|
on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Leech, Dennis (Economics Department, University of Warwick); Aziz, Haris (Computer Science Department, University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | The Double Majority rule in the Treaty is claimed to be simpler, more transparent and more democratic than the existing rule. We examine these questions against the democratic ideal that the votes of all citizens in whatever member country should be of equal value using voting power analysis considering possible future enlargements involving candidate countries and then to a number of hypothetical future enlargements. We find the Double Majority rule to fails to measure up to the democratic ideal in all cases. We find the Jagiellonian compromise to be very close to this ideal. |
| Keywords: | European Union ; Reform Treaty ; Nice Treaty ; Qualified Majority Voting ; Power Indices |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:824&r=pol |
| By: | Lim, Jamus Jerome; Decker, Jessica Henson |
| Abstract: | The recent empirical growth literature has proposed three underlying fundamental determinants of economic growth, namely, physical geography, economic integration, and institutional quality. This paper unpacks the final determinant into both political-economic institutions as well as the primarily political institution of democratic development. Using both cross-sectional and panel datasets, we show that, properly instrumented, there is no evidence that democracies grow faster or slower than non-democracies. This result is in contrast to much of the more recent literature, which tend to find a weakly positive relationship. Political economic institutions, however, remain positive and significant determinants of economic growth, which corroborates much of the empirical evidence in the existing literature. |
| Keywords: | Economic growth; institutions; democracy |
| JEL: | O47 O17 P51 |
| Date: | 2007–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:6076&r=pol |
| By: | Albert Solé-Ollé (Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB); Universitat de Barcelona (UB)); Elisabet Viladecans-Marsal (Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB); Universitat de Barcelona (UB)) |
| Abstract: | We examine the economic and political determinants of decisions taken by local governments regarding the amount of new land to be assigned for development. The analysis draws on a massive database, which includes more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities during the 1999-2003 term-of-office. The increase in developable land in this period is explained using a wide set of variables that capture the specific traits of each municipality in 1999. The variables were selected following a review of recommendations made in the literature on urban growth controls and by taking into account other factors that might be considered specific to Spain. Our results show that urban expansion is influenced by a variety of factors. Thus, the communities found to be expanding most: (i) are rich, (ii) have more new housing purchasers, (iii) are in a weak financial position, (iv) are controlled by parties to the right of the political spectrum, (v) have a low electoral turnout and local government bodies that do not face serious electoral competition, and (vi) have more land but a lower proportion of environmentally valuable land. |
| Keywords: | Land-use regulations, urban growth controls, political economy |
| JEL: | H7 Q15 R52 |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ieb:wpaper:2007/11/doc2007-5&r=pol |
| By: | Lim, Jamus Jerome; Decker, Jessica Henson |
| Abstract: | The theoretical discussion on globalization has suggested that there are linkages between democracy and trade, although the direction of influence is less certain. Formal empirical studies remain scarce, and have often focused on the question of whether democratic regimes influence trade policy, as opposed to the actual relationship between democracy and trade. This paper seeks to answer the question, ``Do democracies trade more?'' by applying the gravity equation to a large dataset of bilateral trade data for the period 1948-1999, while taking into account the role of democracy. It finds that democracy has a positive effect on trade flows, but only after controlling for trade pair heterogeneity. In addition, it makes the case for studies of this nature to draw a distinction between trade flows in the pre- and post-1990s period of rapid democratization as well as between developed and developing countries. |
| Keywords: | Democracy; trade; gravity model |
| JEL: | F13 P51 |
| Date: | 2007–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:6077&r=pol |
| By: | Altay Mussurov (University of Sheffield); Paul Mosley (University of Sheffield) |
| Abstract: | The experience of countries adjusting in the wake of the global crisis of 1997-2000 has awakened many debates related to the political economy and social costs of adjustment. Amongst these, the experience of Russia is particularly controversial, both because of the great severity of the shock experienced by a large number of Russians during the process of perestroika, and because of the political consequences, which in many provinces have involved street protests and demonstrations and in some, also violence and demands for secession (Giuliano 2006). These political consequences are relevant to the general question of the political feasibility of adjustment in the circumstances of the present decade, which is examined in several papers within our research project (e.g. Mosley 2007a, 2007b). In this paper, we examine within this context political participation and wage inequality during the 1998 financial crisis in Russia. We use two household survey data sets. The VTsIOM household survey dataset, conducted in 1998 and 1999, was used to analyze