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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Coleman, Stephen |
| Abstract: | In 2007 Russian voters elected representatives to the State Duma under new electoral procedures that President V. Putin had instituted. A presidential election followed in 2008 leading to Putin’s new role as Prime Minister. To many observers, the reforms and the election campaigns resulted in a party system manipulated to the advantage of the government, although Putin’s reported goal was to reduce the number of political parties. Earlier research [1,2,6] reported that social conformity exerted a strong, persistent, and predictable influence on voting in national elections from 1991 to 2003. This analysis examines how the effect of social conformity on Russian voters might have changed from earlier elections as a result of the electoral reforms and campaign practices. Specific questions addressed are how well the political party system now aligns with the interests of voters, and whether this type of analysis can speak to fairness of the elections. |
| Keywords: | Russia; voting; elections; mathematical model; social norms; social conformity; political party system; entropy |
| JEL: | C51 D7 Z1 Z13 D72 C21 |
| Date: | 2009–01–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:13087&r=pol |
| By: | Aidt, T.S.; Dutta, J. |
| Abstract: | We evaluate the impact of real business cycle shocks on corruption and economic policy in a model of entry regulation in a representative democracy. We .nd that corruption is procyclical and regulation policy is counter-cyclical. Corrupt politicians engage in excessive stabilization of aggregate fluctuations and behave as if they were Keynesian. We also find that business cycle shocks can induce political instability with politicians losing office in recessions. |
| Keywords: | Corruption; entry regulation; performance voting; business cycles. |
| JEL: | D72 K42 O41 |
| Date: | 2008–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:0861&r=pol |
| By: | Marco Manacorda; Edward Miguel; Andrea Vigorito |
| Abstract: | We estimate the impact of a large anti-poverty program -- the Uruguayan PANES -- on political support for the government that implemented it. The program mainly consisted of a monthly cash transfer for a period of roughly two and half years. Using the discontinuity in program assignment based on a pre-treatment score, we find that beneficiary households are 21 to 28 percentage points more likely to favor the current government (relative to the previous government). Impacts on political support are larger among poorer households and for those near the center of the political spectrum, consistent with the probabilistic voting model in political economy. Effects persist after the cash transfer program ends. We estimate that the annual cost of increasing government political support by 1 percentage point is roughly 0.9% of annual government social expenditures. |
| JEL: | D72 H53 O12 O23 |
| Date: | 2009–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14702&r=pol |
| By: | Brunner, Eric (Quinnipiac U); Ross, Stephen L. (U of Connecticut); Washington, Ebonya (Yale U) |
| Abstract: | There is a large literature demonstrating that positive economic conditions increase support for incumbent candidates, but little understanding of how economic conditions affect preferences for parties and for particulars of their platforms. We ask how exogenous shifts to the value of residents' human capital affect voting behavior in California neighborhoods. As predicted by economic theory, we find that positive economic shocks decrease support for redistributive policies. More notably, we find that conservative voting on a wide variety of ballot propositions — from crime to gambling to campaign finance — is increasing in economic well being. We further show that positive economic circumstances decrease turnout and have a mixed impact on candidate choice, highlighting a limitation of inferring policy preferences from party choice. |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2008–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:yaleco:50&r=pol |
| By: | Ananat, Elizabeth Oltmans (Duke U); Washington, Ebonya (Yale U) |
| Abstract: | We find that exogenous increases in segregation lead to decreases in Black civic efficacy, as measured by an ability to elect Representatives who vote liberally and more specifically in favor of legislation that is favored by Blacks. This tendency for Representatives from more segregated MSAs to vote more conservatively arises in spite of the fact that Blacks in more segregated areas hold more liberal political views than do Blacks in less segregated locales. We find evidence that this decrease in efficacy is driven by greater divergence between Black and non-Black political views in the most segregated areas. Because Blacks are a minority in every MSA, increased divergence by race implies that the mean Black voter viewpoint is farther away from the mean voter viewpoint. Thus, reduced Black political efficacy may be one reason that Blacks in exogenously more segregated areas experience worse economic outcomes. |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2008–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:yaleco:30&r=pol |
