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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Bruce Blonigen |
| Abstract: | This paper revisits the issue of people's preferences for international trade protection examining survey data from the American National Election Studies. I first show that both an individual's skills and the international trade characteristics of their employment industry affects their trade policy preferences, in contrast to previous analysis using these data. Second, I document that many people do not feel informed enough to state a preference on trade protection, which is inconsistent with assumptions of standard political economy models. I examine the factors that correlate with being uninformed, and show that inferences from actual trade policy outcomes can be incorrect if one does not account for this uninformed group. Finally, I examine and find that individuals' retirement decisions have systematic effects on both their choice to be informed and their trade policy preferences. This highlights that there are significant life-cycle implications to trade policy preferences. |
| JEL: | D72 D83 F13 F16 |
| Date: | 2008–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14627&r=pol |
| By: | Bruno Amable (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, CEPREMAP - CEntre Pour la Recherche EconoMique et ses APplications - Ministère de la recherche); Donatella Gatti (CEPN - Centre d'économie de l'Université de Paris Nord - CNRS : UMR7115 - Université Paris-Nord - Paris XIII, IZA - Institute for the Study of Labor, PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS : UMR8545 - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales - Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées - Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris); Elvire Guillaud (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS : UMR8545 - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales - Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées - Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we highlight the link between the political demand and social policy outcome while taking into account the design of the party system. The political demand is measured by indivudual preferences and the design of the party system is defined as the extent of party fractionalization. This is, to our knowledge, the first attempt in the literature to empirically link the political demand and the policy outcome with the help of a direct measure of preferences. Moreover, we account for an additional channel, so far neglected in the literature : The composition effect of the demand. Indeed, the heterogeneity of the demand within countries, more than the level of the demand itself, is shown to have a positive impact on welfare state generosity. This impact increases with the degree of fractionalization of the party system. We run regressions on a sample of 18 OECD countries over 23 years, carefully dealing with the issues raised by the use of time-series cross-section data. |
| Keywords: | Political demand, party fractionalization, redistribution, time-series-cross-section data. |
| Date: | 2008–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00348878_v1&r=pol |
| By: | František Turnovec (Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic) |
| Abstract: | The concept of fair representation of voters in a committee representing different voters’ groups, such as national representations in union of states, is discussed. This concept, introduced into discussion about voting rights in the Council of European Union in 2004, was narrowed to proposal of distribution of voting weights among the member states proportionally to square roots of population. Such a distribution should guarantee the same indirect voting power to each EU citizen, measured by Penrose-Banzhaf index of voting power. In this paper we attempt to clarify this concept. |
| Keywords: | Council of Ministers, indirect voting power, Penrose-Banzhaf power index, Shapley-Shubik power index, square root rule, simple voting game |
| JEL: | C71 D72 H77 |
| Date: | 2009–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fau:wpaper:wp2009_01&r=pol |
| By: | John William Hatfield; Gerard Padró i Miquel |
| Abstract: | We revisit the classic problem of tax competition in the context of federal nations, and derive a positive theory of partial decentralization. A capital poor median voter wants to use capital taxes to provide public goods. This results in redistributive public good provision. As a consequence, when all public goods are provided by the central government, capital taxes and public good provision are high. The expectation of high capital taxes, however, results in a small capital stock which lowers returns to redistribution. The median voter would therefore like to commit to a lower level of capital taxes. Decentralization provides such a commitment: local governments avoid using capital taxes due to the pressure of tax competition. We therefore obtain that the median voter favors a partial degree of decentralization. The equilibrium degree of decentralization is non-monotonic in inequality, increasing in the redistributive efficiency of public good provision, and decreasing in capital productivity. When public goods are heterogeneous in their capacity to transfer funds, all voters agree that goods with high redistributive capacity should be decentralized. |
| JEL: | D72 H11 H7 H77 |
| Date: | 2008–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14628&r=pol |
| By: | Menon, Sudha Venu |
| Abstract: | The article presents a broad overview of the concept of political marketing and its significance in the contemporary era of information revolution and democratic resurgence. The article provides meaning, definition and various dimensions of political marketing as a concept and method and differentiates it from mainstream marketing practices. The article also attempts to analyze the origin and development of the concept in different political and social contexts and its usage as a powerful instrument in election campaigning and policy making. The article explains the eight main functions of political marketing including product function, distribution function, cost function, communication function, new management function, fund raising function, parallel campaign management function and internal cohesion management function. The article also explains how the functions of political marketing are effectively applied on the electoral market and government markets. The article finally examines the success and failure of political marketing in creating public opinion in favor of the party. Here examples are taken from different countries including both democratic and non-democratic countries. |
| Keywords: | Political marketing;political;election;campaign;political communication |
| JEL: | M31 |
| Date: | 2008–12–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:12547&r=pol |