individuals’ response patters to escalating economic hardship. Data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) was employed in our analysis of the welfare impacts of the crisis. We address two key questions. Firstly, we attempt to identify major factors behind individuals’ propensity to take part in a political protest. In particular, we look at what determines individual support for reform and whether individual propensities change with the targeted audience. Secondly, we attempt to determine who are the winners and losers from the crisis, in the spirit of the earlier analysis of Brainerd(1998).In particular, we analyse whether wage inequality widened during the crisis and whether wage discrimination worsened. These questions are of interest for several reasons. Firstly, the pace and extent of the crisis had a dramatic impact on Russia’s economy which, in turn, may have influenced political mobilization motivated by claims for policy reversals. Secondly, if financial crisis generated wage inequality, it is important to identify the extent, pattern, and nature of the wage inequality for effective policy formulation. |
| Date: | 2007–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wef:wpaper:0019&r=pol |
| By: | Rahman, Aminur; Li, Quan; Jensen, Nathan M. |
| Abstract: | Since the early 1990s, a large number of studies have been undertaken to understand the causes and consequences of corruption. Many of these studies have employed firm-level survey data from various countries. While insightful, these analyses based on firm-level surveys have largely ignored two important potential problems: nonresponse and false response by the firms. Treating firms ' responses on a sensitive issue like corruption at their face value could produce incorrect inferences and erroneous policy recommendations. We argue that the data generation of nonresponse and false response is a function of the political environment in which the firms operate. In a politically repressive environment, firms use nonresponse and false response as self-protection mechanisms. Corruption is understated as a result. We test our arguments using the World Bank enterprise survey data of more than 44,000 firms in 72 countries for the period 2000-2005 and find that firms in countries with less press freedom are more likely to provide nonresponse or false response on the issue of corruption. Therefore, ignoring this systematic bias in firms ' responses could result in underestimation of the severity of corruption in politically repressive countries. More important, this bias is a rich and underutilized source of information on the political constraints faced by the firms. Nonresponse and false response, like unheard melodies, could be more informative than the heard melodies in the available truthful responses in firm surveys. |
| Keywords: | Public Sector Corruption & Anticorruption Measures,Microfinance,Access to Finance,Poverty Mo nitoring & Analysis,Social Accountability |
| Date: | 2007–11–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4413&r=pol |
| By: | Paul Mosley (University of Sheffield) |
| Abstract: | We analyse the recent wave of political instability in Bolivia in the context of a ‘poverty trap’ model which suggests that elements in a country’s political system, as well as its economic structure, may be instrumental in perpetuating a state of poverty. In Bolivia the costs of adjustment in the recent phase have been very severe, with well over a hundred killed between 1999 and 2007 as a direct consequence of demonstrations against aspects of the globalisation and adjustment process, and an appearance of a return to a state of chronic political instability; other countries affected by the global crisis have suffered less severely. Is this because they used the available instruments of adjustment more effectively, or for other reasons? In particular, how does poverty impact fit into the story: would a ‘more effective’ pattern of adjustment have been more pro-poor? |
| Date: | 2007–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wef:wpaper:0020&r=pol |
| By: | Agustín José Menéndez |
| Abstract: | In this paper, I explore in a systematic manner the different components of the democratic legitimacy of the Union from the standpoint of deliberative democratic theory. Contrary to standard accounts, I claim that the question must be disaggregated, given that the Union has not only several democratic deficits, but also some democratic surpluses. On the one hand, the Union was created to tackle the democratic deficit of nation-states, and has been partially successful in mending the mismatch between the scope of application of their legal systems and the geographical reach of the consequences of legal decisions. Moreover, the European legal order is based on a synthetic constitutional law, which reflects the common constitutional traditions of the member states, which lend democratic legitimacy to the whole European legal order. On the other hand, the lack of a democratically written and ratified constitution is a central part of the democratic challenge of the Union. But equally important is the structural bias in favour of certain material legal results, which stems from the interplay of the division of competences between the Union and its member states and the plurality of law-making procedures, some of which multiply veto points at the cost of rendering decision-making rather improbable. Special attention is paid through the paper to the democratic implications of the structural features of European constitutional law for new member states. |
| Keywords: | constitutional change; deliberative democracy; European law; European public space; legal culture; legitimacy; national autonomy; normative political theory; participation |
| Date: | 2007–11–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erp:reconx:p0013&r=pol |