| By: | Munshi, Kaivan (Brown U); Rosenzweig, Mark (Yale U) |
| Abstract: | Parochial politics is typically associated with poor leadership and low levels of public good provision. This paper explores the possibility that community involvement in politics need not necessarily worsen governance and, indeed, can be efficiency-enhancing when the context is appropriate. Complementing the new literature on the role of community networks in solving market problems, we test the hypothesis that strong traditional social institutions can discipline the leaders they put forward, successfully substituting for secular political institutions when they are ineffective. Using new data on Indian local governments at the ward level over multiple terms, and exploiting the randomized election reservation system, we find that the presence of a numerically dominant sub-caste (caste equilibrium) is associated with the selection of leaders with superior observed characteristics and with greater public good provision. This improvement in leadership competence occurs without apparently diminishing leaders' responsiveness to their constituency. |
| JEL: | H11 H44 O12 |
| Date: | 2008–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:yaleco:53&r=pol |
| By: | Jha, Saumitra (Stanford U) |
| Abstract: | A key challenge for developing societies is to build coalitions across disparate interests in favour of beneficial policies. This paper documents the role of a financial innovation-- shares--in aligning disparate interests in favour of representative government during England's Civil War (1642-48). Using novel micro-data, the paper shows that shareholding was a major determinant of support for political reform by members of parliament. The paper suggests that shares allowed a broad spectrum of investors to benefit from new opportunities overseas. However, overseas rights belonged chiefly to the executive. Thus the introduction of shares aligned incentives in favour of political reforms and overseas policies crucial for growth. |
| JEL: | F10 K00 N13 O10 O43 P10 |
| Date: | 2008–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:stabus:2005&r=pol |
| By: | Meredith, Marc (MIT); Malhotra, Neil (Stanford U) |
| Abstract: | One consequence of the proliferation of vote-by-mail (VBM) in certain areas of the United States is the opportunity for voters to cast ballots weeks before Election Day. Understanding the ensuing effects of VBM on late campaign information loss has important implications for both the study of campaign dynamics and public policy debates on the expansion of convenience voting. Unfortunately, the self-selection of voters into VBM makes it difficult to casually identify the effect of VBM on election outcomes. We overcome this identification problem by exploiting a natural experiment, in which some precincts are assigned to be VBM-only based on an arbitrary threshold of the number of registered voters. We assess the effects of VBM on candidate performance in the 2008 California presidential primary via a regression discontinuity design. We show that VBM both increases the probability of selecting candidates who withdrew from the race in the interval after the distribution of ballots but before Election Day and affects the relative performance of candidates remaining in the race. Thus, we find evidence of late campaign information loss, pointing to the influence of campaign events and momentum in American politics, as well as the unintended consequences of convenience voting. |
| Date: | 2008–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:stabus:2002&r=pol |
| By: | Luttmer, Erzo F. P. (Harvard U); Singhal, Monica (Harvard U) |
| Abstract: | Is culture an important determinant of preferences for redistribution? To separate the effect of culture from the effect of the economic and institutional environment ("context"), we relate immigrants' preferences for redistribution to the average preference in their birth countries, controlling extensively for individual characteristics and country-of-residence fixed effects. We find a strong positive relationship. This cultural effect is larger for non-voters, those with shorter tenure in the country of residence, and those who move to countries with a large number of immigrants from their own birth countries. Immigrants from countries with a higher preference for redistribution are also more likely to vote for a more proredistribution political party. The effect of culture persists strongly into the second generation. |
| JEL: | D72 H23 Z10 |
| Date: | 2008–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp08-038&r=pol |
| By: | Aidt, T.S.; Hwang, U. |
| Abstract: | This paper presents an argument in favor of foreign lobbying. We show how foreign lobbying can help internalize cross national externalities and promote social objectives. |
| Keywords: | Foreign lobbying; common agency; campaign contributions; cross national externalities. |
| JEL: | D62 D72 D78 |
| Date: | 2008–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:0860&r=pol |
| By: | Lazer, David (Harvard U); Rubineau, Brian (Cornell U); Katz, Nancy (Harvard U); Chetkovich, Carol (Mills College); Neblo, Michael A. (Ohio State U) |
