23 D72 |
| Date: | 2010–07–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:24083&r=pol |
| By: | Marta Curto-Grau (Departament d'Economia Política i Hisenda Pública; Universitat de Barcelona; Facultat d'Economia i Empresa -‐ Av. Diagonal, 690 (08034 Barcelona).); Alfonso Herranz-Loncán (Departament d’Història i Institucions Econòmiques Universitat de Barcelona; Facultat d'Economia i Empresa -‐ Av. Diagonal, 690 (08034 Barcelona).); Albert Solé-Ollé (Departament d'Economia Política i Hisenda Pública; Universitat de Barcelona; Facultat d'Economia i Empresa -‐ Av. Diagonal, 690 (08034 Barcelona).) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the extent to which the public allocation of road investment was influenced by political and electoral goals during the Spanish Restoration (1874-‐1923). More precisely, we seek to identify those provinces that were favoured with higher road construction expenditure and whether tactical strategies adopted by the political parties varied over time to reflect increasing political competition. In so doing, this paper combines concepts from three strands of literature: legislative pork-‐barrel; clientelism and machine politics; and electoral competition. Our main empirical finding for a panel of Spanish provinces between 1880 and 1914 suggests that constituencies electing a higher proportion of deputies from minority or opposition parties were initially punished through lower levels of road investment but that, by the end of the period, they were instead favoured with more resources than the rest. In addition, we also observe that senior deputies who had been ministers in previous administrations were more capable than other politicians of attracting resources to their constituencies. |
| Keywords: | road investment, distributive politics, electoral competition, vote buying |
| JEL: | H54 P16 D72 |
| Date: | 2010–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ahe:dtaehe:1008&r=pol |
| By: | Andreas Freytag (School of Economics and Business Administration, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena); G. Pehnelt |
| Abstract: | - |
| Keywords: | - |
| JEL: | F34 O16 |
| Date: | 2010–06–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hlj:hljwrp:02-2008&r=pol |
| By: | Vreeland, James; Spada, Paolo |
| Abstract: | Many believe that deliberative democracy, where individuals discuss alternatives before voting on them, should result in collectively superior outcomes because voters become better informed and decisions are justified using reason. These deliberations typically involve a moderator, however, whose role has been under-examined. We conduct a field experiment to test the effects moderators may have. Participants in a class of 107 students voted on options over their writing and exam requirements. Before voting, they participated in group discussions of about five people each with one moderator. Some (randomly assigned) moderators remained neutral throughout, while others made limited interventions, supporting a specific option. We find a substantial moderator effect. Our experiment is structured like deliberations used world-wide to make community decisions and thus should have some external validity. The results indicate that if organized interest groups had influence over moderators, they might be able to hijack a deliberative decision-making process. |
| Keywords: | deliberative democracy; participatory decision making; interest group; manipulation; moderators; facilitators |
| JEL: | D70 C93 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:24048&r=pol |
| By: | Epstein, Gil S. (Bar-Ilan University); Gang, Ira N. (Rutgers University) |
| Abstract: | Within immigrant society different groups wish to help the migrants in different ways – immigrant societies are multi-layered and multi-dimensional. We examine the situation where there exists a foundation that has resources and that wishes to help the migrants. To do so they need migrant groups to invest effort in helping their country-folk. Migrant groups compete against one another by helping their country-folk and to win grants from the foundation. We develop a model that considers how such a competition affects the resources invested by the groups’ supporters and how beneficial it is to immigrants. We consider two alternative rewards systems for supporters – absolute and relative ranking – in achieving their goals. |
| Keywords: | migration, assimilation, political economy |
| JEL: | F22 J0 |
| Date: | 2010–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5059&r=pol |
| By: | Banful, Afua Branoah |
| Abstract: | Despite their disappointing performance in the recent past, fertilizer subsidies have re-emerged as a tool in the agricultural strategies of many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The new paradigm for fertilizer subsidies calls for use of such mechanisms as vouchers to target benefits to poor smallholders and public–private partnerships to develop private markets. There is some belief that with these innovations, fertilizer subsidy programs will circumvent the deleterious consequences of the programs of the past. However, there has been a glaring lack of innovation in how to prevent politics from dominating the allocation of subsidy program benefits and exacerbating inefficiencies as was the experience in earlier programs. This paper studies how vouchers, which could be used towards the purchase of fertilizer, were distributed amongst districts in Ghana’s 2008 fertilizer subsidy program. We find that politics played a significant role in the allocation of vouchers. Higher numbers of vouchers were targeted to districts that the ruling party had lost in the previous presidential elections and more so in districts that had been lost by a higher margin. A district received 2 percent more vouchers for each percentage point by which the ruling party had lost the previous presidential election - this amount is both statistically and numerically significant. The analysis also shows that district poverty levels, which should have been an important consideration in an economic efficiency motivated distribution, were not a statistically significant determinant of districts’ voucher allocation. The evidence that vouchers were targeted to areas in which the opposition party received strong support is suggestive of the vouchers being used for vote-buying. This finding raises the caution that despite innovations in implementing fertilizer subsidies, politically motivated allocation of subsidy benefits remains a major potential source of inefficiency. |
| Keywords: | Fertilizer, politics, Subsidies, |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:ifprid:1002&r=pol |
| By: | Gil S. Epstein (Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University, IZA and CReAM); Ira N. Gang (Department of Economics, Rutgers University, IZA and CReAM) |
| Abstract: | Within immigrant society different groups wish to help the migrants in different ways – immigrant societies are multi-layered and multi-dimensional. We examine the situation where there exists a foundation that has resources and that wishes to help the migrants. To do so they need migrant groups to invest effort in helping their country-folk. Migrant groups compete against one another by helping their country-folk and to win grants from the foundation. We develop a model that considers how such a competition affects the resources invested by the groups’ supporters and how beneficial it is to immigrants. We consider two alternative rewards systems for supporters – absolute and relative ranking – in achieving their goals. |
| Date: | 2010–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:201015&r=pol |
| By: | Gagnepain, Philippe; Ivaldi, Marc |
| Abstract: | We consider a framework of contractual interactions between urban transport authorities and transport operators. We estimate simultaneously the choice of contract by the authorities and the effect of regulation on the cost reducing activity of the operators. We test whether regulatory schemes currently implemented in the industry are the observable items of a more general menu of second best contracts. We suggest that the generation process of the data we have in hand is better explained by the political aspects of regulation. Moreover, the cost reducing effort of the operators is greater under fixed-price regimes, compared to the cost-plus case. |
| Date: | 2010–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ide:wpaper:22695&r=pol |