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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Sanna Nurmikko |
| Abstract: | We focus on political violence as a mechanism that allows the political leader to fight off opposition and increase his chances of re-election. In a collusive equilibrium, the leader allocates a bribe to the army, and the latter responds by producing political violence. Such an equilibrium is more likely, the larger are the public resources available to the leader; the lower is army’s potential punishment and salary offered by the opposition regime; the more severe is the incumbent’s potential punishment; and when the political leader is sufficiently patient, but the army is shortsighted enough. |
| Date: | 2008–05–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esx:essedp:652&r=pol |
| By: | Albert Solé-Ollé (Universitat de Barcelona (UB); Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB); CESifo); Pilar Sorribas-Navarro (Universitat Barcelona (UB); Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB)) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we test the hypothesis that intergovernmental grants allocated to co-partisans buy more political support than grants allocated to local governments controlled by opposition parties. We use a rich Spanish database containing information about the grants received by 617 municipalities during the period 1993-2003 from two different upper-tier governments (Regional and Upper-local), as well as data of municipal voting behaviour at three electoral contests held at the different layers of government during this period. Therefore, we are able to estimate two different vote equations, analysing the effects of grants given to aligned and unaligned municipalities on the vote share of the incumbent party/parties at the regional and local elections. We account for the endogeneity of grants by instrumenting them with the average amount of grants distributed by upper-layer governments. The results suggest that grants given to co-partisans buy some political support, but that grants given to opposition parties do not bring any votes, suggesting that the grantee reaps as much political credit from intergovernmental grants as the grantor |
| Keywords: | Voting, parties, grants. |
| JEL: | C72 D72 |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ieb:wpaper:2008/5/doc2008-2&r=pol |
| By: | Chris Jones; Oliver Morrissey; Doug Nelson |
| Abstract: | The majority of African countries implemented import liberalisation in the 1990s. This paper explores factors that may explain the pattern of protection and of tariff reform. We consider political economy explanations, motivated specifically by the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model of protection in response to industry lobbies, and the possibility that reforms are technocratic. Using industry-level data for a sample of six African countries, we find limited evidence that political economy factors have influenced the pattern of tariffs or tariff reductions since the early 1990s. One result does appear frequently: relative sector size (measured by the number of employees or establishments) appears to be associated with the relative level of protection. We then explore various descriptive statistics for tariff changes in seven African countries. The analysis suggests that the pattern of tariff reductions was essentially technocratic in structure - across the board reduction in average tariffs and in the dispersion of rates, with larger proportional reductions for higher tariffs – consistent with policy reforms being guided by the World Bank. While political economy factors may have influenced the initial pattern of protection, the technocratic reforms since the early 1990s have diluted political economy influences on average and relative protection. |
| Keywords: | Pattern of Protection, Tariff Reform, Political Economy, Africa |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcre:08/01&r=pol |