| Abstract: | How do political views and social affiliations co-evolve? A long stream of research has focused on the relationship between political views and social affiliations, however, it is typically difficult to discern the causal relationship between views and affiliations. Here we use longitudinal attitudinal and whole network data collected at critical times (notably, at the inception of the system) to pinpoint and specify the determinants of attitudes and affiliations. We find significant conformity tendencies: individuals shift their political views toward the political views of their associates. This conformity is driven by social ties rather than task ties. We also find that, while individuals tend to associate with similar others, political views are notably less a basis for associational choices than demographic and institutional factors. |
| Date: | 2008–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp08-044&r=pol |
| By: | Simeon Djankov; Rafael La Porta; Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes; Andrei Shleifer |
| Abstract: | We collect data on the rules and practices of financial and conflict disclosure by politicians in 175 countries. Although two thirds of the countries have some disclosure laws, less than a third make disclosures available to the public. Disclosure is more extensive in richer and more democratic countries. Disclosure is correlated with lower perceived corruption when it is public, when it identifies sources of income and conflicts of interest, and when a country is a democracy. |
| JEL: | H11 K42 P16 |
| Date: | 2009–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14703&r=pol |
| By: | Campante, Filipe R. (Harvard U); Chor, Davin (Singapore Management U) |
| Abstract: | We investigate how the link between individual schooling and political participation is affected by country characteristics. We introduce a focus on a set of variables--namely factor endowments--which influence the relative productivity of human capital in political versus production activities. Using micro data on individual behavior, we find that political participation is more responsive to schooling in land-abundant countries, and less responsive in human capital-abundant countries, even while controlling for country political institutions and cultural attitudes. We develop these ideas in a model where individuals face an allocation decision over the use of their human capital. A relative abundance of land (used primarily in the least skill-intensive sector) or a scarcity of aggregate human capital will increase both the level of political participation and its responsiveness to schooling, by lowering the opportunity cost of production income foregone. In an extension, we further consider the problem of how much schooling a utility-maximizing ruler would choose to provide. An abundance of land tends to increase political participation ex post, and hence will lead the ruler to discourage human capital accumulation, a prediction for which we find broad support in the cross-country data. Our model thus offers a framework which jointly explains patterns of political participation at the individual level and differences in public investment in education at the country level. |
| JEL: | D72 D78 I20 I21 O15 |
| Date: | 2008–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp08-043&r=pol |
| By: | Peter Michaelis (University of Augsburg, Department of Economics); Thomas Ziesemer (University of Augsburg, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Policy diffusion refers to the process by which a political innovation – like the introduction of a novel emission tax – disseminates over time among countries. In order to analyze this issue from an economic point of view we develop a simple two-country-model of the taxation of emissions in presence of (possible) policy diffusion. Contrary to the usual Nash setting of simultaneous decision making we consider a Stackelberg game: In the first step the domestic government introduces an emission tax td thus acting as Stackelberg-leader, in the second step the foreign government decides whether or not to introduce an emission tax tf and in the third step the firms decide on their output quantities to be sold on a third country’s market. For the case of an exogenous given probability of policy diffusion we show that the optimal domestic tax rate is c.p. the higher, the higher the probability of policy diffusion is. Moreover, we explore under which conditions first-mover behaviour by the domestic government leads to a higher tax rate compared to the Nash solution In the next step we introduce an endogenous probability of policy diffusion by combining our model with a strategic lobbying approach. As a result, the probability of policy diffusion is c.p. the smaller, the higher domestic tax rate td is. Consequently, in fixing the optimal tax rate the domestic government has to account for the foreign firm’s lobbying activities otherwise it will choose a tax rate too high. |
| Keywords: | emission taxes, first-mover behaviour, strategic environmental policy, policy diffusion |
| JEL: | F18 Q55 Q58 |
| Date: | 2008–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:auh:wpaper:0003&r=pol |